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INTRODUCTION

During the first century of the American republic, the South,
besides losing the Civil War, fared poorly with respect to the avenging role of historiography.' Not merely did the inadequacies of Jefferson Davis,2 southern industrial backwardness, noncompatible
railroad gauges,3 and illusions about King Cotton's capacity to compel European support for the beleaguered Confederacy, produce defeat for the cause of complete legal subjugation of black to white.
In addition, despite claims that may strike later generations as excessive,5 southern belles-lettres ran a poor second to the writings of
New England authors. It was not simply that-in the words of that
raraavis, a Unionist South Carolina politician-the South, having
miscalculated, had to endure sufferings "as no civilized people ever
did in this Christian age [because] . . . [u]nder the . . . cruel
1. See H. BurrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931). "It has been said
that the historian is the avenger, and that standing as a judge between the parties and
rivalries and causes of bygone generations he can lift up the fallen and beat down the proud
.... ." Id. at 1.
2. See D. PowrER, THE SourH AND TH SECTIONAL CoNIrcr 263-86 (1968).
3. See R. BLACK, THE RAILROADS OF THE CONFEDERACY (1952).
4. See F. OwsLEY, KING COTrON DIPLOMACY (1931).
5. "In fiction Gilmore Simms stands pre-eminent, and ranks with Cooper . . . 'The
Works of John C. Calhoun,' in six volumes, are equal in merit to Aristotle's Politics and
Ethics. The writings of Hugh S. Legare . . . are unsurpassed for classical lore, style and
interest." B. PERRY, REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN 368 (1889).
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rule of our national government, . . . former slaves, ignorant and

semi-savage, were placed over us, led on by the most unprincipled
adventurers, black and white, from the North . . . ." Equally ap-

palling for Benjamin F. Perry, and despite the amazing circumstance that in the entire history of prewar days so "moral and patriotic [a] tone . . . pervaded"' South Carolina politics that "[n]o

charge of bribery or corruption was ever made against any . . .
legislators or public officers," South Carolina and her allies were
bested not merely in the rude encounters of sword but also in the
future-conditioning interplay of word and pen. Whereas "[i]n Massachusetts, as soon as one of her prominent citizens [was] dead,
some literary friend [stepped] forward to write his life,", in the
South "scarcely a life of any of her eminent sons" 0 was penned at
all. Consequently, education gave to "New England . . . a control-

ling influence over the public sentiment of America. Her literature,
her books, her newspapers and magazines, . . . are at this time . . .

influencing and controlling our opinions and actions.""
Making due allowances for anti-Reconstruction and Victorian
hyperbole, Benjamin F. Perry had a point-at the time. The literary
and historical course of the century since he wrote has largely redressed the imbalance-at least in terms of fictional and historical
composition in general. But for the specifics of the legal history of
these United States, historiography's avenging role has not been
quite so equalizing. This is especially true with respect to what is
central to any attempt to gain adequately the remembrance of
southern legal things past-understanding the relationships between lash and law, comprehending the "reason of slavery.""
One of the more intriguing aspects of the historiography of
United States slavery is how slow it was to show systematic interest
in the peculiar institution's legal history. To be sure, during the
early and middle 1800's slavery did not lack legal compilers and
commentators.' Nonetheless, until the editorial labors of Helen
6. Id. at 364. Plainly, Perry suffered from not having read the Revisionist views on the
matter. See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTION (K. Stampp & L. Litwack eds. 1969).
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

B. PERRY, supra note 5, at 366.

Id.
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 373.
By "reason of slavery" I am analogizing to the idea of "raison d'etat." See F.
MEINECKE, DIE IDEE DER STAATSRXSON IN DER NEUEREN GESCeHicHTE (1924).
13. T. CoBB, AN INQUIRy IrO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1858); W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1853); J.
HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (2 vols.) (1858-1862); G.
STRoUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1827); J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY (1837).
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Tunnicliffe Catterall during the 1920's and early 1930's" there was
no serious effort by post-bellum historians to assemble the case-law
data. Even so, with two partial subsequent exceptions" there was
little systematic analysis until the 1960's. Catterall's labors initially
did no more than cause later historians to make tip-of-the-hat dips
into her congeries of data, using a case here and there much as one
might employ an antebellum traveller's narrative to lend illustrative support to a social or political point.
There are two important reasons for this initial limited use.
First, the early post-bellum historians fought the "paradigmatic
battles" on other territory, where legal structures and case-law developments were pressed into the service of one side or the other in
a largely ancillary fashion. Second, case-law data was used sparingly because of the rigid boundaries of inquiry set by traditional
American legal history, particularly those that, by isolating law
from society, polity, and economy, produced a narrow scholarly
emphasis upon whatever seemed "autonomous about the legal
order-courts, equitable maxims, motions for summary judgment," 6 and so forth. This separation of the internal "box"' of the
law from everything outside was hardly conducive to emphasizing
the legal history of slavery, an area that derives its interest chiefly
from the relationships between law and the larger sociopolitical
world of antebellum America.
Although exploring these reasons might be a profitable exercise,
on this occasion I wish to examine the analytic approaches taken by
scholars of the past decade who have focused upon the judicial role
in the institution of slavery." I propose to proceed in three parts.
The first part attempts to summarize the driving explanations these
scholars have advanced. It also attempts to isolate the points of
disagreement among them. The second part examines slave manumission cases rendered by three southern appellate courts during
the three decades immediately preceding the Civil War. It does so
because most of the published work about the law of southern slav14. H. CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AN THE NEGRo (5
vols.) (1926-1937).
15. C. EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SourH 118-43 (1940); Sydnor, The
Southerner and the Laws, 6 J.S. HisT. 1 (1940).
16. Gordon, Introduction:J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Traditionin American Legal Historiography,10 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 9, 10 (1975).
17. Id.
18. I shall also mention briefly a few other legal historians and historians of slavery
whose research has carried them across the smaller historical stage, but giving short shrift to
"past-roots-searchers" and "present-justice-seekers," see text accompanying note 64 infra,
whose legitimate concerns lead nonetheless to sloppy reading ofthe work in the field that they
appropriate. For a specific example, see note 34 infra.
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ery primarily has addressed criminal trials of blacks and whites,"
and because such an examination will help to evaluate points of
disagreement. Furthermore, manumission cases are more helpful
than criminal decisions in evaluating two explanations for one of the
more intriguing findings upon which there is some scholarly agreement-that ifs' slave felony cases reached the state supreme courts,
most appellate judges increasingly seemed disposed to insist upon
something that looks quite like a formally fair trial. One explanation
of this finding lays it primarily to a "paternalist" desire to protect
slavery-whether to protect the master's property interest, to disprove abolitionists' calumnies, or to discourage the worst white repressiveness that could, if not judicially restrained, encourage slave
unrest or uprisings." The other explanation, though not denying the
force of these motives, urges that the treatment of slaves on criminal
trial cannot be wholly accounted for in this way. It seeks to adduce
also, as an additional determinant of judicial behavior, sympathy
for the slave as a human being. This second explanation doubts that
all antebellum southern appellate judges were equally unrelenting
advocates of the peculiar institution. To oversimplify now with the
promise of making appropriate qualifications later: if the former
explanation suffices, then one might expect to find relatively little
tendency among the appellate judges to resolve close manumission
cases in favor of freedom and against the claims of would-be heirs.
If the latter explanation holds any water, then one should find an
opposing tendency to resolve these issues in favor of freedom. Because the courts of Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia produced di19. For extended discussions of other areas, especially manumission suits, see D. Morgan, American Blacks and the North Atlantic State Supreme Courts: 1790-1860 (July 1970)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago) and A. Nash, Negro Rights and
Judicial Behavior in the Old South (September 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at
Harvard University).
20. It is important to emphasize the "if." Most cases, of course, did not get so far, and
there was almost certainly much greater variance among and within southern states' lower
court jurisdictions.
21. This perspective arguably is implicit in some of the published work. E.g., K.
STAMPP, THE PECUUR INSTrTnON (1956). The best statement of this view, however, was by
the late Mark DeWolfe Howe in a personal communication to me on September 26, 1966.
It might even be expected that those who were anxious to support the institution of
slavery would see that its chances of survival would be increased if humanity rather than
brutality should color it. These considerations any thoughtful student of the South
would expect to find in the opinions of the judges of the highest courts in the Southern
States . . . . I cannot help feeling . . . that many of the 'enlightened' pronouncements

and comments . . . were the reflection of a natural conviction that the one hope of
preserving the institution was to cast out as many of its brutalities as possible and also
make sure that the gentle society of white fathers would not be distracted or endangered
by the presence of free black children.
Letter from Mark D. Howe to A.E. Keir Nash (Sept. 26, 1966).
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verse results in manumission cases, Part Two explores their holdings in detail.
The third part of the Article assesses the significance of Part
Two with respect to the interpretations discussed in Part One. Principally, it is concerned with two questions. One asks to what extent
there was a unified law of southern slavery. The other asks what
assumptions about judicial.attitudes, ideologies, and motives best
explain the changing shape of the law of slavery during the nineteenth century. Part Three also makes a modest effort to link the
findings of Part Two with three larger historiographical issues. The
first, which has developed since Elkins' Slavery 2 is best characterized as the debate over the "comparative exploitativeness" of
United States and Latin American slavery. The second issue is an
older debate that, in spite of falling into the background during the
past fifteen years, nonetheless still retains some vitality. It is the
debate that in the 1930's and 1940's was characterized as the
"repressible conflict vs. the irrepressible conflict" argument over
the Civil War's origins."s The third issue pertains to changing interpretations in the burgeoning field of nineteenth-century American
legal history, and especially to the question how well can one account for the evolution of American law from the Revolutionary era
to the nineteenth century by organizing one's explanation around a
particular concept. That concept, much used and discussed of late,2
22. S. ELKINS, SLAvERY (1959). See, e.g., THE DEBATE OvER SLAVERY (A. Lane ed. 1971).
A related issue deserves mention here. That is whether during the Jacksonian era southern
attitudes on race, slavery, and politics bifurcated into two channels of sociological
thought-one that advocated a seigneurial patriarchy and insisted on humane treatment of
all members, white and black, of an essentially heirarchic sociopolitical order; and another,
a Herrenvolk democracy that advocated equality for all whites but was quite uninterested in
the human condition of the black. See P. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A CoMPARATIV
PERSPECTIVE 17-18 (1967); and G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WarrE MND 43-70
(1971). To anticipate, on the whole, southern appellate judges' decisionmaking did not neatly
divide into such a dichotomy.
23. See A. COLE, THE IRREPREssIBLE CoNrucr 1850-1865 (1934); A. CRAVEN, THE REPRESSIBLE CoNucr 1830-1861 (1939). For a discussion of competing interpretations of the origins
of the Civil War, see H. Beale, "Causes of the Civil War," Soc. Sci. Research Council, Bull.
No. 54 (1946); and T. PRESSLY, AMERICANS INTmPRET THmIR C1VIL WAn (1962).
24. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw (1973); M. Honwrrz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). See generally Nelson, The Impact of
the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century
America, 87 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1974); Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A
Reconsiderationof American "Styles of JudicialReasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 Wis.
L. REv. 1; see also Holt, Now and Then, The UncertainState of Nineteenth-CenturyAmerican Legal History, 7 IND. L. REv. 615 (1974). Put succinctly, a "formalist judge" is said to
think that he merely discovers what the law is and applies it, while an "instrumentalist
judge" uses precedent, logic, and the facts of a given case to "reshape" the law in order to
further some social, economic, or political end. The distinction, most fully developed in
Horwitz' work, clearly goes back, though in different terminology, to Karl Llewellyn's The
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is the idea of a shift from legal formalism to legal instrumentalism
during the period from Yorktown to the early nineteenth century
and back to formalism before the end of that century.
PART ONE:

REFLECTIONS ON VARYING INTERPRETATIONS

A. Four Reasons for Examining the Interpretive Differences
How real and how important are the interpretive differences
among the half-dozen scholars who have sought to analyze the development of the nineteenth-century case law of slavery and to explain the behavior of judges enmeshed in that development? If differences remain after inspection, does it become plausible to say
that author A is right, B half-right, and C quite wrong? Most significantly, do the differences derive more from the data or from the
explanatory models the authors find satisfying? These are the questions that this part of the Article addresses. I have four reasons for
addressing them at the beginning, and for restricting my attention
to those authors who have centered their research upon the judiciary
and slavery.
First, during the past ten years there has grown up a
small-though not always modest-literature on the subject, with
some internal disagreement about findings. The principal essays on
the subject are, in order of appearance rather than merit: Nash,2s
Flanigan," Cover," Tushnet,"s Howington, 2" and Hindus. 0 Second,
Common Law Tradition, and behind him to Roscoe Pound's concept of a formative era of
American law. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE

ERA OF AMERICA LAW (1950). But whatever the terminology, there are at least two potential
difficulties. Grant Gilmore puts one in another recent book, The Ages of American Law,
stating that: "All generalizations are oversimplifications. It is not true that, during a given
fifty-year period, all the lawyers and all the judges are lighthearted innovators, joyful anarchists, and adepts of Llewellyn's Grand Style-only to be converted en masse during the next
fifty-year period to formalism or conceptualism." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw

(1977). See also, Scheiber,supra. The other difficulty pertains to the nature and causes of a
judge's determination to innovate or not.
25. Nash, Fairnessand Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts
of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REV. 64 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fairnessand Formalism];
Nash, A More EquitablePast? Southern Supreme Courtsand the Protectionof the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C. L. REV. 197 (1970) [hereinafter cited as A More Equitable Past?];Nash,
Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The ExtraordinaryChiefJustice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REV. 141 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness]; Nash, The Texas Supreme Court and Trial
Rights of Blacks, 1845-1860, 58 J. Am. HIST. 622 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Texas Supreme
Court].
26. Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J.S.
Hist. 537 (1974).
27. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).

28. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: A Study in the Persistenceof
Legal Autonomy, 10 LAw & Soc'y REV. 119 (1975).
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while these authors would agree that there are differences both in
the explanatory models they advance to account for the data studied and in the ways they relate their findings to the broader political, economic, and social aspects of the American slavery experience, there is less agreement as to the significance of these differences. Third, there are several obvious differences among these authors as to both the data examined and the larger debates about
slavery to which the authors implicitly or explicitly related their
inquiries. The authors examined the case law in widely divergent
geographic areas: Nash, in all the seceding states, except Louisiana,
which is not a common law state; Flanigan, in the South selectively,
giving the greatest attention to Virginia and South Carolina; Cover,
primarily in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia,
and North Carolina; Tushnet, in the secession South, except South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas; Hindus, in South Carolina and
Massachusetts; and Howington, in Tennessee. The authors also
examined the case law at different judicial levels. All except Flanigan, Hindus, and Howington have considered primarily or exclusively state appellate cases. Moreover, there are differences in the
legal areas studied. While Flanigan and Hindus based their conclusions primarily upon criminal trials of blacks and whites, Nash,
Howington, and Cover dealt extensively with manumission cases as
well. Tushnet examined, in addition to criminal cases, tort and
contract decisions. There are substantial contrasts in the rigor with
which the authors set clear boundaries on the type of data at which
they did (and did not) look. Nash and Hindus proceeded the most
self-consciously on this score. By contrast, Cover seemed the most
willing to run the risks of selection. Furthermore, the type of analysis employed by the authors differs. Nash tried to think himself into
the minds of the judges whom he was studying," and Cover sought
a similar end." Flanigan and Hindus seemed to think that this
"Collingwood-like" effort at "imaginative re-enactement"" was not
29. Howington, Not in the Condition of a Horse or an Ox: Ford v. Ford, The Law of
Testamentary Manumission, and the Tennessee Courts's Recognition of Slave Humanity,
34 TENN. HIsT. Q. 249 (1975).
30. Hindus, Black Justice Under White Law: CriminalProsecutionsof Blacks in Antebellum South Carolina,63 J. AM. HIST. 575 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Black Justice Under
White Law]. See also Hindus, The Contours of Crime and Justice in Massachusetts and
South Carolina, 1767-1878, 21 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 212 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Contours of Crime]; M. Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Criminal Justice in Nineteenth-Century
Massachusetts and South Carolina (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California at Berkeley).
31. See Nash, supra note 19, at Introduction.
32. That is not to assert that either wholly succeeded.
33. See R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HIsTORY 39, 282-302 (1946). Collingwood argued
that the historian must rethink the thoughts of the historical personages whom he is treating
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required to reach their conclusions. Finally, the authors reacted to
different aspects of the larger debates about the institution of slavery.
The fourth and final reason for addressing the questions with
which this section began stems from the "wanton impressment" of
the slavery case-law data into two of the larger debates. One is the
debate over the comparative evils of Latin American and North
American slavery, and its close companion, whether slavery was a
capitalist or precapitalist institution. Because this debate is so
embedded in the redress of current political, social, and economic
inequities, clarity is important."
in order to evaluate those personages' decisions and behavior. To understand Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon, the historian almost must become, momentarily, Caesar. Moreover,
the historian should know he has succeeded in the "re-enactment." Although I have always
been unclear exactly how all this is to be accomplished (particularly how one knows one has
succeeded), nonetheless in the area of scholarship with which we are dealing there are two
good reasons for attempting imaginative reenactment of past judicial thinking. First, when
examining cases either as "mirrors" potentially reflecting social thought in general or as
potential indicators of judicial attitudes and goals concerning slavery, one must "be able to
re-think the logical possibilities genuinely open .

. .

. Unless we can decide which cases

offered to the Judges genuine choices, . . . we cannot determine whether the Judge was
bending the law to reach an outcome he personally favored." Nash, supra note 19, at 8.
Second, such "imaginative re-enactment" is needed in an area of historical research frequently characterized by a tepdency to impose present day standards of "racial progressivism" on the past. For development of this point, see text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
34. It may be useful to give an example of what I mean by the embedding of historical
research in the current search for redress and of what may happen to the cause of analytic
clarity, apparently in consequence. Consider an article by federal District Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. Higginbotham, Racism and the EarlyAmerican Legal Process,1619-1896,
407 ANNALs 1 (1973). The article begins with the proposition that "an understanding of the
early American legal process is central to dealing with the racial disparities of today." Id.
The proposition is probably true, and the goal of dealing with racial disparities is important,
but the effects upon dispassionate scholarship are not quite so laudable. At least one other
scholar is set up as a strawman, misread, and put into an artificial debate. Thus, Higginbotham declares:
Professor [XI has written a series of articles generally extolling the treatment of blacks
by the "State Supreme Courts of the Old South." After reviewing a relative paucity of
cases, [Professor [X]] . . . said:

Yet, it is not quixotic to ask whether the black's existence was better aided by
the judicial fairness and integrity of . . . judges such as Pearson and Green
minus the mandate of the fourteenth amendment than by that mandate unaided by judicial compassion.
My answer to Professor [XI is: even with their degraded status after the termination of slavery and the impotence of the Fourteenth Amendment, blacks were inestimably better off than in their prior existence when slavery was a way of life and a few
southern appellate judges made the chains a bit less cutting. It seems strange that one
hundred years after the emancipation some scholars have to be reminded of Professor
Litwack's comment that "the inherent cruelty and violence of Southern slavery requires
no further demonstration."
Id. at 9. But, let us see what Professor X actually did and said. First, while he "extolled"
some judges, he had less kind words for some others. Second, the "paucity of cases" that
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The other debate derives from recent scholarly work in late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American legal history-particularly the work examining the changes in the judges'
understanding of their own functions and of the role of law in economic and social development. There are two related difficulties
here. First, the data of slavery case law are not well integrated into
the central analysis. Sometimes, as in Lawrence Friedman's A History of American Law,"*the data is used too peripherally. When it
is drawn upon, it is too frequently made to subserve the work's
driving explanation of economic development in the "vital center"-the Northeast. The number of factual errors in Friedman's
discussion of southern appellate courts is so high that I assume it
does not typify his handling of legal data coming from the geographic regions with which he is more concerned. For example, his
A History of American Law mentions four justices, including three
chief justices, who sat on the North Carolina Supreme Court before
the Civil War. Friedman omits or states incorrectly the primary
judicial positions or the birth and death dates of all four.36
Professor X examined before publishing anything on the subject exceeded 3000. Third, the
quotation refers plainly to the fourteenth amendment alone. The quotation says nothing
whatsoever about the effects of the thirteenth amendment, which is what Higginbotham
seems to be referring to and which, obviously, "did the major deed" of freeing blacks from
slavery. Fourth, if there was any doubt it should have been dispelled by the sentences immediately preceding and following the one Higginbotham lifted out of context and misread. The
sentence preceding: "Appellate insistence on the rule of law after the passage of the Civil War
amendments would not by itself have guaranteed complete security from violence at private
and public hands anymore than antebellum judicial behavior abolished inequity." The sentences following:
It is surely not too soon to ask for a return to enforcing in full measure the law of the
land as it stands, whether or not it is distasteful to the personal sensibilities of those
responsible for its application. . . . One can only hope that the apparent similarities of
the 1960's and the 1850's do not develop further . . . . In 1856, Judge David S. Walker,
standing as the nominee of the Know-Nothings, lost the Florida gubernatorial election
by 400 votes. Ten years later, he became that State's Chief Executive, and in the bitter
aftermath of war declared: "The colored man and the white man are now in the same
boat: if she goes down, they both go down. . . ." Judge Walker's ethnic terminology may

now be dated, but the same cannot be said of the substance of his sentiments.
Professor X thanks Judge Higginbotham for his reminder but notes that, as the grandson of
a Derbyshire miner, he may not need reminding of the capacity of "master-classes" to exploit.
Professor X is myself, and the article that Higginbotham misleadingly quotes, Fairnessand
Formalism, supra note 25, at 99-100.
35. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24.
36. Every one! To Thomas Ruffin he assigns wildly askew birth and death dates, "17521819." Id. at 118. These dates conceive Ruffin before George m ever thought of annoying the
colonists, rather than correctly in the year of the Constitution's framing. They kill him off
during Monroe's Presidency, before he ever got on the appellate bench, rather than appropriately entombing him in the second year of Ulysses Grant's Administration. Ruffin was in-

cluded on Roscoe Pound's list of the ten leading judges of the Formative Era of American
law. R. POUND, supra note 24, at 4. If Ruffin can be so untimely dismissed from this vale of
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In pointing to Friedman's batting zero for four identifications,
I do not wish to nitpick unduly. I do want to point up a historiographical problem. We know well what book reviewers would say of
one who, writing a general history of American law, asserted that
Lemuel Shaw's chief distinction was being Herman Melville's
father-in-law, or that Thomas Cooley, by virtue of his name, must
have been a Chinese magistrate. They would doubt the author knew
Massachusetts or Michigan law frightfully well and perhaps question his generalizations about American law as a whole. It may be
safer to follow the course of Morton Horwitz in The Transformation
of American Law, 1780-1860n-to me the most interesting and insightful book in the area, yet containing not one index entry to
slavery. Arguably there is a problem of interregional imbalance in
the historical treatment of American law-one that is not entirely
overcome by relegating most of the United States to the status of
periphery.
A second historiographical difficulty in integrating analyses of
slavery law and other recent writings in nineteenth-century legal
history focusing on the northern center springs from the neodevelopmentalism that pervades those writings. When I read the
recent literature in Amerian legal history, I have two salient reactions. One is a fascination with what I take to be the field's most
significant finding of late: the discovery of an early nineteenthtears, it is small wonder that his predecessor as chief justice is recognized by Friedman only
as "a certain Leonard Henderson of North Carolina, who advertised in 1826 in the Raleigh
Register that he had 'four offices for the reception of Law Students' and was on the verge of
opening a fifth." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 279. Similarly, he identifies Ruffin's nextbut-one successor as chief justice, Richmond Pearson, merely as a law teacher "whose private
law school lasted into the 1870's" and whom "[alt least one student thought . . . 'the
greatest teacher that ever lived on the earth.' " Id. at 529. 1 do not know much about Pearson's
pedagogy, but I do know that along with Ruffin he was probably one of the two most important members of the mid-nineteenth-century North Carolina bench-a point that escapes
Friedman. Pearson thus put on the periphery, it is even less wonder that another "teacher of
the law," William Horn Battle, is identified as "a judge of the state's superior court." Id. at
528 n.13. That identification gets him at least part way to his position on the state's supreme
court. I should add that Friedman by no means has a monopoly on misidentification of
southern judges. Ira Berlin thus, in his interesting book, Slaves Without Masters, refers at
page four to "William Gaston, the chief justice of North Carolina." Gaston never was chief
judge of that court. I suspect that Berlin made a sensible gamble, that, in the specific case,
lost-to wit, trusting Eaton's Freedom of Thought in the Old South. Eaton's work (which I
have long admired and whose fifth chapter, "The Law and the Courts," caused me first, two
decades ago, to sense that something might be amiss in the usual historical assumption about
the southern judiciary and slavery, and then to inquire into the subject in this Article), almost
always factually accurate, errs by saying that Gaston "was elected chief justice by the general
assembly in 1833, and held this high position until his death in 1844." C. EATON, supra note
15, at 302. In fact, Thomas Ruffin was selected for the chief justiceship in 1833, on Leonard
Henderson's death, and served as such until 1852.
37. M. HORwrrz, supra note 24.
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century jurisprudential attitude that looks very much like a precursor of legal realism a century earlier than traditionally was thought
to be the case. The other reaction is a curiosity in seeing the historiographical dominance, in 1975-1978, of a rigid, developmentalist paradigm. I feel doubts akin to those voiced by Richard Morris in his
generally laudatory review of William Nelson's Americanization of
the Common Law:"8 "One cannot regard the entire period from 1630
to 1760 as a seamless web.""
To generalize: if Morris is right, the recent work in nineteenthcentury legal history may, even as it pushes the legal changes that
occupy its attention into a high peak of "progress-oriented" jurisprudence, tend unduly to flatten out, to discount the legal changes
that occurred before and after the period of its focus. Perhaps there
is a tendency here that is the temporal counterpart of the geographic
one to which we have just alluded. Just as the concern with the
relationship between American economic development and American legal evolution has lead to over-focusing, to the neglect of the
periphery, on the states where industrial growth proceeded most
speedily, so too the same concern may result in highlighting the
legal changes that occurred in the era of economic take-off, overshadowing the changes prior and posterior to that era. 0 Perhaps, in
other words, too much legal fact is being force-fed into a single
developmental model."
B. Tushnet's View of the State of Scholarly Affairs
Both the foregoing observations and reasons of economy suggest
that we begin our examination of agreement and disagreement
among the findings and interpretations of the law of slavery by
38. Morris, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 86 (1977).
39. Id. at 89. See also The Contours of Crime, supra note 30, at 219-21.
40. There may be an analogy to a weakness that beset political science in its treatment
of political development during, roughly, 1955 to 1970. Peculiarly sure that new Third World
polities of the post-World War II era could be described as developing from a traditional,
premodern polity to one that bore a curious approximation to an idealized Anglo-American
democracy, political development theory simply did not predict well what happened in the
Third World. Nation-building, to use the jargon, hardly proceeded at all along the AngloAmerican path, and eventually scholars began to question the theory itself. See, e.g., Ayres,
Development Policy and the Possibility of a Livable Future for Latin America, 69 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 507 (1975); Moul, On Getting Nothing for Something: A Note on Causal Models of
PoliticalDevelopment, 7 COMP. PoL. STUD. 139 (1974); Nash, Pollution,Population,and the
Cowboy Economy: Anomalies in the Developmentalist Paradigmand Samuel Huntington, 2
J. Comp. AD. 109 (1970).
41. One of the more interesting analyses of southern law, that by Mark Tushnet, supra
note 28, and examined in the following section of this Article, finds quite a different direction
of development in the law from that of "the North"-explicitly, in terms of shifts in legal
reasoning styles, and implicitly, in terms of relationships between law and economy.
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scrutinizing the views of the scholar most critical of the labors of
others in the field-Professor Mark Tushnet. Hence I first set out
his most important contentions about the law of slavery and its
study, and then consider where others might take issue, and where
they might agree." Laying out Tushnet's view of scholarly analysis
of the law of slavery is best done by turning to his 1975 article in
Law and Society, "The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: A
Study in the Persistence of Legal Autonomy."" There he enunciates
most clearly his objections to what has gone before, and seeks to put
something more adequate in its place."
Tushnet believes that the cases have "been widely misused by
previous students of the subject," 5 including both abolitionists and
more recent scholars. Tushnet's mode of objecting to "prior misuse," however, presents an initial barrier to drawing from the text
the most important and insightful of his contentions. It would be
easier if one did not first have to delve through the abundance" of
42. Professor Tushnet has greatly aided me by critiquing an early draft of Part One of
this essay. Indeed, his comments have been most useful throughout the revision, and I thank
him even as I stress that he may well not agree with all that I say. I should also note that a
succeeding section of this essay, concerned primarily with the writing of Michael Hindus, the
other scholar in the area whose interpretations seem most to diverge from my own, does not
come with the benefits of a similar critique-inasmuch as an identical invitation was declined.
43. Tushnet, supra note 28.
44. See also Tushnet, Book Review, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 168 (1976) (R. CovER, JUSTICE
AccUSED); M. Tushnet, Approaches to the Study of the Law of Slavery (April 12, 1978) (paper
presented at the Organization of American Historians Annual Meeting, New York City). My
view of Cover's book is that it is better than Tushnet thinks it is.
45. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 125-26.
46. Before we are five pages into Tushnet's article, we have been apprised of the following: the simplicity of Stanley Elkins' treatment of the "law-making process as one form of
pluralist politics" (id. at 120-21); that "at times" Frank Tannenbaum's exposition slipped
somewhat (id. at 121 n.6); that Marvin Harris' "argument differs from Elkins' only in"
offering "three collective forms of economic man," but that "difference is important in showing Elkins' relative sophistication" (id. at 121 n.4); and that Goodell, though "a perceptive
abolitionist polemicist" (id. at 121) who noted that "parallels were drawn in the Southern
cases to brood mares, horses, or dogs," (id. at 122) "failed to note" that "parallels were
drawn" also to "adults, children, or lunatics." Id.
Similarly, in the next few pages we are told that Tannenbaum's "neat dichotomy"
between Latin American slavery's recognition of a moral personality in the slave and AngloAmerican slavery's failure to do so "is inaccurate," (id. at 124) that "[m]uch of the prior
misconception of Anglo-American slave law derives from the failure of Tannenbaum or Elkins
to offer a clear definition of moral personality," (id. at 124 n.20) and that "Stanley Elkins,
who purported to set the argument on a new course" away from abolitionist arguments about
the wrongs of slavery nonetheless "made nearly every mistake in the four pages that he
devoted to'matters of police and discipline' that Goodell had made a hundred years before."
Id. at 128 n.33. Interstitially we also are informed of abolitionist error. Stroud, though "closer
to the mark than Goodell in his emphasis on sentiment, . . . stood on shakier ground when
he sought to use the codes as 'strong' evidence of practice." Id. at 127. "Goodell's inability
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offhand critical comments that the text presents." Nonetheless,
once past the critical thicket one perceives five major contentions.
First, it is important that analysis of the law of slavery not
begin by assuming a simple determinism in which the law merely
reflects social, economic, or political forces. "[W]e cannot fully
understand the development of slave law in America unless we are
aware of the autonomous aspects of legal change."" This general
contention seems unexceptionable-at least among the writers in
the area." Indeed, the analyses of Nash and Cover explicitly assume
that the law and its judges are to some degree autonomous and
separable from the larger society, polity, and economy. If there is
an analytic difference, it is over the questions how, and to what
degree, the law is autonomous.
Second, the distinctive aspect of southern legal change and the
essence of antebellum slave law's autonomy lay in movement from
initial uncertainty about how to deal with the "moral personality"
of the slave (an uncertainty reflected in the judges' use of inadequate analogies to horses, cows, and other items of personal property) to the greater certainties of "categorical thinking" about slave
law. The "movement from reasoning by analogy to reasoning from
the assumed character of the relationship was, in all its essentials,
what happened throughout the American South.""o Although there
was "a clear trend away from ordinary common law standards and
toward standards that varied with certain gross categories,"5 ' nonetheless:
this shift .

.

. had no systematic impact on the courts' appreciation of the

slaves' moral personality. Slaves were still regarded as human beings, but that
recognition took a different form .

. .

. The cases show a confluence of the

replacement of the common law by statutes with a still-muted but increasing
concern for the defense of slavery agfiinst outside attack and with the uncomfortable reality that, whatever the law had to say about it, slaves were undeniably human beings.52
to understand the more arcane aspects of standard legal propositions led him into more subtle
errors." Id. at 128 n.33.
47. I should perhaps emphasize that it is the offhand and the inaccurate ones, those
not really necessary to Tushnet's thesis, that I cavil at, not those that usefully advance it.
48. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 121.

49. It should be noted, as Mark Tushnet pointed out to me, that he was making no
claim to "priority" on this point in the specific area, but rather was concerned with what he
takes to be a more general tendency to conceive of law as nonautonomous, as determined, as
well as with Elkins' assumptions, which he sees as taking just such a deterministic point of
view. See note 41 supra.
50. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 144.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 137.
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Part of this is familiar, but part is novel. The familiar part is indicated by the following quotations.
[Uincertainty obtained precisely because the slave was not regarded as an
ordinary article of merchandise and traffic. On the contrary, he was regarded
as extraordinary-not merely because he was both perishable and expensive
but because of uncertainty as to just how much of him was property and how
much humanity.53
In the antebellum judicial forum, four components of the southern ideological
system struggled on unresolved: the supremacy of law, the supremacy of
whites, the black man as human, and the black man as property."4

What is novel is the pattern of case law development that Tushnet
perceives, not the moral personality issue. The interest of Tushnet's
piece resides largely in the picture he presents of doctrinal evolution
from analogical to categorical jurisprudence.
So too, and to suggest Tushnet's third major contention, the
value of this novel insight turns upon the plausibility of the account
Tushnet offers to explain the differences he rightly perceives among
the development of the various southern courts.55 In Tu~hnet's view
these differences are explained primarily by either of two factors.
One factor, peculiar to Louisiana, was the presence of the Code Noir
from before the start of her statehood and the consequent existence
of "something quite close to a mature law of slavery, the point
toward which the law throughout the South was moving."'5 As a
result, the Louisiana courts avoided many of the juristic problems
posed by a moral personality who was a captive.
The question of how slaves resemble free persons barely arose. Slaves could
commit crimes because the statutes said so, and not because slaves had the
sort of moral personality which justifies the attribution of criminal responsibility . . . .
Louisiana's criminal cases showed the same easy recognition that the
slave is human as the Code provisions do. When faced7 with a case in which a
free man had killed a slave, the court had no trouble.5

The other factor was the comparative abilities of the various state
courts. For Tushnet the "highly-accomplished judges of North Carolina"58 displayed a finer touch in wrestling with the problem of
53. A More Equitable Past?,supra note 25, at 201-02.
54. Texas Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 642. Compare also Flanigan's view that
although "[ojn the civil side . . . suppression of the [slave's] personality was nearly complete," it was far from that in criminal cases. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 537.
55. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 148. Tushnet omits discussion of Texas, whose mixed
civil law/common law heredity might be thought to have contributed to something of the
same "well-formedness."

56. Id.
57. Id. at 146-47.
58. Id. at 138.
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slavery on their way from analogy to category. Thus, for example,
the reason that the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion on the
applicability of the fellow-servant rule to slaves was of higher quality than "the more humane opinions rendered in Florida and Georgia" was "simply because the judges there were more skillful."',
With respect to development more generally:
[A] law of slavery developed as judges attempted to devise a relatively simple
theoretical framework . . . . However, that framework could not remain sim-

ple enough to meet the mediocre judge's need for sure and easy guidance. After
the reconceptualization had occurred, cases continued to arise, and the theoretical structure necessarily became more elaborate as more cases had to be
accommodated within it. When judges are careful, this accommodation of new
cases to an old structure occurs, I suggest, by very close attention to detail,
and by reasoning that makes fine distinctions plausible. Mediocre judges,
though, try to avoid the difficulties inherent in this endeavor by grasping at
whatever simplifying devices they find at hand-in the South, appeals to
humanity . . . . This modification of my argument explains why North Carolina law diverged from the law elsewhere; we have independent evidence, for
example from Roscoe Pound's evaluation of Judge Ruffin, that North Carolina
judges were more talented than other Southern judges, and therefore had no
need to retreat into abstractions."

Tushnet's analysis is also distinctive on this score."
59. Id. at 162. Florida and Georgia ruled that the employer was liable for injury to a

hired slave resulting from the negligence of another worker. North Carolina, following the
northern courts, reached the opposite conclusion.

60. Id. at 169.1 am not sure whether I understand the logic of the paragraph just quoted,
or if I do, whether I agree. It seems to say the following. There are better judges and worse
judges. Better judges make finer distinctions, pay more attention to detail, use tighter reasoning, and tend to produce the results they want by distinguishing precedent more than by
retreating into abstractions or using simplifying devices. Worse judges make grosser distinctions, pay less attention to detail, use looser reasoning, grasp at the straws of simplifying
devices, and retreat into abstractions and (perhaps) tend more to overrule or ignore prior
cases than to distinguish them. In the slave South one simplifying device at hand was an
appeal to humanity.
I have two points. First, it is not clear to me that the appeal to humanity always worked
out as a simplifying device. Not infrequently, I suggest, it complicated matters. Second, I
am not comfortable with all the paired opposites describing better and worse
judges-especially attention to detail, and use of abstractions. Where, for example, would
John Marshall be placed accordingly? There is detail, and detail. There are abstractions, and
abstractions.

61. 1am not altogether convinced, believing it makes too much of a single comment by
Roscoe Pound and too much of the courts' treatment of the "fellow servant" rule. Moreover,
I can imagine someone arguing the "finer quality" the other way in order to support the
opposite conclusion. If anything distinguished Ruffin from some of his North Carolina colleagues, it was his tendency to go into abstractions. Underlying the particular difference here
are, I think, two broader differences between my judgment and Mark Tushnet's. First, he
sees more interstate unity in the southern law of slavery than I do. Second, his quest for that
unity at times leads to leaps from and across the evidence that, although certainly dazzling
(and perhaps even ultimately correct), leave me wondering whether there is a bit of insensitivity to the differences of attitudes among the southern judges, as individuals, that I believe I
detect. I find myself asking, for example, whether he senses differences between judges Ruf-
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Tushnet's fourth significant point is that it is important to
integrate adequately the analysis of slave law with the larger social,
political, and economic context of antebellum America.62 To do so
we must avoid two pitfalls. One, a typical mistake of the abolitionists, is to examine cases with a "damned if they did, and damned if
they didn't" attitude toward judges' decisionmaking. If a judge
made a repressive decision, he both mirrored and proved to the
abolitionists the harshness and perfidy of the peculiar institution.
If a judge rendered a seemingly humane decision, he was hypocritically cloaking the political order with a veil of kind words transparent to the abolitionists." The trouble with this abolitionist analysis,
apart from its obvious a priori partiality, is that it does not explain
much about the relationships between social order, economy, and
polity, on the one hand, and the law, on the other.
Another pitfall, of more recent origin, is described by those
historians who, Tushnet says, use the same analytic categories as
the abolitionists to try to correct the abolitionist analysis. Two errors are involved. One is less important-the reanalysis tends to
push the description of the judges' decisionmaking too far in the
other direction. The more important error, however, is that like the
abolitionists, the "counter-abolitionist" historians use a singlevalued concept that cannot "adequately represent the complexity"
of the relationships between law and society." Should we, because
fin, Battle, Nash, and Manley (all of the North Carolina bench), or among judges Totten,
Reese, and Green (of Tennessee). Of the "grosser differences," those between Joseph Lumpkin of Georgia and O'Neall of South Carolina, he is well aware. For further discussion, see
note 227 and Parts Two(C) & (D) infra.
62. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 175-80.
63. Unfortunately, the abolitionists, and their successors, seemed to find evidence
only of harsh and repressive attitudes, so that, while they examined the cases to discover
the sentiments of the judges, they believed that the only sentiments honestly expressed
were those consistent with what the abolitionists already "knew" about Southern slavery; everything else was hypocrisy, benevolent words concealing the horrors of slavery
. . . hidden beneath the words . . . .

Id. at 127.
64. The South was committed to the institution of slavery . . . . Still, a judge
might attempt to ameliorate some of the harshness of the institution, and that is what
the abolitionists ignored. A recent student of slave law, Professor A. E. K. Nash tried to
correct the abolitionists' analysis, but he used their own categories. Unfortunately, he
went too far in speaking of the law's "essentially decent treatment of the black" and of
its "libertarian policy."
The difficulty with the abolitionist and counter-abolitionist analysis, though, is not
that Southern law has been located in the wrong place on a continuum between antislavery and proslavery, or between libertarianism and conservatism. The real problem
is that the issue just cannot be analyzed in those terms, because they make sense only
if an increase in authoritarianism or repression necessarily implied a decrease in paternalism or benevolence. In fact, Southern slavery could be at once extremely repressive
and extremely paternalistic, and no single-valued concept can adequately represent the
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of these pitfalls, avoid using the cases altogether? Tushnet answers
no:
[W]e would lose important insights into the slave system if we did so. We
would not know less about how slaves were treated, of course . . . . Instead,

we would know less about what responsible public officials thought they should
say about slavery . . . . In short, the law of slavery shows us the ideological
5
structure of Southern society, and that is not to be ignored.

Whether the ideology is hypocritical does not much matter, "for, as
Professor Genovese notes, we can assume that all ruling class ideologies are self-serving."" To understand adequately the slavery case
law we must understand the functioning of that law as a mirror
and/or as a component of the southern ideological structure. "Cases
are particularly useful tools with which we can obtain leverage on
complexity of the system. As the evidence presented in this article shows, we need a
much more complex analysis of Southern paternalism, like Professor Genovese's, to
understand Southern slave law.
Id. at 176. 1 did not realize that I was engaged in exactly the enterprise that Tushnet describes
me as engaged in. Perhaps I was, but note that Tushnet depicts a statement I made primarily
about the Texas court as though it sought to embrace equally all southern courts, and also
offers as well as one correct citation an additional citation where nothing of the sort attributed
to me appears. Compare Tushnet, supra note 28, at 176 & n.197 with Negro Rights, Unionism,
and Greatness, supra note 25, at 143. He also omits my qualifications as to the scope of the
"essentially decent treatment" phrase quoted from Texas Supreme Court, supra note 25.
"'Fairness,' 'decency,' and 'equity' must be understood with respect to both prevailing
nineteenth-century racial mores and in light of the undeniable inequities of the statutory
double standard of American law in the antebellum era." Id. at 622 n.2. Note finally that
my reference was solely to judge-made law, not to statutory law.
65. Id. at 129. I should note that the literal content of this quotation makes me pause
on two counts. First, I am puzzled by the "of course." At least to the extent that judicial
decisions themselves amounted to slave treatment in particular cases (not to mention
whether they had any impact more generally), it seems that neglecting the cases would mean
we would know less. Second, and in light of Tushnet's strictures about abolitionist analysis,
I am puzzled by the two succeeding sentences. Using the verbal phrase-what the judges
"thought they should say about slavery"-rather than something like "what the judges believed about slavery," runs the risk of loading the analytic dice. Similarly, I am not sure
whether Tushnet means in the next sentence quoted that the case law is useful only for
showing us the ideological structure, or whether he means that that is just one of several
possible advantages to be derived from studying the cases. That is what much of his own case
law analysis seems to suppose. For, and this is one of his essay's strengths, in fact his
discussion frequently seems to get out of, and go beyond, the Procrustean Marxist bed in
which here, and in the adjoining sentences, see quotations cited at notes 66 & 67 infra, he
seems about to confine his approach. See note 68 infra.
66. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 129. Never mind what Professor Genovese says. Of course
one may assume the self-servingness of all ruling class ideologies and let their analysis go at
that, yet there are penalties in so doing. Without reaching the difficult questions of what one
means by ideology, and of how it functions (questions considerably more complicated, for me
at least, than some of the writers in the area we are discussing seem to think), let me just
suggest that what makes interesting the study of many ruling class ideologies is how imperfectly they do in fact self-serve. I surmise this is the case with respect to the law of slavery
and the ideology of the peculiar institution.
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problems of ideology, because judicial opinions are public documents designed to convince.""
Tushnet's fifth point is that although we should not resort to
the abolitionist assumption that judicial pronouncements are always suspect, we should realize that when courts did make reference
to humanity and other appeals to sentiment, they did not give these
statements much effective legal force. Rather, the "literary style of
these opinions provides the key to understanding what was happening. The opinions leave the impression that phrases like
'considerations of humanity and interest' were invoked ritualistically, and did not reflect any real sensitivity to the human aspects
of slavery."" Throughout the antebellum period the ritualistic invocation of such considerations dominated any real attempts to give
them effect. Despite rhetorical statements that "slaves were human
beings who had human relationships with their masters . . . the

quality of human relationships could not be made the subject of
judicial inquiry, and in this area, no change over time can be
seen.""
To recapitulate, as I understand Tushnet, he was saying that
the future analysis of the slavery case law should be most fruitful if
it accepts five propositions:
1-that the law of slavery displayed a certain degree of autonomy;
2-that the essence of its autonomous development is seen
in an evolution from analogical to categorical analysis;
3-that interstate variances in the degree of development
are explained by the presence or absence of a Code Noir, and by
differing judicial abilities;
4-that the law of slavery cannot be successfully analyzed
in single-value terms, or by using proslavery/antislavery, or liberal/conservative continua, but should be plumbed for its utility
in understanding the self-serving ideology of the master class;
and
5-that, in contrast to its changing style of legal reasoning,
its invocations of humanity and the like were static-remaining
from 1800 to 1860 more or less equally superficial.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 152. Tushnet informs me that he is less certain now than he was in 1975 that
"considerations of humanity" were only superficially addressed by the judges. Hence there
may be less distance between his view and my own than the discussion here suggests. Similarly, I should note that because the points raised in notes 64 & 65 supraoccurred to me since
our correspondence, he has not had a chance to concur or dissent concerning them.
69. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
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C.

"Black Justice" Below the Appellate Court Level, and Four
Whiggeries
Arthur Howington's 1975 essay, "Not in the Condition of a
Horse or an Ox," 0 and Michael Hindus' 1976 article, "Black Justice
Under White Law: Criminal Prosecutions of Blacks in Antebellum
South Carolina,"" are the principal published acceptances of a
suggestion I made a decade ago that someone ought to examine the
slavery case-records below the appellate level.72 Howington puts the
reason for this suggestion neatly: "State Supreme Court decisions
have received the most adequate attention, but the behavior of
these . . . tribunals resembles the tip of an iceberg . . . . An accur-

ate appraisal of the law of slavery awaits a full and systematic
examination of this total range of judicial activity."73 Hindus has
said much the same thing.74 I group these two authors together,
notwithstanding differences in the states of their research and in
their analytic approaches," because they both examine "black justice" at the local level. Both seemingly would add a sixth item to
the list of five prescriptions I have imputed to Tushnet:
6-in order to understand completely the law of slavery, you
must delve below the appeals court level.
This contention is difficult to dispute, especially if one is seeking an overall picture of how the judicial system affected the treatment of the slave. How then, if at all, do Howington and Hindus
differ as to the five propositions? To begin with the similarities,
both appear to accept the first proposition by rejecting a simple
determinism and entertaining the possibility of autonomous legal
change. Not unnaturally, given the focus upon individual southern
states, neither author reaches the issue posed by Tushnet's second
contention that the primary movement of southern judicial thinking
70. Howington, supra note 29. See also A. Howington, "According to Law": The Trial
and Punishment of Black Defendants in Antebellum Tennessee (April 13, 1978) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians in New York City).
Though not yet published, this paper is an extremely interesting analysis of trials of blacks
in the lower courts of six Tennessee counties, and I rely on it substantially in the following
discussion.
71. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30.
72. See Fairnessand Formalism, supra note 25, at 93.
73. Howington, supra note 29, at 250.
74. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30. See also M. Hindus and D. Jones,
The Social History of American Law: What It Is and Where to Begin (October 23, 1976)
(paper presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History,
Philadelphia).
75. Howington's 1975 article is a useful exploration of a single case, Ford v. Ford, 26
Tenn. (7 Hum.) 92 (1846), on, so to speak, the way to a dissertation. Hindus' article is a
distillation, post-dissertation.
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about slavery was from reasoning by analogy to reasoning by category. A fortiori, neither reaches the third proposition's explanation
for such movement.
Howington and Hindus do differ, however, on another important issue: whether southern courts took seriously the implications
of considering the slave as more than property. While Howington's
writings suggest that at least some Tennessee courts did recognize
and grapple with those implications,"6 Hindus argues that the South
Carolina lower courts were little interested in any such enterprise.
For Howington, it "is arguable that the measure of fairness which
scholars have found at the appellate level of the judicial system was
also present at the trial court level."" For Hindus, "[g]iven these
cases it is hard to accept the arguments of scholars about the protection afforded blacks by the appellate courts." 8 Of South Carolina's
law of slavery Hindus declares, "despite all its haphazard forms
[and] incompetent magistrates . . .

,

the outcome-invariably

supportive of white dominance-was not at all uncertain. The motive of preserving white dominance was so firmly ingrained . . . it

survived all attempts by the most prominent jurists in the state to
alter it.""
76. Thus, after an exhaustive examination of the background and lower court trials as
well as the appeals of a suit for freedom in Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 92 (1846),
Howington concludes: "The Tennessee Supreme Court, in the area of post-mortem manumission, did recognize and protect the humanity of slaves . . . ." Howington, supra note 29, at
262. In his view, moreover, at least as noteworthy was the decisionmaking of the lower courts
of two counties involved in the case. "These local tribunals, those closest to the social realities
of the 'peculiar institution,' meted out justice which, no less than that of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, accepted the humanity of the slave as point of departure." Id. at 263.
77. Howington, supra note 70, at 26. Howington also states that:
[s]uch evidence as does exist contains very little to indicate that the Grand Jury treated
slave defendants any differently than white defendants.
Considering all the black defendants, slave and free, in this study (157 cases),
only forty percent of them were convicted on their trials, five percent more than for the
white defendants as a whole. Juries did convict seventy percent of the black defendants
who stood at the bar, but they also convicted sixty-eight percent of the whites who stood
there.
Id. at 10, 26.
78. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 580.
79. Id. at 599. Hindus also makes the following points: "[Flew whites were ever tried
for murdering a slave." Id. at 579. "Black justice may have served some bureaucratic need
for certification, while . . . soothing some slaveholders' consciences, but it was never intended to be just. And just it rarely was." Id. at 599.
Howington, in contrast, states:
Daniel J. Flanigan has suggested that where the regularly established courts had jurisdiction over slave crimes, they "were more likely to benefit from the entire procedural
system that protected whites," to benefit from what the Memphis Appeal called the
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A second difference between Howington's and Hindus' analyses
pertains to Tushnet's fourth proposition about avoiding the pitfall
of single-valued abolitionist or counter-abolitionist analysis." Hindus' position is implicit, rather than explicit, and I suppose one
could argue his location relative to the pitfall either way. One could
say that he finds no "liberalism" worth speaking of, and thus locates
South Carolina justice further to the abolitionist end of the spectrum than Flanigan, let alone Nash.8 ' But, although it can be argued
that one falls into the analytic pit whenever one attempts to examine the content of southern justice from the standpoint of its moral
characteristics, I expect that Hindus might say that he escapes
because he is after something quite different-to wit, the ways in
which the judicial system was used to preserve white dominance.
Be that as it may, Howington, at least in 1975, took his position
squarely "in the pit," saying:
The treatment afforded slaves in a given case can be assigned to a position on
a continuum. Court action which protected the property component of slavery
at the expense of the humanity of the slave would occupy one extreme of that
continuum. Judicial activity which emphasized the humanness of the slave at
the expense of property considerations would occupy the opposite extreme.
The property-oriented extreme can be labelled "pro-slavery" and the
82
personality-oriented extreme "anti-slavery."

What accounts for these differences? Is one author right and the
"glorious uncertainty of the law." Flanigan's suggestion accurately describes the situation in Tennessee.
Howington, supra note 70, at 5.
80. See Tushnet, supranote 28, at 176.
81. Tushnet states that "Flanigan . .. uses the liberal-conservative dimension, simply
relocating Southern law from the liberal end, as Nash suggested, to a point much closer to
the conservative end. For what it is worth, were I required to use those categories, I would
agree with Flanigan." Id. at 176 n.197. I did not think that I located southern law as a whole
on the liberal end-for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that I did not think in
terms of a unified southern law of slavery. The disparities among judges and courts struck
me too forcibly to do that.
82. Howington, supra note 29, at 251. Note that Howington was referring to judicial
behavior in manumission cases. Note also his qualification that the "term 'anti-slavery,' in
this instance, emphatically does not imply judicial behavior consciously destructive of the
peculiar institution .

.

. [r]ather, . . . the legal tension inherent when men owned other

men." Id. at 251. He also speaks of a
third category of judicial behavior [which] occupies the middle ground of the propertyhumanity continuum .

. .

. The law as an institution perpetuated norms and values

such as procedural fairness and equitable law enforcement. If judicial actors, in slave
cases, responded primarily to the institutional demands of the legal establishment, their
behavior, relative to the extremes of the pro-slavery-anti-slavery continuum, can be
labelled as juridicially neutral.
Id. at 251-52. More recently, however, Howington appears to be having second thoughts about
such continua. Thus he states: "In my opinion, arguments about the liberality or illiberality
of judges, about the pro- or anti-slavery bias of judges do not cut to the heart of the matter."
Howington, supra note 70, at 27.
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other wrong? Not necessarily. One possible explanation is simple:
different state court systems produced different results. In looking
at Tennessee, Howington is examining the southern judicial system
in which, if one can safely make inferences from appellate decisions,
one would expect the greatest degree of lower court procedural fairness. Hindus, by contrast, is studying a state whose lower court
system one would expect to rank fairly low on this count.
Yet is such an explanation altogether sufficient? I think not. It
rests entirely on a structural difference between two states' judiciaries, and it tells us little about the larger question of interpreting the
evolution of slavery law in the South as a whole. That larger question is, after all, what mainly concerns us. Further, and with respect
to that larger question, may it be that a "greater truth" can be
found by drawing a homely analogy to the difference between the
optimist's and pessimist's perceptions of a glass with some water in
it? The former sees the glass as partially full. The latter sees it as
partially empty. Although that clich6 may seem to hold little promise in sorting out differences in a serious scholarly enterprise, I am
going to argue that it does. In my judgment, many of the differences
among the authors discussed here lie less in the evidence they examine, and more in the sociopolitical beliefs and psychological dispositions that they bring to the evidence. Some authors are surprised
to find, and tend to make much of, any judicial efforts that go at
all towards insisting upon fair procedures in slave trials. Others are
struck by, and accordingly emphasize, any shortfall from full
"colorblind" justice.*
83. Something in the subject matter seems to bring out these beliefs and dispositions
to an unusual degree. To revert to the earlier example of Mark Howe's view (see Howe, supra
note 21), a few years earlier a distinguished southern historian had suggested almost the
reverse-that my analysis was too harsh on the southern judges. Not long ago a commentator
at a convention panel on the law of slavery was plainly relieved to find that my English birth
laid to rest a suspicion that I might be descended from and hence partial to, a midnineteenth-century North Carolina chief justice with the same surname. That point settled,
he seemed more disposed to take my views on the matter at face value. I mention this not to
object, but to underline the degree to which the subject itself poses hazards. They are hazards,
moreover, that one is sometimes propelled into by one's own beliefs and experiences, whatever
they be. Thus, Howe (rebounding perhaps from a summer in the Deep South advocating
integration) objected once to giving "a far larger significance . . . [to] the humanitarian
reflections of Green, J., than they deserve." Id. at 1 (referring to the 1846 Tennessee case that
later was the subject of Howington's 1975 article). "After all," Howe went on, "in the Ford
case the Court, and Green, did nothing more humane than what the statute required them
to do and they knew full well that emancipation of the slave would be followed by his
banishment from the State." Id. Howe's beliefs seemingly led him to misread Tennessee law,
or perhaps not to look at it thoroughly. Between 1842 and 1849, a statute was in force that
permitted county courts to allow manumitted slaves to remain in Tennessee. Although I knew
that at the time, I did not know until I read Howington's article that the slaves (there were a
substantial number freed under the will), not merely were not banished from the state, but
ultimately inherited a 112 acre farm. See Howington, supra note 29, at 258-59.
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To say this is to intimate my central historiographical contention in this Article: at play in the analysis of law and slavery is an
American analogue to what Sir Herbert Butterfield long ago criticized as the Whig interpretation of history." Butterfield was concerned with the tendency of many late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century British historians to "draw lines through certain
events, some such line as that which leads through Martin Luther
and a long succession of whigs to modem liberty,"" to busy themselves "with dividing the world into the friends and enemies of
progress,"" and to prefer those who extended liberty to those who
curtailed it. The American analogue lies in two tendencies in historical scholarship about the peculiar institution, especially its legal
evolution. Each has its characteristic ways of locating historical
persons, events, processes, and institutions on a "line . . . which
leads . . . to modem liberty."" To make matters a bit more compli-

cated, I suspect that each of the two tendencies comes in stronger
and weaker versions, so that there are at least four subvariants.
Let me spell them out. Before doing so, however, let me clarify
a point that might otherwise engender confusion. What I am about
to say concerning "Whiggery" in the interpretation of history may
appear to resemble closely what Tushnet has been arguing when
objecting to scholarship that organizes case-law data along proslavery/anti-slavery, or liberal/conservative, continua." Indeed,
Tushnet, by adducing a different mode of explaining the law of
southern slavery's structure, one that emphasizes its evolution towards autonomy, may seem to be the only one among us who has
avoided the pitfall of Whiggish analysis. Yet I expect that Tushnet's
explanations may escape Whiggery only by paying a potentially
crippling price. The price is paid in two historiographical currencies.
One is the currency for understanding the linkages among historical
individuals, events, and social structures. The other is the currency
for understanding the southern experience of slavery in relation to
the rest of the North Atlantic community of nations. Furthermore,
it was precisely the losses in understanding run up by Whig history
that lay at the base of Butterfield's concern about the Wbig interpretation of history. In his view, Whig history "presentism" debilitated true understanding of the past. A "shortcut through that maze
of interactions by which the past was turned into our present, .
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

H. BvrrRw, supra note 1.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 12.
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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[Whig History] circumvent[ed] the real problem of historical
study""-understanding how and why historical personages acted
as they did. "Real historical understanding is not achieved by the
subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making
the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of
another century than our own. "0 The chief problem with Whig history was not that it made moral judgments about who did and who
did not further the cause of liberty, or even that it studied "the past
with reference to the present[;] . . . there may be a sense in which

this is unobjectionable if its implications are carefully considered
. . . ."" Rather the problem is the pattern of abridgement that

emerges. The Whig historian's moral judgments tend to put "a stop
to his imaginative endeavour, .

. [to cut] short the effort of his-

torical understanding."12 The upshot of the Whig approach is a
"method and . . . kind of history that . . . would be impossible if

all the facts were told in all their fullness.""
Butterfield's observations, directed at quite a different school
of historians than those we are considering, seem strangely on point.
What Butterfield said of Lord Acton often applies equally well to
the study of slavery: "[A] common feature of Whig historians.
is the hint that for all this desire to pass moral judgments on various
things in the past, it is really something in the present that the
historian is most anxious about."" It is a similar process of presentism at work, a hyperactive moralizing, which leads to abridgements
that, lacking fullness, also lack understanding. Because of a complication inherent in the study of the law of slavery, I am not sure that
abjuring moral judgments in the formal analysis, which is what
Tushnet alone among us seems largely to have managed, suffices to
escape the difficulties to which Butterfield pointed. In a unique
way, the study of slavery is the study of liberty versus nonliberty.
This observation is so obvious that it seems almost silly to make,
but it points to a complication that is perhaps less plain. To refer
to Butterfield again:
The truth is that there is a tendency for all history to veer over into whig
There is a magnet for ever pulling at our minds, unless we have
history. ...
found the way to counteract it; and it may be said that if we are merely honest,
if we are not also carefully self-critical, we tend easily to be deflected . ...
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

H. BTrrERIELD, supra note 1, at 25.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 6-7.
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The complication is that in writing about slavery, especially about
slavery in its last century in our hemisphere, we are terribly prone
to veering. The magnet is then at its strongest-in part because it
can work its way into almost any of the major questions about the
problem of slavery. Moreover, it is difficult to answer these questions without asking about any number of historical personages'
actions relating to slavery, and without in turn becoming involved
in analyzing the relationships between these persons' belief structures and their actions. Almost inevitably one then asks how liberal
or conservative, how pro- or anti-slavery, such persons were. So too
with respect to institutions-including the institution of the law.
Unless one is happy with severing the law from social, political, and
economic structures, unless one is satisfied with analyzing law as
purely autonomous, there are two choices.
The first choice is to hypothesize, or swiftly conclude, that a
whole region was populated by persons who unanimously thought
one way about slavery. One can then view the law merely as repressive, and entertain oneself with working out the fine details of that
repression. The second choice is to realize that the magnet is just
outside the historian's mental door, to try self-critically and carefully to ask about individuals, institutions, and events, and to become sensitive to their divergences on the nature of liberty and its
relationships to slavery. One tries, if one makes this choice, to examine the content of moral beliefs without turning the examination
into a moral evaluation of moral beliefs. In making this choice one
is getting frightfully close to the magnet while trying to compensate
for its power to make one veer. The balance required is difficult
always to maintain. The difficulty of the balancing act explains in
part the tendencies of two of the four varieties of "Whiggery" when
analyzing southern slavery-to return to our earlier metaphor-to
see the glass of water as partially full. That said, and the metaphors
thoroughly mixed, let me turn to sketching out the four Whiggeries.
The first pair of Whiggeries do have, though in differing measure, a persistent habit of viewing the glass as partially full. I think
it is this habit that Tushnet has in mind when speaking of a counterabolitionist analysis." But if it must be labelled I would prefer
something such as the "search for the silent South" approach, or
"other South" historiography." The locus classicus is, of course,
George Washington Cable's 1889 book, The Silent South," but it
96. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 176.
97. See C. DEGLER, THE Omn SourH (1974); M. SosNA, IN SEARCH OF THE SILEwr Sourn
(1977).

98. G. CABLE, THE SR.ENr Sourn (1885).
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has a more recent tradition, turning up, for example, in the 1930's
in Avery Craven's The Repressible Conflict" as a view of the Civil
War origins, in the 1940's in Clement Eaton's Freedom of Thought
in the Old South"' as a minor theme, and more recently in the
writings of Carl Degler.1 1 Either label seems preferable to the term
counter-abolitionist, which is more appropriately employed in two
other locations, both of which have more directly to do with countering anti-slavery. One location is among those who in the antebellum
era developed positive-good theories of slavery. The other location
is historiographical, rather than historical. I have in mind those
historians, chiefly of the early twentieth century, who gave a temporary respectability to the view that the peculiar institution was an
uplifting, Christianizing, and civilizing school for savages. This
view, often associated with U. B. Phillips, but of which a better
example was the Mississippi historian, Dunbar Rowland, 02 should
not be confused with those who more recently have argued something different. What is the difference? Essentially it is between
those who were saying that the South was not so bad because slavery
was not, at least in its time, such a bad way of organizing blackwhite relations, and those who say that the South was not as unanimously "pro-slavery" as it is sometimes depicted because it contained some who thought there were things wrong with the institution in part or in whole. The latter view may contain an implicit,
and Whiggish, stance that "the South was not so bad," but the
reasons are not at all the same. To be very Whiggish for a moment:
the former makes a partial virtue out of the vice; the latter makes
a virtue out of the recognition of partial vice.
It is this latter view with which I am concerned. What of its two
versions, or subvariants? The stronger version, as applied to the
judiciary, would find "secret Jeffersonian liberals"" or even "secret
abolitionists" manning the southern benches, judges seeking consciously to undercut the peculiar institution's defenses, seeking to
hasten the Emancipation Proclamation. The weaker version, while
99. A. CRAVEN, supra note 23.
100. C. EATON, supra note 15.
101. See C. DEGLER, supra note 97. See also C. DEGLER, NEImR BLACK NOR WarrE:
SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAzIL AND THE UNrrED STATES (1971).
102. See the opening pages of the early twentieth-century Mississippi historian's two
volume history of his state. D. ROwLAND, HISTORY OF Mississippi (1925). Rowland, at one time
president of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, surely penned the classic counterabolitionist view-one that makes U. B. Phillips seem progressive by contrast.
103. The term "Jeffersonian" emphasizes, of course, only one side of Thomas Jefferson's split mind on the matter. For a critique of Jefferson's thinking on slavery, see R.
MCCOLLEY, SLAVERY AND JEFFERSONIAN VIRGINIA (2d ed. 1973) (especially text beginning at
114).

34

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

not ruling out the possibility of finding a few individuals filled with
malice prepense toward slavery, is more inclined to explore judicial
doubts and uncertainties about the institution as a whole, or more
likely, about some of its features. While it might be surprised to find
secret abolitionists, it would not be as surprised to find some individual judges who put union ahead of slavery, even though they
might cotton to the institution as long as they did not have to make
the choice. This version also is interested in exploring the possibility
of judicial decisionmaking that might have the effect, though not
the intent, of weakening the institution's defenses, or that might
aim at diminishing its most oppressive excesses. Despite their differences, these versions have a common characteristic-a certain
pleasure at finding southerners disposed to ameliorate the peculiar
institution-that causes me for the present purpose to classify them
together.
The other tendency, in its two "empty glass" versions, sometimes strikes me as having the strange misanthropy common to
Calvin, Rousseau, and Marx-that peculiar reformer's misanthropy
that loves mankind in the abstract but disdains individual persons
and their foibles. That, I submit, amounts to another kind of Whig
interpretation of history, the dismal Whiggery that is always reminding us how far short we are of perfect justice and ultimate
equality.
As applied to southern history, the stronger version of this tendency has an immediate difficulty, though not one that often daunts
it. The,difficulty occurs in separating out the very dark grays of total
perfidy from the dark grays of somewhat tempered evil, in distinguishing the very cruel master from the not so cruel one. For this
version the overriding, indeed virtually all-obliterating, fact is that
of one man's dominion over another. Slavery's abyss boggles the
mind's capacities for moral differentiation. Dominion is dominion.
It is all very wicked-and not to be given a moment's real historiographical understanding. This stronger version is close to what
Tushnet objects to when criticizing abolitionists who in one moment
saw explicit evil in, for example, the judicial pronouncements of a
positive-good theorist such as Joseph Lumpkin, and in the next
moment perceived pure hypocrisy in a judge who, venturing to
speak of considerations of humanity, freed a slave.
The weaker version might be called Whiggish Fabianism. It
allows for some variations in the grays of the historical fabric,
104. Whiggish Fabianism is to be distinguished from Eberhard Fabianism, wherein all
contrary facts are erasable.
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but-to mix a metaphor again-remains keenly aware of the emptiness of the glass. It may well see some difference between hanging
a slave without a trial at all and according him the formal dues of
correct procedure first. It may agree that there is a difference between one court's saying that the slave, since he is a man, can elect
between freedom and slavery, and another court's saying that since
he is a chattel, he cannot. But this view will stress more strongly
how often slaves were whipped on plantations without ever getting
into the formal court system, and how many slaves never got the
chance to choose freedom. Even more emphatically, it will point to
the degraded state that freed blacks were expected to occupy. Or it
will tell you that those who supported African recolonization in the
early nineteenth century, far from being benevolent, were engaging
in racism of the worst type.No
The distinctive common denominator of these two subvariants,
the one that warrants lumping them together just as we lumped
together the first two subvariants for their pleasure in amelioration,
is their displeasure in the shortfall from a more recent set of reference points. Sometimes that set consists of the standards of today,
standards, it may be added, that not infrequently are idealized. At
other times that set seems to consist, in somewhat utopian fashion,
of the standards of a future good society in which true justice, not
to mention complete equality and the brotherhood of man, become
realized. But the displeasure at the shortfall is much the same.
To generalize, I suggest that our writing on the peculiar institution still tends to engage in what historians have done ever since the
Civil War-judging the South and slavery. Whiggery persists in
various shapes and guises. Thus, while at times I am impressed by
calls to change the contours of the debate and by disputes over
whether American slavery was precapitalist, proto-capitalist, or just
plain raw-capitalist, something else impresses me more. It is something that derives less from whether the historian considers himself
a Marxist or a liberal pluralist, less from whether he talks about the
glories or the inglories of Latin American slavery compared to our
own, less from the specific subject matter and the evidence he is
contemplating, and more from the analytic habits of driving that he
exhibits. Two such driving habits, two tendencies to veer, are of
particular import.
One is the Whiggish veering we have been discussing. Whether
it takes the form of an empty-glass, shortfall Whiggery, or the form
105. See R. McCOLLEY, supra note 103, at 129-30 (a toned-down expression of this
perspective).
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of a full-glass, ameliorative Whiggery, it is a critical driving habit
that affects our understandings of southern history. It is as if the
historian's analytic vehicle always comes with wheels whose alignment is never quite true. Even if he gets his perceptual toe-in set
just right so that he goes straight at the evidence (a rarity), his
camber and even more his caster (set well to the negative and
rearward-trailing, or set well to the positive and forwardreferencing) are always characteristically askew one way or the
other. Hence, for us to understand southern history, and more particularly the law of slavery, it becomes important that we understand also the alignment patterns of its historians.
The other important veering tendency to be clear about is as
much a cause of the veering as it is a perceptual habit. In my
judgment, at least in the historiography of slavery, sectionalism is
not quite dead. And, as I have noted earlier, among American legal
historians the old industrial-agrarian, city-frontier distinctions are
very much alive in the center-periphery dichotomy and, underlying
that, in these historians' decisions about what it is most important
to study first, and most.
D.

Hindus' South Carolina, Howington's Tennessee, and "Black
Justice" in the Western Penal Tradition
By asking penetrating questions at the judicial level where
study has been most needed, Michael Hindus' "Black Justice
Under White Law: Criminal Prosecutions of Blacks in Antebellum
South Carolina""o' is an important essay. Because of its importance,
and because I have two central questions about its conclusions and
the way it reaches them, I want to examine it in detail. My two
questions are: first, could any, some, or much of the evidence it
utilizes plausibly subserve different, more ameliorative Whiggish
conclusions?; second, would the conclusions look substantially different if, rather than scrutinizing antebellum South Carolina's system of black justice in the withering light of nineteenth-century
Massachusetts' treatment of criminals, we compared it with the
larger European penal tradition whence it sprang or with another
slave state's judicial system?
Near the beginning of his essay, Hindus observes: "The position
of the black defendant in South Carolina cannot be understood
apart from the state's legal system."10 That is certainly so. Moreover, it was a legal system that, most would agree, notwithstanding
106. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30.
107. Id. at 575.
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Benjamin Perry's encomiums on the probity of her judges,10 was
hardly an innovative model that would have inspired visiting
nineteenth-century penal reformers. As Hindus puts it, "justice for
whites was mixed at best." Pointing to the State's archaic laws, to
those laws' excessive penalties "far in excess of popular support,"
and to the "lack of facilities for long term confinement .

. .

,

Hindus next suggests that for whites, these circumstances:
were easily turned to a defendant's benefit. Cases ending in conviction were a
small minority of those brought .

.

.. The convicted stood a good chance of

being pardoned. The ambiguities of the South Carolina criminal justice system
saved white lives and hides,

. . .

[b]ut

justice

for blacks,

. . .

might have

been completely different."'

I have two potential problems with this passage. First, what will be
the evidence brought to sustain the judgment that, for whites, harsh
law produced lenient results? That is not, for example, how we
generally think about English law of the period."n Second, what will
be held sufficient to fulfill the description "completely different?"
After proceeding logically through the statutory disadvantages
imposed on blacks in criminal proceedings, Hindus reaches what for
me is the most interesting part of the essay, in which he measures
local justice quantitatively by systematic use of district court records. The result is certainly far superior to the impressionistic generalizations that have filled the major historical works on the pecu108. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
109. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 575-76. But we should be
cautious about how far the penalties exceeded "popular support"-as well as about the
meaning of that term in antebellum South Carolina. For a useful article, see Ely, American
Independence and the Law: A Study of Post-Revolutionary South CarolinaLegislation, 26
VAND. L. REV. 939 (1973). Ely suggests that (at least in Charleston) the bench and bar were
more capable than one might surmise from Hindus' sentences (though note that Hindus does
not state the contrary explicitly), and that there may have been relative satisfaction with the
broad shapes of post-Revolutionary South Carolina law, with its conservative carryover of
English tradition. For other studies of South Carolina law, see Bridwell, Mr. Nicholas Trott
and the South Carolina Vice Admiralty Court:An Essay on ProceduralReform and Colonial
Politics, 28 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1976); Harrison, A Study of the EarliestReported Decisions of
the South Carolina Courtsof Law, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51 (1972); Negro Rights, Unionism
and Greatness,supra note 26; Senese, Building the Pyramid: The Growth and Development
of the State Court System in Antebellum South Carolina, 1800-1860, 24 S.C. L. REv. 357
(1972).

110. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 576 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., E. CALVERT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1927). To

be sure, the number of British capital crimes on the statute books in the early nineteenth
century greatly exceeded those for which capital sentences were commonly imposed, and the

capital sentences exceeded the actual number of executions. Nonetheless, the vagaries and
severities of British law frequently disadvantaged the defendant sufficiently to bar extending
Hindus' comment overseas. See 1 L. RADZINOWIcz, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITs ADMINISTRATION FROM

1750 (1948). See also text accompanying notes 142 & 175-81 infra.
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liar institution.112 The question I wish to satisfy myself about, how-

ever, is whether the evidence strictly requires all the conclusions
that Hindus derives. Could any of the evidence be put equally well
not to the service of Hindus' "Fabian Whiggery" but to the service
of "ameliorative Whiggery?" In some instances, moreover, is there
too little evidence to warrant firm conclusions of either type? Let
me set out Hindus' conclusions that most interest me in this regard
and discuss them in the order that they appear in his text. I shall
continue the earlier proposition-numbering scheme, but shall group
together closely linked contentions:
7a-In South Carolina, "few whites were ever tried for murdering a slave."113
7b-"[T]he conviction rate for slave murder was well
below the average for South Carolina crime."'
7c-With respect to appeals from convictions, "only the
most atrocious murders by men of the lowest standing. resulted
in conviction."" 5 Sixteen of the seventeen convictions were upheld.
7d-"Given these cases it is hard to accept the arguments
of scholars about the protection afforded blacks by the appellate
courts." 6
Does all this necessarily follow? I can readily imagine an ameliorative Whig historian saying that what is really surprising regarding 7a is Hindus' discovery"' that there were as many as seventyone prosecutions for slave murder in eighteen of the State's fortysix districts. He might further observe that if this rate held for the
entire State, and if the black and white populations in the eighteen
districts were representative of the whole State's demographic
make-up, then there might well have been more than 200 such prosecutions over the whole State. As to 7b, he might declare that a
thirty-two percent conviction rate was about thirty-two percent
higher than he would have expected. As to 7c, he might argue that
the evidence supporting the conclusion that only "men of the lowest
standing" were convicted was incomplete for two reasons. First,
appellate records show nothing about those convicted who did not
appeal. Seventeen cases is a small number from which to conclude
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See, e.g., K. STAMPP, supra note 21, at 217-36.
Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 579.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id.
See id. at 579.
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anything more than that those who were convicted and who appealed apparently were of "the lowest standing." Second, and more
important, he could say that to form any hard conclusions one ought
first to determine the distribution of murders among all standings
in the population. After all, he might note, even today those convicted of murder, and thus whose appeals reach the United States
Supreme Court, are typically persons of "low standing." Then he
might express some puzzlement about the criteria for lowest standing. Without examining the cases, he could note that, according to
the text, one of the appellants had murdered his own slave. Presumably no slaveholder was of the lowest standing, heinous though his
character might have been."'
Finally, our "silent southerner" might say that the evidence
does not entail the conclusion reached in 7d. Whether the evidence
be the seventy-one local prosecutions or the extremely high rate of
affirmance in the higher court, it would not unassailably follow that
it becomes "hard to accept the arguments of scholars about the
protection afforded blacks by the appellate courts." On his reading
of the statistics the inference could well go the other way. But, even
accepting arguendo Hindus' interpretation of these cases, our ameliorative Whig could properly ask how one can get from one type of
case in just over a third of the judicial districts in one state, especially one long considered "hawkish" on the peculiar institution,'
to any verdict about cases in the South as a whole? Is this not like,
for example, inferring from a party preference poll of Orange County
anything about the overall distribution of party affiliation in California or from a count of Catholics and Protestants in Vermont
anything about the distribution of religious denominations in New
England as a whole?
What, then, of Hindus' related conclusion as to the South Carolina legal system's handling of lesser injuries to slaves? Hindus
states:
8-"The conviction of whites for cruelty to slaves, assaults
on slaves, and undue correction was equally hard to obtain."12"
118. If the Whig knew the preexisting literature on the subject, he might observe that
an earlier author had put forward figures showing that for the years 1830 to 1860 in 25% of
South Carolina appellate cases involving homicide or attempted homicide of slaves the defendants were the slaves' owners-a figure somewhat below the 40% equivalent figure for the
other southern states whose appellate courts heard such cases. See Fairnessand Formalism,
supra note 25, at 77 n.60. Despite the small overall numbers involved, the differences might
usefully provoke speculation before rushing to judgment.
119. W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SourH
CAROLINA, 1816-1836 (1965).

120. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 581.
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I expect our silent southerner might note that the convictionprosecution ratios of 18/71 and 31/83 for slave murder and slave
cruelty suggest, as they work out to 22.5% and 37.3%, that it was
considerably easier to obtain a conviction for slave cruelty than for
slave murder. He might keep that to himself, but what he would
almost certainly exclaim about is that there were eighty-three prosecutions and thirty-one convictions. That the state intervened at all
short of murder might seem even more surprising than the number
of prosecutions for murder.
Hindus' next finding, even though restricted to two of forty-six
districts, would positively excite our half-full-glass Whig:
9-Contrary to conventional wisdom, the "[tirial records
of 1,076 slaves and free blacks . . . for two upcountry Southern

Carolina districts, Anderson and Spartanburg" suggest that although "plantation justice existed" it "was far from the exclusive means of dealing with slave criminality in the upcountry
. . . . [IJn any capital case, the owner was required to submit

his slave for trial. Furthermore, any case that crossed plantation
boundaries or involved race control . . . was likely to appear in

these court records."121

Certainly, I at least am astonished. If further research showed a
similar incidence of cases in the rest of the State and in other slaveholding states, then the penetration of the formal legal system into
the social system of slavery would appear much greater than almost
anyone has suspected. This point deserves substantial elaboration,
particularly given the ways that Hindus develops his two-district
data-by examining and comparing the incidence of trials, conviction rates, and punishment rates among white and black populations. Our ameliorative Whig, while agreeing on the importance of
proposition 9, might interpret the evidence differently. Let us see
how he might proceed.
Hindus' central findings as to the law's degree of penetration
are:
10a-"[C]omparison of rates of trials . . . indicates that

blacks were tried at a lower rate per thousand of population than
were whites."'2
10b-7.2% of the Negro defendants were free blacks. Only
a tiny fraction of the population, free blacks were prosecuted "at
about six times the rate of slaves. Plantation justice . . . proba121. Id. at 582.
122. Id. (Table I).
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bly accounts for part of this difference. But much of it represents
harassment."23
10c-For blacks, "average conviction rates were about twice
those of whites in South Carolina."'
What should be noted first is that, in comparing indictment and
conviction rates among different groups or at different times, a
closed analytic system can be used to produce adverse results regardless of what the rates may be. Thus, if the rate of black indictments is lower than that of whites, one can call this proof that the
formal system of justice did not concern itself with the plantation
subsociety, and that is "bad." Conversely, if the rate of black indictments is higher than that of whites, the difference may be attributed
to persecution or white dominance. That also is "bad." Conviction
rates can be interpreted in the same closed fashion. Lower conviction rates may be held to prove sloppiness of procedures, hypocrisy,
or failing to treat seriously the moral personality of the slave. Conversely, higher conviction rates may be held to prove persecution,
terror, and so on. Similarly, with respect to increasing or decreasing
rates over time for the same groups, be they slaves or free blacks,
an increase may be said to show increasing severity of treatment in
reaction to fears of abolition and black unrest. A decrease may be
said to show that "[a]ll over the South mob action began to replace
orderly judicial procedure, as the feeling against abolitionists
mounted and as Southern views on race became crystallized." 25
To what extent, if at all, might the ameliorative Whig plausibly
argue that this is what happens in Hindus' essay? I think he might
say the following. First, unless we attach a restriction, Hindus'
Table I does not significantly prove his judgment that "blacks were
tried at a lower rate per thousand." The restriction is that the statement is clearly true only for the decade before 1840, and possibly
true after 1850. If our Whig is not statistically inclined, he might
still perceive that the 1840's rate is slightly higher for blacks than
for whites (2.3 versus 2.2 per thousand). If he is statistically inclined, he might say he is frustrated because the data are not displayed by year rather than by decade and thus in a fashion that
permits him to test Hindus' contention in an optimum manner. And
most of all, he might wonder whether a table for the other district
Hindus studied in detail (Anderson) would show similar results.'26
123. Id. at 584.
124. Id. at 587.
125. J. FRANKLIN, THE MILYTANr SouT 89 (1956).
126. This district also seems to be the one with more surviving case records. The text
(Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 582) and Table II (d. at 583) state that
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Having expressed his frustration, however, he might then note
that with the data as presented we can still test one obvious question: For each of the decades, what measure of statistical association
is there between race and trial rate? Employing Yule's Q, an easy
measure to calculate without a computer,'2 he would find that: (1)
for 1831-1840, Yule's Q works out to .586-moderately high, and
suggesting that Hindus is right for that decade; (2) for 1841-1850,
the rates are so close that the measure is useless-for that decade
there is no association between race and likelihood of indictment;
and (3) for 1851-1860, Yule's Q works out to .22-slightly positive
but not sufficient to warrant any certain conclusion."'
Having convinced himself that Hindus has not indisputably
proved his entire point, our Whig might then declare that the more
significant point is that black rates for the two decades before the
there were 1076 trials of blacks in the two districts between 1818 and 1860, the records of
which have survived. Presumably the number of surviving Anderson district cases is 1076
minus the 1818-1830 Spartanburg cases (number not given, but probably quite small), and
minus the 1831-1860 Spartanburg cases (321 according to Table I), equals 755 minus pre-1831
Spartanburg cases.
127. For a discussion of Yule's Q and Goodman and Krustal's gamma, see H. BLALOcK,
SocmAL STATISTIcs (1960).
128. This is particularly true for any extension to South Carolina as a whole. The 1860
census enumerated 402,406 slaves and 9914 free blacks in South Carolina. Hindus' Table I
shows that 8567 blacks lived in the Spartanburg district in the same year-or 2.08% of the
total for the State. Black Jstice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 582.
The equation for Yule's Q =

ad - bc

where a, b, c, & d are the cell entries in a 2 X 2
ad + bc
matrix. In the specific instance, the cell entries (drawn from Hindus' table and approximating the average population for each decade as population at beginning of decade/2 + population at end of decade/2) are as follows:
(a) White Population
Indicted

(b) White Population
Not Indicated

(c) Black Population
Indicted

(d) Black Population
Not Indicted

Therefore:
Yule's Q for 1831-1840 = (306) (5227) - (25) (16694) = .59
(306) (5227) + (25) (16694)
Yule's Q for 1851-1860 = (511) (7943) - (17913) (144) = .22
(511) (7943) + (17913) (144)
A chi-square test does work out as significant at the .001 level for both of these decades.
But given the size of the numbers in the lower cells (chi square is much affected by large
numbers), and given the data base of only 2.08% of the whole State's black population, and
since chi square measures only randomness, not association, I imagine our ameliorist Whig
would want more before agreeing with Hindus about 1851-1860.
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Civil War should have been as high as they were. To him, the more
important point would be the degree of the formal law's penetration
of slave life. And his overall interpretation of the evidence probably
would be that sometime in the late 1830's or early 1840's that penetration became significant and remained so until the time of secession.129
Turning next to the comparative rates of prosecution of free
blacks and slaves, our Whig would probably say that, although the
difference was intriguing, the small amount of data precluded certainty as to its larger significance.130 Almost-certainly, apportioning,
on the basis of two anecdotal citations, part of the difference to
"plantation justice . . . inapplicable to free blacks," and much of
it to "harassment," would strike him as incautious.,', Because I
129. He might venture a final point in this connection. He would suggest that what
Hindus really needs as his demographic measure is not total population by race, but rather
total adult population. That is the population "at risk" of indictment. He would so suggest:
(a) because he would suspect that differential fertility and mortality rates existed between
the races in the Spartanburg district as they have elsewhere throughout United States history, and that there were more "nontriable" children among the black population; and (b)
that with such demographic measures the results might work out differently. A very rough
calculation suggests that the indictment rate for the adult populations of whites and blacks
would be (per 1000 per year) about:
1841-1850
blacks
whites

4.2
3.7

1851-1860
3.2
4.7

That calculation would only be true if the percentages of the two populations 14 years or
younger in the judicial district were the same as those in the United States as a whole at the
time of the 1850 census. Then, 44-45% of the black population and 39-40% of the white
population were under 15 years of age.
130. This is so at least in terms of any generalizations from the two districts to the State
as a whole, or to the entire South. Moreover, the text states that 7.2% of the black defendants
were free. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 584. The only table in the article
that breaks apart the statistics by "slave vs. free" pertains to punishments by whipping. That
table (it is numbered Tables VI and VII but is really the same table) mentions 37 free-black
cases and 390 slave cases ending in punishment by lashing, which would work out to free
blacks receiving 8.7% of such sentences. Id. at 588. Presumably the difference lies mainly
either in differential conviction/acquittal ratios or in the proportions of the types of sentence
imposed.
131. The interpretive apportionment may not be erroneous. The problem is that we do
not have enough data to be sure. Here, as in several other places in the article (for example,
where it is said that South Carolina's legal system was "never intended to be just," id. at
599), the language tells me almost as much about the author's attitude toward the subject
as it does about the subject itself. The evaluating words veer toward a seemingly foreordained
judgment. I am reminded of a statement recently made by Sanford Levinson (discussing the
difficulties of drawing inferences from trial rates, conviction rates, and so on, given the
prevalence of historical relativism today): "We are, presumably, grimly satisfied to discover
those occasions when blacks are convicted more frequently than whites, since, of course, that
surely counts as evidence for the discrimination we correctly believe to have existed in the
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cannot determine exactly what Hindus means to conclude from the
finding that average conviction rates for blacks "were about twice
those of whites in South Carolina" and from a comparison to Massachusetts, where the conviction rate for all persons was seemingly
almost exactly the same as that for South Carolina blacks, 3 2 1 am
unable to guess what our liberal Whig might conjecture. Hence let
me proceed to Hindus' next major cluster of contentions, which
pertain to relative severity of punishment and to changes in South
Carolina justice over time. These contentions are more important
anyhow. They are:
1la-Noncapital punishments of blacks were inequitable
and fairly heavy-though on the average less so than they have
sometimes been characterized.'3
1lb-Capital punishment of blacks was frequent.
"Although execution did not automatically follow a death sentence, blacks were still executed . . . at a high rate."'*3 Between
1800 and 1855, "at least 296 slaves were executed for criminal
offenses in South Carolina."' 35 By contrast, in Massachusetts,
with slightly more than twice the number of South Carolina
blacks, between 1801 and 1845, "only twenty-eight executions
South." S. Levinson (April 13; 1978) (comments presented at the Organization of American
Historians Annual Meeting, New York City) (copy on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). The
paper was a critique of, inter alia, Howington, supra note 70, and of an early draft of this
article. Sometimes Hindus' language reminds me of the attitude toward black defendants
that he imputes to the South Carolina magistrates and judges-guilty unless proven innocent.
That is not to say that on the merits Hindus is wrong-any more often than the South
Carolina magistrates and judges were. It is just to point up the "empty-glass Whiggery."
132. Part of my difficulty stems from trying to place this alongside the use of Massachusetts justice later in the article (in discussing punishments) as a "good standard for the
generation," and alongside other rates of conviction presented elsewhere in the article. To
draw them together, we seemingly learn that the following rates existed:
Jurisdiction

Crime

Conviction
Rate

S.C.
S.C.
S.C.

Murders of slaves by whites
All murders
All crimes

32%
46.7%
71.3%

S.C.
All crimes
34.3%
Mass.
All crimes
69.6%
The figures are drawn from Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 579 n.18 (top
three figures in chart); id. at 587 n.43 (bottom two figures in chart). I cannot reconcile the
difference between the page 579 and the page 587 "All S.C. crimes" conviction rates.
133. Id. at 589.
134. Id. at 595.
135. Id. at 596.
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occurred. . . . This large number of executions calls into ques-

tion economic self-interest as an ultimate guarantor of slaves'
well-being."13
11c-Changesover time in conviction and punishment rates
are explained by "[t]he motive of preserving white dominance,
. . . the function of law and authority in South Carolina. Black

justice may have served some bureaucratic need for certification, while at the same time soothing some slaveholders' consciences, but it was never intended to be just.""3 Evidence for this
is the way the Anderson and Spartanburg district "courts responded to South Carolina's racial crises of the 1850s. Conviction rates, which had been declining, underwent a reversal in
that decade . . . . Punishments became more severe . . . .

[T]he average whipping upon conviction rose from thirty-three
lashes in the 1830s to fifty-six lashes in the 1850s.""3
This is very interesting. But does the evidence necessarily prove the
conclusions? Because I have a better grasp here on Hindus' interpretation of the evidence, I can venture a more certain ameliorative
Whig series of conjectures. Next to Hindus' view that convicted
slaves fared far worse than either South Carolina whites or Massachusetts felons, our Whig would raise several points for debate.
One pertains to the Massachusetts comparison base. Now I am
sure he would concede that there is nothing wrong with, indeed
much instructive in, comparing the Bay State's and the Palmetto
State's treatment of convicted criminals in the antebellum era. But
may that not be like using a Rolls-Royce as the standard, against
which almost any vehicle is bound to fall short, even a decently
performing, moderately priced American sedan? Is not preindustrial South Carolina's legal horse-and-buggy bound to look
quite slow and rough-riding? Our Whig might therefore urge the use
of additional standards of comparison. The question then arises
which additional standards are reasonable and which are
practical? 3 Our Whig might sensibly propose the following: (1)
136. Id. at 596-97.
137. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 590.
139. The reasonable and the practical may not be the same because penal statistics of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are frequently difficult to obtain. Even when
available they may not be very useful. See, e.g., W. BowERs, ExEcUTIONS IN AMERIcA 201.402,
app. A (1974) (since they omit all executions under local authority, and given the nineteenthcentury decline in those executions, Bowers' statistics could produce some very peculiar
results if mishandled). See also J. TOBIAs, CRIME AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIEWY IN THE 19ru CENTURY
256-60 (1967) ("proving" that in a large English industrial city-Leeds-"changes of chief
constable had more effect on the rate of indictable crime than had anything else").
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another slave jurisdiction; (2) the system whence derived those of
South Carolina and Massachusetts-that of Great Britain (for while
it might be regrettable that South Carolina's system did not modernize as swiftly as that of Massachusetts, it would also be interesting to see whether it regressed when compared to the mother country's development); and (3) one or two other legal systems in the
European-Atlantic community of nations and empires (slavery and
punishment are, he might assert, problems of Western culture). To
start the comparison correctly and to mark his distance from some
underlying assumptions about the history of applied penology that
seem as doubtful as they are dogged in studies of slavery, our Whig
also should begin with some general propositions about how one
ought to look at the severity of legally prescribed punishment, white
versus black and slave versus free, in the antebellum South. Because I am not sure that he would,4 0 let me make them on my own
behalf.
Behind the writings on the subject, I detect a developmental
penal paradigm that looks'rather like the following. "In the Dark
Ages punishments were arbitrary, cruel, and bloody. Then came the
Renaissance and the Reformation and the beginnings of humanism
and humanitarianism. But the Counter-Reformation set the clock
back to the cruelties of the Dark Ages. Then came the eighteenth
century. Capital crimes and sadistic punishments were reduced.
This movement was spurred greatly by Enlightenment types such
as Beccaria. Then ensued nineteenth-century penal reforms. Except
in certain retrograde places (some or all slave states and Russia)
doctrines of penal reform came to dominate over primitive notions
of retribution and deterrence. Out went the barbarism of corporal
punishment. In came humane-or at least less inhumane-penitentiaries. Again, except in certain retrograde places
where chain gangs and prison guard savagery replaced earlier sadisms, the emphasis came to be on reform-or at least on dealing
more fairly with criminals."
Now this is a caricature that few historians would believe in all
its simplicities-at least as portraying what they really think about
the subject when they are thinking hard about it. Nonetheless, on
this occasion a page of caricature may be worth many pages of
scholarly recital as a quick litmus test of the vague images of
"punishment in Western history" that we, hardly any of us special140. That is because, depending on how much one permits within the designation
"Whig interpretation" before considering the Whiggery transcended (or traduced), either the
following comments are not Whiggish at all or they are the progeny of a rare subspecies of
Whiggery.
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ists in the subject of penology, carry about in the back of our minds,
for it is within the terms of such vague images that we are likely to
address the subjects within our expertise-be they the history of
American law or of American slavery.
Whether I am right about the caricature's utility depends upon
the reader's reactions to the following set of propositions. This alternate set-oversimplified though it is-seems to me closer to a minimally adequate depiction of the broad outlines of "punishment and
prison in Western history" as it relates to our inquiry. To the extent
that the reader finds he accepted the propositions before I put them,
then I suppose the previous caricature is a straw man. But if it is
that, then I am at a loss to account for the way in which the
"severity of slavery" question has been typically discussed. I shall
put this set as lettered propositions to distinguish them from the
numbered list I have generated. If we are to discuss sensibly the
broad outlines of penal development and to locate southern slavery's punishments within them, then we need, as a bare minimum,
something like the following.
A. It is delusive, even false, to postulate a unilinear concept
of a steady and progressive humanizing of legal punishments starting from an early point (be it located in the Middle Ages or in the
post-Renaissance and Reformation), reaching a take-off point during the Enlightenment, and moving in an ascending arc through the
nineteenth century and into our own era.
B. It is delusive first because it tends to attach itself to, and
to be reinforced by, a larger Whig illusion. That is the illusion that
all, or almost all, civil polities (both western and nonwestern) are
somehow moving along a broad line toward a better endpoint-whether the end-point approximates a pluralist AngloAmerican democracy or a democratic socialist paradise. The unfortunate analytic consequence is a tendency to judge all polities, or
all legal systems, either by their shortfall from the end-point or by
their shortfall from the state, nation, or legal system that seems
most advanced at the particular point in time the historian is considering.
C. It is delusive second because it misconstrues general developmental patterns of European-American punishment. It also fails
to make sufficiently clear distinctions and changes over time among
the following:
(1) the formal law's punishment prescriptions (its statutory
severity);
(2) the execution of punishments (its severity in practice);
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(3) the varieties of corporal, noncorporal, and borderline corporal/noncorporal punishments-again in form and in practice;
(4) the extension and discriminatory nature of the law's punitive power (whom it reaches, and whom it does not, or, whom it
reaches more, and whom less, severely);
(5) the functions of punishment; and
(6) the relationships between the power of the central state,
and penetration of the society by the legal system.
D. To be more specific, the laws of the country whence sprang
South Carolina's laws, England, did not progress in a clear direction
from more severe to less severe during the centuries that were formatively influential on the colonies, the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In fact, as Table II shows, most of the capital crimes still
TABLE 11141
ENGLISH CAPITAL STATUTES AND REIGNS OF ENGLISH MONARCHS

Time Span During Which Statutes Added
Edward III through Henry VII (1327-1509) ...........
Accession of Henry VIII to Charles II (1509-1660) ....
Total Number in Force in 1688 ................
Charles II through George I (1660-1727) ............
George II (1727-1760) .......................
..........
George III (1760-1810) ..................
Total Number in Force in 1819 ................

Number
Added

Number
In Force

6
30
approximately 50
91
33
63
.. . 200+
....

on the English statute books as late as 1820 were products of the
"Enlightenment century." In other European countries, too, humanizing the law did not proceed steadily from the Enlightenment
on."' Just about the time that the post-American Revolutionary
wave of "permissivism" concerning manumission of slaves turned to
the ebb,"' European countries began to doubt the Enlightenment
141. The figures in this table are derived from 1 L. RADZINOWIcz, supra note 111, at 45.
142.

See M. FoucAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977).

Furthermore, throughout the eighteenth century, one can observe a certain increased
severity . . . [;] in France, the legislation on vagabonidage had been revised in the
direction of greater severity on several occasions since the seventeenth century; a tighter,
more meticulous implementation of the law tended to take account of a mass of minor
offences that it once allowed to escape more easily . . . .

Id. at 76.
143. For an account of slippage away from "promanumission" legislation passed in the
Revolutionary era during the 1790's and early 1800's, see W. JonAN, WHITE OvER BLACK
(1968). For another view of the relationships between the ideals and political structures of
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wisdom, and the French Revolutionary enthusiasm, that had resulted in codified liberalizations. For example, in Switzerland some
cantons went back to the penal laws of Charles V-enacting in effect
the views of a Zurich judge who, replying in 1802 to a government
questionnaire about the effects of recent penal reforms, "bitterly
attacked the humanitarian effeminacy of the age . . . , made ironic

remarks about the dream of a possible elevation of mankind . . . ,
[and] recommended the reestablishment of a qualified death penalty and corporal punishment."' Prussia, under Frederick the
Great and particularly under Frederick William II, had had a comparatively mild set of criminal statutes,"' but at the end of the
eighteenth century she brought back whipping, branding, and the
pillory. Austria, rejecting the Enlightenment reformism of Joseph II
in respect to criminal matters, reintroduced capital punishment in
1803.u6 It is against that larger comparative backdrop, not simply

against what was happening in some other ex-British colony, that
the penal habits and capital dispositions of an American slave-state
should be prdjected. The Constitution of the new Republic, whatever its other efficacies and virtues, and despite its temporal attendance by calls for rejecting English common law so to extirpate the
baneful influence of monarchic despotism, did not unmake the past
or entirely remove the legacy and influence of European penal conventions."'
E. A more adequate, if too quickly sketched, backdrop of relevant European punitive arrangements would (ignoring what in the
contours of society, economy, and polity gave those arrangements
the characteristics they possessed) resemble a composite (and aesthe American Revolution and slavery, see D. MAcLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AmERIcAN
REVOLUTION (1974).
144. G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SocAL, STRucTURE 98 (1939).
145. Id. at 99.
146. For a readable and interesting general account of Joseph II, see S. PADoVER, THE
REVOLUTIONARY EMPEROR: JOSEPH HI OF AuSTRIA (1967). But for some caveats as to how much
Joseph's Enlightenment reformism improved the prisoner's lot, see J. SELUN, SLAVERY AND
THE PENAL SYSTEM 66-69 (1976).
147. For discussions of the fight in some ex-colonies over whether the English common
law was best received or rejected wholesale as antithetical to American independence, see E.
BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836 (1964), and L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
24, at 93-100. At times the issue provoked intense feelings, not to mention silly legislative
enactments, that are hard to understand now. But, and this is my central point, despite an
American penchant for changing history that seems to persist (such as the naming and
renaming of Cape Canaveral), there is simply no way that the contemporary historian can
properly detach South Carolina's legal tradition, or that of any other of the original thirteen
colonies, from all its trans-Atlantic links. Moreover, the practice is less excusable now than
it was in the early days of the Republic when Americans were trying to figure out what it
meant to be American, and hence avoiding foreign entanglements.
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thetically outrageous) triptych, in which the left panel sums the
Boschian horrors typifying the pre-eighteenth-century practice, the
central panel depicts &1'Ingres the doubtful rationalisms of the
Enlightenment century, and the right panel shows Daumier-like the
nineteenth-century punitive progress. The left-hand panel would
illustrate at least these main features of the pre-eighteenth-century
past:
(1) Extending the applicability of corporal punishment
under state aegis from the lowest classes upwards through the
social strata;"'
(2) Introducing galley slavery in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and widespread branding in the sixteenth century-the latter for obvious reasons of identification and the
former, diffusing from southern Europe to central and northern
Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,' to turn
punishment to governmental profit;8 0
(3) Substituting, as sailing vessels replaced rowed galleys
penal slavery at naval bases;'"'
warfare,
in
(4) Introducing houses of correction (first, in England, the
Bridewell, but more important as an influence and model for the
rest of Europe, the Amsterdam Tuchthuis in 1596), which, like
galley slave ships and les bagnes,"2 sought to reap a profit from
148. See J. SELLIN, supra note 146. To me this is the most interesting thesis of an
otherwise slightly disappointing book, a book very long on the horrors and rather short on
analysis. Sellin sets out to explore and winds up confirming Gustav Radbruch's contention,
in a 1938 essay, Der Ursprungdes Strafrechts aus dem Stande der Unfrelen, reprintedin G.
RADBRUCH, ELEGANTIAE JURIS CRUINAus (1950), that "[t]o this day, the criminal law bears
the traits of its origin in slave punishments," and that "punishments originally reserved for
those in bondage were later inflicted for crimes committed by low-class freemen, and ultimately on offenders regardless of their social status." J. SELmU, supra note 146, at viii. "By
the end of the twelfth century, the slave punishments of earlier days had been enshrined in
public penal law and made applicable to free and unfree alike." Id. at 41.
149. Convict oarsmen were used in the Danish galleys in the seventeenth century.
Even the landlocked states of central Europe saw galley slavery as an attractive means
of ridding the community of undesirables. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the
Swiss canton of Lucerne had a galley for convicts on Lake Lucerne, and Bern had one
on Lake Geneva . . . .
Id. at 54-55. Not long after, these Swiss communities decided that it was more profitable to
sell their galley convicts south to Mediterranean polities.
150. The exact date and place of the beginning of galley slavery as a specific punishment for crimes committed is obscure. A 1348 Castilian ordinance mentions it, but it does
not seem to have become "big business" until the following century. See id. at 43-55.
"Branding began to be used in the middle of the sixteenth century. At first, a fleur-de-lis was
burned into the shoulder . . . but later . . . the use of the letters GAL became common
practice." Id. at 49-50.
151. See id. at 83-104.
152. Convict prisons. THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 72 (1973).
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punishment by means of forced labor, but unlike these institutions, had in mind the notion of reforming criminals before they
became worse;"1 3 and
(5) Introducing, as a commutation of capital punishment,
transportation to penal colonies overseas in the seventeenth century. 54
If the principal features of this pre-eighteenth-century part of
the triptych are extension and inventiveness in new modes of retribution as well as the glimmerings of the idea of reforming, what then
of the middle part, the eighteenth century? As our quick look at
English capital statutes suggested, humanizing was not the sole
order of the British day; nor was it on the continent. One example
will suffice: a criminal was sentenced to be taken in a cart to a
scaffold before the front door of a church where,
the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs, and calves with red-hot
pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the . . .
parricide, burnt with sulfur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn
away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, . . . and then his body drawn and

quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to
ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds . . . .1
153. J. SELLIN, supra note 146, at 70-82.
154. Id. at 97. For a detailed study of two penal colonies in Australia roughly contemporaneous with the period of our concern in the slave South, see J. RrrcmE, PUNISHMENT AND
Paorr (1970).
155. The sulphur was lit, but the flame was so poor that only the top skin of the
hand was burnt . . . . [The executioner . .. took the steel pincers, which had been
especially made for the occasion, . . . [but] found it so difficult to tear away the pieces
of flesh that he set about the same spot two or three times, twisting the pincers as he
did so . . . .
. . * [Tihe same executioner dipped an iron spoon in the pot containing the boiling
potion, which he poured liberally over each wound. Then the ropes that were to be
harnessed to the horses were attached with cords to the patient's body . . . .
The horses tugged hard, each pulling straight on a limb . . . . After quarter of an

hour, the same ceremony was repeated . . ., [and] after several attempts, the direction
of the horses had to be changed . . . . Two more horses had to be added . . , which
made six . . . in all. Without success.
Finally, the executioner . . . said . . . that there was no way or hope of succeeding,

and told him to ask their Lordships if they wished him to have the prisoner cut into
pieces. [The prisoner] . . . told them . . . to carry out their task and . . . asked the
parish priest . . . to pray for him . . . .

. . . [Tihe executioner . . . cut the body at the thighs instead of severing the legs
at the joints; the four horses gave a tug and carried off the two thighs after them, . . .
then the same was done to the arms . . .; the flesh had to be cut almost to the bone
When the four limbs had been pulled away, the confessors came to speak to him,
. . . the truth was that I saw the man move his lower jaw . . . as if he were tallking.
One of the executioners even said shortly afterwards that when they had lifted the trunk
to throw it on the stake, he was still alive.
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The date of this lay not in the darkest Middle Ages, nor even
in the religious strife of the Counter-Reformation.' Nor was the
place Russia or some other polity of backward infamy. Rather, it
occurred during the height of the Enlightenment, and at its physical
intellectual center, Paris.
Of course it may be objected that this public spectacle of torture, designed both to deter and as punishment worse than mere
speedy death, was precisely what the Enlightenment reformers objected to. But for two reasons this objection is not entirely convincing. The first reason is that whatever the motives of Enlightenment
objections in theory, the practice remains as part of the penal backdrop of slavery in the American colonies. It was only two years
before the French execution just described that Georgia shaped her
slave code. The second reason arises from the motives behind, and
curative modes of, the Enlightenment theorists' proposed reforms.
To be sure, humanizing, softening, and eliminating excessive punishments were aims. But at least three other characteristics were
also present that we should not forget.
First, alongside the humanizing tendencies was that other
strain of Enlightenment thinking-rationalizing. Hence arose one of
the novelties of the Enlightenment's approach to penology-an assiduous concern for making the punishment fit the crime, for graduating the penal harshness by fine degrees. But there came out in the
effort a side of rationalism that today looks slightly bizarre. Katherine Preyer'67 has recently analyzed perhaps the most indicative
American example-Thomas Jefferson's 1776-1779 proposal" in the
Virginia legislature for the reform of the Commonwealth's laws.
Revulsed at their "sanguinary hue," Jefferson wanted to rework
them into proportioned penalties. But, to the twentieth-century eye
at least, the proportioning was a bit odd. Cutting down drastically
on the number of capital crimes, and thus escaping the English
M. FOUCAULT, supra note 142, at 3-5 (the account of an officer of the watch). My abbreviations
have considerably toned down the disgustingness of the process.
156. Rather it occurred in the year when Edmund Burke's first literary triumph, A
PHILOsoPHIcAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL (1757)
was published, the year in which George Washington turned twenty-five and Frederick the
Great defeated the French at Rossbach, and two years after the publication of Rousseau's
DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (1755) and Diderot's
great ENCYLOPEDIA (1755). Voltaire was already 63 at the time.
157. K. Preyer, Reforming the Criminal Law in Virginia (Oct. 22, 1976) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History) (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review).
158. The proposal was made to the Virginia legislature in 1776, and a legislative committee, of which Jefferson was a member, was formed in that year, but the presentation of
the draft bill was not made until June 1779. It failed to pass. Id.
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inheritance in part, Jefferson advocated, for instance, death by
burying alive for high treason, death by poison for murder by poison,
death by hanging and gibbeting for murder by duel,'" castration for
buggery, and maiming the offender in the same fashion that he
maimed his victim.8 0
Second, proportionalizing punishments downward from death
did not necessarily mean, even when the proportionalizing eliminated the death penalty, just humanizing by establishing a more
pleasant punitive limit short of that sentence. Beccaria is generally
thought of as the locus classicus of the anti-capital punishment
movement and as the real start of modem penology's deemphasis
of retribution and emphasis on deterrence. That much is correct. It
is well to remember, however, that Beccaria objected to capital
punishment not because it was inhumane but because it did not
deter. What Beccaria wanted was effective punishment whose
"painfulness only just exceed[s] the benefits derived from the
crime." 8' But at the peak of his pyramid of punishments, having
taken away the capstone of capital p'unishment, he substituted, and
quite explicitly justified, a deterrent punishment that he thought
would be viewed as worse than death-lifelong slavery accompanied
by painful treatment. For Beccaria, one of the reasons that the
death penalty did not deter was because "[m]any look on death
with a firm and calm regard-some from fanaticism, some from
vanity, . . . some in a last desperate attempt . . . to escape misery
. . ."" What he proposed as a substitute did not have this puni-

tive flaw. Penal slavery for life "among fetters and chains, under the
rod, under the yoke or in an iron cage" 18 3 did not permit the exercise
of fanaticism or vanity. And, as long as suicide was guarded against,
escape from misery was prevented also. "Were one to say that perpetual slavery is as painful as death and therefore equally cruel I
would reply that . . . the former would be even worse."'" This is

an interesting humanitarianism, and as practiced by Beccaria's
royal disciple, Joseph II, at least in Austria the way that Beccaria
159. This punishment applied only to the original "challenger" if he won. The "winning
defendant" was merely to be hanged.
160. Jefferson thus was proposing to revive the lex talionis. In other sections of his
proposed bill the Anglo-Saxon notion of restitution to the victim's kin returned. As Preyer
notes, the proposal has embarrassed some later Jefferson scholars. See M. PETERSON, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE NEw NATION 124-33 (1970).
161. J. SELuN, supra note 146, at 65 (quoting from C. BECcARIA, OF CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTs (1764)).

162. Id. at 66.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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puts the trade-offs may well have been correct."'
Third, if rationalization did not necessarily mean less cruelty,
neither did the shift at the turn of the century from retribution and
deterrence to reform and deterrence. To say. that brings us to the
third part of the triptych-the nineteenth-century backdrop against
which the punishments of American penology, in both slave state
and free, were evolving. Although during the nineteenth century the
law shifted from prescribing one set of physically agonizing punishments to a different set of punishments, the shift was not simply one
from punishment of the body to punishment of the spirit,"' or a
replacement of more barbarous punishment with less barbarous
punishment, or a movement from less humane punishment to more
humane punishment. If we so view the shift, then we fall into gross
dichotomies conditioned by, and perhaps too uncritical of, modern
penal practices'm7-dichotomies that lead us into lining up countries
and states along a developmental line, preferring one system and
disparaging another. Although there is some truth in these depicted
shifts, especially if we are comparing the beginning and the end of
the nineteenth century, we should keep in mind the following qualifications.
(1) While the nineteenth century witnessed a diminution in
the mutilation-branding-whipping trio of direct violent assaults on
the body prescribed by formal judicial sentence, it also saw at least
two expansions of physical punishments. One was the use of whipping to control and punish in the prisons."' That the judge did not
sentence a convict to a whipping did not mean the convict would
165. One Josephine substitution for the death penalty was barge-towing in the Hungarian portion of the Danube. I say "in" advisedly. The criminals were placed in foot-irons and
neck-irons, "harnessed in rows to the vessels, often to the waist or even to the neck in water,
wading through swamps and constantly forced to labor, . . . ." Id. at 67 (quoting the military
commander there). Of 1175 criminals so sentenced between 1784 and 1791, 721 died at their
toil. Life expectancy was about two years "on the job." That works out to about a 30%
mortality rate per year, which is comparable to death rates in the worst of New World slavery
conditions. See P. Cuarm, THE ATLANric SLAvE TRADE (1969); C. DEGLER, supra note 101.
Irons used to short-chain prisoners in Graz weighed about 50 pounds, and according to a 1790
governmental report "hinder them in working and sleeping [such that] [elven the healthiest and strongest man could not last under this extreme kind of punishment more than four
years." J. SELLIN, supra note 146, at 68 (quoting from Kaut, Leibes und Freiheitsstrafen,in
STRAFRECHTSSAMMLUNG DES N& LANDESMUSEUM IM Scm.oss GREILLENSTEIN 52 (Vienna Museum)).
166. See M. FOUCAULT, supra note 142, at 7-8.
167. Of the abolition of torture as a public spectacle, Foucault remarks, "perhaps it has
been attributed too readily and too emphatically to a process of 'humanization,' thus dispensing with the need for further analysis." Id. at 7. I am inclined to agree.
168. All this says nothing of the many twentieth-century nations that, especially in the
last 30 years or so, have reintroduced torture, or substantially expanded it from a lesser late
nineteenth-century base, and moreover have invented new techniques for punishment.
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not be whipped later by the guard. The other expansion amounted
to new inventions, for the nineteenth century was by no means
unimaginative in its penal thoughts. One innovation, for example,
was hooding the criminal, making it impossible for him to see anything, and forcing him to scrutinize his inward soul until he repented. This "humane" reform may or may not have worked well,
since often the prisoner went mad.'" But, results aside, even if the
intent was to translate the punishment from torture of the body to
reform of the soul, the means was not wholly noncorporal. Though
in one sense gentler, the assault was extended drastically over time,
and in some cases lasted the entire prison sentence. A similar point
can be made about the nineteenth-century modifications of penal
labor-the treadwheel, the crank, and oakum picking. With Beccarian logic, a new futility is introduced. And, the very pointlessness
of being made to turn a crank or a treadmill that had no product
output (in contrast to the older forms of Tuchthuis labor that at
least produced something, repulsive to the worker though the tedium and labor might have been) must have increased the physically
punitive impact of the labor. 0 It is well to remember that this form
of punishment reached its peak in Great Britain under the Du Cane
regime of the last quarter of the nineteenth century."' That is the
169. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 259-60.
170. The treadmill appears to have been reinvented in the early nineteenth century, for
that was when it really caught on as a punishment, though one had been installed in the very
first London house of corrections in the 1580's. See J. SELLIN, supra note 146, at 107. William
Cubitt, an Ipswich engineer, designed one for Suffolk County jail in 1820, and within 12 years
87 of England's 93 local prisons had installed them. By midcentury the real novelty of the
nineteenth-century version, that the "labor produced nothing except sweat and fatigue," was
in full sway. Id. at 109. Here, abbreviated from Sellin are typical workday assignments
computed in vertical feet that prisoners were required to climb in the 1830's. Id. at 109.
Hours on Wheel
Prison

Summer

Durham Jail
9
Exeter House of Correction
8
Reading Jail
8
Worcester Jail
10

Daily "Climb"

Winter

Summer

Winter

6
7
8
8

10,867
9860
12,564
13,600

7560
8612
12,564
10,880

According to Sellin, the usual requirement for the hand-crank (in which the prisoner was
required to turn round and round a crank with a friction device to make the turning difficult-a crank that produced nothing at all) was 10,000 revolutions per day. Id. at 110. If forced
to the choice, and other things being equal (hours and years of service), some of us might
prefer picking cotton in the open air.
171. The British prison system was centralized in 1877 and placed under the control of
the Home Office's Prison Commission, whose chairman was one Colonel Edmund Du Cane,
"a strict militarist." Id. at 112. A much later occupant of the same position, Sir Lionel Fox,
wrote of Colonel Du Cane's chairmanship in 1951: "Our prisons for twenty years presented

1979]1

REASON OF SLAVERY

57

underside of the nineteenth century-the side we forget when we
look at a Monet landscape.
(2) There is something close to a twentieth-century historian's
penal faith that may not make sense at all-that even a small number of lashes is a less humane punishment than almost any number
of months or years in prison. One hundred thirty years ago, Charles
Dickens, visiting Philadelphia's model prison, Cherry Hill, thought
otherwise.'7 2 He may have been right, and we should be cautious in
making the contrary assumption, even if we do not know the exact
trade-offs.
(3) A third qualification is needed because of a danger when
engaging in the newly fashionable historiographical pastime of
"lash-o-metrics,"" 3 producing a variation of the Gertrude Stein fallacy that a rose is a rose is a rose: thirty-nine lashes is thirty-nine
lashes is thirty-nine lashes. 7 ' Assuming, arguendo, that corporal
the pattern of deterrence by severity of punishment, uniformly, rigidly, and efficiently applied. For death itself, the system had substituted a living death. It became legendary . . .
even in Russia." Id. at 112. I shall have to confess I had not heard the legend before reading
Sellin. But see J. TOBIAs, supra note 139, at 204 (quoting S. WEBB & B. WEBB, ENGLISH
PRISONS UNDER LOCAL GovERNMENTS (1963)). The regime was characterized by "a uniform

application of cellular isolation, absolute non-intercourse among the prisoners, the rule of
silence, oakum-picking, and the tread-wheel." Id. at 207.
172. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NoTES (1842), cited in L. FRIEDMAN, supranote 24, at
260 n.28.
173. That seems as appropriate a linguistic barbarism as any, given its origin in
"cliometrics." See R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS 144 (1974).
174. And the assumption sometimes seems to be that such a sentence is 62.5% more
painful, cruel, barbaric, and regressive than a sentence of two dozen lashes. Marvin Harris
verges on the point, although writing in another connection-taking Elkins to task for
arguing that proof of greater physical leniency in North American (as opposed to Latin)
slavery would be largely irrelevant, even if forthcoming. For Elkins they would be irrelevant
because they overlook a fact more significant to Elkins: since the Latins recognized the slave's
moral personality, in the case of Latin American slaves we are "dealing with the cruelty of
man to man," S. ELKINS, supra note 22, at 78 n.113, whereas in the case of United States

slavery we are dealing with the behavior of men towards slaves considered "legally and
morally not men." Id. (emphasis in original). Harris observes: "It is devoutly to be hoped
that Elkins shall never be able to test his exquisite sense of equity by experiencing first thirty
lashes dealt out by someone who calls him a black man and then a second thirty from
someone who calls him a black devil." M. HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RAcE IN THE AMERIcAs 75

(1964). This passage occurs as part of a long section in which Harris appears to be arguing
two things at once. One is that comparison of the severities of different slave systems is a
waste of time. "Better to dispute the number of angels on a pinhead . . . . The slaves,
wherever they were, didn't like it . . . ." Id. at 74. The other is that Elkins' and Tannen-

baum's argumentation and evidence for the lesser nastiness of Hispanic and Brazilian slavery
are defective. I think that Harris is right on the latter issue. But with respect to the former,
his righteous indignation leads to throwing out the historiographical baby with the immoral
bathwater. Great vibrant phrases make for vague analysis. For example: "What the laws of
the Spanish and Portuguese kings had to do with the attitudes and values of the Spanish
and Portuguese planters, however, baffles one's imagination. The Crown could publish all the
laws it wanted, but in the lowlands, sugar was king." Id. at 76. That is closer to a statement
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cruelty is worth measuring, then we ought to measure it properly.
It is plain that there are at least three relevant variables besides the
number of lashes administered and the frequency with which whippings took place."' These variables are: the condition of the victim,
the instrument used, and the manner of its application. Although I
do not pretend to have much expertise on the subject, even a cursory
browsing among some of the weirder tomes in penal literature shows
that the mental picture most "lash-o-metricians" seem to have of
the matter will not do. As far as I can see, and drawing also on our
previous comments, the mental picture looks rather like this:
COMPARATIVE SEVERITY/HUMANENESS OF NONCAPITAL PUNISHMENTS
+
Totally
Barbaric
MUTILATION

Very

Quite

More

Barbaric

Retrograde

Humane

BRANDING

WHIPPING

INCARCERATION

*II

The mental picture is seemingly composed of four neat little Whig
boxes, with (apart from some ambiguities about the separateness of
the two left-hand boxes, and some shadowiness about the way in
which the right-hand box shades into contemporary penal practices)
order-of-magnitude differences and no overlap between the boxes.
And, at least with respect to the "Quite Retrograde" box, there is
little internal differentiation. A bit of browsing and a bit of thinking
make clear why this mental picture will not do. First, as to the
condition of the victim, there are obvious physical and mental differences-whether he is plied with rum beforehand, whether he feels
he deserves the punishment, whether he derives expiation from it,
whether (at one extreme) the punishment severely degrades his
sense of status and self-esteem, leaves it unchanged, or (at the other
extreme) enhances it; and the state of his health."' Second, with
of a problem for historical explanation than it is to a solution.
Consider also Fogel's and Engerman's discussion of whipping and the slaves' absorption
of the Protestant ethic in TYme on the Cross, where they begin by noting that whipping "could
be either a mild or severe punishment." R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, supra note 173, at 144.
Most of the discussion, however, reads as if this comment had not been made. See also H.
GUrMAN, SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME: A CRTIQUE OF TIME ON THE CROss 14-41 (1975).
But note that the emphasis on the frequency of whipping in Gutman's critique arises from
his objections to Fogel and Engerman's statistical inferences on the matter.
175. Unlike Hindus, who does both numbers and frequencies, most of the "lash-ometricians" so far have simply concerned themselves with the matter of frequency.
176. Without going into much detail here, let us make a few observations. First, some
of the "luckier" sailors were made drunk before flogging. Second, some criminals do want to
be punished. Third, the unspoken historians' assumption that all slaves, or all European
whites, whipped for crimes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries felt as degraded as we
would now or as would have members of the ruling class or the bourgeoisie of the time may
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respect to the instrument used, there are substantial differences in
the amount of pain and punishment of which each is capable. For
example, it appears that some of the most common produced very
different results-ranging from the Russian.knout and the bastinado (frequently lethal or permanently crippling), through the English cat-o'-nine-tails (which could be, but usually was not, lethal or
permanently crippling), to the whips prescribed in southern slave
law. Third, there were customary and officially prescribed differences in the manner of application-the locus on the body (which
is what made the bastinado so injurious), how powerful the strokes
were (in the British navy a fuller swing was taken than in the British
army, with more devastating effects), and whether the sentence
continued, or was halted until recovery and then resumed, or simply
cut short if the victim fainted or seemed on the point of death. These
are not particularly pleasant details. Yet we cannot sensibly approach the question of punitive severity in the legal systems of
southern slavery without a coherent picture of the western penal
tradition, a picture of which these unpleasant details are an integral
part. Bearing those qualifications and details in mind, let us consider some illustrative comparisons that put the formal penal prescriptions of South Carolina black justice in better perspective.
(a) A Non-Anglo-Saxon, New World Slavery. A runaway
slave, found guilty of an assault upon a soldier (having "almost
killed him, . . . broken his jaw, his teeth and almost blinded
him,"-but only after the soldier "ill-treated him") was
"condemned . . . to be flogged every day and on Sundays . . . his
not always be accurate. See, e.g., 1 G. RAWICK, THE AMERICAN SLAVE: A CoMPosTE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1972). "But dem whippin's done me good. Dey break me up from thievin'
and make de man of me." E.GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORD THE SLAvEs MADE
65 (1972) (quoting from 4 G. RAwicK, supra, at 55). The viewpoint of the ex-slave quoted is
as different from that of Frederick Douglass or Solomon Northrup as it is from our own.
Fourth, I am not sure how much to make of the last phase in the quote. But is the attitude
altogether different from the white-American tradition that makes a male virtue of taking
your punishment, "your medicine," like a man? As long as we are debunking the myth of
Sambo these days, we ought not to rule entirely out the possibility that some recipients of
corporal punishment gained more status from the way they "took it" than they lost with their
reference groups whose members were all subject to the same cruelties. Finally, we should
not, when we say "x" corporal punishment is barbarous, or utterly cruel, ignore two factors
that recent medical research tells us make for substantial differences in the amount of pain
experienced, and presumably in the felt cruelty. The first is the surrounding expectations and
circumstances. For example, "wounded soldiers are said to feel far less pain than equivalently
injured civilians because for the soldier the wound means the war is over . . . ." Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 4, 1978, at 3, cols. 1-2. The second factor is that a person's psychological attitude
towards pain is linked to his body's release of endorphins, chemicals apparently "involved in
the body's natural system of pain control." Id. at 20, col. 1. I do not presume to offer any
answers with these speculations, but merely to underline some reasons why I think insufficient the conventional historian's approach to matters of punitive severity.
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right ear to be cut off, and to carry a chain on his foot . . . for the
remainder of his days . . . ."1I The place was French Louisiana,

and the date, 1742. Although the incident occurred long before the
nineteenth century, I mention it in part to give a sense of the
eighteenth-century base from which nineteenth-century slave systems evolved, and in part to help correct the notion that non-Anglo
New World slavery was always more humane than Anglo-American
slavery."'
(b) The "Mother Country." Suppose that our ameliorative
Whig thought to compare South Carolina black justice with justice
in the British navy, taking the navy as the closest British analogue
to slavery for Englishmen. He might well anticipate that English
sailors, though mistreated, would fare better than South Carolina
slaves. If so, he would be in for a surprise about the punishments
doled out as lawful retribution. Drawing together Hindus' statistics
on corporal punishment in Massachusetts and South Carolina with
those in a recent article on the Royal Navy,"' he could derive Table
TABLE III
WHIPPINGS TYPIFYING THREE ANGLO POLITIES

Massachusetts
State Prison, 1840's
S.C. slaves
1818-1860 (Anderson
& Spartanburg
districts)

British navy,
1768-1770
1790-1791
1812
1793-1809
1755-1797

Average Lashes

Crime

Place & Dates

felonies

not more than 10

......................

52.7
property
45.9
against person ..................
against morality . ................ 39.7
127.3
sexual crimes ...................
72.8
threatening authority ..............
45.4
Average of All Trials of Slaves
desertion .......................
desertion . .. ...................
desertion ........................
homosexual offenses . . . , . ........
.........
mutiny ................

Average (Unweighted) of all
Sailors' Punishments for Above Offenses

184
208
197
425
283

259

177. 11 LA. Hisr. Q. 288, 292 (1928) (emphasis added).
178. I have not come across in any of the English-American colonial or postindependence appellate court cases anything like prescribing daily whippings for the remainder of one's days.
179. Gilbert, Buggery and the British Navy, 1700-1861, 1976 J. Soc. HIST. 72.
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He might go on to observe that maximum South Carolina slave
whipping sentences paled by comparison with some representative
British navy yearly "highs." Thus:
British navy,
1760 high
1761 high
1762 high

desertion and theft ............... .700
600
drunkenness, disrespect, mutiny ....
1000
buggery .........................

These highs-and perhaps also some of the averages above-were
in fact, if not in legal form, capital sentences. Few sailors would
have lived through that many strokes of the cat.
If our Whig were thoughtful, he might be intrigued by the comparison and yet not be wholly satisfied by the results. Should he not
look further to the civilian population of England, and the administration of justice to it, both capital and noncapital? Comparing
Hindus' South Carolina statistics with the British period that saw
the separation of crown and colony, beginning with the accession of
George m in 1760, he could derive Table IV.so
TABLE IV
LAGGED TABLE OF LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH
AND EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH CAROLINA
CAPITAL SENTENCES

London & Middlesex

South Carolina

Decade

Capital
Convictions

Executions

Decade

Executions
(Slaves)

1760-1769
1770-1779
1780-1789
1790-1799
1800-1809

428
776
1189
745
821

224
356
534
211
110

1800-1809
1810-1819
1820-1829
1830-1839
1840-1849

37
35
87
42
59

180. A word of explanation is needed as to why the dates in the Table are "lagged
comparisons," as to why the same decades are not compared. First, the ideal solution, comparing South Carolina and British rates 1760-1810, is not possible because there are no South
Carolina statistics available for the earlier decades. Second, comparing the same decades in
the nineteenth century would not suit our ameliorist Whig for two reasons. One, as the dismal
Whig would doubtless note, the results of such a comparison would not suit the ameliorist
Whig, because, especially following the reforms of English penal statutes during the third and
fourth decades of the nineteenth century, the English rates would look much "better" than
the South Carolina ones. Two, as the ameliorist Whig would respond, the first reason is not
a very good one because it turns his argument into an argument he is not trying to make. He
is not, he would emphasize, trying to suggest that South Carolina kept up with northern and
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Regretting that earlier statistics for South Carolina are not
available, what might our Whig nonetheless be struck by? Could he
safely conclude that allowing for the lagged time, slaves in South
Carolina were less likely to receive capital sentences than were their
free English counterparts in London forty years earlier, or more
likely? One test would be to correct for differences in total population size, and thus to construct a table such as Table V.
TABLE V

Number of Slave
Executions

Decade
1800-1809
1810-1819
1820-1829
1830-1839
1840-1849
1850-1854

37
35
87
42
59
27 x 2= 54 equivalent

S.C. Slave
Population*

Percent of Slave
Population
Executed
per Decade

171,258
227,420
286,938
321,220
356,011
389,340

0.022%
0.015%
0.030%
0.013%
0.017%
0.014%

*Computed on a straight-line basis between censuses
(Census n + census n + 1)
2

Equally accurate statistics for London during the late eighteenth
century are not obtainable, but it would seem safe, given the city's
growth rate from the first decennial census in 1801 through the
nineteenth century, to conclude that during the eighteenth century,
English capital punishment reforms of the nineteenth century. He is trying to compare South
Carolina justice with the system of justice from which it split off at the time of the Revolution,
with, so to speak, its base-line. The point is related to a more general one-which of five ways
is the most accurate way of thinking about southern slavery law: (a) as regressive, as actually
"going backwards;" (b) as static, as somehow struck in a pre-Enlightenment phase; (c) as
diverging, as taking a different (autonomous) evolutionary course, from that of the American
North, England, and/or Europe; (d) as moving forward (but more slowly) along essentially
the same Enlightenment and liberalism influenced-path as those other places took, or; (e) as
a complete mixture of the above. For further discussion, see Part Three (A) of this Article
infra.
Much the same considerations apply to the construction of Table VI, infra. The year 1785
is chosen because that is the year for which data are readily available, and Radzinowicz
declares that it is fairly representative. The South Carolina data are from Black Justice Under
White Law, supra note 30, at 595. The London and Middlesex data are from 1 L. RADziNowIcz,
supra note 111, at 147, 152. There are no major perturbations in the annual data displayed
in Radzinowicz that would, if we divided the ten-year spans differently, produce substantially
different trends than those apparent in Table IV, to wit: (1) a peak of both capital sentences
and actual executions in the 1780's; (2) a slight increase in the number of capital sentences,
but; (3) a downtrend in the number of actual executions.
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her population never exceeded one million.' 8' Thus, alongside the
range of South Carolina rates of execution per decade (from the
1830-1839 low of 0.013% or thirteen per 100,000, to its Denmark
Vesey influenced 1820-1829 high of 0.030%, or thirty per 100,000) he
could place the London range of eleven per 100,000 (1800-1809) to
fifty-three per 100,000 (1780-1789). He might be content to leave the
matter there, and as long as we did not forget his caveat of comparing two forty-year lagged half-centuries, then we could agree that
he had demonstrated his case. But what of the one decade when
there is overlap, 1800-1809? There, if the comparison is corrected for
population, the Londoners fare better. Does this undercut his case?
No, he probably would reply, "because of the way I am constructing
my case. I am not saying that year for year South Carolina slaves
always fared better. Moreover, I want you to see for what crimes
Londoners were hanged during the relevant period. Let me give you
a representative year, 1785." So saying, he would construct Table
VI.
TABLE VI
CRIMES FOR WHICH LONDONERS WERE EXECUTED IN 1785

Murder
Sex
Serious battery
Burglary
Robbery
Unlawfully returning
from transportation
Horsestealing
Other Property Crimes
Total

1
0
0
43
31
4
5
13
97

Having constructed Table VI, our Whig might ask whether South
Carolina slaves were ever hanged in these proportions for crimes
against property.
(c) Another Slave State-Tennessee. A well-rounded comparative evaluation of South Carolina's legal system should include at
least one other slave state. Only very recently, however, with the
appearance of Howington's work on the Tennessee judiciary, has
research similar to Hindus' been done at the lower court level. Although Howington's work is still incomplete, his study of six Ten181. London population was 960,000 in 1801 and 2,400,000 in 1851. E. WOODWARD, THE
AGE OF REFORM, 1815-1870, at 1 (1938).
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nessee counties182 (including the one with the largest free Negro
population) is sufficient to permit some interesting contrasts with
Hindus' findings.
Although I cannot make all the comparisons I would like because of differences in how the two scholars analyze their data,
black justice in these six Tennessee counties looks, in Whiggish
terms, substantially better than South Carolina's. It evolved further
along nineteenth-century lines: serious crimes were brought into the
regular lower level court system; the "racial gap" with respect to
prosecution rates and sentencing patterns was narrower; and the
types of punishments to which free Negroes were subjected came to
approximate, as the nineteenth century wore on, those doled out to
whites. Let us examine these points briefly.
Hindus, it will be recalled,' found that 7.2 percent of the South
Carolina black defendants were free, a proportion of the prosecutions about six times the proportion of free to slave blacks in the
population as a whole. He attributed part of the difference to a
system of plantation justice for slaves and much of it to white harassment of free blacks."' Was there a similar pattern of harassment
in Tennessee? Data in Howington's paper allow us to construct a
slightly different, though at least as useful, percentage comparison
-the percentage of all prosecutions of free persons that were
brought against free blacks versus the percentage of the total free
population that was black. Consider the figures he gives for Davidson County (Nashville), where there are enough prosecutions to be
statistically meaningful. Howington states that there were 1006 felony prosecutions between 1826 and 1861, of which fifty-three, or
5.26 percent, were prosecutions of free blacks.' In 1860 there were
1209 free blacks in Davidson County, or 3.74 percent of the county's
total free population."' At least superficially, the percentages suggest that perhaps some, but probably not much, racially based harassment can be fairly attributed to the Davidson County judicial
system.'
182. Howington, supra note 70.
183. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
184. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
185. The percentage figure is my calculation from his raw data presented at Howington,
supra note 70, at 19.
186. My calculation is from Table II. SUPERINTENDENT OF CENSUs, STATISTICS OF THE
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 61-63 (1872) (state of Tennessee) [hereinafter cited as 1870
POPULATION STATISTICS].
187. Certainly, at any rate, much less racially based harassment can be attributed to
Davidson County than to the Anderson and Spartanburg judicial districts of South Carolina.
My own suspicion is that if we could control for income levels, we would find that, given the
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What, if anything, can be learned by comparing South Carolina
and Tennessee conviction rates? Hindus found that average conviction rates of blacks were about twice those of whites in South Carolina, and argued that this buttressed his conclusion that justice for
blacks was not the intent of the State's judicial system. 1' Assuming, arguendo, the legitimacy of this inference, what of Howington's
results for Tennessee's court system? Table VII sets out the comparative conviction rates over similar time spans, and given the different modes of data presentation in the two texts,' for as nearly
comparable categories of crime as possible. The "A" columns show
the conviction rates using Howington's method-including cases
dismissed prior to trial, grand jury refusals to return a true bill of
indictment, and unknown outcomes. The "B" columns show the
same data using Hindus' method-including only trials that
reached an acquittal or a conviction. Three points emerge. First,
using Howington's method we find that a majority of Tennessee
prosecutions against slaves, but only a quarter of South Carolina
prosecutions, never reached the stage at which a verdict was rendered. Second, and in consequence, over seventy percent of the
Tennessee slaves, but just under half of the South Carolina slaves,
escaped a guilty verdict-receiving the benefits of the law's delays
as well as of its due process. But third, does this entail the conclusion that Tennessee slaves fared on the whole better-or that one
system produced fairer, or alternatively, less exploitative, results?
Not necessarily, as the computations in the Hindus mode indicate-at least if the two systems' trials of blacks are alone compared-for the differences (59/41 versus 66/34) are, given the case
numbers, not really telling. It may be, in other words, that Tennessee had a higher propensity to initiate prosecution on flimsier evidence (as an empty-glass Whig would view it) or to accord the black
the benefits of the formal legal system (as an ameliorative Whig
higher tendency of low-income individuals to be subjected to the criminal, as distinct from
the civil, litigation system, a substantial part of the variance in free black vs. white prosecution rates could be as readily explained by such income-level differences as by harassment.
188. Black Justice Under White Law, supranote 30, at 599.
189. The capital crimes to which the Howington figures pertain are broader than those
listed here from Hindus. Compare Howington, supra note 70, Table 1, at 13, with Black
Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, Tables III, IV, V, at 585-86. The conviction rates
for other offenses reported in the same tables by Hindus, however, are sufficiently similar to
suggest that the difference does not matter here. Howington's figures cover the following
offenses: murder, 39 prosecutions; attempted murder, 13 prosecutions; rape, 9 prosecutions;
arson, 7 prosecutions; burglary, 10 prosecutions; unknown, 12 prosecutions. Seemingly (unless some were included among the unknowns) there were no prosecutions for the other two
capital offenses on Tennessee's statute books at the time-robbery and assault with intent
to rape.
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would view it). Or, it may be that the differences are to be explained
more by the quality of the records kept, and by the vagaries of
history's preservation of records.
TABLE VII

Howington's
6 Tennessee
Counties
1826-1861
A
B
Capital Prosecutions
Convicted
Acquitted
No Bill/Dismissed
Other Outcome

29%
20%
39%
12%

59%
41%

Hindus'
2 South Carolina
Counties
1818-1860
A
B
Murder, Assault, Poisioning, Sex
53%
26%

66%
34%

23%

Is there no more satisfactory way to leave the discussion? Three
further comparisons permit us to probe a bit further, though not to
resolve the issue. First, Davidson County population and capital
prosecution statistics suggest a considerable post-1835 penetration
by the legal system into the peculiar institution akin to that which
Hindus found in South Carolina. Excluding free black prosecutions,
69.7% of the capital prosecutions in Davidson County during the
years that Howington studies were brought against whites, and
30.3% were brought against slaves.' Again excluding free blacks,
the white population climbed from 59% of the total population in
the 1840 census, to 63% in 1850, and 68% in 1860."' Because Howington has not yet reported the distribution of the cases over time,
and because of differences in the types of offenses for which slaves
and whites were capitally punishable, we cannot be absolutely certain. Nonetheless, the Davidson County population/prosecution
proportions appear fairly similar.
Second, while Howington does find different conviction rates
and punishments of whites, slaves, and free blacks, the differences
do not all cut in the same direction. For example, slaves prosecuted
for murder of whites were seemingly acquitted more often than
190. These percentages are derived from Howington, supra note 70, Table III, at 15.
191. 1870 POPULATION STATISTIcs, supra note 186, at 61-63. It should perhaps be noted
that the changing population composition of Davidson County during these decades was
somewhat unusual for the antebellum South. Percentage-wise, the free blacks were growing
in population much the most rapidly, followed by whites, with the slave growth rates being
the smallest. I assume that Nashville must have already begun to function demographically
as an urban center, drawing in free blacks from more rural counties.
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slaves prosecuted for the murder of other slaves. But, if they were
found guilty, the former were almost twice as likely to receive a
sentence of death. Again, almost the same percentages of white and
slave defendants were acquitted in capital cases, 48% and 45% respectively. Yet, except in Davidson County, there was a much
higher tendency to convict whites for an offense lesser than that
named in the indictment-in large part, conceivably, because of
differences in the applicable law.192
Third, the most striking set of statistics, the one that, inadvertently perhaps, best captures the quality of Tennessee black justice
in the state's capital city, pertains to the sentences given to convicted whites and free blacks by the Davidson County criminal
court. The modal and the median sentences were identical for both
groups-three years. Blacks fared better with respect to the second
most frequent sentence (one year as opposed to five years for
whites), but slightly worse in average sentence (4.5 years versus 3.8
years for whites). These were sentences following high, but not very
different, rates of conviction (82% for free blacks, and 75% for
whites).'" Whether one should interpret these Tennessee statistics
as pointing toward essentially equitable behavior by judges and
juries or interpret them as showing a certainamount of inequitable
treatment,"' is debatable. But two points seem plain, unless Howington's further research greatly shifts the balance of the facts he
has so far uncovered. First, the Tennessee data do not sustain the
common view of historians that free blacks rarely received justice.'"
Second, although South Carolina black justice does not look quite
so dreadful when set against its European origins, it fares almost as
badly in comparison with Howington's Tennessee as it did in comparison with Hindus' Massachusetts.
Where, then, does all this get our Whig? And, where does it get
us and the legal history of slavery? Where it gets our Whig is clear:
brimming over with the partial fullness of the southern glass, and
perhaps incautiously forgetting to address Hindus' last major propo192. Prior to 1854, there was no category of second degree murder for slaves, and manslaughter, not being a capital offense, did not fall within circuit court jurisdiction. See Howington, supra note 70, at 17. Howington suggests that if the pre-1854 juries had been able to
convict slaves for second degree murder, the acquittal rates might have been lower. Id. at 18
n.32. He is probably right, but the statistics for post-1854 cases (only six cases in all) are
insufficient to be sure.
193. See id. at 24.
194. The statutory inequalities are plain enough, but are not on point here, other than
as marking the bounds within which judge and jury had to act.
195. See generally, I. BERmN, SLAvEs WTHoIT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO INTHE ANTEBELLUM Sourn 317-18, 334-36 (1974).
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sition-that increasing tensions over slavery were reflected in higher
lash-rates as the Civil War approached."'
196. Supposing, however, that our Whig were not so incautious, but rather diligent
almost to the point of tediousness, he might go on to note the following points. Critical to
Hindus' overall conclusion that the function of law in South Carolina was "preserving white
dominance" and that black justice in the State "was never intended to be just" are, besides
the evidence already discussed, two additional types of information. One is statistical data
going to show that punishments became more severe, and conviction rates increased in
response to, the "crises of the 1850's." Black Justice Under White Law, supranote 30, at 590.
The other amounts to a few pieces of impressionistic evidence about the attitudes of individual judges and about the resolutions of a case or two.
I expect that our Whig, were he fairly knowledgeable about the matter, would take up
the latter first. While he might agree with Hindus on a number of the "bits of impressionistic
evidence," he might want to enter the following reservations. He might say that he was
puzzled by what seemed oddly uneven extrapolations from cases to judicial attitudes and
motives, depending on whether there was a white on trial for murder of a black or a black on
trial for murder of a black. In the former instance (see id. at 580 n.22), in the case of State v.
Posey, 35 S.C.L. 54, 4 Strob. 103 (1849), he might say that he was not clear that Hindus
approved the court's finding that a technical flaw warranted reversing a conviction. By
contrast, in the latter instance, Hindus, in discussing the case of State ex rel. Matthews v.
Toomer, 25 S.C.L. 44, 1 Chev. 106 (1840), seemingly thought that the court's similar use of a
technicality to reverse a conviction of a black was obviously what it should have done. Black
Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at 592 n.54. The reversal of the white's conviction,
our Whig might think, seemed to warrant in Hindus' mind a possible minus point, but the
reversal of the black's conviction would warrant no equivalent plus point. Second, our Whig
might think it peculiar to use as evidence of the general judicial tenor of mind when confronted with the Denmark Vesey "insurrection," a declaration made some six or seven or eight
years later in a very different connection-one made, moreover, by a semi-retired septuagenarian judge, a judge never prized by his colleagues for undue attention to the niceties of
procedure. See note 236 infra (for my reasons for this judgment). Third, he might think it
peculiar to state that the principal proposal for slave reform-one ventured by the State's
leading jurist, John Belton O'Neall, "was not even discussed"-when in fact its publication
was the occasion of something of a brief editorial battle among two South Carolina newspapers, albeit one of them a minor one and perhaps a "house-organ" for O'Neall. See Negro
Rights, Unionism, and Greatness, supranote 25, at 177-87.
Be that as it may, I think our "silent southerner" would turn his chief attention to the
data Hindus adduces in favor of a response to the crises of the 1850's and would raise two
questions. First, is it plain that the data on conviction rates require Hindus' conclusion?
While it is true, as Hindus states, that "conviction rates, which had been declining" increased
"in that decade," it also seems true both that capital punishment rates did not increase (at
least during the years for which Hindus gives us the data, 1850-1854), and that the increase
in conviction rates during the 1850's still left them below those of all previous decades but
one. Black Justice Under White Law, supra note 30, at Table VIII, at 590. Is that a significant
reversal? To reenlist Yule's Q, the association between decade and conviction rate for the
1840's and 1850's yields only an unimpressive .199. Our Whig might be forgiven for wanting
more proof. If, however, he sought to make the best case possible on behalf of finding a strong
associational relationship, and that he therefore standardized the cases in the matrix so as
to correct them for the circumstance that the black population was growing more swiftly than
the white, he would come up with a case-number standardized-on-population matrix such
as this, and with the values for the measures of association printed immediately below the
matrix:
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Where it gets us and the legal history of slavery is a bit different. Whether we agree or disagree with the substance of our Whig's
assessment, we should concede the following procedural points.
First, from comparing what our Whig and Hindus and Howington
have said about the data, it is hard to resist the conclusion that
there is a strong tendency to veer into one type of Whig history or
another. Second, we may feel fortified in our earlier suspicion that
to an unusual degree the interpretive differences stem less from the
data base and more from the kinds of explanations that the various
historians in the field find satisfying, less from the evidence and
more from the dispositions and principles of selection that please
the various scholars."' Third, if we are at all cautious, we must
1840's

1850's

WHITE

399 indictments

503 indictments

BLACK

152 indictments

118 indictments

Uncertainty coefficient:
symmetric -

0.00841

with race as the dependent variable-0.00959
with decade as the dependent variable - 0.00748
Kendall's Tau B - -0.10176
Gamma -

-0.23777

These results tend in Hindus' direction, but only slightly. They are not sufficient to clinch
the case. Second, what of the increase in the severity of punishment for those who were
convicted? Hindus considers this important, citing seemingly in approval, one "northern
jurist" (John Codman Hurd) who "decried the kind of justice these courts provided as 'acts
of unlawful assemblies.' "Id. at 591. That is arguable, since even though what the courts did
may or may not have been much better than acts typical of unlawful assemblies, the courts
were lawful. Hindus then suggests, adducing in support the statements of two individuals,
"[flew South Carolinians disagreed." Id. That is getting an opinion survey out of not very
many respondents. Be that as it may, more central are the following "mean lashes per
sentence": 1818-1830, 16.7; 1831-1840, 33.2; 1841-1850, 44.5; 1851-1860, 56.1. Id. On its face,
the change is quite impressive, even though the numbers remain very low against an
eighteenth-century European backdrop. I expect Hindus is right-something was happening
in the data. Yet a contrary argument can be made.
If one looks separately at the nine types of crime that Hindus reports, the change is less
impressive. For example, relative to 1841-1850, for 1851-1860 lash-rates go up in five categories (crimes against property, verbal crimes, sexual crimes, moral crimes, and threats to white
authority) and down in four (crimes against the person, against order, crimes of slave status,
and discretionary prosecutions). To reach a firm conclusion one would have to know at least
three things one does not know from the information given. First, what were the year-by-year
totals? Second, what were the medians, the modes, and the standard deviations? Averages
(means) have the obvious defect that they are disproportionately swayed by extreme cases.
Third, what is the evidence that if (on closer inspection of the data) the severity of punishment did indeed increase significantly, the reason was response to crisis? On this Hindus
offers no evidence. And while we may guess that he probably is right, we really do not know.
197. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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admit that as yet there are not sufficient data bases of trial level
black justice to form any safe generalizations about its functioning
across the South as a whole. Fourth, there is nothing particularly
distressing or peculiar about finding these veering tendencies. Just
as half a century ago it was not surprising that historians tended to
deprecate Black Reconstruction and to emphasize the "good side"
of slavery, so it is not surprising to find today many historians
taking a grim satisfaction in looking at things past the other way
on. Historians, after all, like to tell stories. Stories need plots and
audiences. The tastes of succeeding audiences for southern stories
change usually in relationship to each generation's perceptions of
the sensible political arrangement of black and white relations. The
post-Plessy v. Ferguson' generation of whites, having decided on
"separate but equal," found U. B. Phillips plausible. Since Brown
v. Board of Education"' we have thought more of equality between
the races, and less of separation. And many of us are less happy than
our historian forebears were with other nonracial inequalities-issues of wealth, distribution of power, and so on. So, and
equally naturally, stories of a different sort are more plausible and,
possibly, a bit more true. Although a later generation may disagree
with us, it is impossible to foretell. In the meantime let us continue
our examination of the matter at hand by turning to those writings
in the field we have not yet assessed.
E. UnderstandingAppellate Decisionmaking:Flanigan,Nash,
and Cover
In the view of one scholar, the writings of Nash and Flanigan,
the two earliest venturers among the group we are considering into
the area of law and slavery, exhibit substantial similarity in approach. According to Michael Hindus, Flanigan's work, "in its use
of appellate court records and its emphasis on procedural matters,
. . . fits into the Nash mold."o I am not altogether sure what the
Nash mold is,"' despite, as we have noted earlier,20 2 Mark Tushnet's
location of its products along a single-valued continuum constructed from the abolitionists' categories, 203 and despite his location
of Flanigan's writings "closer to the conservative end" of the same
198. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
199. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
200. Hindus, supra note 30, at 576 n.4.
201. Although I do have the sense that Hindus does not think it is the fine sort that
produces intellectual brie, plainly it is not the mold that explains Hindus' cast-which, given
his Berkeley Ph.D., must be the Stampp die.
202. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
203. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 176 n.197.
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spectrum." Arguably, some of the objections leveled against Robert
Cover's fascinating explorations of (chiefly) northern judicial reactions to the Constitution's compact with slavery generate from using
a similar continuum. Ronald Dworkin"' and Derrick Bell 20 8seem to
be perched on Tushnet's continuum, if anyone is, when suggesting
Cover is not accusatory enough in JusticeAccused 20 7 and too sympathetic with the dilemmas of these northern judges. There is, furthermore, lack of agreement on Cover's position. Thus, James Ely2 5 is
not convinced that Cover has proved the firmness of the initial
ground on which he stands-that these judges really did suffer any
severe doubts over the question of slavery's immorality versus the
judge's duty to administer the law. By contrast, Eugene Genovese
suggests that Cover comes close to taking a "cheap shot" 209 in discounting too greatly the genuineness of the value placed by those
judges on "Union."
It is not my intent at this juncture to undertake an adjudication
among Cover's various critics, despite the fact that some of them
appear more disposed to snipe at Cover than to reexamine the evidence that led to his judgments. The latter task I shall undertake,
but in Part Two of this Article where it more appropriately belongs-because it pertains, to the extent I shall assay it, to the
slavery adjudications of one of the three courts we will there be
principally concerned with. I have two purposes in this section. The
major purpose is to explain why I have difficulties with Flanigan's
analysis, especially with his interpretation of the juridical behavior
of two courts-those of North and South Carolina-that were particularly influential in the formative years of slavery jurisprudence. 2 0 The minor purpose is to indicate briefly why I think Cover's
analytic approach is so useful. Flanigan's essay, to be sure, begins
very much where I came out earlier: "The legal status of slaves was
anomalous; they were at once property and persons." 2 11 That is similar to my view that Roger Taney oversimplified when, in Dred Scott,
204. Id.
205. Dworkin, The Law of the Slave Catchers, THE TIMEs (London) LrrERARY
SUPPLEMENT 1437 (Dec. 5, 1975).
206. Bell, Book Review, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 350 (1976).
207. R. COVER, supra note 27.
208. Ely, Book Review, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 265.
209. Genovese, Book Review, 85 YALE L.J. 582, 587 (1976). Otherwise the review is
generally laudatory.
210. See also D. Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom, 1800-1868 (1973)
(unpublished dissertation at Rice University); Nash, supra note 19. My impression is that
the author of the former had not read the latter, since I expect that some of his judgments
discussed below would have been different if he had.
211. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 537.
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he intimated that from the time of the Revolution on there was a
southern consensus on viewing the slave as mere property.212 But
Flanigan diverges from my view almost immediately by saying on
the same opening page, "[o]n the civil side of the law the suppression of the personality was nearly complete,""' by citing an 1861
case as "a classic exposition of the law of slavery"214 (an Alabama
case stating that the slave "has no legal mind, no will which the law
can recognize"), 215 and by asserting that:
In criminal matters, however, the personality of the slave became more evident
. . . . In a criminal trial the law considered the slave a responsible individual
and meted out its harsh punishments accordingly. Ironically, the law demanded a greater degree of responsibility from the slaves than from their
masters, since most states punished slaves more severely than whites for a
large number of crimes. 21'

I have three difficulties with this opening page-a page that is
important because it sets the stage for and characterizes much of
the rest of the analysis. First, I do not think that the degree of
required legal responsibility can be simply prorated from the severity of punishments. 217 More is at stake in the setting of punishments.
Second, Flanigan is in a certain sense correct that the slave's personality was more suppressed in civil, than in criminal, cases. I am
not sure, however, that suppression of personality is an analytically
fruitful phrase. May it be, like Elkins' phrase, "moral personality," 218 a term that creates as much fog as it does clarity? Its salient
characteristic is the strength of its normative overtones relative to
its analytic precision. Strictly speaking, the question to be addressed is what legal rights, inequalities, and obligations did southern statutes and case law create and foster during the antebellum
period? But do not the terms "suppression of personality" and
"moral personality" contain powerful allusions to late twentiethcentury values-e.g., "fulfillment of self" and "positive freedom" 21'
212. See A More EquitablePast?, supra note 25, at 201-02.
213. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 537.
214. Id.
215. Creswell's Ex'r v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229, 236 (1861), quoted in Flanigan, supra note
26, at 537. But note that he also mentions the 1846 Tennessee case, Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn.
(7 Hum.) 92 (1846), as an exception. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 537 n.2.
216.

Id. at 537-38. ,

217. See Part One (D) supra.
218. See generally S. ELKINS, supra note 22, at 81-139.
219. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (especially the
values accepted by the minority and explicitly rejected by Justice Powell writing for the
Court). Rodriguez contended for a constitutional right requiring equal per capita state and
local expenditures on Texas public school systems. His attack on Texas' heavy reliance on
property taxes, and its resulting interdistrict disparities in per capita school spending, depended on a "positive freedom" base reflected in Justice Marshall's dissent, in which an

1979]

REASON OF SLAVERY

73

-that may obscure the precise ascertainment of things past? My
third difficulty with Flanigan's opening page is that I am unsure
why Creswell's Executors v. Walker'" is judged "a classic exposition
of the law of slavery." One of several possible alternatives to Walker
is Ford v. Ford,221 the mid-1840's decision in which the Tennessee
court said that a slave has "mental capacities, and an immortal
principle in his nature, that constitute him equal to his owner,-but
for the accidental position in which fortune has placed him." 222 Another is Guardianof Sally v. Beaty,22 a South Carolina decision of
the 1790's in which the judge permitted one slave to purchase and
free another despite the seeming conflict of the purchase with the
slave code.2'
The leading South Carolina judge from the 1830's to the Civil
War, John Belton O'Neall, actually on one occasion urged that
Guardian of Sally should be the reference point for slavery jurisprudence. Thus, in 1848 he stated:
The first thing which ought to be done, is to get back alongside of such men
as C.J. Rutledge . .. in the case of the Guardian of Sally v. Beatley (sic), . . .

an expression of the benevolent feelings which had been tried in the
crucible of the revolution; there was perhaps no very correct notion of law in
the ruling of the case, yet it spoke what, I think, always belongs to Carolina-a
love of mercy, or right, and a hatred of that which is mean or oppressive. 22 5

It may of course be argued that sentiments such as O'Neall's were
rare, that O'Neall's expressions came in dissent, that the majority
opinion refused to grant freedom, and therefore that the earlier case
to whose sentiments he vainly appealed could not possibly be regarded as a classic. This argument, cheering as it may be to the
empty-glass Whig, misses the main point, which is to inquire into
the meaning of the term "classic" and into the analytic consequences of the meaning intended. There are at least three possible
meanings of the word "classic" as used here, each of which has
analytic consequences. First, Walker may be called a classic because it is deemed representative of the southern case law of slavery
over the whole antebellum period. Second, the term may be applied
because the case is considered representative of the point to which
equally good education is lifted to the status of a prerequisite for equal enjoyment of other
constitutional rights. See I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
220. 37 Ala. 229 (1861).
221. 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 92 (1846).
222. Id. at 96.
223. 1 S.C.L. 104, 1 Bay 260 (1792).
224. Id. at 105, 1 Bay at 262.
225. Vinyard v. Passalaigue, 33 S.C.L. 249, 254, 2 Strob. 536, 549 (1845) (dissenting
opinion). For a fuller treatment, see Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness,supra note 25,
at 172-75.
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the law of slavery had developed by the time the case was decided,
at the outbreak of the Civil War. Third, Walker may be regarded a
classic in much the same way as is Thomas Ruffin's opinion in State
v. Mann 2 2 -because of its logic's purportedly ruthless elegance in
laying down the requirements of dominion inherent in the peculiar
institution.?22
226. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829) (reversing lower court holding that the employer of a
slave could be indicted for committing assault and battery against the slave). The defendant
had shot and wounded the slave, who had run off in the midst of chastisement and had
refused to halt when so ordered by the defendant.
227. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, supra note 176, at 35-36.
Never has the logic of slavery been followed so faithfully by a humane and responsible man. As Ruffin knew, no civilized community could live with such a view . . . . The
court had to reconsider its attitude.
In 1834, in State v. Will, the liberal Judge Gaston, speaking for the same court,
handed down a radically different doctrine at once infinitely more humane and considerably less logical.
Will had killed an overseer who, similarly frustrated at the slave's running away during
a whipping, tried to shoot him. Genovese goes on to say, the "Supreme Court, under Judge
Gaston's leadership, overturned Will's conviction . . . . Judge Ruffin must have been re-

lieved; he remained silent and did not dissent from a ruling that so clearly contradicted the
philosophy inherent in his own previous judgment." Id. at 36. But compare Cover on the same
judge:
[Ruffin] was extraordinary (really very much like Holmes) in his eagerness to confront
the reality of the unpleasant iron fist beneath the law's polite, neutral language. Ruffin's
unusual refusal to clothe an exploitative and brutal relationship with the trappings of
anything save power and force led him to infer a legislative policy of the utmost brutality
from the mere existence of slavery.
R. COVER, supra note 27, at 78. Compare also Harriet Beecher Stowe:
No one can read this decision, [Mann] so fine and clear in expression, so dignified and
solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful in its results, without feeling at once deep
respect for the man and horror for the system. The man . . . has one of that high order
of minds, which looks straight through all verbiage and sophistry . . . .There is but one
sole regret; and that is that such a man, with such a mind, should have been merely an
expositor, and not a reformer of law.
H. STOWE, KEY To UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 78-79 (1853), quoted in R. COVER, at 77 n.*
I have been a bit uncomfortable with the conventional view of Ruffin's slavery jurisprudence for some time. See A More Equitable Past?, supra note 25, at 221-23. For one thing,
State v. Mann seems to be more of an aberration than a norm in the North Carolina court's
decisionmaking. Chief Justice John Louis Taylor had just died, with Ruffin replacing him
(as associate justice until 1833, when he succeeded Leonard Henderson as chief justice). Iam
not at all sure that Taylor's court would have said anything of the sort. For another thing,
Ruffin's later jurisprudence, when it differed from his colleagues, almost invariably was
harsher. See, e.g., State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849) (in which Ruffin dissented
from his colleagues' reversal of a slave's conviction for homicide). The slave had killed a white
who had assaulted a Negro friend of his. Ruffin believed that the reversal set a politically
dangerous precedent by allowing slaves to "assume to themselves the judgment as to the
right" of resistance to white authority. "First denying their general subordination to the
whites, it may be apprehended that they will end in denouncing the injustice of slavery itself,
and, upon that pretext, band together to throw off their common bondage entirely." Id. at
428. Frederick Nash (Associate Justice, 1844-1852, and Chief Justice, 1852-1858) and Richmond Pearson (Associate Justice, 1849-1858, and Chief Justice 1859-1878) thought differ-
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Each of these meanings has difficulties, at least if we want
disinterestedly to examine the case law of slavery in its full variety.
If the first meaning is intended, the error is plain: Walker simply
does not characterize the varied flows and ebbs of nineteenthcentury slave law's evolution. 2" If the second meaning is intended,
there is room for argument about Walker's representativeness. 229If
the third meaning is intended, there is a clear historiographical
danger that the historian may slide imperceptibly from what is a
fairly narrow definition toward a broader definition, and in turn
forget the limits of the original meaning. Taking on a wider life of
its own, the analytic term begins to force the evidence this way and
that, measuring cases and opinions by their perceived proximity to,
or distance from, the classic case, rather than approaching them
with abundant caution for their potential uniqueness, each having
an equal ab initio right to the historian's understanding.230 This
happens, I think, primarily when the historian wants it to happen
because the consequent ordering of the evidence fits his predispositions on the subject.
The results of such an approach can be selective readings of the
evidence and, ultimately, conclusions on important matters that are
doubtful or just plain wrong. Let me illustrate my point by examining Flanigan's treatment of the early nineteenth-century slavery
jurisprudence of the North Carolina and South Carolina appellate
courts. First, consider Flanigan's assertion that South Carolina's
"high court was far more interested in convictions than in the methods trial courts used to obtain them."23l Since this sweeping indictment of the South Carolina judges' motives comes just after Flanigan mentions two cases in which the high court overruled lower
court convictions of blacks because of defects in the trial courts'
ently. Objecting strongly to Ruffin's view that "reason of slavery" required slaves to put up
with physical abuse by any and all whites, Nash stated: "Necessity is the tyrant's plea, and
policy never yet stript, successfully, the bandage from the eyes of Justice." Id. at 409. Pearson
asked: "Does this show he has the heart of a murderer? On the contrary, are we not forced
. . . to admire, even in a slave, the generosity, which incurs danger to save a friend?" Id. at
406. Lastly, with respect to State v. Mann, I am not convinced that the Ruffin opinion really
was that well honed. It presupposes that the employer of a slave must have the same extent
of "absolute authority" as the master of the slave if the institution is to survive. (The
conventional treatment of the case overlooks the circumstance that Mann was not the slave's
master.) Query whether this is really so.
228. See Tushnet, supra note 28.
229. That is to say, and as I shall argue in Part Two of this Article, I do not think that
Creswell's Executor represents the average views of southern appellate judges on manumission, even on the point in question-whether slaves could make an election between freedom
and slavery if their master provided in his will for such a choice.
230. See H. BrrERmHMD, supra note 1.
231. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 541.
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procedures,"' the reader anticipates that what follows will be supporting evidence. Yet what follows is this:
In 1830, when a master objected that the magistrates had tried his slave more
than six days after the offense, allegedly insurrection, and that other slaves
were allowed to testify against him without oath, the Court of Appeals was not
disturbed. One judge remarked that "when the dreadful . .. consequences of
the insurrection of slaves in South Carolina, are taken into consideration, it
appears to me, that the judges of the superior courts ought to be extremely
cautious in interfering with the magistrates and freeholders . . . and that they
ought not to be eagle eyed in viewing their proceedings, and in finding out and
supporting every formal error or neglect, where the real merits have been duly
and fairly attended to, and determined according to justice." 3

Flanigan next offers an even broader generalization: "South Carolinians' general disregard for the rights of slaves (and also of free
blacks) was most spectacularly revealed in the events surrounding
the discovery of Denmark Vesey's conspiracy in 1822. Large numbers of Charleston free blacks and slaves went to the gallows after
secret trials.""'
How much of this bears scrutiny?2" Because the high court
never ruled on the fate of Vesey and his co-conspirators, we must
rely upon the prior, and seemingly damning, quote abjuring sharp
scrutiny (being too "eagle-eyed") of trials of blacks in the
magistrates-and-freeholders courts.
While I have other objections to this passageu' (especially that
232. Ex parteRichardson, 16 S.C.L. 136, Harp. 308 (1824) (prohibition granted because
one of the triers of fact was not a resident of the county where the crime occurred); Scott v.

Hudnall, 11 S.C.L. 168, 2 Nott. & McC. 419 (1820) (reversing because the slave court had
not tried the slave within the six-day limit required by the law).
233. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 541-42 (quoting Bay, J., in Kinloch v. Harvey, 16
S.C.L. 224, 228 Harp. 508, 517 (1830)).
234. Id. at 542.
235. I do not wish to spend time, although some full-glass Whig may, questioning how
large the "large numbers" were that "went to the gallows" (of 131 persons arrested, ultimately
35 were executed and 32 were deported). One could ask, for example, whether the numbers
sentenced were large, not so large, or moderate, and note that the conclusion may depend
upon one's perspective as to what really is a mass horror. Moreover, it should be noted that

at the time some South Carolinians objected, and more did later. See, e.g., D. MORGAN,
THE FIRST DISSENTER 127-34 (1954) (narrative of the objections of

JusTicE WILLIAM JOHNSON:

Justice William Johnson of the United States Supreme Court). But the genuinely important
point relevant to our immediate analytic concerns is different. It pertains not to the fate of
Denmark Vesey and his would-be comrades in arms, if in fact insurrection was what they were

about, but rather to the evidence that Flanigan adduces for his generalization about the
South Carolina high court.
236. I have four additional comments on the use of that quotation. First, is the quotation used fairly-that is, with appropriate emphasis on the judge's qualification when one
ought not be too eagle-eyed ("where the real merits have been duly and fairly attended to,
and determined according to justice")? In other words, is the judge indicating a genuine
"hang 'em" mentality, or is he objecting to the same purportedly excessive appellate court
attention to formal detail that many twentieth-century critics of nineteenth-century proce-

1979]1

REASON OF SLAVERY

77

the judge Flanigan quotes was not a member of the court of appeals
at the time), my main objection points to a larger historiographical
moral. My objection is that Flanigan's method of selection results
in a more general failure to penetrate to the really interesting questions about a curiously intriguing bench. These include questions
about the causal linkages among: (a) judicial motives; (b) the
dures have leveled-and that Flanigan elsewhere draws our attention to?
Second, is there any good evidence to believe that what this judge said typified the
thinking of the South Carolina high court? For two reasons it is interesting here that Flanigan
quotes from Catterall, rather than going to the original case report. 2 H. CATTERALL, supra
note 14, at 340-41. See Flanigan, supra note 26, at 542 n.12. One is that he does not tell the
reader that the case in which the quote occurs was a civil suit, not a criminal one, brought
by a slave-owner opposing not capital punishment, but deportation of a slave found guilty of
insurrection. To the judge it was important that deportation "was an act of mercy" (as
opposed to execution). Kinloch v. Harvey, 16 S.C.L. 224, Harp. 508 (1830). The other reason
is that the immediately preceding case in Catterall is State v. Scott, 17 S.C.L. 136, 1 Bail.
294 (1829), in which the high court unanimously reversed what it took to be the lower court's
defective proceeding against a person suspected of Negro-stealing. Note the comment in the
case by Judge David Johnson: "The question, whether the prisoner is intitled to be tried by
a jury, . . . or in the summary, and in some degree arbitrary manner, authorized by the act
under which he was arrested, is, of itself, of little less importance than that of life and death."
Id. at 138, 1 Bail. at 298.
Third, the judge whom Flanigan quotes-Elihu Bay-never was a member of the threejudge high court that South Carolina created in 1824 to replace the previous arrangement of
two en banc appellate courts (one in law and one in equity). Rather, on account of his age
Bay was relieved from riding crcuit and permitted in semiretirement to hear occasional cases
in Charleston. Taking Bay's views as representative of the high court in 1830 therefore makes
little sense. If one takes as relaxed a position about who constituted the "high court" as
Flanigan does, then one ought not ignore opposite-tending judicial statements bearing on
judicial aims. For example, in State v. Hudnall-one of the very cases cited by Flanigan in
asserting that South Carolina's court preferred convictions over fair trial methods-Judge
Richard Gantt stated:
Would it not be in direct violation of the principles of natural justice, as well as the order
of civil government for unauthorized individuals to usurp jurisdiction . . . and carry into
execution the solemn and awful sentence of death?
. . . Every feeling of humanity and justice revolts at the idea, that any other mode
of trial, less formal and substantial than what the act has prescribed, should be sanctioned.
11 S.C.L. 170, 2 Nott. & McC. 423-24 (1820).
Fourth, even if the 1824 judicial reorganization had not taken place, it is doubtful that
Elihu Bay's views of optimal judicial procedures indicated much more than his own predilections. Bay was not given to niceties of procedural detail as long as in his judgment substantive
justice was done. For example, see Bay's dictum in Kinloch v. Harvey, 16 S.C.L. 224, 228,
Harp. 508, 517 (1830). Another case that predated Kinloch was State v. Gee, 1 S.C.L. 65, 1
Bay 163 (1791), in which Bay sentenced a slave-murderer to the maximum penalty that South
Carolina's law at that date allowed-seven years at hard labor-notwithstanding defendant's
arguments that could have been adduced to reach a less punitive conclusion. If I may quote
myself from some eleven years ago: "Elihu BAy seems to have been more interested in
punishing persons whom he thought wicked and letting off those whom he thought innocent, than in how he did it." Nash, supra note 19, at 132 n.41. For the reasons underlying
my judgment, see id. at 73-82, 167.
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judges' sense of their role; (c) the case-law results in various areas
of decisionmaking within slavery jurisprudence; and (d) judicial
attitudes concerning other issues such as states' rights versus the
principles of Union. Because I have addressed these questions elsewhere,"' I shall not do so here at length. Suffice it to say that the
reader of Flanigan's essay would not have the slightest inkling that
the court about which he hands down his peremptory judgment was
a court whose majority: (a) used procedural technicalities to void
convictions under the oppressive South Carolina Colored Seamen's
Acts; 23 8 (b) solidly favored nationalism in a conflict between a
United States Supreme Court Justice's claim about the dictates of
his occupation and the demands of a South Carolina slave-patrol
law;2ss (c) voided the oath of superior allegiance to the South Caro237. See Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness, supra note 25.
238. See State v. Shaw, 15 S.C.L. 181, 4 McCord 480 (1828); Calder v. Deliesseline, 16
S.C.L. 84, Harp. 186 (1824); Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness, supra note 25, at 14648.
239. Johnson v. Martindale, 17 S.C.L. 77, 1 Bail. 163 (1829). In this case a court-martial
fined Supreme Court Justice William Johnson $100 for failing to perform slave patrol duty
as required of all slaveholders by an 1819 state statute. He also refused to avail himself of
the permitted alternative to serving-hiring a substitute. Unsuccessful, he next sought to
obtain a writ from a circuit judge to prohibit the fine's collection, on the ground that the law's
enforcement collided with a 1792 federal statute excusing all federal officers from militia
duty. Unsuccessful in obtaining this writ, he appealed to the state supreme court, which split
two to one. The court majority, David Johnson writing the opinion, insisted that in the
collision between two mutually inconsistent laws, the state provision had to give way. Colcock, in the minority, argued that the South Carolina law established the primary duty (not
in terms of importance but in terms of prevailing in case of conflict) "that the general
government has no right to interfere in the domestic concerns of the States . . . and that the
right to elect a Judge" did not give the federal government the power to free Johnson from
his local duties as a slaveholding South Carolina citizen. Id. at 170-71. The circuit judge,
incidentally, who denied the writ and was overruled was Elihu Bay.
240. State v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. 1, 2 Hill 1 (1834) (decided by the court together with the
case of State v. M'Meekin). Bay once again was overruled in his refusal to issue a mandamus
in favor of individuals whose state military commissions had been withheld for refusing to
subscribe to the oath of office requirement set by the 1833 Nullification Convention: "I . . .
do solemnly swear . . . that I will be faithful, and true allegiance bear, to the State of South
Carolina." Id. at 2, 2 Hill at 3. One of the majority judges, John Belton O'Neall, wrote an
opinion that still must stand as something of a record for combined purple prose, nationalism,
and opposition to the whole business of allegiance and oath-taking. To Robert Barnwell
Rhett, the grandfather of secessionist fire-eating and counsel for the pro-nullification side,
O'Neall's words must have been infuriating. Objecting to Rhett's tracing back to feudal
England the concept of the citizen's duty of allegiance, O'Neall stated that the Norman
conquerors had imposed feudalism at sword's point and forced "the free spirit of the Saxon
to meditate in darkness at the sound of the curfew." Id. at 124, 2 Hill at 211. Then he went
on to argue that the American revolution had freed from the "phantom of allegiance" the
"sturdy republican wanderer, clothed in the skins won by his bow and spear, drinking from
the bubbling brook, and eating the bread produced by the sweat of his brow . . . ." Id., 2
Hill at 212. In O'Neall's view the very idea of allegiance was "an unfit garb to clothe the
republican, . . . like putting on the statue of Washington the robe of the Caesars." Id. at 125-
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lina (as opposed to the federal) Constitution that the Nullifiers of
the early 1830's enacted;24 (d) so undermined South Carolina statutes against manumission that the legislature passed another statute in effect overruling the court;"4 ' (e) upheld a large majority of
convictions of whites who injured blacks, while reversing a slight
majority of felonious convictions of blacks; 2 and (f) continued up
to the eve of the Civil War (quite in contrast to some other southern
appellate courts, not to mention some northern ones), to insist that
comity between the states took precedence over anti-freedom South
Carolina statutes. 243 1 am not saying, of course, that South Carolina
black justice was exemplary, or that the South Carolina appellate
court was on balance enormously "progressive" in defining the relationships between law and slavery. There is, however, something
seriously defective in an analytic approach whose "dismal Whiggery" leads to ignoring all these points.
The other example of dismal Whiggish veering that I wish to
examine is Flanigan's discussion2 4 of one of the most influential
judges in the early nineteenth-century development of the law of
southern slavery, Chief Justice John Louis Taylor of North Carolina. Flanigan's interpretation of Taylor's jurisprudence, which
strikes me as quite odd, is instructive for two reasons: first, for
further demonstrating the need to look in some detail at doctrinal
developments and judicial motivations on particular courts; and
second, for again showing the power of the historian's analytic approach in selecting and distorting the evidence.2 5 In discussing the
problem of providing reasonably fair-minded triers of accused
blacks-whether judges and jurors in the regular court system or
26, 2 Hill at 214. For O'Neall the political obligations of the citizen were not properly defined
as allegiance at all. "It is allegiance in the dominions of the Autocrat of all the Russias: it is
here constitutional obedience." Id. at 128, 2 Hill at 220. Regrettably I am not doing justice
to O'Neall's opinion, chopping up its rhetoric so. For a fuller treatment, see Negro Rights,
Unionism, and Greatness, supra note 25, at 151-54, or better still see the original, in which
O'Neall goes on to give an extraordinary number of reasons why, whatever the South Carolina
Nullifiers might erroneously think, the federal constitution's requirements of constitutional
obedience to its provisions prevailed over the theory and practice of nullification. In retrospect, it still is one of the great opinions of nineteenth-century American political jurisprudence, and it contributed in no small measure to the legislative decision to reorganize the
courts.
241. For an analysis of this process see Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness, supra
note 25, at 154-66. Note that I am referring to the post-1835 law, rather than equity, court.
242. Respectively, the percentages were 87.5% and 58.3%. See Nash, supra note 25, at
213-15.
243. See Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 S.C. Eq. 161, 11 Rich. Eq. 447 (1860).
244. Flanigan, supra note 26.
245. Because Flanigan's comments on Taylor are interspersed with other concerns, I
shall have to draw them together, leaving it to the reader to go back to the original in order
to see whether my elisions introduce any inaccuracies.
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freeholders and magistrates in the irregular court systemsFlanigan seems to approve of the sensitivity to the problem of
some states, 246 including North Carolina, which provided that
slave-triers must be slaveholders. He quotes John Louis Taylor to
the effect that there were two purposes behind this provision: first,
"to surround the life of the slave with additional safeguards;" 247 and
second, "more effectually to protect the property of the owner." 248
Following these quotes are two surprising assertions. First,
24
Flanigan states that in the 1826 case quoted from, State v. Jim,#
Taylor held that the slaveholder requirement was still valid because
he "fear[ed] that the nonslaveholding class might harbor a dangerous hatred of the masters' human property."so This is possible,
although Taylor does not appear to me to have been a particularly
fearful man.25' Second, Flanigan asserts that the "requirement of a
slaveowner jury was actually a form of disfranchisement directed at
those who did not own slaves, but . . . most states were democratic

enough to allow nonslaveowner juries."2 2 Suddenly the argument's
central concern has shifted from protection of blacks to the masterclass' ill treatment of disadvantaged whites. After several pages
Flanigan seeks to tie up this loose end, returning to the subject of
Taylor and the North Carolina court, and the question under what
circumstances would slave testimony be accepted in trials of other
slaves. According to Flanigan, five years before State v. Jim, the
North Carolina Supreme Court had dispensed, in State v. Ben,23
with a previous requirement that slave testimony be given credence
only if it were supported by "pregnant circumstances." For Flanigan, Taylor's reasoning in the earlier case was not at all convincing.
Taylor, says Flanigan, believed that a 1793 legislative act extending
the right of trial by jury to slaves repealed whatever in the previously existing slave code differed from common law rules of evidence.2 14 But in so reasoning, Taylor was, according to Flanigan,
"blinded by superficial equalitarian rhetoric to the realities of slavery and slave law."@5 For Flanigan, the dissenting judge in the case,
246. See Flanigan, supra note 26, at 550.
247. Id. at 551.
248. Id.
249. 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142 (1826).
250. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 551.
251. But see Taylor's comment about a "bellum servile" in Trustees of the Quaker
Society of Contentnea v. Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189, 203 (1827). On the whole, Ruffin
fits Flanigan's bill of particulars better in this respect.
252. 'Flanigan, supra note 26, at 551.
253. 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434 (1821).
254. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 557.
255. Id.
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John Hall, "maintained a more sensible attitude."m' Hall realized
that what appeared superficially to be an extension of equality in
fact withdrew "an important statutory protection" from slaves.
Therefore he dissented, and "Ben went to his death, a sacrifice to
'equality' in North Carolina."m7 Flanigan concludes: "Five years
later Chief Justice Taylor destroyed his own credibility on the issue
by refusing to extend the reasoning of State v. Ben to abolish
2
slaveowner juries."a
Flanigan, finding Taylor inconsistent, even
inhumanitarian, in two cases, seems to consider the chief justice a
"bad" judge, or at least one blind to the realities of slavery.
That sounds convincing, and quite damning, but is it really?
The perceptive reader might spot a curious omission: with whom
did Taylor destroy his credibility? We are nowhere told. Certainly
not among his contemporaries-there were no newspaper editorials
about his perfidious decisionmaking; his fellow judges did not rise
against his leadership; William Lloyd Garrison did not berate him.
Obviously, Taylor has destroyed his credibility only with Flanigan.
It is clear that what we have before us is a classic illustration of
Whiggish "presentism," one that abbreviates and selects in a way
that inadvertently bars adequate understanding of the past.
I want here to pursue this issue a bit further by offering an
alternate explanation, of Taylor's behavior in Jim and Ben as an
example of the type of analysis that I think necessary in order to
avoid Whiggish veering and to reach "adequate understanding." It
seems to me that three analytic steps are necessary, which, if taken,
leave us much less certain than Flanigan that Taylor's decisionmaking was altogether reprehensible.
The first step consists in filling in two gaps of information left
by Flanigan. One, although Flanigan emphasizes that Taylor's reasoning in Ben sent a slave to his death whereas Hall's reasoning
would have saved him, he nowhere tells us that in the other case,
Jim, the result was exactly the opposite. Two, whatever we may
initially think of the results of these two cases, we should look at a
bit of potentially relevant biographical detail: Taylor, far from
being a scion of the southern master class, was born in London of
impoverished Irish parents, came to the colonies as a child with his
brother, worked his way through William and Mary, and as a young
man was elected to the North Carolina legislature where he unsuccessfully sponsored bills to make it easier for masters to free their
slaves. Those gaps filled in, we may be somewhat reluctant to con256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 558.
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clude swiftly anything about Taylor's credibility.
The second step consists in seeking to place the particular decisions that confront us within the larger slavery issues that the Taylor court wrestled with. As I have discussed these issues elsewhere,-"
I shall only summarize them swiftly here. The principal issues were
three: (1) the circumstances in which the court should permit manumissions, given restrictive legislative statutes; (2) whether common law, as distinct from statute, protected the slave at all; and (3)
the extent to which slaves on trial should receive due process similar
to that guaranteed to whites. On the whole the Taylor court tended
to generous emancipatory decisionmaking except in one critical
area-manumission that sought to evade state law."" With respect
to the issue of common law protection, Hall and Taylor were divided
for almost a quarter of a century, with Hall taking the view that
common law did not protect slaves in places where slavery had been
established by custom or positive enactment.28 ' Hall took a very
rigorous "Continental absolutist" position:262 any restraints on absolute power over the slave were "the consequence of positive laws
. He that was taken in battle remained bound to his taker
forever, [who] . . . could kill him with impunity." 263 Taylor rejected Hall's position passionately:
Upon what foundation can the claim of a master to an absolute authority over
the life of his slave, be rested? The authority, . . . is not . . . in the law of
nature . . . , not the necessary consequence of the state of slavery ...

[whose] natural inconveniences ought not to be aggravated by an evil, at
which reason, humanity, and policy equally revoltY'

For Taylor, whatever legislatures might say about killing a slave:
"the crime is unchanged in its essence, undiminished in its enormity. The scale of its guilt exists in those relations of things which are
prior to human institutions, and whose sanctions must remain for2
ever unimpaired."a
Even if we did not know that Taylor's doctrines on the issue of
common law protection were to become something of a touchstone
for judges in oiher states inclined to "ameliorate" the slave's condition, and to be disparaged as meaningless natural law "twaddle" by
259. See Nash, supra note 19, at 52-64. To avoid possible confusion, the reader should
note that the name was changed to the Supreme Court 13 years before the actual structural
change was accomplished.
260. See id. at 34-68.
261. State v. Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454 (1823); State v. Boon, 1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 103,
106-07 (1801).
262. See Nash, supra note 19, at 88-93.
263. Id. at 107.
264. Id. at 112.
265. Id.
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thoroughgoing pro-slavery fire-eaters on the southern benches, these
sentences might make us think twice about the positions attributed
to Hall and Taylor by Flanigan, and search for an alternate explanation.
That explanation can be derived by adopting alternate motivational assumptions about Taylor's and Hall's decisionmaking, assumptions that moreover link two issues-protection of blacks, and
trial rights of blacks. The assumptions are these: both judges were
unavoidably engaged in a knotty enterprise, seeking to
"domesticate" slavery beneath a rule of law. Both were at least
somewhat uncomfortable with the task. Neither judge much liked
the peculiar institution, feeling southern society was somehow
trapped in it. But there was a critical difference: Hall's sense of the
incompatibility between the common law tradition and an absolutist view of slavery, coupled with a fairly strong sense of judicial selfrestraint, made him at times both logically unable and aesthetically
unwilling to force law and absolute dominion together in the absence of positive statute. Taylor, by contrast of a more activist bent,
was bound and determined to force the peculiar institution under
the common law as much as he could. In most criminal cases pertaining to blacks the results were the same, and as I have elsewhere
argued" the period 9f Taylor's tenure, from 1800-1829, saw the
North Carolina court advancing much further than any other South
Atlantic judiciary of the same generation towards extending trial
rights and protection against abuse. But on occasion, the two
judges' decisionmaking values produced opposite results in particular cases.
To say this is to indicate the third step that we need to take
toward adequate understanding. That is to see if, by making these
assumptions, we can plausibly explain their differences. Two cases
prior to Ben require such explanation. About one, State v. Sue6 7 I
shall regretfully have to be brief, and simply say that I think Taylor's reasoning was more convincing."' State v. Washington26 ' raised
a dozen years later a critical question seemingly forgotten in Sue:
did a slave have any right to appeal from the county court to the
state supreme court? The prosecution argued that because no appeal had been allowed from the magistrates-and-freeholders courts
created in 1741, the same limitation applied to the 1793 jurisdictional transfer of some slave cases to the county court. On this
266.
267.
268.
269.

See A More Equitable Past?, supranote 25, at 204-11.
1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 189 (1800).
For an explanation of why I so think, see Nash, supra note 19, at 145-48.
6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 100 (1812).
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occasion, however, it was Taylor, rather than Hall, who rejected the
prosecution's arguments. For Taylor and the court majority, the
transfer allowed the slave to avail himself of the benefits of a 1777
law permitting defendants dissatisfied with county court judgments
to appeal. Hall, dissenting, objected to the court majority's imputation to the 1793 legislature of an anomaly of justice, one that arose
since the 1793 act only provided for trying blacks in county court
when the defendant was arrested just prior to, or during, regular
county court terms. Slaves arrested at other times were subjected
to trials before three justices-of-the-peace, from whom everyone
agreed no appeal lay. Thus the anomaly: the timing of the arrest
determined the slave's right to appeal. Hall (quaere, "maintaining
a more sensible attitude?") favored sending Washington to his
death rather than attributing the anomaly to the legislators. What
can we make of this? I am strongly inclined to think that Hall's was
the more neutral, if very chilly, reading of the relevant statutes, and
to think that on this critical occasion Taylor's usually meticulous
reading of statutory intent gave way to his determination to extend
the rule of law over slavery. If he had agreed with Hall in
Washington, his court would have been put abruptly out of the
business of deciding appeals from slave trials. Absent jurisdiction,
he would have been powerless. I freely concede that my imputation
of motives is debatable. Much less debatable, however, is the conclusion that Sue and Washington together afford little support for
any suggestion that Hall regularly favored the slave and that Taylor
did not. Hall's and Taylor's decisionmaking did not fall on any
simple liberal-conservative continuum. These precedents in mind,
we can sensibly consider alternate explanations for Taylor's positions in Ben and Jim.
There is, indeed, a very plausible alternate for Taylor's conclusion in Ben that the 1741 statutory requirement of "pregnant circumstances" to corroborate the testimony of one slave against another was, by 1821, no longer in effect. It is that he read the relevant
statutes neutrally. Most of the argument in the case pertained to
whether the 1793 act providing to slaves tried in county court the
right to a jury trial and an 1816 act giving to superior courts (one
level above the county courts) exclusive original jurisdiction in slave
capital cases operated as a repealer of the 1741 requirement. Taylor,
joined by Leonard Henderson, said they did. The 1816 act stated,
after all: "the trial shall be conducted in the same manner, and
under the same rules, regulations, and restrictions, as trials for free
men . . . ."1o Hall disagreed, saying that the 1816 Act was quite
270.

Quoted in State v. Ben, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434, 436 (1821).
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silent "as to the competency . . . of witnesses: that, as I apprehend,
was left to the law . . . of 1741."21 For Hall, and for Flanigan, "a

humane policy forbade that the life of a human being (one of themselves) should be taken away upon testimony coming from them,
unless some circumstance appeared in aid . . . .
But there was another relevant act, one that Flanigan does not
bother to mention, but that for Taylor and Henderson (and for
myself) was dispositive. An 1802 act specifically declared that in
trials for insurrection the testimony of one slave against another had
to be supported by "pregnant circumstances."2 3 In Taylor's view,
if the 1793 jury trial act had not repealed the pregnant circumstances requirement, then this provision of 1802 would have been entirely unnecessary. So must the 1802 legislators have thought, and
surely they, nine years after the fact, were in a much better position
to know the 1793 legislators' intent than were the judges a third of
a century later. So thought Taylor, and not, I think, simply because
he was blinded by egalitarian rhetoric.
Finally, what of Jim's case? In my judgment, four aspects provide solid ground for an alternate to Flanigan's conclusion that in
Jim Taylor destroyed his credibility. First, as we noted earlier, the
result was not to hang Jim, but to give him a new trial.
Second, Jim had two grounds for his appeal-one, his objection
to a nonslaveholder being on his jury, which Flanigan tells us about,
and another, which Flanigan omits. That other ground was the indictment's failure to allege that the assault and attempted rape for
which Jim was being tried had been committed "violently . . . and

against" the victim's will. The 1823 statute under which the prosecution had been brought had made carnal assault a capital offense
only for nonwhites. For whites, such an assault continued to be no
more than a misdemeanor. In Taylor's view the very fact of a novel
and racially discriminatory punishment constituted "an additional
reason for . . . adhering to the established forms,""' requiring ex-

press allegations in the indictment.
Third, there was an excellent statutory reason why Taylor did
not do what Flanigan suggests he ought to have done in order to
maintain his credibility-extend "the reasoning of State v. Ben to
abolish slaveowner juries."27 The reasoning of Ben, we recall,
turned on the intent of the 1793 jury trial statute, which Taylor had
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 438-39.
12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142, 144 (1826).
Flanigan, supra note 26, at 558.
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declared "was a virtual repeal of so much of the . . . [previous 1741
code] as differs from the Common Law rule of evidence . . . ."9*

Flanigan argues that Taylor was inconsistent, five years later, in not
seeing the 1793 statute as abolishing slaveowner juries. The 1793
statute, however, expressly directed "the Jury to be composed of
owners of slaves."2' How is it, then, that the spirits of Ben and the
statute should have led to abolishing the statute's explicit
provision?
Fourth, inasmuch as the court granted Jim a new trial, and
inasmuch as Jim objected to the procedures of his new trial as well
as of his former one, he appealed his case again to Taylor's court.
In the second trial, which also reached a verdict of guilty, the principal witness had varied in parts of her testimony, primarily as to
what she had been doing in her house when, she alleged, Jim had
entered it. Jim's counsel had moved in the lower court for complete
rejection of her testimony, which would have ended the case. The
judge, however, had instructed the jury that they could reject whatever parts of the testimony they disbelieved and "act on such part
as they did believe." That judicial instruction was the core of Jim's
objection. And, when his case reached Taylor for the second time,
Jim was ultimately successful. Taylor ruled that the entire testimony should have been rejected, adducing as a principle of common
2 78 This was
law the maxim, "falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus."
hardly "hang 'em jurisprudence." As one of his successors as chief
justice was to observe three decades later:
Any one, upon the first blush, after reading Jim's case, would suppose that
he could hardly open an English law book without meeting with the general
rule "falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus," yet, strange as it may seem, he will
not . . . find the rule laid down in any English book of reports or by any writer
upon evidence . . . there is full positive proof that there is no such rule. King

v. Teal and others, 11 East. Rep. 307 (1809).m

So much for the particulars of Flanigan's explanations of judicial motivations and attitudes on the high courts of the two Carolinas, and so much for my efforts at elaborating why I think Flanigan's explanations evidence an undue veering into dismal Whiggish
historiography. Do the specific interpretive differences I have laid
out suggest any broader morals about the study of the legal history
of slavery? I believe they suggest four that, picking up our earlier
numbering scheme, I shall put as propositions. They are:
276.
277.
278.
279.

8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434, 436 (1821).
12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142, 144 (1826).
State v. Jim, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 508, 510 (1828).
State v. Williams, 47 N.C. 257, 263 (1855) (Pearson, J.)
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12-If we are to understand thoroughly the law of slavery, it is
not sufficient to treat all the relevant statutes and cases as if
they were emanations of a South united in self-conscious defense
of the peculiar institution. That might be our conclusion, but it
should not be our beginning.
13-In consequence, a high investigative priority should be
given to examining cases embedded, not within a unitary matrix
for the South as a whole, but rather within the actual jurisdictional units that existed, especially those that were primary in
southern legal thinking-the states' court systems.
14-At an early analytic stage we should try to fathom the lay
of the judicial land in each state court system, particularly the
major factors that might serve to differentiate, from one slave
state to another, judicial behavior on the issue of slavery. These
factors potentially include: (a) statutes that judges may have
seen as limiting their decisional freedom; (b) precedents that
judges may have seen as similarly limiting; (c) concepts of the
judicial role that judges may have perceived as more and less
appropriate; (d) factors in particular states' politics that judges
may have taken as more or less limiting upon their freedom to
decide-such as whether they were subject to periodic election
or had life tenure, or whether they belonged to the dominant
political party; (e) the personal factors of social and economic
background that may or may not have affected their decisionmaking; and (f) the broader political beliefs that they valued,
as well as the uncertainties they may have felt about those beliefs-such as the value of "Union," the value of a "rule of law,"
the value of comity among states in sustaining law and Union,
the values, conversely, of keeping blacks in total subjection, or
of limiting the extension of greater political power to white lower
classes.
15-If, again, we are really to understand the law of southern
slavery and how it evolved, we ought to examine it against the
backdrop of developing northern abolitionism and against the
backdrop of changing Euro-Atlantic concepts of mete political
superordination and subordination, as a matter of North-South
United States tensions, and as a matter of changing EuroAtlantic norms as to who gets what, when, and how.
To say this is to intimate why I find Cover's work considerably
more valuable than have some critics. As I have said earlier, I do
not intend to enter into a lengthy analysis of Justice Accused, in
part because it has been amply reviewed elsewhere, in part because
most of its content pertains to northern judicial reactions to slavery,
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and in part because I shall take up my doubts concerning his analysis of the Virginia court in Part Two of this Article. Nonetheless, it
is appropriate to specify briefly that which seems most useful about
his book. I have in mind three aspects of his approach. The first is
that he keeps his judges, so to speak, within the Atlantic community
of nations, rather than putting them on an American island bereft
of any intellectual or political ties to the European tradition.
The second useful aspect of his approach lies in his intentions
both to get inside the minds of the judges he is dealing with and to
use the insights of role theory in seeking to get inside. The third
aspect that appeals to me is that Cover restores to the active agenda
of research a number of issues that concerned me some years ago
but that threatened to be tabled by default, given the exploratory
paths that other writers pursued. Moreover, he advances them from
where I had left them. These are chiefly the relationships between
judicial role and political ideas, the relationships among conflicting
demands posed by the judicial vocation, the political vocation, the
capacities of political institutions to solve problems, and the central
role of manumission decisions as indicators of variance in judicial
thinking about the fit between law and slavery.
The work of other writers has advanced considerably our understanding of black justice at the local level and has given us a possible framework for thinking about the autonomous development of
a unified law of slavery. We have not, however, advanced similarly
in our understanding of the southern appellate judiciaries-especially not with respect to their functioning during the decades of greatest political strife over the peculiar institution, the
1830's through the 1850's. To say this is to point ahead to what will
occupy our attention in Parts Two and Three of this essay. Before
proceeding there, however, we should round out our reflections on
varying interpretations by putting in summary comparative form
what the various authors have sought to explain, and how; and by
drawing from that summary comparison and our previous inquiries
whatever analytic differences may remain that are not attributable
to variance in focus, evidentiary level, and data base. The most
useful way of summarizing what the various authors have sought to
explain, and how, is to divide them up as follows: (1) according to
what they are seeking to explain; (2) according to what they consider the necessary components of satisfying explanations and of
further research; and (3) according to their underlying assumptions
as to what can and cannot be taken for granted in the debate-as
to where, in other words, they place the boundaries of sensible or
respectable debate. Let me try such a summary, author by author,
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in the order that each chronologically joined the debate.
A. Nash. What is to be explained: Southern appellate decisions in three areas-manumission, trials of blacks, and trials of
whites for felonious injuries to blacks. Major components: Appellate
records in ten seceding states, 1800-1860, and judicial biographies
that show considerable variance among the southern judges with
respect to attitudes and decisionmaking on manumission, and with
respect to taking seriously "the slave's humanity," but much less
variance with respect to providing trials as fair as the law permitted
in criminal cases. The evidence shows a pervasive, but not universal, inability to resolve an ideological tension among "four components of the southern value system . . . supremacy of whites versus
the supremacy of law, . . Negro as property versus the Negro as

human."20 The judicial variance is closely related to "Unionism vs.
Secessionism," but not to indices of socioeconomic status. Principal
assumptions: Southern attitudes may have been less hegemonic
about slavery than commonly assumed. Overt attitudes of "political
gladiators" may or may not be representative of other southerners.
There is not necessarily a direct correlation between "intent" to
support the peculiar institution, and "result." Role theory is useful
in accounting for judicial decisions, but it is difficult to.explain
them adequately without bringing in questions of "liberalism/
illiberalism/conservatism/radical reaction," and "pro-slavery/
anti-slavery." It is necessary to set at the start plain boundaries
delimiting what one will and will not examine, in order to minimize
the effects of one's assumptions about the nature of southern
slavery upon the data. It is necessary to look at the development of
each court separately, as a small group, and to analyze the judges'
reasoning in order to try to "get into" their minds.
B. Flanigan.What is to be explained: The difference between
the law's "suppression of personality" in civil cases and the movement of nineteenth-century southern law away from suppression in
criminal cases. Major components: Appellate court records and
scattered lower court records of criminal trials that show it is a
mistake to think of "pro-slavery" versus "libertarian" courts, because "almost all southern judges worked within the confines of the
proslavery mentality, but . . . realized that full recognition of the

slave's humanity in a criminal trial did not endanger his status as
the master's property or undermine the peculiar institution." 281
These judges, turning "their backs on the brutal colonial past," 28 2
280. A More EquitablePast?, supra note 25, at 240.
281. Flanigan, supra note 26, at 548.
282. Id. at 564.
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made "a remarkable attempt to reconcile fairness and even a degree
of legal equality with slavery as a dynamic and perpetual institution.""' Principalassumptions: It is not very useful to go into the
judges' minds or to speak of "pro-slavery," "anti-slavery," and
"libertarianism." It is useful, however, to speak of "substantial
equality with whites,""' "greater procedural fairness,"m5 and
"embark[ing] very often on an unmistakably equalitarian
course."2M
C. Cover. What is to be explained: The judicial reaction to
anti-slavery, why "earnest, well-meaning pillars of legal respectabil28
the
ity" collaborated "in a system of oppression-Negro slavery,"m
dilemma of the anti-slavery judge. Major components: Appellate
records in a selection of (largely northern) state supreme court cases
and a sprinkling of United States Supreme Court cases that show,
with few exceptions, anti-slavery judges solving their moral dilemma by formalist decisionmaking when asked to enforce fugitive
slave laws. Escalating the worth of the values other than freedom
promoted by an antifreedom decision, these judges ascribed the
responsibility for the decision elsewhere (to federal or state statute
or constitution). Principal assumptions: It is not necessary to set
clear boundaries as to what evidence is and is not to be examined,
or to study various courts as decisionmaking units (as distinct from
particular judges). "Liberal/conservative" and "pro-slavery/antislavery" distinctions are useful, analyzing legal reasoning is important, and role theory and cognitive dissonance theory are the most
powerful "explainers."
D. Tushnet. What is to be explained: The distinctive development of southern slavery appellate case law, how it is distinctive,
and what is the most fruitful use that historians can make of case
law and statutory materials in this area. Major components: The
type of legal reasoning used by southern appellate judges, and its
change over time from analysis by analogy to analysis by category; judicial determination not to go more than superficially consists
in "the slave as a moral personality;" the most fruitful approach
equals historians' applying the case law and the statutory law to
understanding the ideology of the "master class." Principal
assumptions: A Genovese-like model of southern society is essentially correct. There were not sufficient attitudinal differences about
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 568.
R. CovER, supra note 27, at 6.
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slavery among the various courts or among particular judges to
render fruitful explanations that depend in whole or in part on
"liberal/conservative," or on "pro-slavery/anti-slavery," distinctions.
E. Hindus. What is to be explained: What antebellum South
Carolina "black justice" was like below the appellate court level.
Major components: Lower court records of criminal trials in two of
forty-six judicial districts in one state and some "statewide evidence" that, compared with Massachusetts justice, shows that
slaves were dealt with by formal local process far more than has
customarily been believed, and that the function of law and authority in South Carolina was to preserve white dominance, and that the
law was never intended to be just. Principalassumptions: They are
largely similar to Tushnet's except disbelieving Genovese; the style
and content of the legal reasoning is less important than Tushnet
believes; it is not critical to examine manumission decisions.
F. Howington. What is to be explained: Same as Hindus, but
generalizations more clearly restricted to the state studied (Tennessee). Major components: Extensive analysis of circuit court records
in six counties (including the two largest in terms of slave populations) that shows results in criminal trials of slaves closer to those
Nash and Flanigan found at the appellate court level than to those
Hindus found in the lower courts of South Carolina. Principal
assumptions: Speaking of judges' "liberality/illiberality," or of their
pro-slavery/anti-slavery bias is not very useful;"' neither is an explanation depending primarily upon interest in protecting the master's property; "role theory" provides the clue to an adequate explanation.
We have now reached the point at which we can attempt some
tentative answers to the central questions that we posed at the
beginning of Part One-how important and real are the interpretive
differences among these authors; whether close inspection of what
they have said makes their differences seem larger or smaller; and
whether the differences that remain are traceable more to variance
in the data studied or to the explanations that "satisfy" the authors.
It is plain that no author has taken a genuinely extreme interpretive
position. No author is so "empty-glass" as to argue that the southern judges, whether at the trial or appellate court level, behaved in
the fashion of Nazi judges underwriting Hitler's inferno, or even of
Soviet judges taking their cues from the Party in determining the
288. Note that I am here relying on Howington's 1978 paper, supranote 70, rather than
on the somewhat different views on this matter expressed in his 1975 article, supranote 29.
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"guilt" of dissidents engaged in "hooliganism" or other heinous
deviations. At the same time, no author is so "full-glass" in his
Whiggery as to argue that southern judges seeking to interface law
and slavery consciously set out to exacerbate the internal contradictions of the peculiar institution. Considered within the narrow ideological spectrum of American political history, however, differences
do remain-essentially due in varying measure to one or more of
three factors: data differences, rigorousness of setting boundaries on
the data included or excluded, and "explanatory satisfyingness."
Those differences in interpretation attributable wholly or
largely to data differences-for example, those between Tennessee
and South Carolina lower court procedures, or those arising out of
the circumstance that more appellate than lower court decisions are
available for analysis-are the least troublesome in an important
sense. In theory at least, further research at the lower court level in
different states would give us a better sense of the whole pattern of
southern black justice. It is the differences grounded more in data
boundary-setting and explanatory satisfyingness, that are more
troubling. The chief outstanding issues appear to be six:
(1) whether there were significant variations among judges
and among different southern court systems in attitudes and behavior concerning the appropriate relationship between law and slavery, or with respect to the desirability of the peculiar institution
itself;
(2) whether the essential course of the case law of southern
slavery is from reasoning by analogy to reasoning by category, and
concomitantly toward a unified and more or less autonomous shape
of doctrine and decision;
(3) whether judges consciously or unconsciously set out to bolster the peculiar institution's defenses as opposed to "doing justice," and whether such tendencies increased or became universal
in the decades before the Civil War;
(4) whether adequate explanation is aided or confused by
trying to distinguish between judicial liberalism and judicial conservatism, or between pro-slavery and anti-slavery;
(5) whether role theory accounts completely, largely, or little
for judicial behavior; and
(6) whether more is to be gained than lost by adopting the
natural and social scientific practice of setting clear initial boundaries at the outset of inquiry as to what evidence will and will not be
assessed, and by making sure that such evidence is either completely enumerated or randomly sampled, as distinct from the traditional historian's approach of gathering as many evidentiary rose-
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buds as he may find.
With one exception, because I prefer to let our conclusions concerning these issues grow as much as possible out of the evidence
we shall consider in Part Two, I do not propose to elaborate further
on these issues at this juncture. The exception pertains to the sixth
issue. Whatever else may be true about studying the law of slavery,
one proposition seems indispensable if we are to minimize the dangers of extracting from the evidence what we are disposed to believe
when we go in. That proposition is that we must clearly establish
the evidentiary boundaries at the outset. While I am far from sympathizing with those ardent preachers of the gospel of "scientific
history" who would have us always quantify the data of human
existence, nonetheless it seems plain that, notwithstanding the brief
history of the legal historiography of southern slavery, it is an area
already beclouded by loose approaches to the boundaries of datagathering. Absent firm historiographical rules of evidence, we just
do not know about the correctness of the verdicts that emerge about
the law of slavery.
PART Two: FINDING THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE OF KING COTTON:
THREE-STATE COMPARISON OF APPELLATE Surrs FOR FREEDOM

A

Posing the Critical Questions: Were There Significant
Differences Among JudicialAttitudes?
Our central task in Part Two will be to address the issues about
the nature, shape, and essential course of judicial decisions concerning slavery that Part One left unresolved. As late as the year 1787,
and despite the slave codes legislated during the colonial era, southern slavery was an institution of social domination whose judicial
contours remained ill-defined. The statutory law was much more
certain than the judge-made law. It was not clear whether the common law gave any protection of its own force to the slave, whether
the slave possessed any substantial rights to a fair trial, or whether,
in suits for freedom, judges would resolve uncertainties in favor of
liberty or in favor of putative owners. By the eve of the Civil War
the appeals judiciaries in all states with substantial slave populations had wrestled extensively with these issues. Of that there is no
doubt. Doubt obtains, rather, with respect to the motivations, intents, and achievements of the judges who so wrestled to fit law and
slavery together-and especially with respect to whether consensus
existed as to judicial aim and purpose among the various slave-state
A.

jurisdictions, and whether consensus waxed or waned as the Civil
War approached.
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The critical questions, in other words, are these: were there
significant differences among judicial attitudes towards non-whites
and towards the peculiar institution, and did such differences persist throughout the antebellum era? I am going to argue: (a) that
such differences existed; (b) that they did persist; and (c) that the
best evidence of such diversity lies not in criminal cases concerning
blacks but in manumission cases, in suits for freedom.
Two reasons explain why the best evidence lies there. First,
depending on who is doing the interpreting, appellate reversals of
convictions of blacks and appellate upholdings of convictions of
whites for inflicting bodily injury on blacks can, as prior writing in
the field has shown, be interpreted in several ways. A single decision
may be attributed to one or more of the following judicial motives:
(1) a praiseworthy determination to be fair to the black; (2) a less
praiseworthy determination to put a good front on the peculiar institution and thereby demonstrate to northerners that it was not so
bad as abolitionists asserted; (3) a judicial conviction that the master's property investment in the black needed protection against
poor and unruly whites who injured him or provoked him to crime;
(4) a fussy old-fashioned formalist jurisprudence that insisted compulsively on adherence to the law's forms; or (5) a mechanistic
following out of perceived legislative intentions. The sheer number
of possible motivational combinations affords, thus, fertile ground
for inconclusive interpretive debate.
Second, the less well-studied area of judicial reactions to manumission is likely to be more telling both because it put the southern
judge closer to the political firing line on the future of the peculiar
institution than did other issues in slavery jurisprudence and because, in consequence, it affords to both dismal and ameliorist
Whigs less room to maneuver interpretively, less opportunity to
slide conveniently from one explanation for judicial behavior to another.
Accordingly, in this Part we shall analyze the manumission
holdings of three courts from the time that each began to experience
a substantial manumission caseload to the end of the antebellum
decades-Virginia from the early nineteenth century to 1860; Tennessee from the late 1820's to 1860; and Georgia from 1845 to 1860.
I select these courts (a) because I suspect that previous analyses of
these courts (including my own) have been at least partially erroneous; (b) because all three courts tackled most of the major knotty
problems arising in the area; and (c) because, in my judgment, the
three courts' reactions to the question of liberty for slaves offer the
clearest evidence in favor of the thesis that significant differences
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among the southern judges did arise and did persist. If the thesis
cannot be sustained by such a comparison I doubt it can be sustained anywhere.
Before proceeding to the comparison we should pin down two
matters. One arises from my insistence in Part One that our tendencies to Whiggish veering should be minimized by requiring the historian to spell out in advance what primary evidence he will and will
not use in arguing his thesis. Accordingly, let me so specify. The
condition for inclusion is that admissible primary evidence be of the
following types: (1) appellate case reports in the three states; (2)
available biographical data concerning the judges who decided
these cases; (3) appellate cases decided by, and biographical data
pertaining to, other southern appeals judges faced with similar issues; or (4) statutes and relevant legislative journals or newspaper
accounts of proceedings in legislatures pertaining to manumission
issues.
The other matter arises from two needs: (a) to minimize both
my opportunity and that of the reader to slide back and forth on the
definition of significant difference; and (b) to minimize the likelihood that we slide back and forth on a related matter-the extent
to which discriminations against nonwhite minorities are a particularly southern, as distinct from a national, theme of American history. As Part One has made clear, it is my conviction that sliding
back and forth on these matters of definition and regionalism is at
least as responsible for interpretive variations in the analysis of the
law of slavery as is the legal evidence itself. That is why it is crucial
to be as clear as we can about our analytic reflexes on these matters
before we approach the evidence.
Accordingly, I am now going first to quote and then to identify
four paired excerpts from some leading nineteenth-century state
appellate court decisions concerning the rights and appropriate
treatment of racial minorities. I pair these excerpts because in my
judgment they constitute strong prima facie evidence for the existence of significant attitudinal difference on the parts of nineteenthcentury white judges toward minorities. Moreover, in some instances the locations and times of these attitudes' expressions are not
at all what would be anticipated by someone predisposed to think
that "greater racism" or "lesser liberalism" are regionally specific
southern phenomena. The reader can usefully test his own Whiggish
reflexes by reading the paired excerpts and then, before reading my
identifications, trying to guess which quote is attributable to a Deep
South, Upper South, or non-southern judge, and the approximate
date of such quote.
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PairA-Equality and Inequality in Trial Procedures
A-1: "The law of the case . . . is precisely the same as if the accused were a
free white man, and we cannot strain the law even 'in the estimation of a hair,'
because the defendant is a slave . . . ."m
A-2: "The difficulty in such cases is to ascertain the truth . . . . [S]uch as
we have among us can rarely be trusted in such matters. Those of the race . . .
have generally exhibited a total disregard of virtue, candor, and integrity, and
have shown . . . a propensity to cunning, deception, and perfidy . . . ."2

Both quotations pertain to the degree of equality that nonwhites

should receive when in court. The first was used by the Texas Supreme Court in 1860 to reverse a black's conviction for murder because his court-appointed defense attorney and the prosecution had
mutually agreed to an alteration in the wording of the indictment
under which he was tried. The second was a justification used by
the Oregon Supreme Court in 1890 to discount the testimonial credibility of the Chinese relatives of an orphan, and thus to uphold a
lower court decision to put the Chinese orphan in the custody of a
Presbyterian orphanage rather than having him brought up by the
relatives.
PairB-Resolving Doubts for or Against Liberty
B-1: "An aged man . .. is about to descend to the grave. Between him and
his slaves exists a tie . .. [The aged man looking about him, asks himself,
'then, whose shall these be?' He does what he can to confer upon them the boon
they hold most dear! [A]t length it is discovered that the records are silent
on the subject; immediately, the birds of prey are upon the wing .

.

.. It

would indeed be a reproach to the law, if there was no way in which it could
correct the evil . . . ."a

B-2: "The act creates a forfeiture of property in case of a defective registry
.

. .

where there appears to have been an intent to comply honestly with all

its directions, the construction should be liberal in favour of the master."m2

The first quotation comes from an 1855 North Carolina case in
which Chief Justice Frederick Nash upheld a claim to liberty by
ordering lower court records amended fifty years after the fact to
cure a defect-namely the circumstance that these records contained no formal order for the emancipation of the claimant blacks,
as required by state law. The second quotation comes from an 1817
Pennsylvania case wherein Pennsylvania Chief Justice William
Tilghman enunciated his principles for deciding suits for freedom
arising under his state's gradual emancipation of law.
PairC-PerceptionsAbout Innate Capacitiesof Whites and Nonwhites
C-1: "[H]e is made after the image of the Creator. He has mental capacities
[The laws under which
... that constitute him equal to his owners ....
289. Calvin v. State, 25 Tex. 789, 797 (1860).

290. In re North Pac. Presbyterian Bd. of Missions v. Ah Won, 18 Ore. 339 (1890).
291. Mayo v. Whitson, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 231, 239 (1855).
292. Wilson v. Belinda, 3 Serg. & Rawl. 396, 397-98 (Pa. 1817).
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he is held as a slave have not and cannot extinguish his high born nature
ism

C-2: "The same rule which would admit them to testify . .. might soon see
them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls.
This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-heated imagination,

. .

. but an actual and present danger ....

a race of people whom

nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual
development beyorid a certain point, as their history has shown . . . ."a

The first quotation should be familiar from our discussion of Howington's research in Part One.215 It is of course Judge Nathan Green
of Tennessee rejecting in 1846 the argument that as a chattel a slave
could not sue for his freedom. The second quotation was part of the
reasoning advanced by California's Chief Justice Murray in 1854 to
deny the right of Chinese to testify in the murder trial of a white.
PairD-The Demands of Comity and the Legal Status of a Freed Black
D-1: "[Aiccording to the doctrine here asserted . . . a portion of the people
of one of the States of this confederacy are without remedy as individuals . . .
to enforce a legal right in a co-State of the Union . . . .m
If so, there is no restraint in our law against taking his life . . . . [H]e

must be regarded as an alien enemy was by the barbarian rules which prevailed in the dark ages, and which the majority of the court appear to sanction
D-2: "The State of Ohio, forgetful of her constitutional obligations . . . and
afflicted with a negro-mania, . . . inclines . . . to her embrace, as citizens, the

neglected race . . . occupying, in the order of nature, an intermediate state
between the irrational animal and the white man.
Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her peculiar philanthropy,
should determine to descend another grade . . . and claim to confer citizen-

ship on the chimpanzee or the ourang-outang (the most respectable of the
monkey tribe), are we to be told that 'comity' will require of the States not
thus demented, . . . to meet the necessities of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into . . . this confederacy?

The doctrine of comity is not thus unreasonable.""'

Both quotations come from the same 1859 Mississippi case, in which
the court majority heatedly denied the right of an ex-Mississippi
slave, duly freed at her master's wish in Ohio, to collect a bequest
left to her by him in Mississippi, and in which the minority equally
heatedly accused the majority of taking an absurd position.
There is no need here to go into detailed assessments of these
cases, but only to ask the reader to determine if he or she agrees with
me that, at least on their face, the first quotation in each pair
293. Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 92, 95-96 (1846).
294. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854).

295. See Part One (C)supra.
296. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 285 (1859) (Handy, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 281-82.
298. Id. at 262-64 (Harris, J.).
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appears significantly less reactionary or less racist than the second.
If he or she agrees about at least three of the four pairs' then the
following analysis of manumission decisions in the Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia courts may be persuasive. If he or she does not, I
anticipate that nothing I might say would bridge the Whiggish gap
in our perceptions of southern judicial behavior.
B. Major Issues in Suits for Freedom
To the southern courts, suits for freedom posed a set of issues
rather different from those that formed the bulk of the related dockets of the northern judiciaries-enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Laws and consideration of state Personal Liberty Laws.'" To be
sure, the issues overlapped, especially in respect to conflict of laws,
the demands and just expectations of interstate comity, and the
effects of a slave's residence in a free state. Moreover, occasionally
southern courts acted with considerable vigor, even imagination in
thwarting or punishing would-be kidnappers of free blacks."' None299. Pair B appears to be the pair in which room for argument exists, because of the
nature of the Belinda case.
300. See R. CoVER, supranote 27. See also T. Moiuus, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL
LBERTY LAws oF THE NoRm, 1780-1861 (1974). Morris treats thoroughly the politics of these
laws and their judicial administration in five states-Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
301. See, e.g., Welborn v. Little, 105 S.C.L. 106, 1 Nott & McC. 263 (1818); State v.
Greenwood, 8 S.C.L. 111, 1 Mill 420 (1817). In State v. Greenwood, David Johnson, speaking
for the South Carolina court, refused to reverse the conviction of a Charleston constable for
assault and false imprisonment. Constable Greenwood apparently dreamed up a get-richquick scheme which ran awry. He slapped two free blacks into jail on trumped-up charges.
Playing upon their ignorance, he persuaded them to indenture themselves to another white
named Hasket who offered to pay their bail and future court costs. They were then released
to Hasket who, after paying the constable some seventy or eighty dollars sub rosa, removed
them from the Charleston area-probably out of state, where he sold them as slaves. Shortly
after this transaction the Charleston police learned of the scheme and instituted an unsuccessful search for Hasket and the Negroes. Failing, they confronted Greenwood, who confessed and was brought to trial.
By the time he stood in the prisoner's dock, Constable Greenwood had reconsidered his
confession and had unsuccessfully prayed to have all of it barred from the trial save that part
which tended to exculpate him-namely the fact that he was acting, both at the time of his
"arrest" and "release" of the Negroes, under a magistrate's warrant. Rejecting Greenwood's
appeal, David Johnson observed: "the charge against these men was founded in the basest
falsehood, fabricated by the defendant, for the nefarious purpose of enslaving them for life,
in which, it is feared, he has been but too successful, with a view, to use his own language,
'to make money of them.'" Id. at 111, 1 Mill at 422.
In Welborn v. Little the South Carolina court overlooked irregularities in police procedure and upheld a jury's miniscule award of damages in order to effect substantive justice.
A free boy of "very dark color" originally had been apprenticed with the consent of his father
and the local commissioners of the poor to one Little. About a year before the commencement
of the suit, Little sold the unexpired apprenticeship to Welborn. Six or eight months later
Welborn delivered the boy to an acquaintance named Garrison, who then set out with him
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theless, absent statutes providing for general emancipation, the
basic southern adjudicative problems pertaining to freedom boiled
down to seven issues: (1) whether fair hearings of claims to liberty
were to take place; (2) whether damages should be permitted for
wrongful detention in slavery; (3) what kinds of proof were admissible or controlling, and what presumptions arose from particular
types of evidence (such as skin color); (4) how to resolve cases in
which there was doubt about a former master's intent; (5) the effects of restrictive statutes when there was little question about the
master's desire to free but considerable question about its legality;
(6) the weight that should be given to "fourth party claims;"3 02 and
for Kentucky, presumably intending to sell him into slavery there. One of the commissioners,
"on hearing of it, and suspecting . . . that foul dealing with him was intended, issued a
process of his own manufacturing," 10 S.C.L. at 106, 1 Nott & McC. at 264, under which
Garrison was apprehended before he got across the South Carolina border, and the boy
returned into the custody of the commissioner.
Welborn, who had not yet been paid by Garrison, then sought to obtain the boy from
the commissioner, but the commissioner refused on the ground that the original transfer of
indenture from Little to Welborn had been illegal since neither he nor the boy's father had
underwritten it. Welborn then brought an action against Little to recover money paid to him
on a consideration that had failed. Welborn had the letter of the law on his side, and the jury
recognized this by finding for him. But the jurors apparently felt that the law's spirit lay on
the other side of the balance, for they awarded him only -lt damages! Id. at 107, 1 Nott &
McC. at 265.
From this verdict Welborn appealed, adducing two arguments. First, he urged that the
original taking of the boy from Garrison was illegal: the commissioner had no right to go
around inventing writs and having them served on people as if he were a judge. Second,
Welborn argued that there was no fair proportion between the sum allowed by the jury and
the amount that he had paid to Little in anticipation of several years' services.
The constitutional court treated these arguments with righteous disdain. David Johnson
dismissed Welborn's contentions about the writ's illegality by judicial fiat, saying "it is not
necessary to consider, as it answered the purpose for which it was intended, and . . . subserved the cause of justice and humanity . . . ." Id. at 107, 1 Nott & McC. at 264. Perhaps
it was not necessary since Welborn was seeking to coerce the commissioner not into returning
the boy, but into returning the money from Little. Yet if that is so, the lack of necessity
stemmed from the nature of the suit, not from the fact that the writ had "answered the
purpose for which it was intended." Rubber hoses frequently answer their purposes too, but
that does not make third degree legal.
Reaching Welborn's second argument, Justice Johnson admitted that there had been a
partial failure of consideration, and that the jury's award was low. Would he, therefore, order
a new trial? No:
jU[nder the particular circumstances of the case, I do not feel disposed to disturb their
verdict . . . . [There was the strongest probability that he never would have been
disturbed in the possession, . . .but for the transfer made by himself-leading to apprehensions dishonorable to humanity-and that to a stranger, who, to his knowledge, was
about to carry him out of the state, in direct violation of a positive law.
Id. at 108, 1 Nott & McC. at 267-68.
302. This analysis defines the wishes of the master, of the slave, and of those who would
have inherited the slave had not the master sought to free him, as respectively, first, second,
and third party claims. Fourth party claims, then, are those such as the claims of creditors
owed by an estate saddled with debts.
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(7) the weight that should be given to other states' constitutions,
statutes, and judicial decisions in conflict of law situations, in which
arguably the slavery policies were not four-square with those expressed in the domestic jurisdiction's constitution, statutes, and
prior holdings. Plainly these categories are not altogether discrete."o'
Still, it will be helpful to our analysis if we view these issues as,
potentially at least, posing choices for the judges in which their
private predilections on the subject of slavery might come to the
fore. So too might come their views about related political issues-especially their reactions to gathering North-South frictions
concerning the Constitution's compact with slavery.
Did the course of larger political events substantially affect
southern appeals courts' resolutions of these issues? Particularly,
did the raising of southern defenses against Yankee abolitionism in
the late 1820's and early 1830's lead to a sharp decline in any previously existing judicial tendencies to resolve these issues in favor
of freedom? Did, in other words, southern appellate judges join in a
"concert of defense" of the peculiar institution?
Perhaps the leveling force of Jacksonian democracy would
make itself felt on the bench in the form of newly appointed judges
echoing mass intolerance and demanding hegemonic support for an
institution that kept several million Negroes lower on the societal
totem pole than "poor white" farmers and mechanics. Moreover,
regional differences between Upper and Lower South might find
reflection in judicial decisions. Perhaps in the Upper South some
judges still would be appointed from old, established families who,
though abandoning personal "Jeffersonian" doubts about the morality of slavery and construing it more and more as a cherished,
aristocratic, agricultural order threatened by crass northern industrialism, would hesitate to inform their decisions with either righteous "positive-good" hyperbole or absolutist ideological justifications of plantation-capitalism. Joining them might be a few cunning
supporters of the order of exploitative, purely profit-seeking, bondage from the cotton states. "Aristocratic" judges might well still
feel a moral imperative that power be exercised with grace and
believe that slavery's chances of survival would be increased should
humanity rather than brutality color it. Cunning supporters of King
Cotton, though uninterested in grace or morality, might agree-at
least to the extent of dressing their decisions in the rhetoric of humanity and thus making more elusive the abolitionist's target. In303. For example, what a master intended when he took his slave out of the state to
further his aim merged the fifth and seventh issues.
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deed, either sort of judge might render occasional decisions in favor
of freedom-particularly if precedent should make a decision for
bondage logically "sticky."
Such judges, however, would limit their generosity. While
doubtlessly reaping the rhetorical most of such rare liberality, they
would at the same time probably be moving the general contours of
slave law towards a more tightly closed caste-structure-slowly at
first as, reasoning from a more or less blank state of precedent, they
groped for appropriate analogies, and then more quickly later as the
juristic categories of a unified law of the peculiar institution came
into being. Almost certainly, these judges would be both less than
favorably disposed to the free Negro and anxious to ensure that
freedom only be granted to slaves on condition of removal from the
South, so that the gentle society of white fathers would not be endangered by the presence of free black children. They might, then,
limit their benevolence to freedom effected far from arenas of possible trouble. The North might be slightly better than the
South-though not much so, particularly as abolitionists began to
make propagandistic use of free Negroes. Canada would be somewhat safer, but Liberia would be quite out of harm's way. Such
judges, then, might look with favor only on liberty in Africa. To be
sure, granted the onslaughts of abolition and the rise of King Cotton, not all-or even a heavy majority of-judges would be motivated by considerations of grace or cunning. Surely judges would
appear in increasing numbers to defend slavery loudly and furiously, whether in terms of Calhoun's contractualism, Fitzhugh's
feudalism, or Fundamentalist scripturalism. Perhaps, finally, the
post-1830 limits pf judicial diversity would be drawn narrowly between the lines circumscribing blatant, tactless pro-slavery and
those delineating gracious, cunning pro-slavery. Perhaps-but what
actually happened?
Most southern state supreme courts took fairly uniform positions on the issues of hearings and damages for wrongful detentions.
These issues produced less controversy than questions of the master's intent to free and of that intent's legality. All judges-even the
most "reactionary"-seem to have insisted on fair hearings of
claims to freedom.0 o Generally this was accomplished by requiring
304. Consider, for example, South Carolina Chancellor George Dargan, whose life and
attitudes match almost too neatly to be credible the stereotype of the fire-eating southerner.
Dargan was a keen Baptist and a South Carolina college graduate, a Nullifier who volunteered
in 1832 for the state militia because he feared Andrew Jackson would send federal troops,
and then was a Secessionist in 1850. Dargan died of a fit of apoplexy in 1858, but not without
first becoming a keen believer in spirit rappings and clairvoyance and taking to addressing
Unionists as "old fogies." "His boast for many years was, that he had never been beyond the
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a master to post a bond. Occasionally, however, southern courts
went even further to insure fair hearings. In both South Carolina
and Arkansas a court threatened a dilatory master with contempt."
The Tennessee judges upheld a chancery court that had bodily removed slaves from their owner in order to foreclose the possibility
of their sale prior to trial."'
Damages for wrongful detention likewise generated little controversy. Most courts followed South Carolina practice."' Thus if a
slave who won his freedom had simultaneously sought a monetary
award and the jury had granted it, the courts let the verdict stand.
If he had not sought both in the same suit, they generally refused
to permit a later suit seeking damages. Only the Virginia court
expressly denied damages."' The Tennessee court diverged in the
limits of South Carolina, and hoped never to be under the necessity of going out of the State."
B. PmRY, supra note 5, at 63. Yet even this arch-provincial, bitterly opposed to emancipation,
apparently did not seek to deny hearings on circuit.
305. J. O'NEALL, DIGESr OF Tm NEGRO LAw OF SourH CAROLNA 9 (1848) (discussing
Spear v. Rice, 16 S.C.L. 8, Harp. 20 (1823)). The court report, however, does not mention
this fact. In the Arkansas case, the executor actually was imprisoned for cQntempt. Campbell
v. Campbell, 13 Ark. 513 (1853).
306. Sylvia v. Covey, 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 247 (1833).
307. See Pepoon v. Clarke, 8 S.C.L. 32, 1 Mill 137 (1817), (a case which arose from an
attempt to convert an apprenticeship into slavery for life). As a small child in Baltimore,
Phebe was hired out by her mother, a free woman of color, to work for a certain Mr. and Mrs.
Alexander Gibson. In 1806 the Gibsons moved from Maryland to Charleston and, unbeknownst to Phebe's mother, took the girl along. Gibson appears to have regretted his action
and made preparations to send her back almost immediately. He died shortly thereafter,
however. Mrs. Gibson had no such qualms. Marrying Clarke a few months after Gibson's
death, she took to whipping Phebe whenever she claimed she was "born free." At maturity
Phebe finally found someone, Pepoon, to bring suit against Clarke.
The unlawfulness of the conversion was manifest enough to the jurors, who awarded
Phebe both freedom and $400 damages. Clarke then appealed on the ground that he had had
no reason to believe Phebe's claim, that he had trusted in his wife's assertions, and that
consequently the damages were unfairly high. Judge Johnson, speaking for a unanimous
Court of eight judges, rejected Clarke's appeal:
So far from thinking that the damages in this case are so excessive as to authorize the
granting of a new trial, I cannot forbear to declare my own conviction, that there has
been a base attempt to consign to slavery, for life this unfortunate being, whose very
situation called loudly for the protection of every feeling and honest man. With this view
of the case, I should not have been disposed to grant a new trial, if the damages had
been much greater.
Id. at 33, 1 Mill at 141-42.
308. In Paup v. Mingo, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 163 (1833), a testator who died in 1789 bequeathed freedom to his slaves to take effect after his affairs were "settled and all his debts
paid." Id. Twenty years elapsed before the slaves received their liberty, by virtue of a court
ruling, and another eighteen years passed before the debts were completely settled in 1827.
The freed blacks, discovering a surplus of profits in the final settlement, sought to claim it.
The court ruled against them, but some variation in the tones of the opinions delivered
existed. Thus Dabney Carr stated:
It was strongly contended for the freedmen, that this fund having been raised from
their labours, after they were entitled to their freedom, ought of right to go to them.
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other direction-toward favoring the Negro. In Matilda v.
Crenshawo' the court held that a Negro, having won a first suit for
freedom, could bring a second suit to recover from his ex-master
both court costs and wages for the time lapsed during the pendency
of the first suit. Seven years later, in December 1840, the Tennessee
court expanded this doctrine in the face of two facts that might well
have caused a judiciary made hostile to the cause of freedom by
abolitionism to back off. 10 Sweeper, once a Maryland free Negro,
had been convicted in 1826 for "persuading and conveying slaves
out of . . . Maryland into . . . Pennsylvania . . . .*"n For this

activity on behalf of the cause of liberty the Maryland court had
sentenced him to permanent banishment from the state and to sale
for the term of seven years. Undeniably Woodfolk, his purchaser,
had kept him too long. Nonetheless, Woodfolk's attorney made an
argument which provided a golden opportunity for the Tennessee
judges to condone informal additional punishment for Sweeper's
abolitionist activities: he pointed out that the original suit for freedom had been an action of ejectment, a mixed action under Tennessee law, 12 and that consequently Sweeper should have claimed
damages in that first suit. Having missed his chance, the attorney
continued, Sweeper now would have to be satisfied with just his
liberty. Certainly the court could have accepted this line of reasoning. Formal neutrality would have lent its aid to that end. Moreover,
Matilda's doctrine could, as Woodfolk's counsel observed, lead to
There is much in this argument, which addresses itself to our sense of justice, and to
our feelings; but unfortunately for them, the point has been irrevocably settled against
them. Suits of this kind have been very frequent . . . for more than a century . . . . In

many . . . the violation of freedom has been gross and palpable, and the public feeling
strongly on their side; yet in not one single case, have damages for the detention been
given . . . . Hard as the case may seem upon the freedmen, I for one, can never think,
at this day, of breaking through this settled course and policy of the country.
Id. at 176. By "country," Carr meant, of course, Virginia. Compare William Cabell's tone:
"I consider it the settled law . . . that a person held in slavery . . . cannot recover damages
. . . for his illegal detention . . . . I deem it unnecessary to inquire into its policy or abstract

justice." Id. at 180. Court President Henry St. George Tucker issued an opinion whose tone
is much like Cabell's. The tonal differences may not be wholly insignificant.
309. 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 249 (1833).
310. Woodfolk v. Sweeper, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 88 (1840).
311. Id. at 89.
312. Ejectment was an action brought for the recovery of land, which by the end of the
eighteenth century had largely displaced earlier modes of trying title-such as mort
d'ancestor or novel disseisin. Such actions were purely "real," that is, they determined only
the right of title. A separate, subsequent personal action for damages was necessary if the
wrongfully dispossessed party wished damages for "time and profits lost." The popularity of
ejectment lay in the fact that as a mixed action, combining the real and personal, both title
and damages could be secured in one litigation. See BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 49-50, 607 (4th
rev. ed. 1957).
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"ruinous consequences" 313 for masters in general. If hire could be
recovered here, in other instances it could be "recovered for fifty
years." 34 Masters who had inherited or purchased an apparently
valid title might, its defectiveness proved in court and damages
assigned, be ruined. But the Tennessee court rejected this bid to
adopt the Virginia view and affirmed the Matilda doctrine. The
Tennessee judges could see "no reason for changing the practice, but
on the contrary, believe it to be greatly better, than to mingle up in
one suit a contest for the right of liberty, and damages for the
violation of it."315 Yet over the long run surely it was "greatly better"
for only one party, the slave. Juries trying both freedom and damages probably would be more cautious about awarding liberty and
less disposed to award high monetary amounts than would separate
juries, one trying freedom and the other assessing damages.
What, if anything, of larger significance is suggested by the
Virginia and Tennessee courts' different holdings on the issue of
damages? The Tennessee opinions imply a curious lack of anxiety
about defending the master class' property and about the threatening depredations of abolition. The Virginia court's position appears
more infused with concern for the rights of property; yet the justifications advanced by its judges stopped well short of espousing a
positive-good theory of slavery. Were there, then, no postabolitionist courts that did set out consciously to defend slavery as
a beneficial institution? If none existed, then given the post-1830
popularity of that "gospel" in other branches of the southern state
governments and in the southern press, we well might be inclined
to think that there was something very peculiar about the relationship between the appellate judicial role and "reason of slavery."
Fortunately for our analytic purposes, one such court exists-that
of Georgia, to whose slavery jurisprudence we now shall turn. The
Georgia court provides a useful base against which to compare the
decisionmaking of other southern courts concerning the peculiar
institution.
C. Ardent Pro-Slavery and the GeorgiaSupreme Court
If all southern state supreme courts had fashioned the laws of
slavery as did the Georgia Supreme Court, dismal Whig analysis of
313. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 93 (1840).
314. Id. at 95. However, the court did require a new trial in the instant situation because
the lower court had virtually instructed the jury to find damages and thus determined as law
what was an important matter of fact-Woodfolk's culpability. He was not the original
purchaser, yet he was required to pay $743.50.
315. Id. at 96.
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those laws would have an easy, long, and successful life. Although
the Georgia legislators ignored for several decades a constitutional
provision calling for the formation of a separate appellate court, the
Georgia court, once established in 1845, more than made up for its
tardy beginning by speedily becoming a staunch exponent of the
positive-good theory of slavery. The nine men who sat on the threejudge court from its formation to the outbreak of the Civil War
formed by far the most politically active, articulate, and doctrinaire
southern bench in support of the peculiar institution. Table VIII
indicates the periods of service of each judge. This "triumph" of
ardent pro-slavery was in some measure due to the force of personality of one man, Joseph H. Lumpkin, whose de facto dominance of
the court received de jure cognizance from the state legislators in
1859, when, again tardily, they bestowed the title of Chief Justice
upon him."'
To say this is once again to take issue with Daniel Flanigan,
who seemingly considers it misleading to single out the Georgia
court as being especially pro-slavery." In my judgment, the Georgia
court was just exactly that. Examination of the personal attributes
and life experiences of the judges suggests some possible sources of
their unusually keen and overt pro-slavery. An unusually high proportion of the Georgia judges (eight of the nine) played active roles
in party politics, before or after, and sometimes during, their tenures on the court. Three were staunch Democrats. The choleric
Henry Benning, whose "immortality" resides appropriately enough
not in judicial memory but in the military fort named after him,"'
and Charles J. McDonald, a successful candidate for governor in
1839 and 1841, though unsuccessful in 1851, were fire-eaters a decade before Lincoln's election. As leaders of the Georgia delegation
to the Nashville Convention in 1850, they urged secession. The third
Democrat, Ebenezer Starnes, though ultimately a Unionist elector
on the Douglas ticket in 1860, considered secession a virtual inevitability as early as 1855.
Three of the five Whigs"' experienced tension between the Unionist ideological position of their national party and their own
Georgian perspectives. Richard Lyon crossed party lines during the
1850 constitutional crisis and was elected to the court as a states
316. See 3 H. CATrERALL, supra note 14, at 5, discussing Memorial to Joseph Henry
Lumpkin, 36 Ga. 19, 19-42 (1867).
317. See Flanigan, supra note 26, at 548.
318. Benning formed a regiment in the earliest stages of the War, fought for four years,
and had two horses shot from under him at Chickamauga.
319. In Georgia, as elsewhere in the South, Whigs secured a number of judgeships
disproportionately greater than their statewide political strength.
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TABLE VIII
GEORGIA JUDGES (1845-1860)

1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860

Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin
Joseph H. Lumpkin, C.J.
Joseph H. Lumpkin, C.J.

Hiram Warner
Hiram Warner
Hiram Warner
Hiram Warner
Hiram Warner
Hiiam Warner
Hiram Warner
Hiram Warner
Ebenezer Starnes
Ebenezer Starnes
Ebenezer Starnes
Charles J. McDonald
Charles J. McDonald
Charles J. McDonald
Linton Stephens
Charles J. Jenkins

Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Eugenius A. Nisbet
Henry L. Benning
Henry L. Benning
Henry L. Benning
Henry L. Benning
Henry L. Benning
Henry L. Benning
Richard F. Lyon

rights Democrat. Joseph Lumpkin favored secession at least by
November 1860. Even the reputedly brilliant Eugenius A. Nisbet
had difficulties reconciling Whiggery and slavery. After graduating
first in his class at the University of Georgia at the age of sixteen
and attending Judge Reeves' Litchfield, Connecticut, "law school"
for two years, Nisbet became by special act of the Georgia legislature the only person granted permission to practice law while still a
minor. He followed "strange gods" when the Whig party disintegrated in 1854; psychologically unable to vote Democratic, he cast
his ballot for the Know-Nothings. 320
Only two Whigs-Linton Stephens, the younger half-brother of
the vice-president of the Confederacy, and Charles Jones Jenkins,
governor from 1865 to 1868-did not favor secession merely on the
grounds of Lincoln's election. Jenkins' Unionism was sharply qualified, however; he simply advocated waiting to secede until Lincoln
committed an act of coercion against the slave states. As Table IX
suggests, 32 1 compared with the appeals courts in the states compris320. E. COULTER, GEORGIA: A SHORT HISTORY 311 (rev. ed. 1947).
321. The sources for the data from which the percentage figures are calculated for the
non-Georgia judges may be found in Nash, supra note 19, app. II, at 536-56. I have excluded
from the percentage calculations those judges whose birthplace or education is unknown and
those who did not attend college or law school. The numbers of judges for whom the data are
known, and not known respectively, are as follows: Birthplace: Alabama, 18 known, 4 not
known; Florida, 9 & 3; Georgia, 9 & 0; Mississippi, 11 & 2; Texas, 5 & 0. The information
gaps concerning state of birth are likely not large enough to affect substantially my generalizations.
The gaps are larger with respect to higher education, and of course some judges did not
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ing the southernmost tier of Anglo-American slavery jurisdictions-those bordering the Gulf of Mexico-the Georgia bench was
almost certainly the most homogenous in terms of background and
life experience. Only one of the Georgia judges, Hiram Warner, was
born outside the South. Of the remainder all except two were
native-born Georgians.3 22 By contrast, fourteen of the seventeen
judges in Alabama during this period came from the Upper South,
the North, and abroad;2 ' only three came from the Deep
South-two from South Carolina, and one native-born Alabamian.
Similarly, from 1845 to 1850 the Florida court actually consisted of
at least half northerners. 24 A similar homogeneity characterized the
college and professional training of these Georgia judges.325 The fact
that four of the Georgia judges attended college or law school outside the Deep South326 appears to have made at most a small difference in their attitudes toward Unionism in 1860-or, as we shall see,
in their views on freedom for blacks. To be sure, with the exception
of Lumpkin, they were less "fire-eating" than the two whose higher
education was entirely southern. Buttheir support of southern slavery was simply a bit more genteel.
Any attempt to analyze Georgia appellate decisions should recognize that from an early date Georgia legislators were hostile to
manumission. On November 19, 1801, a law prohibiting postmortem manumission passed the Georgia Senate without'a recorded
have any formal higher education, so greater caution is in order. The numbers of judges are:
Education: Alabama, 6 higher education known, 16 not known; Florida, 4 known, 2 known
that they did not attend college or law school, 6 no data available (n.d.a.); Georgia, 7 known,
2 known did not attend, 0 n.d.a.; Mississippi, 4 known, 2 known did not attend, 7 n.d.a.;
Texas, 3 known, 2 known did not attend, 0 n.d.a. In the percentage calculations, I have
"prorated" in instances in which part of the higher education took place in one state, or
region, and the remainder took place in another. For example, Nisbet's college education in
Georgia and his Litchfield, Connecticut, "law school" education is weighted 12 in-state, i
out-of-state.
322. These two-Charles Jenkins and Charles McDonald-were born in South Carolina
and graduated from the University there.
323. These judges came from England (1), Massachusetts (2), New York (1), New
Jersey (1), Kentucky (2), Virginia (6), Tennessee (1), and North Carolina (1).
324. These judges were: (1) Thomas Douglas, born Connecticut, 1790; died 1855; no
college; Whig; Episcopalian; (2) George S. Hawkins, born New York, 1808; died 1878; Columbia University; Democrat; (3) Thomas Baltzell, born Kentucky, 1804; died 1866; no college.
For the fourth judge sitting during that half-decade, J. B. Lancaster, no data are available.
325. The comparison cannot be pushed too far since the number of non-Georgia judges
about whom no educational data are available is much greater than the number for whom
no information exists regarding birthplace.
326. Nisbet attended Judge Reeves' Litchfield, Connecticut, law school; Lumpkin was
an honors graduate of Princeton; Jenkins was third in his class at Union College; and Stephens studied under Joseph Story at Harvard after graduating as valedictorian both at the
University of Georgia and at the University of Virginia Law School.
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TABLE IX
HETEROGENEITY AND HOMOGENEITY OF BACKGROUND OF MEMBERS OF
THE GULF STATES' SUPREME COURTS

1830-1860

Percentage of Judges Born

In
State
ALABAMA
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
MISSISSIPPI
TEXAS

6%
0%
67%
0%
20%

Out Of
State

In
Deep
South

In
Upper
South

94%
100%
33%
100%
80%

18%
33%
89%
20%
80%

53%
33%
0%
70%
0%

In The
North Or
Abroad
29%
33%
11%
10%
20%

Percentage of Judges Attending College or Law School

In
State
ALABAMA
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
MISSISSIPPI
TEXAS

20%
0%
43%
0%
33%

Out Of
State

In
Deep
South

In
Upper
South

In The
North Or
Abroad

80%
100%
57%
100%
67%

33%
50%
64%
25%
33%

17%
25%
7%
75%
17%

50%
25%
29%
0%
50%

dissent." In 1815 and 1816 the Senate majority was unwilling to
open even the narrow gate to freedom that theoretically remained-special private bills in the legislature. The Senators rejected the two such bills seeking liberty for individual slaves.3 28 I
1818 they increased the penalties for violating the substance of the
1801 prohibition. Thus, while some authority exists for Judge
Lumpkin's proposition that before 1824 most Georgians were not
hostile to foreign manumission, 329 the legislative records of the early
nineteenth century corroborate his judgment that "public opinion
has never wavered in the State, for the past fifty years, so far as
domestic manumission was concerned." 330
327.

See 1801 GEORGIA SENATE JOURNAL 25.

328. Abraham Manzo's hopes were dashed by a vote of 25 to 12, 1814 GEORGIA SENATE
JOURNAL 16; one year later the slave Caesar was turned down 19 to 12. See 1815 GEORGIA
SENATE JOURNAL 37.

329. See Sanders v. Ward, 25 Ga. 109, 118 (1858).
330. Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 513 (1854).

1979]1

REASON OF SLAVERY

109

Georgia lower courts of the 1830's, however, handed down two
decisions that considerably lessened the law's restrictive implica3 ' determined, first, that the posttions. In 1830 Jordan v. Bradley"
mortem manumission laws did not void a will directing out-of-state
freedom, and second, that the will was valid even though it allowed
the slaves to choose between freedom and slavery. Seven years later,
in Roser v. Marlow,"' another superior court judge ordered an executor to remove Negroes to a free state if the legislature refused on
application to allow their remaining in the state as freedmen. The
result of these decisions when similar cases came before the post1845 supreme court was an argument over their rightful strength as
precedent. Though in 1848 and 1851 the "first court"-and the only
dominantly Unionist one-of Lumpkin, Nisbet, and Warner twice
upheld the "remove-then-free" doctrine of Jordan v. Bradley,3 33
three years later a new court began a movement toward restriction.
Warner's replacement by Ebenezer Starnes was not so significant as
was Eugenius Nisbet's 1854 defeat for re-election by Henry Benning.
Cleland v. Waters334 in 1854 and 1855 presented once more the
question whether slaves could exercise an option to go free. Benning
argued from civil law that slaves had no legal capacity to choose.
Lumpkin, while almost certainly not pleased at liberating the Negroes, found this line of reasoning "too technical to commend itself
to my approval,""' and contrary to precedent in other states. Lumpkin could have followed the technique of a South Carolina judge to
argue that the 1845 change in Georgia's judicial structure meant
that prior cases were not binding.336 Yet while he viewed the peculiar
institution as "wisely ordained by a forecast high as heaven above
man's, for the good of both races,"337 he felt that any policy changes
"should be by the lawmaking, rather than by the law-administering
33
department of the government." 338 Lumpkins
was not yet prepared
to undertake judicial legislation in order to impress the law of slavery with the stamp of his own attitudes-at least not where precedent stood athwart any such desires. Where it did not, Lumpkin was
331. 1 Ga. 443 (1830).
332. 1 Ga. 309 (1837).
333. See Cooper v. Blakey, 10 Ga. 263 (1851); Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445 (1848).
334. 19 Ga. 35 (1855), enforcing 16 Ga. 496 (1854).
335. Id. at 40.
336. See Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. 289, 293, 1 Bail. 632, 641-42 (1830) (O'Neall, J.)
(discussion of the effect of South Carolina cases antedating the 1824 judicial reorganization
in that state).
337. Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 514 (1854).
338. Id. at 520.
339. Probably Starnes-who concurred with Lumpkin-was not prepared to undertake
judicial legislation either.
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by no means so restrained.
During the latter half of the 1850's, then, the Georgia judges
rejected every type of claim to freedom, except one, brought before
them. In so doing, they staked out positions that can hardly be
characterized as anything other than determinedly pro-slavery.
First the court took a narrow view of foreign manumission. In
1855, in Hunter v. Bass"' the judges voided a will directing that the
testator's slaves be removed from Georgia and taken to Illinois or
Indiana to enjoy freedom. Their ground for voidance of the will was
that those two states had passed statutes prohibiting free Negroes
from settling. This was true enough, but the Georgia court could
have applied the cy pres doctrine to designate some other place that
permitted freedom. The North Carolina court, faced with the same
issue two years later, went out of its way to effect manumission,
even though that involved making policy decisions concerning
which slaves left, where they went, and how they paid for their
passage."' The Georgia court, however, rejected this approach. As
Benning stated heatedly: "[T]he monstrous doctrine of Cypres
[sic] is not to have given it one inch of ground beyond the possessio
pedis."3 12 North Carolina also generally rejected cy pres, and I suspect that Benning's annoyance well may have resulted from the
particular substance of the bequest. In balancing between preservation of slavery and fulfillment of testamentary intent, then, the
court pressed its judicial thumbs hard on pro-slavery's side of the
340. 18 Ga. 127 (1855).
341. In 1857, Hogg v. Capehart, 58 N.C. (5 Jones) 71 (1857), reported as a note to
Feimster v. Tucker, 58 N.C. (5 Jones) 64 (1859), confronted Chief Justice Frederick Nash with
a will whose very simplicity would have doomed its testator's purpose in Georgia. It stated
simply: "I give to my slaves their freedom." Id. at 72. The would-be white heirs of the slaves
advanced three arguments against liberty: (1) the will was too vague as to the manner in
which freedom was to be effected, and since North Carolina law forbade in-state manumission
and the will gave no inkling that it was the testator's desire for the slaves to be removed from
the state, it should be annulled; (2) the estate possessed insufficient funds to provide for the
costs of any such removal; and (3) the will provided no option for slaves not wishing to leave
the state.
Frederick Nash dealt with these arguments swiftly. It was, he said, "the duty of the
executor to free the slaves"-and, impliedly, to find the means of doing so. Id. The court
would help the executor with respect to choosing a place: "[W]e appoint Liberia." Id. at
73. The transportation costs could be paid by hiring the slaves out to provide necessary funds
if they were not available from the estate. Nash was not impressed with the idea that so hiring
them out amounted to illegal quasi-emancipation. The question whether a slave could choose
between freedom abroad or continued bondage in the Tarheel State was no problem either;
the Chief Justice had another ready solution. He proposed to select a commission and assign
them the task of finding out which adult blacks wished to leave. Further, if "there are children
under the age of fourteen, their parents must elect for them." Id. at 74. And lastly, "[If
there are any who have no parents, or whose parents elect for them not to go, they must have
liberty, on coming of age, to make their election." Id.
342. Hunter v. Bass, 18 Ga. 127, 129 (1855).
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scales. Ex-slaves in Canada, after all, would not constitute a great
danger to the future of slavery in Georgia. Thus this decision appears more pro-slavery-even (dare I say the word?) less
"libertarian"-than the North Carolina court's holding in Hogg v.
3
Capehart.1

The second restrictive position adopted by the Georgia court
concerned "quasi-emancipation," which in its original formulation
was a term meant to cover a practice that amounted to letting slaves
go about as if free while their masters technically retained title to
them.4 " Favored by late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
Carolina Quakers as a means around restrictive statutes, though by
no means used only by them, the practice was intended to skirt
requirements for legally sanctioned manumission that the slaves
might not fulfill-typically requirements permitting freedom only
to blacks who had performed extraordinarily meritorious services or
requiring removal from the state as the price of freedom.
Judges could, and did, react to this phenomenon in one of two
ways. They could-as did the North Carolina justices between 1816
and 185011 and as did some of the South Carolina chancellors in the
343. See note 341 supra.
344. Similarly, title to lands or improved property might be vested in a white owner on
the express stipulation that he would permit the slaves to use them for their own benefit.
345. See R. COVER, supra note 27, at 75-82. Cover's discussion illustrates both the
usefulness and the dangers of his selective and thematic psychological approach. This approach allows him to cover a great deal of territory quickly and in an insightful fashion. But
by focusing almost exclusively on the North Carolina court's consideration of "the Quaker
trusteeship scheme in Trustees v. Dickenson (1829)", id. at 76, he underplays how the court
got to the position it did, and perhaps slightly overstates the personal objections of some post1830 North Carolina judges toward quasi-emancipation. He says, "[A]nd, by the late 1840's
Ruffin's brethren were not only in full agreement; they were also overtly impatient with the
now seemingly endless line of cases coming before the court with minor variations on the
Quaker theme." Id. at 79. Trustees of the Quaker Soc'y of Contentnea v. Dickenson, 12 N.C.
(1 Dev.) 189 (1827), was not as Cover has suggested "one of the first of a long line of North
Carolina cases in which the competing factions of this court would articulate their positions
on slavery in terms of the broadest possible principles." R. COVER, supra note 27, at 77. The
North Carolina judges had been articulating their positions in just such a broad fashion for
over a quarter of a century before they decided Trustees v. Dickenson, but these articulations
had been made primarily in connection with criminal trials of whites and blacks. Before the
1840's the disagreements were not caused by court factionalism but were primarily one-onone affairs between Hall and Taylor on specific issues. This was true particularly after 1818,
when there were only three judges on the court and Leonard Henderson held the balance of
power.
One can make a somewhat better case for factions in the South Carolina judiciary.
Dickenson was the eighth, rather than the first, of a series of related cases. That series began
eleven years before, with Haywood v. Craven's Ex'rs, 4 N.C. (2 Car. L. Rep.) 360 (1816). In
succession the judges voided a will directing executors to "set them free by the laws of the
State," id.; annulled a private bill passed by the legislature freeing an intestate's slaves,
Administrator of Allen v. Peden, 4 N.C. (2 Car. L. Rep.) 442 (1816); prohibited an executor's
efforts to remove slaves to the North in order to effect a will, Turner v. Whitted, 9 N.C. (2
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1810's and 1820's 34 -pry suspiciously into such trusts and void them
Hawks) 613 (1823); and frustrated executorial attempts at delaying the sale of Negroes until
a more generous manumission law should be passed, Pride v. Pulliam, 11 N.C. (4 Hawks) 49
(1825). See also Wright v. Lowe's Ex'rs, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 354 (1818). In only one case did the
would-be heirs fail to lock the Negroes into slavery. In James Ex'rs v. Masters, 7 N.C. (3
Mur.) 110 (1819), the testator's executors succeeded in recovering slaves from legatees under
his wife's will. She had a life-tenure in them, and the court probably intended only to prevent
the tenure being converted into an absolute estate. By the end of the sixth decision the judges
had closed all the loopholes open to executors, and all but one open to masters. That was to
bequeath slaves outright to individuals whom the master could trust either to send the
Negroes to the North or to treat them as if free-to "quasi-emancipate" them. Moreover, in
the seventh and eighth cases North Carolina closed this loophole, too. Thus the seventh case,
Huckaby v. Jones, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 120 (1822) (which Cover does mention) and the eighth,
Trustees v. Dickenson, did not arise out of the blue.
The North Carolina results may seem not dissimilar to those the Georgia court might
have reached. Some years ago I attributed the North Carolina results largely to neutrality
and deference to restrictive legislative intent. See Nash, supra note 19, at 52-68. What Cover
has said more recently on this score is not too different. The tone of the North Carolina court,
however, is very unlike that of the Georgia judges. See, e.g., Trustees of the Quaker Soc'y of
Contentnea v. Dickenson, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189 (1827) (Taylor, C.J.) (where the parties
fighting against freedom had the weakest case). Speaking of the Quakers, Taylor indicated
his certainty that, rather than holding the blacks as slaves until they had performed meritorious services and then seeking (as the law allowed) their manumission, the Quakers would
give them de facto freedom forthwith. To presume otherwise, he said, would be
to presume that a Society not less remarkable for the purity of its principles, than for
an unshaken steadfastness in maintaining them, will at once degenerate from their long
tried morality. The whole history of the people called Quakers, shows that neither
prosperity nor adversity, favor or persecution, . . . has ever interrupted the even tenor
of their ways . . . .

Id. at 202. For, as he had stated earlier, "if a sense of religious obligation dictates . . . the
exercise of . . . benevolence, which however virtuous and just in the abstract, the policy of
the law . . . has forbidden, . . . a transfer of property so directed must be void." Id. at 202.

346. For example, see the decisions of Chancellor DeSaussure (a highly conservative
South Carolina jurist regarded by later judges as the first great figure in that State's equity
jurisprudence) who as early as 1795, in a series of public lectures, opposed redistricting and
eliminating property qualifications for whites on the ground (inter alia) that such political
reform would enforce the (as he put it) mistaken idea of equality and in turn lead to freeing
the slaves and the ruination of both races. In Bynum v. Bostick, 4 S.C. Eq. 107, 4 Des. 266
(1812), the chancellor put himself clearly on the Hall-Ruffin-Georgia court side of the issue
whether slaves had any common law rights. No, he said, "[t]he condition of slaves in this
country is analagous to that of the slaves of the ancients, . . . and not that of the villeins of
feudal times." Id. at 107-08, 4 Des. at 267. As a circuit judge in the 1830's (he had a long
judicial career), he ruled against an attempt to transport slaves out of the country to liberate
them. The executors of the will in question argued almost exactly what the North Carolina
court later was to accept in Hogg v. Capehart,that the removal from the South did not clash
with legislative policy against intrastate post-mortem manumission. Calling the executors'
argument frail, he went on-in a rather Lumpkin-like fashion-to reject their point that the
testator had not sought to skirt the law but rather requested the assistance of government in
his aim. He said:
Besides, what government is meant? . . . [Tihe State government . . . has no foreign
relations with St. Domingo . . . . If the government of the United States be meant . . .
neither the State nor . . . its citizens, would ever permit the interference . . . with that

subject, on which . . . the United States has no right to intermeddle, and on which, if
it made any attempts . . . a disruption of the bonds which bind and unite the States,
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as contrary to state policy as expressed by the legislature. Or they
could-as did David Johnson, John Belton O'Neall, and some of
their associates on the South Carolina bench in the 1830's and
1840's-variously turn their backs on the practice, winking at it
judicially, even coming frightfully close to aiding and abetting the
practice."' Both types of juridical responses to quasi-emancipation
are susceptible to two interpretations. The dismal Whig can argue
that the early nineteenth-century North Carolina reactions
amounted to judicial expressions of pro-slavery, whereas the ameliorist Whig can attribute them largely to judicial deference to legislative intent. Similarly, the dismal Whig can discount the activities
of O'Neall in sapping the intent of the restrictive 1820 South Carolina emancipation statute (a less plausible discounting endeavor, I
think, than with respect to the North Carolina judges), while the
would necessarily take place. It is the noli me tangere subject.
Frazier v. Executors of Frazier, 11 S.C. Eq. 149, 151, 2 Hill Eq. 304, 307 (1835). For the
reversal of DeSaussure in this case, see note 347 infra.
Another example is the opinion of Judge A. P. Butler (later one of the more fire-eating
South Carolina senators) in Rhame v. Ferguson, 24 S.C.L. 83, Rice Eq. 196 (1839). At the
original trial in a quasi-emancipation suit Judge Butler charged the jury that the will
amounted to "a palpable attempt to . . . evade the laws of the State . . . ." Id. at 85, Rice

Eq. at 201. The jury nonetheless found that the blacks were not yet free, despite considerable
contrary evidence, and the appeals court refused to award a new trial. For a fuller discussion,
see Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness, supra note 25, at 154-64.
347. See id. at 154-56 (discussion of Linam v. Johnson, 18 S.C.L. 66, 2 Bail. 137 (1831))
(David Johnson, for the appeals court, ruled that a master could not use an action of trover
to recover a black with whom he had made an unofficial deal to let him "moonlight" and go
about on his own). See also Carmille v. Pringle, 27 S.C.L. 190, 2 McMul. 454 (1842); Frazier
v. Executors of Frazier, 1 S.C. Eq. 149, 2 Hill Eq. 304 (1835); Cline v. Caldwell, 19 S.C.L.
171, 171, 1 Hill 423, 423 (1833) (the appeals court barred caption of a quasi-free slave,
although in Linam it had said that caption might lie, and observed that a contract "absolute
on its face, but with a secret trust, to let the negro go at large as a freeman . . . is no violation
Overruling DeSaussure in Frazier,O'Neall asserted that the chancellor's reading of the
letter of the law amounted to a "strange misapprehension" of it and clashed with the law's
spirit. Carmille v. Pringle, 27 S.C.L. 190, 2 McMul. 454 (1842). In my judgment O'Neall read
the law in a decidedly non-neutral fashion. In Carmille-the most intriguing case from the
standpoint of O'Neall's "libertarianism"-O'Neall overruled another Chancellor, Benjamin
Faneuil Dunkin, who had said of a gift of slaves on the express stipulation that they be
permitted to work for themselves, paying only one dollar a year to their nominal new masters,
"[ilt appears . . . too clear of argument, that the bill of sale . . . [was] an undisguised

attempt to evade the law . . . forbidding emancipation." 27 S.C.L. at 191, 2 McMul. at 456.
What made O'Neall's overruling of Dunkin particularly striking was that it came just after
the state legislature (partly in response to the surgical manumission jurisprudence that
O'Neall was practicing "on" the 1800 and 1820 laws) passed another law designed to remove
all doubt. I find it hard to disagree with what later chancellors said of O'Neall's decisions,
especially Carmille.For example, Chancellor George Dargan stated in 1854: "It is impossible
to deny that this decision afforded a precedent, and a form by which the Act . . . might be
practically annulled and the policy of the State baffled." Morton's Heirs v. Thompson, 27
S.C. Eq. 146, 147, 6 Rich. Eq. 370, 375 (1854).
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ameliorist Whig can make much of them.
In Drane v. Beall,"" however, the Georgia judges took up a
position that leaves no room for disagreement about its significance
among Whiggish optimists and pessimists. The court's intimations
about quasi-emancipation admit of no real analytic doubt: the judicial intent was repressive, iniquitous, unreasonable-almost any
pejorative one wishes to apply. To be sure, the failure of the Drane
bequest is not altogether surprising since the testator made the
technical mistake of directing that his slaves first be freed and then
be taken out of state-"to Liberia, California, or any free State or
Territory . . . as they choose to elect.""' Still, neutrality hardly

required the court to adduce the additional and flimsy reason for
voiding the bequest-that another provision of the will, which stipulated that the slaves work for four years on the testator's plantation
to raise the money needed for their transportation, set up an illegal
state of "quasi-emancipation."
Putting aside the question whether the word order of liberation
and removal should have mattered, let us look at how the Georgia
judges interpret the meaning of the term "quasi-emancipation."
The Drane court stretched the term considerably from its original
"Carolina meaning." The testator in Drane plainly had no intention
of contributing tinder to the Georgian domestic powderkeg, no intention of permitting his slaves to go about indefinitely in Georgia
in a twilight status between bondage and freedom and thereby raising other slaves' dissatisfaction with their own less fortunate lots."'
Beall, the testator, instead created a carefully controlled temporary
mechanism to remove slaves from the state."5 ' Moreover, he adopted
a mechanism whereby the slaves' freedom minimized the burdens
on the estate's other legatees. Surely the policy trade-offs were very
different than in, for example, Trustees of the Quaker Society of
348. 21 Ga. 21 (1857).
349. Id. at 27.
350. That, of course, was the "evil" that bothered John Louis Taylor but not John
Belton O'Neall. Differences of opinion on the likely results of such practice existed. If you
thought the way Taylor did, you worried quite a lot about legislative intent and somewhat
less about the socially disruptive potential of the practice. If you thought the way O'Neall
did, you guessed that perhaps in-state quasi-emancipation was not such a bad idea after all:
"If it was so that a man dared not make provision to make more comfortable faithful slaves,
hard indeed would be the condition of slavery. For then no motive could be held out for good
conduct; and the good and the bad would stand alike." Carmille v. Pringle, 27 S.C.L. 190,
197, 2 McMul. 459, 470 (1842). That kind of "quasi-emancipation" and the policy motives
behind sitting on it, or winking at it, differ substantially from the situation in, and the
motives behind the disposition of, Drane.
351. Beall even prescribed that, for slaves electing to go to California or Liberia, the
profits of their labors would only be paid to them once on board the ships to take them there.
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Contentnea v. Dickenson."' I find it hard to resist the conclusion
that Drane turned out the way it did because, at bottom, Lumpkin,
Benning, and McDonald did not want any slaves to gain freedom,
at any time, in any place, or in any manner.
The only advantage Drane gave to Georgia slavery jurisprudence was that it made easier the next push in closing the gate to
freedom. That push came just two months later when, in Pinckard
v. Mc Coy, 353 Benning stretched the meaning of illegal quasiemancipation yet further. In Pinckard the testator avoided any
word-order mistake by carefully instructing that the blacks be conveyed while still slaves to a free state. But the testator's estate was
saddled with debts, and Judge Benning found that the testator's
plan to hire out the slaves first to pay off the debt and then to raise
transportation moneys amounted also to an illegal quasiemancipation.
The hint of something close to pro-slavery hysteria in these two
cases became plainly evident as the Georgia judges dealt with other
suits for freedom. Bivens v. Crawford354 involved a "remove-thenfree" will request that almost any other southern court would have
upheld without question. The testator provided that after his wife's
death his executors should
take all of my slaves and their increase, .

. .

to some State or Territory ...

which will admit them, where slavery is not tolerated; to the end that my ...
slaves be free; and in the event that no State or territory will admit . .. slaves
as residents, to be free, then .

.

. transport .

.

. to .

.

. Liberia . . . .-

In Lumpkin's eyes, the bequest failed because at the instant of the
wife's death, the slaves became "freemen in this State."3 1 Surely
that interpretation of the will's effect is a strange one. Clearly the
testator intended his slaves to leave Georgia as slaves and be freed
by entering a free state. Otherwise what is the significance of the
phrase "which will admit them, where slavery is not tolerated?" Yet
Justice Lumpkin went on to make a statement both curious and
extreme: "But were this not so, we are inclined to think, that policy
forbids . . . such a construction . . . as to allow negroes to remain
. . . who are ultimately, after . . . one or more lives, entitled to

their freedom."35 1 On first flush, this reads as a hypothetical. It may
be more than that, however: "we are inclined to think" seems peril352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189 (1827). See note 345 supra.
22 Ga. 28 (1857).
26 Ga. 225 (1858).
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
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ously close to "we would rule." If one interprets this statement as
indicating applicable judicial policy, then in one fell swoop Lumpkin short-circuited any potential for resolving a question that
plagued other courts-what to do with children born to a slave with
a grant to future freedom.118 The Georgia judges apparently would
have ruled void any bequest that sought delayed freedom-that is,
a bequest that awarded freedom after the death of the donor's wife.
Bivens appears to take from the master any right to establish such
a conditional, temporary bequest of slaves by converting such a
grant of life tenure in the slaves into outright ownership.
The pro-slavery attitudes of the post-1855 Georgia judges were
so extreme that they rejected both the possible assistance of a moderate manumission society and comity-not only with northern
states, but also with slave states whose laws were less harsh than
their own. In American Colonization Society v. Gartrell,""Lumpkin
voided a manumission bequest on the flimsy technicality that the
Society's charter of incorporation, which forbade it to hold or transport Negroes as slaves, made anything other than illegal domestic
manumission impossible. This was dubious logic: after all, the
judges could have ordered the executors to transport the Negroes as
slaves to a northern state and there set them free. No other court
except the Mississippi court in its last two antebellum years chose
that technicality to prevent transportation to Liberia. Lumpkin
even suggested that state policy might prohibit any suit by the
American Colonization Society-apparently even a suit brought on
behalf of a free Negro unlawfully detained or being denied a monetary bequest. The sociological reflexes underlying this decision have
an almost suicidal quality. By failing to allow foreign manumission,
the Georgia judges barred the one "solution" to southern slavery
that-no matter how impractical or utopian-would have placed
black freedmen where they would be least likely to "infect" slaves
with temptations to escape.
No less startling is the doctrinal pitch of another significant
0 the court refused liberty to
Georgia case. In Knight v. Hardemanas
a slave woman due under the terms of a Maryland will to be freed
at age thirty. Before she came of age, she had been transported to
Georgia. When she reached thirty she brought suit by next friend.
In an opinion that for its readiness to jettison interstate comity is
almost without parallel, Lumpkin turned her down. Her counsel's
358. See Part Two(D)(3) infra (for the importance of the question and the difficulties
its resolution posed for the Virginia court).
359. 23 Ga. 448 (1857).
360. 17 Ga. 253 (1855).
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references to Virginia and Tennessee decisions that allowed equity
courts to grant freedom were in vain. Lumpkin's disdain for other
southern courts' rulings was transparently clear in his very wording:
"[these] decisions . . . from Virginia, Tennessee, and several other

of the slave or quasi slave States""' had not discussed the questions
"with that thoroughness which either principle or their intrinsic
importance demanded." 362 He was strongly inclined to opposite conclusions. The laws of Maryland were prejudicial to Georgia's rights
and interests. "No one pretends that negroes can be carried to New
York . . . and held there in perpetual bondage . . . . With what

more propriety can slaves be brought here and emancipated?"3 3 It
would be one thing if the woman had claimed under a Massachusetts or an Ohio will; Lumpkin's irritation would be more understandable, though his logic no more convincing. Yet here he was
denying effect to the laws of another slave state. He was doing so,
moreover, when no good reason existed why she could not be returned to Maryland to receive her liberty. The South Carolina court
five years before3 had paid more heed to the laws of Ireland than
Lumpkin in 1855 granted to those of a sister slave state.
At best, Lumpkin in these cases was rejecting the wisdom of the
adage that "mine enemies' enemies are my friends." At worst, he
was attempting to nail down every possible escape hatch from slavery. True, even in 1858 he was-unlike Benning-still a little troubled by the force of contravening precedent within his own state.
Thus, when Sanders v. Ward' presented a will explicitly directing
the executors to remove the testator's slaves to "some free State
. . . and there . . . manumit them,"'

a situation analagous to that

in the old pre-supreme court case, Jordan v. Bradley,3 7 Lumpkin
was willing to uphold the bequest. Benning, by contrast, would have
361. Id. at 261-62.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 263.
364. See Guillemette v. Harper, 38 S.C.L. 75, 4 Rich. 186 (1850). In Guillemette,
O'Neall held that a Georgia slave taken as a boy to Ireland by his master (who also freed the
boy in his will) and later returned to the South (by the widow) was free. "According to
Somerset v. Stewart . . . he became thereby free. [Tihat case carries the law further than I
should willingly acknowledge . . . . But if the master carries a slave to Great Britain . . .

[and] while there assents in any way to his freedom, there can be no objection to the . . .
freedom thus acquired." Id. at 77, 4 Rich. at 190. For analyses of Somerset's case, see D.
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 469-501 (1975);
Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American
World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974).
365. 25 Ga. 109 (1858).
366. Id.
367. 1 Ga. 443 (1830).
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voided the will as contrary to state policy.6" Although Lumpkin did

not undertake judicial legislation quite in the way that Benning
proposed, he advised the Georgia legislature in no uncertain terms
of what he thought should be done, and who should do it. The
Georgia legislature duly responded by passing a restrictive statute
one year later.' After that statute was passed one other very tiny
escape hatch remained open-and that just for slaves liberated by
wills drawn before the 1859 statute.
In March 1860 the Georgia court did its best to close that escape
hatch too. Confronted with a pre-1859 will that permitted slaves
either to choose a master in the state or to be removed and liberated
in the North, Richard Lyon, former Whig turned States Rights
Democrat, expressing Lumpkin's views as well as his own, overruled
sub silentio the earlier holding that slaves could make such an elec368. Sanders involved the issue referred to earlier as the only post-Cleland v. Waters
type of suit for freedom that a Georgian slave won during the late 1850's. On this occasion,
however, Lumpkin decided to take a position more activist than that he adopted in Cleland,
since the Sanders testator got his word order on removal and liberation the right way round,
and directed removal to a place or places that did permit in-migrant blacks. See also Myrick
v. Vineburgh, 30 Ga. 161 (1860); Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 420 (1858).
369. A year after observing that he thought the American Colonization Society's purposes might well be fundamentally antithetical to true policy in Georgia, fundamentally at
odds with "reason of slavery," Joseph Lumpkin came clean on his own views about the
peculiar institution's appropriate "foreign policy." On the one hand, he could see nothing
technically against the letter of Georgia law as it stood even if "a testator bequeaths his slaves
to Stephen A. Douglas . . . or [worse] Rufus Choate . . . ." Sanders v. Ward, 25 Ga. 109,

120 (1858). On the other hand, he had "no partiality for foreign any more than domestic
manumission . . . ." Id. at 124. Particularly he objected "to the colonization of our negroes
upon our northwestern frontier. They facilitate the escape of our fugitive slaves. In case of
civil war, they would become an element of strength to the enemy. . . ." Id. This is a judge,
a pillar of appellate reason, speaking in 1858-and before the Lincoln-Douglas debates got
well under way. Already, however, he divines the military future. Here was a certain mad
prescience. What was to be done? "If this . . . demands a new policy to be introduced-and
for myself I think it does-let it . . . be inaugurated by the Legislature . . . ." Id. at 118.

Let all post-mortem manumission be prohibited, in Georgia, in Ohio, in Timbuktu. Now this
is an interesting sort of a thing for a judge to be advising, particularly in view of the contemporaneous southern insistence that had just borne constitutional fruit in the Dred Scott
majority's insistence on the substantive due process right of a master to take his slave, his
property-in-man, wherever he pleased in the territories of the Union. Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In his lifetime he may take where he pleases, and of course he
has the right to convert property-in-man into man-in-man as he wishes. But, at the very
moment of death, "reason of slavery" requires the master's due process right to be cut short
very quickly-quite unlike his last wishes in respect to property-in-property. This view is
quite extraordinary. It is the more so, as a judicial suggestion, inasmuch as Lumpkin had
"been informed by a . . . Representative" of the lower house of the Georgia legislature that
such a bill had been proposed in the State Senate "and voted down by an overwhelming
majority . . . ." 25 Ga. at 119-20. Extraordinary Lumpkin's suggestion might have been, but
it was successful. On December 14, 1859, the legislators, heeding his advice, passed an act
prohibiting all post-mortem manumission.
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tion. In Curry v. Curry7 Lyon held that because slaves were chattels they possessed no legal capacity to make such an election.
This was true-blue pro-slavery, unabashed and ardent. The
extent of Lyon's ardor is most evident when compared with the
statements of a contemporary North Carolina judge on the same
issue. The North Carolina judge whom I have in mind is not one of
that crew of "namby-pamby-on-slavery" types that came to populate the North Carolina court after 1830,-1' but is, rather, our old
friend Thomas Ruffin, that rigorous expounder of the absolutist
3 3
North Carolina
theory of slavery.372 In 1858, in Redding v. Findley,'
faced precisely the same question posed to the Georgia court in
370. 30 Ga. 253 (1860).
371. Thus I am not thinking of J. J. Daniel (1832-1848), who persuaded his younger
colleague, Frederick Nash, to join him in decisions acquitting criminal blacks (thereby distressing Thomas Ruffin) and who argued against removing Free Negroes' rights to vote at the
1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention. For a discussion of these cases, see Nash,
supra note 19, at 465-70. For details on the North Carolina judges, see S. AsHE, BIOGRAPHICAL
HIsronY or NORTH CAROLINA (1925). The 1835 convention vote was very close. Daniel, Gaston,
and the free Blacks lost 66 to 61.
Nor am I thinking of that "liberal Catholic," William Gaston (1833-1844), who also
opposed removing the free Negro's right to vote, and who wrote the decision in State v. Will,
18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834) ("a monument to the cruelty of an overseer, and to the
humanity of the court toward a slave," 2 H. CATTERALL, supra note 14, at 2). Gaston viewed
a grant of freedom to take effect in Liberia as overriding a contrary charitable purpose to
donate the slaves to a white hospital. See Cameron v. Commissioners of Raleigh, 36 N.C. (1
Ired. Eq.) 436 (1841). He told a graduating class at his alma mater point-blank:
On you . . . will devolve the duty which has been long neglected, . . . the ultimate

extirpation of the worst evil that afflicts the southern part of our Confederacy . . . .
Disguise the truth as we may, and throw the blame where we will, it is slavery which,
more than any other cause, keeps us back in the career of improvement. It stifles industry and represses enterprise . . . and poisons morals at the fountain-head . . . .
W. Gaston, Address Delivered Before the Dialectic and Philanthropic Societies at Chapel
Hill, N.C., June 20, 1832 (4th ed. 1849), reprinted in LivEs OF DISTINGUISHED NORTH
CAROLINIANS 176-77 (W. Peele ed. 1897). "Although he openly advocated the abolition of such
an unwise system . . . he was enthusiastically cheered by his audience. So popular was this
speech . . . five editions . . . were published, the last in 1858. Not long after . . . he was
elevated to the Supreme Court . . . by the legislature." C. EATON, supra note 15, at 200.

Nor, further, am I thinking of Frederick Nash (1844-1858), whom we have recently
quoted; nor of Richmond Pearson (1848-1878), who was closer to an orthodox middle-of-thesouthern-road position on slavery than were Gaston and Nash, believing that blacks may well
have been worse off in freedom than in slavery, though extending any number of trial benefits
to them; nor of William Battle (1852-1868), whose ground on slavery lay fairly close to
Pearson's. See generally Nash, supra note 19, at 322-30.
372. How could I have Ruffin in mind when speaking of a North Carolina judicial
comment almost contemporaneous with Curry v. Curry-given Ruffin's retirement nearly a
decade earlier? The answer is simple. Although Ruffin retired in 1852 and began to describe
the peculiar institution as something going mutually to benefit both races (somewhat in
contrast to his 1829 Manns view that any man "in his retirement" must repudiate slavery as
a moral way of doing business among men), he was brought back briefly out of retirement in
1857-1858, when his successor, Frederick Nash, took ill.
373. 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 216 (1858).
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Curry v. Curry: could slaves elect among continued slavery in the
South, freedom in Liberia, or freedom in a free state? Ruffin said:
[I]t is not true in point of fact or law, that slaves have not a mental or a moral
capacity to make the election . . . and, if needful . . . , to go abroad for that

purpose. From the nature of slavery, they are denied a legal capacity to make
contracts . . .; but they are responsible human beings, having intelligence to
know right from wrong, and perceptions of pleasure and pain, and of the
difference between bondage and freedom, and thus, by nature, they are competent to give or withhold their assent . . . .3u

To be sure, argued Ruffin, a state legislature might, as part of its
power to control the conditions of manumission, pass a statute that
explicitly took away the legal capacity of slaves to elect between
bondage and freedom. But a court could not properly take away the
right for "no one ever thought that it required a municipal law to
confer the right . . . or the capacity . . . . They pre-exist, and are

founded in nature, just as other capacities for dealing between man
and man.""' Perhaps Ruffin should have said that no one exercising
any good sense thought a law necessary to confer the capacity to
choose. But if we say that, though it may lessen any mounting
irritation with Joseph Lumpkin that we may feel (it is hard not to),
we will be succumbing to the magnet of our Whiggery, rather than
addressing the questions that we ought.
The principal question is whether we can adequately account
for the substance and tone of the Georgia decisions without resorting
to distinctions such as more and less "pro-slavery" or more and less
"illiberal." It will hardly come as a surprise that I find it difficult
not to resort to such distinctions even when examining only Georgia
decisions. The American Colonization Society case and Curry v.
Curry, for example, simply appear to me more pro-slavery and illiberal than Jordan v. Bradley in exhibiting a determination to wall
off the peculiar institution from any contrary influences, to put
slavery off by itself as a perpetual societal island. I find it even more
difficult not so to characterize Georgia slavery jurisprudence when
making interstate comparisons, even those of the selective sort such
as we have so far been essaying.
My saying that, however, does not prove that the feat of adequately explaining southern slavery jurisprudence without recourse
to such distinctions cannot be performed. To be fair we should
consider at least briefly two alternate explanations that do not require using them: (1) an explanation that assumes a much narrower
span of judicial attitudes toward the task of interfacing law and
374. Id. at 218-19.
375. Id. at 219.
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slavery than I have assumed may have obtained among the southern
judges, an explanation that assumes one end of that span to be what
we have earlier described as cunning pro-slavery and the other end
to be fire-eating pro-slavery; and (2) an explanation along the lines
that Tushnet suggests,76 one that is concerned primarily with examining the evolution of southern slavery jurisprudence toward unity
and autonomy and with the changing types of judicial reasoning
characterizing that evolution.
To take up the former alternative first, its plausibility in explaining the cases we have examined rests upon solving two sets of
difficulties inherent in its assumptions and applications. The first
and less problematic set springs from inclarity as to exactly what is
meant by cunning pro-slavery and as to how it supposedly operated
to achieve its purported central aim-convincing northerners that
southern slavery was humane and debrutalized.3 n The second and
376. See Part One (B) supra.
377. Thus, does "casting out brutalities" include permitting the reward of freedom in
none, a few, or quite a few circumstances? Can we, in other words, imagine a seriously
credible de-brutalized slavery that did not include some sort of an escape hatch for roughly
the reasons that O'Neall was thinking of as well as for reasons of "political saleability" outside
the South-for remember that political saleability is assumed by this explanatory model to
be a critical intent. If we answer that we can imagine a de-brutalized slavery without such
an escape hatch, then we shall have to say that the manumission case-data are not substantively helpful to characterizing the Georgia court's pro-slavery, and defer our judgment until
we look at other more useful data such as trials of blacks, instances where whites are punished
for maltreating blacks, or judicial suggestions to the legislature urging, say, the passage of
statutes on maximum hours, setting holidays, limiting permitted punishments by the master,
and the like. If we say that of course some kinds of escape hatches to freedom for at least the
particularly meritorious bondsman would have to be built into a de-brutalized slavery, then
the explanatory model (though not the Georgia court) appears a bit better off.
We seemingly could characterize the Georgia judges as nonpractitioners of this debrutalizing to-save-slavery politics-as, rather, somewhere close to the other exploitative pole
assumed to exist by the explanatory model. In addition, we will have made the explanatory
model itself more plausible, for it is in fact frightfully difficult to think that a de-brutalized
but no-escape-hatch slavery would have amounted to a preserved slavery program that its
hypothetical southern judicial salesmen would have believed saleable. And too, we will again
be able to label the Georgia court as a nonpractitioner of this mode of enhancing the public
relations of slavery. For, whatever else Joseph Lumpkin was doing when he went into his
flights of rhetoric on the peculiar institution, he was not selling anything at all to the North.
When he said, for example, that it "is a vain thing . . . to fight against the Almighty. His
ways are higher than ours . . . ! Let our women and old men, and persons of weak and infirm
minds, be disabused of the false . . . notion that slavery is sinful," American Colonization
Soc'y v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 464-65 (1857), he was hardly putting forward the kind of societal
teleology likely to be popular north of the Potomac. The fact is that in the manumission cases
he usually was not talking to the North at all. And when he did, it was typically as an aside,
as a back of his non-cotton-picking hand warning to the North to keep its non-cotton-picking
hands off the peculiar institution, in the middle of his main sermon, so to speak, to the
Georgia troops. It was mainly they whom he was addressing-to make sure they had their
minds right on the subject. If you are trying to assuage or divert the North you do not say
the sort of thing that Lumpkin said up to 1824 in Cleland v. Waters:
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more problematic set consists in the following four difficulties that
arise in trying to apply the explanation to the cases. One, it
"mispredicts" both the tone and the apparent primary audience of
the Georgia decisions.3 8 Two, it does not explain why the Georgia
judges-particularly so influential and reputedly great-hearted a
man as Joseph Lumpkin-took the path they did."' Three, it requires considerable stretching to cover at all some of the holdings
and off-the-bench statements of other judges.s 0 Four, to work, the
explanatory model requires some rather curious mental gymnastics
with respect to the relationships among the actions it ascribes to
judicial practitioners of cunning pro-slavery, the political sources of
those actions, and the likely political and sociological effects of
those actions.8 ' In sum, it is not clear to me that using this explanaThe true character . . . of slavery had not been fully understood. . . at the South; . . .
she looked to emancipation . . . in the uncertain future . . . . Thanks to the blind

zealots of the North, for their unwarrantable interference . . . . [tihe result is, a settled
conviction that it was wisely ordained . . . for the good of both races, and a calm and
fixed determination to preserve and defend it, at any and all hazards.
Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 519 (1854).
378. While one misprediction does not of course collapse the model, it may make us a
little wary.
379. Were they, in other words, simply conscious, brutal exploiters of slaves? More
particularly, why did Lumpkin not adopt a cunning pro-slavery strategy of decisionmaking?
While we may chalk up "uncunning" behavior among some southern judges to stupidity,
callousness, or just plain ill temper toward the North, it is harder to do so with a judge who,
over the whole range of his activity, was regarded as a pivotal figure in the development of
Georgia law. See Suttler, in 2 MEN OF MARK IN GEORGu 302 (W. Northen ed. 1910).
Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin is one of the great figures in Georgia history, ...
one of the few greatest American judges . . . . Judge Lumpkin's cry was always justice
[and] [h]e devoted himself to the labor of stripping off . . . whatever might conceal
the core of natural justice . . . not cankered by technicality or by harmful legislation.
In this . . . he was the leader and conductor . . . . He delivered but one dissenting

opinion in the first twenty volumes of the reports . . . .
Id. at 306. See also Memorial to Joseph Henry Lumpkin, 36 Ga. 19, 19-42 (1867) (which even
making allowances for nineteenth-century "occasional" rhetoric, is suggestive).
380. The explanatory model, to work at all, must assume that substantial attention
would be paid in the North to these opinions, and it cannot very well assume that only the
cunningly gracious ones would be read, while the kind of thing that Lumpkin was saying
would slip by unnoticed. While there are problems with the assumption itself, let us grant it
arguendo, for so doing leads us to a plain difficulty posed by Lumpkin's and similar opinions
for our hypothetical cunning judges. That is to say, if they were as cunning as all that, surely
they also would have realized that a few pages of Lumpkin or Harris or Benning could undo
hundreds of pages of their own. Furthermore, the explanatory model, to work, must-even
if, again arguendo, we say that it explains the Georgia court by itself-also account for the
kinds of positions that we have come across in making our running comparison with other
southern judges without crediting the genuineness of pronouncements-such as Gaston's
University of North Carolina Commencement Day address-that on their face appear different from (more "liberal" than?) the Georgia opinions.
381. That is, the model must engage in some rather fancy footwork both about the
meanings of actions in relation to their apparent normative source in modern Western liberalism and about the likely sociopolitical effects of such actions in a slave society. How so?
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tion gives us much more than some pejorative labels to apply to the
Georgia decisions and possibly to decisions in other courts we are
about to examine.
What then is the apparent utility of the second alternative, the
type of explanation that Tushnet has advanced? I expect that it
may have greater explanatory power in understanding the jurisprudence of the Georgia court than in understanding the decisionmaking of some other courts, but I also expect that we may find we
need to make at least three qualifications. First, we may find in the
courts that (using my terminology for a moment) look most proslavery a greater shift toward formalistic categorizations than
among those that look less ardently devoted to the peculiar institution. The second qualification is that the tendency towards formalistic abstractions may appear in the area of manumissions more
pronounced than a shift away from analogy. The third qualification
is that we may find the law of slavery across the South as a whole
less unified than Tushnet suggests. But to say this is to indicate the
need for deferring judgment on these possibilities until we can test
them against the evidence offered by the manumission jurisprudence of the Virginia and Tennessee courts.
"A Vexed and Perplexing Question:" Manumission Before the
Tennessee and Virginia Courts
(1) Politics, Pro-Slavery, and the Bench-Two Examples
Writing in 1853, a Tennessee Judge, Robert L. Caruthers,
sought to explain the frequent shifts in Tennessee law on the issue
D.

Consider again Gaston's speech, this time along with Nash's decision in Hogg v. Capehart
and Ruffin's decision in Redding. Are these "actions" all indistinguishable from each other,
and from the Georgia decisions, except insofar as we can array them along some sort of
continuum from straightforward pro-slavery to graciously cunning pro-slavery? If we try this,
we shall have to say something to the effect that Benning and Lumpkin were very honest
about what they said, that Ruffin was probably a tad less so, while Nash and, especially,
Gaston were heinously deceitful-in going around talking about "the boon of liberty" and
claiming that the peculiar institution was the "worst evil that afflicts our part of the Confederacy." On this showing, they were borrowing the very values and words of modem liberalism,
and putting them into the service of a deceitful aim-perpetuating slavery. Would not it be
much simpler, in the absence of strong contrary evidence, to take the words and actions more
nearly at their face-value, and surmise that what probably was really happening was that
indeed the values of Western liberalism were slipping here and there into the administration
of justice in the peculiar institution? Is there not a likely further difficulty in making the
cunning-straightforward continuum do all the explaining? If we do, we have to assume that
the judges assumed they could very graciously and cunningly go around de-brutalizing slavery, by introducing ameliorations based on liberal norms, while at the same time somehow
preventing any diffusions into the structure of the slavery system of these values as real,
rather than merely propagandistic, entities. That in turn assumes either a most curious blend
of cleverness and stupidity in the judges themselves, or some very odd notions of our own
about the way in which social structures and social processes behave over the long run.
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of in-state manumission of slaves. "It is," he said, "a vexed and
perplexing question, upon which public opinion . .. has been subject to much vibration between sympathy and humanity for the
slave, and the safety and well-being of society.""' This comment
deserves our attention on at least three counts.
The first significant point is the date of the statement. Judge
Caruthers made this comment in Tennessee at just about the same
time Lumpkin and his Georgia colleagues began to fulminate on the
positive glories of the peculiar institution, and almost half a century
after the time when Lumpkin dated the achievement of virtual unanimity in Georgia public opinion against domestic (meaning instate) manumission.30 The Tennessee legislature, though reasonably consistent in permitting foreign manumission, never consistently forbade domestic manumission. That a slave-state judge, and
more so that a slave-state legislature, still, as late as the 1850's, did
not believe that "reason of slavery" required forbidding domestic
manumission, is striking.
The second point of interest lies in the Tennessee court's disposition of the problem posed in the case that evoked Caruther's obser8 Pride's will expressly
vation, Bridgewater v. Legatees of Pride."
divided his slaves into two groups. To one group of about thirty he
bequeathed freedom if they could be emancipated either in Tennessee or in Illinois. If not, they were to be sold. To another, more
favored, group of eleven he bequeathed freedom, but with an important difference. If they could not be freed in either state, they were
not to be sold but were "to be . . . taken care of by the executor, or
such person for him as will treat them kindly . . . to have their

freedom at as early a time as practicable."115 The Tennessee judges
found no difficulty with the indefinite state of quasi-emancipation
that resulted from the circumstance that neither Illinois nor Tennessee law permitted such emancipations. The judges directed the
executor to hold the slaves "reserved from sale . . . until they can
be set free by a compliance with the law . . . ."I" I doubt that the
382. Bridgewater v. Legatees of Pride, 33 Tenn. 135, 137, 1 Sneed 194, 197 (1853).
383. Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 513 (1854).
384. 33 Tenn. 135, 1 Sneed 194 (1853).
385. Id. at 138, 1 Sneed at 200.
386. Id. at 139, 1 Sneed at 200.
387. Apparently he was quite a keen one, as indicated by his reaction in a private letter
to Tyler's 1841 veto of the bill to revive the United States Bank:
Our most gloomy forebodings have been realised. The Whig President has this day sent
into the Senate his veto of the Bank Bill. Now comes the "Winter of our discontent."
No one can yet tell what course things will take. . . . The great Whig party defeated &
put to shame in the face of their enemies by a Whig President! Is not this a new case in
the history of parties in our country? Is not this the first time a gallant army was basely
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Georgia judges would have reached the same conclusion.
The third point of interest derives from its potential for undercutting my earlier intimation in seeking to account for the peculiar
extremity of Georgia decisions-namely, that it was perhaps related
to the judges' high degree of political activity off the bench. Caruthers was himself not entirely remote from politics. An early Jackson
supporter, he had become a Whig by the time he was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1840.w8 A generation later, and almost
a decade after his election to the Tennessee bench, Caruthers once
more sought to affect the course of national politics, just at the same
time as did his Georgia counterparts. But there was a critical substantive difference in their goals. In Georgia the drive toward secession began almost immediately after Lincoln's election with "a series of speeches by prominent Georgians, including Benning and
Nisbet.""'*By contrast, Robert Caruthers went to the Nation's capital as one of the Peace Commissioners who sought to prevent disunion by backing the substance of the Crittenden Compromise.",
betrayed to an enemy? . .. Let him resign or carry out the will of those by whom he
was elected ....
Letter from Robert L. Caruthers to W. P. McClain (Aug. 16, 1841) (Manuscripts Section,
Tennessee State Archives and Library, Nashville, Tennessee).
388. M. JOHNSON, TOWARD A PATRIARCHAL REPUBLIC: THE SECESSION or GEORGIA 17
(1977). The lead-off speaker, on November 6, 1860, was none other than our good (and
volatile) friend, the judicial militarist, Henry L. Benning. The "meaning of Mr. Lincoln's
election to the presidency is," said Judge General Benning to the Georgia House of Representatives, "the abolition of slavery as soon as the Republican party shall have acquired the
strength to abolish it." Id. at 30. Self-preservation required secession forthwith, he told "the
cheering legislators." Id. Eugenius A. Nisbet, "who, according to Alexander Stephens, was
'regarded as the embodiment of conservatism,"' id. at 114, and was a supporter of Douglas
during the 1860 presidential campaign, announced his conversion to the cause of secession a
month later in an address to the people of Macon: "'If [secession] is, as I esteem it, revolution, then I am for it,'" he told them. Id. at 28. Why? Because
[olur merchants, artisans, day laborers and small farmers are sustained and grow in
wealth through the general prosperity of the country; and that springs from slave
labor. . . . It is not too much to say that we love the institution of slavery, as we love
... our sunshine and our showers-our soil and its fruits. This feeling pervades all
classes. It has grown up with our polity . .. it is an heirloom . .. part of our religion.

Id. at 42. After a visiting truth squad of fire-eaters confirmed that Nisbet's new politics was
"for real," he ran successfully for the secession convention. There he introduced both the
secession resolution that ultimately won out over Herschel V. Johnson's cooperationist substitute (by a vote of 166 to 130) and the resolution of unanimity pledging both supporters and
opponents of secession in the convention to support the will of the majority. See id. at 98,
114-19.
389. With him went one of his two colleagues on the Tennessee bench, Robert J.
McKinney, an Irish-born Democrat but a strong Unionist, and moreover an individual who
twenty-seven years earlier, at the Tennessee Constitutional Convention of 1834, had voted
in favor of an unsuccessful amendment to end slavery. The Commission originated when
Virginia, initially rejecting secession after Lincoln's election, asked other states to join in
sending delegates to a Peace Conference in Washington. Twenty-one states responded. Its

126

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

When it came to "slavery versus union" the politics of the
Tennessee judges were not quite the same as those of the Georgia
bench. What about their judicial behavior when confronted with
suits for freedom? And, what of the Virginia judges' decisionmaking
on the same score? Four similarities in the political positions and
structures of the Virginia and Tennessee courts might lead us to
expect similar judicial reactions to emancipation in the postabolitionist decades, and perhaps to anticipate that both would
display slightly different perspectives from those of the Georgia
bench. First, until the early 1850's, judges were appointed to both
benches by the legislatures and had effective life tenure-the Virginia judges by law and the Tennessee judges in practice, for Tennessee legislators, unlike the Georgia electorate, always seemed willing to renew the twelve-year judicial terms. Second, relatively
strong two-party systems existed in both states until the collapse of
the Whigs in the middle 1850's. Third, both polities rested on more
diverse economic bases than did most of the single-staple cotton
states of the Deep South. Fourth, the mountain areas of both states
were less committed to slavery as an economic institution than were
their lower-lying territories, the Virginia Tidewater and western
Tennessee.
Yet, and as our consideration of their handling of damages and
fair hearings already has suggested, their judicial behavior was far
from identical. The differences were manifested primarily in their
treatment of four questions dealing with what masters intended and
four questions about the legality of clear intent. Doubt as to intent
arose principally in four ways: First, when some procedural flaw in,
or lack of proof of, a manumittory conveyance existed; second, when
the master seemed to condition freedom on a particular destination
to which it was impossible to take the Negroes; third, when the
master failed to make clear what he wanted done with children of
slaves whom he freed at a future date; and fourth, when the master's
sanity was challenged by residuary legatees. The legality of clear
recommendations resembled those advocated by Kentucky Senator Crittenden in Congress
to provide guarantees to the South against Congressional abolition of the D.C. slave trade or
interference with the interstate slave trade, and compensation to slaveowners unsuccessful
in recovering fugitive slaves because of violence. The chief differences were (1) that Crittenden's proposals applied the "free-north-of-36*.30', slave-south-of-36* 30'" prescription to all
present and future territorial acquisitions, whereas the Peace Commission limited the formula to present territories, and (2) that the Peace Conference recommendations would have
required majority approval from both North and South for any future acquisitions. Republicans and secessionists united in voting down the recommendations in Congress. For a useful
discussion, see K. STAMPP, AND THE WAR CAME: THE NORTH AND THE SECESSION CRISIs 18601861, at 103-30 (1950). To our late twentieth-century eyes both sets of recommendations look
reactionary, but that is not the point.
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intent also came under fire, chiefly at four points: First, when the
master ignored or attempted to skirt restrictive domestic laws by
taking slaves to a free state, manumitting them there, and returning
South with them; second, when he attempted to place them in a
qualified state of freedom; third, when he willed to them freedom
conditional on their making a choice to accept or reject his offer; and
fourth, when he attached some other restrictions to the grant of
freedom. In general, the Tennessee court settled these questions
with remarkable alacrity and libertarianism, while the Virginia
bench tacked back and forth to an extraordinary degree. Let us
examine these differences, comparing as far as is feasible contemporaneous courts in the two states while trying to develop some
sense of each of these courts as separate small groups reacting to the
issues in terms of different legacies of law and precedent. We shall
look first at the Virginia court inasmuch as that court's burden of
precedent loomed larger and inasmuch as a "legacy" of previous
writing on the subject also exists.
(2)

Precedent and the Make-up of the Virginia Court in 1830-1831
In the winter of 1830-1831 the Virginia legislature selected a
socially prominent new president'" to head the five-man court of
appeals. Henry St. George Tucker was a member of a family of
diverse views on slavery. His father was St. George Tucker, a former
member of the court who a third of a century earlier had authored
the one "full-dress" antebellum scheme for emancipation of Virginia's slaves."' His younger brother, Beverley Tucker, was a
positive-good theorist. 39 2 The new court president seemingly in390. The position of president was the equivalent of Chief Judge.
391. St. George Tucker's scheme began with a 1795 letterto the corresponding secretary
of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Jeremy Belknap, who sent it to a number of prominent Massachusetts politicians including John Adams) for comment. The idea wound up as
Note H in Tucker's 1803 edition of Blackstone's Commentaries-awork that Cover considers
"the most interesting and original of American legal works (excluding the Federalist)from
the Revolution to Story's Conflicts." R. CovER, supra note 27, at 37 n.* Freeing female slaves
and their children as each reached 28 years of age, and following Tucker's own calculations,
it would have taken 105 years to free the last Virginia slave. From a dismal Whig viewpoint
that is an awfully long time. But that calculation ignores two things: (1) the fact that 105
years is not very long relative to the length of slavery's existence in Christendom; and (2) if
any contrafactual historical supposition is safe, the fact that, had Virginia adopted such a
scheme, long before 1900 (1795 + 105 = 1900), political pressures would have forced an
advancing of the timetable. As is plain enough from Western imperialism's post-1945 experience in Africa and Asia, gradual decolonization schemes or emancipation schemes do not hold
still that long.
392. It is a minor curiosity of southern historiography that many historians describe,
as a paradigm of the supposed generational shift from Jeffersonian liberalism to pro-slavery,
the contrast between St. George Tucker and Beverley Tucker-yet never mention Henry St.
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clined more to his father's point of view. While hardly an avowed
abolitionist, Henry Tucker regarded manumission as a "benevolent
design.""' Left to his own devices, Tucker might well have tended
to a jurisprudence that leaned in favor of liberty. Two sets of circumstances, however, initially restricted his opportunity for so
doing.
The first was that, in assuming the seat of his brother-in-law
and former tutor, John Coalter, he also was displacing Francis Taliaferro Brooke as president and was advancing over the other three
continuing members of the court. Table X indicates the make-up
of the court from 1831 to 1860."11 While we cannot be certain, it is
George, Beverley's elder brother. See, e.g., C. EATON, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN CIVnazMrION,
1790-1860, at 303-04 (1961). Beverley Tucker's pro-slavery essays and passionate novel, The
PartisanLeader, hardly gave him the standing of his elder brother. Beverley was a professor
in Missouri. Henry St. George had served as Congressman from 1815 to 1818. Not long after
his appointment to head the Virginia Court he was offered a post in Andrew Jackson's
Cabinet that (rather foolishly, in my view) he turned down. The post was AttorneyGeneral-one that, it will be recalled, led Roger Taney on to becoming a household word in
certain circles, and perhaps the only household word to be, in Charles Sumner's words,
"hooted down the page of history." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1012 (1865). One of
the reasons for my continuing sense of fascination with the Virginia Court of the 1830's is the
contrafactual supposition that if Tucker, not Taney, had become Attorney General, fought
Biddle and the Bank, Calhoun and Nullification, and so forth, and succeeded (what could
be more natural) John Marshall, then the United States Supreme Court's course in regard
to slavery might not have been quite the same.
393. Elder v. Elder's Ex'r, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252, 261 (1833). Interestingly, Tucker preferred to use the word "man" rather than the paternalistic "boy" to describe Negro adults.
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Burruss, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 289, 302 (1833).
394. John Coalter: born 1763 in Rockbridge County, Virginia; studied at William and
Mary; was so poor as a young lawyer that he "walked to his courts with his clothes and papers
in a bag on his shoulders;" wedded by his third marriage to Frances Bland Tucker, sister of
Henry St. George Tucker; became attorney general of Virginia; sat on the Court of Appeals
of Virginia, 1811-1830. His resignation from the court of appeals may have been voluntary,
for the other four judges were reelected.
Henry St. George Tucker: born 1780 in Virginia, son of Judge St. George Tucker; elected
to Virginia House, 1807, U.S. Congress, 1815-1819; declined appointment by Jackson as
Attorney-General; served as Professor of Law, University of Virginia, 1841-1845; moved adoption of the Honor System as Chairman of the Faculty; died 1848. Writings: Commentaries
on Law of Virginia, 1836; Lectures on ConstitutionalLaw, 1843; Lectures on Natural Law
and Government, 1844.
William Cabell: born 1772 in Virginia; attended Hampden-Sydney, 1785, William and
Mary (law), 1790-1793; served in Virginia Assembly 1796, 1798, 1804; elected Presidential
Elector, 1800, 1804, and governor, 1805; died 1853. Cabell was reelected governor twice (the
maximum number of terms allowed).
Francis Brooke: born 1763 in Virginia; never attended college; served as Speaker of
Virginia Senate, 1804; died 1851.
John Green: born 1781 in Virginia; died 1834.
Dabney Carr: born 1773; attended Hampden-Sydney; politically inactive; died 1837.
William Brockenbrough: born 1778 in Virginia; studied law at William and Mary College,
1798; appointed judge of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1834; died 1838.
Richard Parker: born 1783 in Virginia; elected to U.S. Senate as a Democrat in 1836;
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possible that being brought in from the outside suggested to Tucker
the wisdom of discretion."'
The second and more significant set of circumstances was comprised by the legacy of statute and precedent pertaining to freedom.
While Virginia in 1782 had assumed an "open" position on manumission, by 1805 legislators opposed to this view had garnered just
enough votes to restrict manumission to that which would take
effect outside the state."* Of primary importance was the legacy of
precedent. Unlike their Tennessee contemporaries, the Virginia
judges of the 1830's did not begin with a virtual juridical blank slate
in suits for freedom. Quite the contrary, from the turn of the century
on the Virginia Court of Appeals had been faced with a substantial
manumission docket.
Consequently, to understand the post-1830 Virginia appellate
judicial role in the peculiar institution it is critical first to understand the pre-1830 manumission decisions. It is the more so in view
of an apparent interpretive difference between two authors, Robert
Cover and myself, about the pre-1830 cases-especially about those
of the 1820's.
Focusing on the early nineteenth century, Cover has argued
recently that during its first decade, the Virginia judges inclined to
"eclectic use of equitable, common law and statutory devices all
. . . infused with a favorable attitude toward manumission.""' Alserved two months and resigned to accept court position; declined Van Buren's offer of
Attorney-General in 1840; died 1840.
Robert Stanard: born 1781 in Virginia; served as member of the Virginia Constitutional
Convention 1829-1830; died 1846.
Briscoe Baldwin: born 1789 in Virginia; father of Colonel John B. Baldwin, "leader of
Union Party in the Secession Convention of 1861;" died 1852.
John J. Allen: born 1797 in Virginia; educated at Washington College and Dickinson
College; served in Congress, 1833-1835; died 1871.
William Daniel: born 1806 in Virginia; adhered to secessionist ideology; died 1873.
William Moncure: born 1805 in Virginia; died 1882.
Green B. Samuels: born 1806 in Virginia; elected as a Democrat and served in Congress
1839-1843; died 1859.
George Lee: born 1808 in Virginia; known as a secessionist.
William Robertson: born 1817 in Virginia; died 1898.
See generallyDicrroNAnY OF AMERICAN BIoGIMPHY (20 vols.) (1929); L. TYLER, ENCYcLOPEDIA OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY (5 vols.) (1915).
395. His older associates had the advantage of considerably more judicial experience,
and if he was successfully to lead these men-some of whom would continue their tenures
after his departure-Tucker well might have felt that a delicate, rather than a vigorous,
guiding hand might constitute the best initial approach to his task.
396. See, e.g., An Act to amend the Several Laws Concerning Slaves, ch. 63, § 10, 1805
Va. Acts 35 (1806).
397. R. CovER, supra note 27, at 69. Robert Cover suggested that American courts of
that era could adopt one of three stances in interpreting manumission statutes: (1) perceiving
the statute as intended to further freedom, and hence furthering "these ends without conflict
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though not dealing with the case of the 1810's and 1820's in much
detail, Cover states that "[bly 1821 decisions in the area of conflict
of laws .

. foretold a decisive shift .

. . In 1824 . . . that shift

manifested itself."1" Cover further seems certain that the shift away
from favoring freedom became permanent (until the Civil War) with
an 1831 case. Though he does not examine cases after that date, he
states: "If any doubt might have remained about an explicit rejection of earlier standards, they were certainly dispelled by the court
in Gregory v. Baugh in 1831 . . . ."3"

Writing some years before Cover, and focusing on the period
1831-1860, I argued that during the 1830's some Virginia judges,
ultimately a majority, attempted with only modest success to lay
down a more liberal jurisprudence than had characterized that of
the 1820's. "Passivists, whose personal liberal tendencies were
seemingly overcome by judicial self-restraint, they sought diligently
to distinguish earlier Virginia decisions against liberty."4 "
Reviewing the evidence again, I am inclined to think that both
of us erred, myself primarily in putting too much weight on a particular 1824 case as representative of pre-1830 jurisprudence,"' and
Cover in skating selectively from one case to another during the
period 1799-1809; dismissing cursorily the decade of the 1810's; and
extrapolating a post-1830 future from his analysis of four cases between 1820 and 1831, rather than proceeding systematically through
these decades. Without seeking to judge whether my "hedgehog"
analytic technique or his "fox-like"4 02 one resulted in more serious
error, let me now present a re-analysis that seems more adequate
than either earlier effort as a prerequisite for understanding Virginia
jurisprudence from the beginning of Tucker's court presidency.
Essentially my re-analysis has three parts, to each of which
ideally I would give equal attention. For reasons of economy, however, I shall reduce my comments about them in the text to two
observations. One is that three cases of the first decade of the nineteenth century deserve a bit more attention than Cover gave them,
with positivist principles," id. at 62, limiting the judges' role to neutral rule application; (2)
in gray areas, where a neutral reading of the statute gave no clue to the right result, asserting
"a principled preference for liberty as one of those larger principles of law which are the basic
stuff out of which rules of decision are formed," id.; and (3) asserting "a sort of bend-overbackward principle by which there is an obligation to achieve a profreedom result unless there
is very specific, concrete positive law that prevents it." Id.
398. Id. at 74.
399. Id.
400. Fairnessand Formalism, supra note 25, at 92.
401. Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824).
402. The hedgehog, reputedly, burrows down deeply and knows a lot about a little,
whereas the fox, allegedly, covers the territory rapidly and knows a little about a lot.
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especially Woodley v. Abby, 4"' the outcome of which causes me to
suspect that, relative to some post-1830 slavery jurisprudence, especially that of Tennessee and Texas, the 1799-1809 Virginia profreedom "peak" is less lofty than Cover implies."o The other is that
the Virginia court's manumission docket from 1810-1819 simply is
not very useful in determining whether the Virginia judges' attitudes were moving during that decade in an anti-freedom direction."'5 Hence we arrive at the really crucial task-imaginatively
403. 9 Va. (5 Call) 336 (1805).
404. Two of them go toward sustaining his estimate of judicial inclinations-Pegram
v. Isabell, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 390 (1807) (holding that hearsay evidence that a slave's
ancestor was free could be introduced in court); and Wilson v. Isbell, 9 Va. (5 Call) 425 (1805)
(indicating judicial willingness to free a slave unlawfully brought back into the state after
residence elsewhere). Cover discusses Woodley v. Abby briefly, using it to show that one
should "not . . . make too much of the phrases favoring liberty in these opinions," R. Covan,
supra note 27, at 74, inasmuch as Roane, confronted with a conflict between the rights of
slaves and of creditors, chose for the creditors. We may be able to extract a little more from
the case, given its facts and given a 3 to 2 split on the outcome. In Woodley, Abby and others
had been slaves of one David Bradley, who had emancipated them in 1792. They enjoyed
freedom for over a decade, but were returned to slavery in 1805. Why? Because a year before
he had freed them, he had become the second husband of one Eliza Harrison whom, it
appeared, a year before that, as administratrix of her first husband's estate, had squandered
it. Harrison's estate's representatives charged a devastavit, and succeeding, received de bonis
propriis Bradley's freed slaves. So ruled Roane, Court President Lyons, and Judge Fleming.
Judges Carrington and St. George Tucker objected in vain, arguing unsuccessfully that "a
person de facto free, either by birth, as in the case of the children, or by actual emancipation
in due form of law, as in the case of the parents, cannot be taken in satisfaction to satisfy
any judgment, or decree in any suit to which he is not a party." 9 Va. (5 Call) at 342.
Comparing this case's result with others prior to 1810 in Virginia, what is the
consequence? First, with this exception, and possibly Roane's dissent from the majority's
1799 holding in Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1799), that the increase of futurofree mothers did not go free at the same time as their mothers but had to wait until they too
reached the appointed age of freedom, the regular judges on the high court itself-though
generous when all that lay against freedom were the wishes of would-be heirs-never really
wrenched the claims of property or the property orientation of the governing statutes. The
"wrenchings" that took place that genuinely put the phraseology of "natural rights to liberty"
into serious competition against the rights of property, came from the pen of Chancellor
Wythe in lower court trials. His holdings only prevailed on appeal when the appellate judges
found other, less "radical" grounds on which to sustain them.
405. With one exception, the cases of the 1810's continue past doctrines by upholding
claims to freedom based on illegal importation by the master and turning down claims when
the white importer was not the master. The exception is Abraham v. Matthews, 20 Va. (6
Mun.) 159 (1818). That case shifted the onus probandi in an illegal importation case onto
the plaintiff slaves on the ground that twenty years had elapsed before they sought to take
action in the courts. Abraham, however, is a slender reed on which to place much reliance as
evidence for a serious shift against freedom between 1810 and 1818, especially since the slaves'
counsel filed no written brief and gave no oral argument. It is the more so in light of William
and Mary College v. Hodgson, 20 Va. (6 Mun.) 163 (1818), handed down just a month later.
In that case the college president and (horribile dictu!) the professors, who had been bequeathed 500 bushels of Indian corn annually by the will of William Ludwell Lee to help
support a free school, argued that their bushels took precedence over the grant of liberty Lee
had bequeathed to his slaves in another clause of his will. In 1808 Chancellor Creed Taylor
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trying to re-enact the thinking about slavery of the judges of the
1820's, trying to determine whether Cover is correct in perceiving a
decisive shift away from favoring freedom at, or between, any of the
three dates he somewhat ambiguously gives-1820-1821, 1824, and
1831.
Emphasizing the contrast between the judicial style of the Virginia court and the Kentucky court,#4 Cover argues that a shift
away from freedom occurred in the former judiciary between
Griffith v. Fanny07 in 1820 and Lewis v. Fullerton"'in 1821. Looking
at verbal style is one way of interpreting substantive result. Let us
try a second approach-one that ignores whether judges allude to
natural rights to liberty and concentrates rather on the substance
of the different facts in the two Virginia cases, one that seeks to
determine whether the factual differences suffice to explain the different outcomes in Griffith and Lewis.
In Griffith, if anything was "suspicious," it was the behavior of
various owners of the slave Fanny. Fanny's original Virginia master,
Kincheloe, had sold her to Skinner, an Ohio resident, delivered her
to Ohio, "and received the purchase money.""' Not more than one
month later Kincheloe had executed a bill of sale not to Skinner but
to Griffith, a third party from Virginia. How did this happen? It
appears that Skinner and Griffith made a private agreement to this
effect because Skinner, "by the laws of Ohio . . . could not hold a

slave in his own right."",, For eighteen months after execution of the
bill of sale Fanny "was at different times seen at" Skinner's Ohio
residence; clearly she had resided in Ohio for a time. Later she was
returned to Virginia and into the possession of Griffith, "who
claimed her under the bill of sale."" Fanny brought suit for her
freedom. The "section of the Ohio Constitution, prohibiting involhad rebuffed the (hungry?) pedagogues, saying "that liberty secured to [the blacks] by . . .
benevolence and humanity . . . is supposed to have been an act no less meritorious than the
establishment of a free school." Id. at 165. The court of appeals affirmed on March 2, 1818.
406. Cover stresses the natural rights phraseology of Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K.
Marsh) 467 (1820). See R. CovER, supra note 27, at 95-98.
407. 21 Va. (Gilmer) 143 (1820).
408. 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821).
409. 21 Va. (Gilmer) at 143.
410. Id. at 144.
411. Id. Fanny's lawyer, I find on going to the original report of the case after penning
these paragraphs on the basis of Cover and Catterall's brief excerpting of the case, argued
exactly what I surmised was an alternate possibility-namely, that the whole transaction
was, "on its face a fraud" that aimed at deliberately avoiding the laws of Ohio and of Virginia.
Only Roane, John Coalter, and Francis Brooke heard the case-Cabell was absent for unstated reasons, and Court President Fleming (on the court from its inception in 1789 until
his death in February 1824) was ill for much of his last years.
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untary servitude, was inserted into the verdict""' on her behalf, and
the court of appeals agreed she should go free.
Contrast Lewis. Lewis' mother was Rodgers' slave. Seemingly,
Rodgers had taken her into Ohio, although for what total length of
time is not evident. There was only one occasion prior to Lewis'
birth, however, when Milly was seen in Ohio, "on a Sunday, working
at a sugar camp therein, in the absence of her master, and without
any evidence that it was with his permission." 13 Later Milly had
obtained a writ of habeas corpus and shortly thereafter an Ohio
county court judgment. Subsequently Rodgers persuaded Tupper to
convince Milly that if she would agree to serve Rodgers for two
years, as an indented servant, Rodgers would not appeal the Ohio
county court's action to a higher Ohio or federal court, and he would
execute in return an Ohio deed of manumission. This deed was
indeed executed and attested in Ohio. Shortly afterward Milly was
brought back into Virginia, where Lewis was born and sold to Fullerton. On reaching maturity he brought suit against Fullerton but was
denied freedom.
Are these cases quite the same? Or might it have been that in
Griffith, but not in Lewis, the Virginia court saw a palpable attempt
to evade the laws of Virginia against bringing slaves back into the
Commonwealth after their residence elsewhere? In Lewis did the
court perhaps see no permanent Ohio residence intended by the
master, but rather an Ohio lower court decision that, putting him
in a bind, induced him to make a deal under duress, which once he
had got his slave back safely into Virginia, he sought to avoid?
Might it be, then, that the Virginia court, rather than shifting from
respect for the Ohio Constitution in 1820 to disrespect in 1821, was
really applying the same criteria in relationship to different masters
whose behaviors struck the Virginia judges differently.
Now let us ask whether there is an alternate reading possible
of Maria v. Surbaugh,11 the pivotal case that arose three years after
Lewis. Cover thinks Maria "might have gone either way""' and
that, going against the blacks' claim to freedom, it manifested "a
decisive shift in the attitude and technique of the Virginia Court.""'
I am not sure that is true for several reasons.
First, it is less clear to me than to Cover that Maria, dislikable
though the result surely is, contravened relevant Virginia preced412. Id.
413. 22 Va. (1 Rand.) at 22.
414. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824).
415. R. COVER, supra note 27, at 74.
416. Id.
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ents such as Pleasants v. Pleasants and, at least "in spirit" on a
related matter, Woodley v. Abby. 17 Second, I am not certain that
Mariadenoted a fundamental substantive or stylistic shift because
were I so to conclude, I would be at a loss to account for other cases
of the 1820's that Cover does not discuss. Yet it seems to me important to consider them before leaping ahead seven years to the conclusion that Gregory v. Baugh' in 1831 removed any doubt that a
shift of either sort occurred. It is the more important since three of
the four continuing judges who greeted Tucker in 1831 sat on the
Maria case, since the fourth joined the court just after Maria, and
since he wrote the court's opinion in its very next manumission case.
That opinion, interestingly, came down in favor of liberty."'
On balance, I find it hard to extrapolate any major substantive
shift from the cases of the late 1820's. Three cases could be adduced
by a fertile dismal-Whig imagination, but two of them offer very
weak evidence indeed.", Against those cases, one needs to balance
417. In Maria the will bequeathed the slave Mary to the testator's son "with a declaration that she shall be free as soon as she arrives at the age of thirty-one years." 23 Va. (2
Rand.) at 228. The question posed was, what happened to Mary's children born after the
testator died but before Mary became 31? Did they go free also? Judge Green, taking a
lengthy look at Pleasantsv. Pleasants,concluded that they did not. In Pleasantsthe will had
freed a group of "slaves, . . . together with their increase, .

. .

immediately on their coming

to the age of thirty years." 6 Va. (2 Call) at 321.
The decision of the 1799 court of appeals majority (reversing Wythe) determined, over a
dissent by Roane, that they too had to wait until reaching thirty. In effect, Roane wanted to
hold that the right to freedom was complete and vested in the parent slaves-that only the
timing was delayed, not the right. Hence he would have had any of their children born after
the "vesting" go free with the parents. As we have noted, six years later, in Woodley, Roane
opposed Tucker's related view that once freed, slaves and their children could not be brought
back into slavery to pay for a wasteful executor's ways. Even if the reader does not accept
my analogy to the spirit of Woodley, is it not evident that the children in Maria stood on a
less favorable footing than those in Pleasants?In Mariathere was no mention of the increase
at all. Had the Virginia court majority adopted Roane's view in Pleasants,and even more
had the majority adopted Tucker's view in Woodley, we would be on much safer ground in
viewing Maria as not merely an unpleasant result, but as a newly wooden result contra the
spirit of liberty.
418. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665 (1831).
419. See Ben v. Peete, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 239 (1824) (Carr, J.) (Green, J., not sitting).
420. Sawney v. Carter, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 173 (1828) (Green, J., not sitting); and Stevenson v. Singleton, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 72 (1829) are weak. Both involved a novel argument-that
a court of equity should intervene to enforce an alleged contract between master and slave
whereby the latter would "moonlight" and earn his freedom by paying the former an agreedupon sum from those earnings. When I say "weak," I mean of course relative to the general
shape of southern slavery jurisprudence. For a society that genuinely decided both to encourage the rights of (the master's) property and to maximize the cause of freedom, allowing
such contracts could have been a principal mode of permitting societal change.
The "not so weak" case is Moses v. Denigree, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 561 (1828). Moses, which
as far as I know has been surprisingly overlooked by all the "empty-glass" Whigs, is a bit of
a bombshell for any "full-glass" Whig. Dabney Carr turned down a deed of emancipation
signed on November 13, 1781-just a few months prior to the 1782 Act-on the ground that

136

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

a larger number that suggest continuity with the past.'
Similarly, with respect to a stylistic shift, firing as does Cover
directly from Judge Green's 1824 Maria declaration that judges
should approach slavery cases neutrally toward Judge Carr's 1831
Gregory dictum that earlier judges had relaxed the rules of law too
greatly in favorem libertatishas an unfortunate effect. It shoots at
the head of another declaration by Judge Green about "good" slavery decisionmaking that stands squarely between Maria and Baugh.
That is his 1828 opinion in Isaac v. West's Executor." There, seemingly aware that the way he had construed a deed in the course of
reaching a pro-freedom result was less convincing than it might be,
he declared:
If this construction is doubtful, some weight is due to the maxim, that
every Deed is to be taken most strongly against the grantor, and to the spirit
of the Laws of all civilized nations . ..."In obscura voluntate manumittentis, favendum est libertati." (citations omitted) And for the Common Law, see

Coke Litt. 124, b.1
that Act only took effect prospectively after May of the latter year. Technically, Carr was
correct; the 1782 Act stated that "it shall hereafterbe lawful . . . to emancipate" without
proving meritorious services. True, Carr seeks to distinguish Moses from Pleasants,which did
look forward "to the passage of a Law as a condition." Id. at 565. Nonetheless, and especially
as I have previously described Dabney Carr as "probably the most liberal Judge appointed
between Tucker's father in 1804 and Peter Stanard in 1838," Nash, supra note 19, at 207,
the result in Moses, seemingly short of Charles v. Hunnicutt, 9 Va. (5 Call) 311 (1804),
disconcerts me about my former judgment.
421. On the one hand, in Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172 (1829), the Virginia
court plainly was unwilling to uphold lower court decisions where depositions in favor of
freedom surprised the defendant master. On the other hand, in Fulton v. Shaw, 25 Va. (4
Rand.) 597 (1827), the same judges were equally unwilling to permit a master to grant
freedom to a particular female slave while reserving to himself "an absolute . . . claim to all
. . . children . . . born of her body." Id. at 598 (Brooke and Coalter were absent in both
cases). This deed is surely a little grotesque. Dabney Carr, neutrally following, so to speak,
the obverse side of Maria, told the grantor that he could not make any such reservations. "A
free mother cannot have children who are slaves." Id. at 599. Other decisions of the decade
look doctrinally continuous with those of the preceding decades. Dunn v. Amey, 28 Va. (1
Leigh) 465 (1829), continues the earlier tradition of Patty v. Colin, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 519
(1807), by temporarily selling slaves granted freedom for a sufficient term of years to pay off
estate debts. Spotts v. Gillaspie, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 566 (1828), warrants, given our prior
consideration of alternate readings of Lewis v. Fullerton, more attention. In Spotts (rather
in contradistinction to Cover's reading of Lewis and Fanny) Francis Brooke (whom, some
years ago and without looking at these 1820's cases, I argued was the most conservative and
least pro-freedom of the judges to sit between 1830 and the middle 1850's, Nash, supra note
19, at 227-28) held that the law of Pennsylvania controlled the outcome in Virginia. For
Brooke the effect of Pennsylvania's 1780 gradual emancipation law was to free, in Virginia,
the daughter of a Pennsylvania slave born in 1786 and brought, as part of a bequest, by the
Virginia resident legatee to the Dominion State. Comity, though not natural law rights to
freedom, had more effect eight years after Lewis than in Lewis. That was, perhaps, not
because the Virginia court had suddenly turned back to embracing the Enlightenment in a
way that Wythe would have approved, but rather because nothing in the master's behavior
indicated the propriety of a contrary result.
422. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 652 (1828) (Brooke, J., not sitting).
423. Id. at 657.
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There is a further major reason why I am not convinced that
the Virginia judges shifted as a group decisively away from favoring
freedom even by 1831, the year of Baugh. It is that I do not agree
with Cover that, examined closely, Baugh itself suggests an
"explicit rejection of earlier standards."
To begin with, the court was divided on three of the four issues
presented in the case, and retiring Judge Coalter was absent. On the
first issue, Brooke, Cabell, Carr, and Green did agree: Baugh's attempt to gain his liberty by proving descent from a female Indian
with a right to freedom would have to be remanded for another trial
because the circuit judge had erroneously paraphrased to the jury
what witnesses had said about the status and appearance of the
female ancestor. On the second issue, the court split three to one.
Only Francis Brooke believed that, notwithstanding the passage of
over half a century, the doctrine of lis mota still applied as a barrier
to introducing evidence favorable to Gregory's claim. Dabney Carr,
stating that his initial inclination had been to agree with Brooke's
view, voted with Green and Cabell.
On both the third and fourth issues the court split two and two.
Brooke concurred with Carr's positions, while Cabell stated that he
agreed with "my Brother Green, in all points."12 The issues were
intimately related. The third issue pertained to the admissibility of
hearsay evidence both as to the plaintiffs descent from his putative
ancestor and as to whether she had in fact been an Indian. The
fourth issue concerned where lay the onus probandi,on the slave or
on his owner, with respect to two further questions, assuming that
Gregory could prove his Indian descent: (a) the date when his Indian
ancestor had been imported into Virginia; and (b) the place from
which she had been imported.4
I have two difficulties with Cover's belief that the passage he
quotes from Carr's opinion opposing the admissibility of hearsay
424. R. CovER, supra note 27, at 74. Since the court was divided two to two (Coalter
absent) on some aspects of the cases and three to one (in favor of "libertarian" pro-freedom)
on another, I become more puzzled each time I look at the case as to whether Cover studied
it closely.
425. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 693.
426. Without going into all the historical complexities here, considerable doubt obtained as to whether and when late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century Virginia statutes: (a) prohibited enslaving Indians brought into the Commonwealth; and (b)
whether a presumption in favor of liberty was created if it could be proved that an Indian
had been brought in by land (and hence perhaps taken from a friendly tribe) as opposed to a
presumption in favor of slavery if it could be proved that the Indian had been brought in by
sea (in which case, the assumption was, from places such as the West Indies, where Indian
slavery was lawful). For a fuller discussion of this issue, see 1 H. CArrBRALL, supra note 14,
at 61-71.

138

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

evidence shows an explicit general rejection of earlier standards on
the part of the court as a whole-two objections besides the obvious
one that Carr spoke only for one other judge.
First, I am not sure that Carr meant his rejection as broadly as
Cover interprets it. This we can see if we add (and italicize) what
comes immediately before and after the passage (not italicized) that
Cover quotes from Carr. Thus:
[Tihe decisions of this court, in several cases, have gone to let in hearsay to
prove descent from an indian woman; and this is the consideration which I
have found it most difficult to get over; for I am exceedingly reluctant to
unsettle what is at rest. But all who have examined the earlier cases in our
books, must admit, that our judges (from the purest motives, I am sure) did,
in favorem libertatis, sometimes relax, rather too much, the rules of law, and
particularlythe law of evidence.'2

To me it looks arguable that Carr's concern was less general, and
more specific about, primarily, the rules of evidence.
Second, before we reach any conclusions about a major shift
away from earlier pro-freedom standards, we ought to compare
Green's reasons for objecting to Carr's wish to "firm up" the evidentiary rules. Said Judge Green:
[l7t is important to the descendants of all female indian servants, many of
whom are still legally bound to a temporary service, and to a large stock of
emancipated slaves, who are bound to service in all generations to the age of
thirty years, under Pleasant's will . . . . All of the former class now, and all
of the latterin a few years, must be reduced to unconditional slavery, if it shall
become the settled law, that the identity and condition of their remote ancestors cannot be proved by hearsay evidence or traditionaryreputation.m2

Equally, we should note Green's objections to moving away from the
old pro-freedom rule of transferring the burden of proof from the
427. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 680 (emphasis added). See also R. CoVER, supra note 27, at 74.
428. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 690-91 (emphasis added). Catterall's excerpting of the cases
makes one minor, understandable omission, and one major, less understandable, omission.
The minor one is that Green apologizes for spending as much time as he does on the hearsay
evidence rule before arguing that the result is important to Indian servants' children and
Pleasants' slaves' increase. That is not the sort of thing on which Lumpkin and Benning
would have bothered to spend time, or the sort of thing about which a "de-brutalizing
hypocrite" would have bothered. The major omission is her not telling us that Green tackles
John Marshall's holding on the issue, adverse to slaves, in Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 290 (1813), saying, "I do not comprehend the rule laid down in the cases in the
supreme court of the U. States," 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 687-88, and pointing out that as a
Maryland citizen the dissenter, Gabriel Duval, was the justice who presumably knew what
was what in Maryland legal practice. Such have been my sentiments about Queen for a
number of years, and I confess to some Whiggish pleasure at finding a southern judge taking
the same line. For useful discussions of the United States Supreme Court and slavery, see
Roper, In Quest of JudicialObjectivity: The Marshall Court and the Legitimationof Slavery,
21 STAN. L. REv. 532 (1969); Wiecek, Slavery andAbolition Before the UnitedStates Supreme
Court, 1820-1860, 65 J. Am. EHsr. 34 (1978); P. Finkelman, A More Perfect Union? Slavery,
Comity, and Federalism, 1787-1861 (1976) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago).
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slave, once he had proved his Indian descent, to the master with
respect to the time and place of the ancestor's importation. Distasteful of the colonial practice of holding the children of Indian
servants to the age of thirty-one plus one additional year for each
offspring born to such children, Green stated:
No possible contrivance, short of reducing the whole race to absolute
slavery, could be better calculated to obscure and confound their right to
freedom, and to destroy the evidence of it.
Considering these facts, . . . I cannot for a moment doubt the propriety
of the former decisions of this court . . . that proof that a party is descended

in the female line from an Indian woman,. . without anything more, is prima
facie proof of his right to freedom . . . .e2

As indicators of the Virginia judges' attitudes on slavery jurisprudence at the beginning of the 1830's, Green's views on hearsay
and burdens of proof warrant as much attention as Carr's. What I
perceive, then, is not a general shift but rather disagreement and
disunity. Indeed, two other cases decided in 1830, just before
Tucker's appointment, suggest that some of the judges were not
even entirely consistent in their thinking about suits for freedom.
In Thrift v. Hannah,as0 Francis Brooke decided that the marriage of a slave mistress, after she had drawn up a witnessed deed
of manumission to take effect at her death but before its probate,
terminated the deed. Thus the slaves passed to her husband. Dabney Carr dissented on the ground that the act of drawing a witnessed
deed ended the mistress' right to perpetual property in the slaves;
only state action remained possible. The slaves possessed a grant
valid save insofar as the state legislature might nullify it by passing
a prohibitory general law. On this occasion John Green 3 ' agreed
with Carr. But Brooke carried with him two other judges, Coalter
and Cabell. 32 In Brooke's view, two considerations militated a different conclusion. First, the testator could have revoked her deed
prior to probate simply by tearing it up. Second, upon her marriage
she ceased to be feme sole. Once feme covert, her husband rightfully
owned the slaves, and she retained no independent power to manumit them. Brooke's argument was clearly the more neutral one.
Curiously, Carr's reasoning appears an attempt at libertarian intervention on behalf of the slaves and rather at variance with his posi429. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 686.
430. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 300 (1830).
431. Green served on the court from 1822-1834. Little is known about his background

except that he served in the War of 1812.
432. The latter was a popular Republican ex-governor who had been re-elected twice,
the maximum legal number of times. See 3 DicroNARY OF AMEmcAN BIOGRAPHY 390 (1929); 2
L. TyizR, supra note 394, at 47.
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tion in Gregory v. Baugh a year later. Thus, from the standpoint of
assessing personal attitudes (as distinct from jurisprudential behavior), Thrift v. Hannah is suggestive only about the minority judges,
Carr and Green.
The second 1830 case, however, was somewhat more indicative
of the other judges' predilections. Walthall's Executor v.
Robertsons required the court to interpret a will whose wording was
undeniably ambiguous:
[I1f it be agreeable to the laws . .. after the death of my said wife Mary it is
my will . . . , that the following slaves owned by me, viz. Joan senior, Gary,

Jack, Tom, and Peter,shall as soon as they attain the age of thirty-one years,

shall be freed; and I appoint . . . , trustees for the liberation . . . , and for
them to make the necessary application to court. . ., both as to their freedom

and their remaining in the state. If the laws of the state be against such
procedure, then my will . .. is, that the said slaves shall be equally divided
among my children .

...."

The issue involved testamentary intent in light of relevant state law.
Since the Acts of 1805 and 1819 required the removal of freed slaves
4
the court had to decide whether Walthall's primary
from Virginia,"
intent was manumission or retention of the blacks in the Commonwealth. For John Green and the three judges who concurred with
him, the words "if the laws of Virginia be against such procedure"
referred "both to the emancipation of the slaves, and procuring
permission to them to remain in the state . . . ."a4 Green reasoned
that Walthall must have known of the laws, and known further that
3 the
since his slaves had not "done any act of extraordinary merit"4'
laws would not permit their remaining. He must, therefore, have
been gambling on a change by the time of his death. Since change
had not come, he wished his children to inherit the slaves. In dissent
Dabney Carr reached the opposite conclusion, arguing first that the
4
who only "had an
defendant was "an ignorant, illiterate man,"#
idea, that some application to court was necessary,"43 ' and second
that the wording clearly showed two separate purposes. The court,
433. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 189 (1830).
434. Id. at 189-90.
435. Note the early date of the prior act relative to the concert-of-defense "schedule."

In 1778 the legislators' liberalism on this issue had peaked in the enactment of a law that
allowed illegally imported slaves to be freed. In 1805 the legislators changed positions radically-they enacted a law that allowed such slaves to be seized from their owners and sold
at auction, the proceeds to go to the State Treasury! The 1819 Act moved back to a slightly
less "closed" position, allowing slaves of extraordinary merit to remain in the Commonwealth
once freed. But this could not help Walthall's slaves.
436. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 194.
437. Id. at 195.
438. Id. at 193.
439. Id.
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said Carr, should send the slaves out-of-state to freedom.
Neither analysis wholly dispels the will's ambiguity. Walthall
was not obviously gambling on a statutory change. Nor do his words
clearly show "two distinct and independent things; the freedom
first, the residence afterwards.""' Neither Green's nor Carr's opinion appears entirely neutral. Indeed, the difficulty of Walthall lay
in the virtual impossibility of writing a neutral opinion. The situation almost encouraged the judges to write their private beliefs into
law. In company with Maria, Thrift, and Baugh, however, the result
in Walthall suggests some inferences about the attitudes and behavior of the four judges whom Tucker met in 1831.
It reinforces a suspicion raised by Carr's handling of Thrift that
pro-freedom personal views at times motivated his decisionmaking.
Particularly suggestive is the sentence with which he prefaces his
detailed analysis of Walthall's will: "Reasoning a priori, we should
hardly suppose, that the testator who wished to confer the boon of
freedom on his slave, would make that dependent on his residence
in this or that quarter of the globe.""' Given the lack of compelling
logic in the argument with which Carr followed this observation, it
may be correct to perceive at least an underlying reflex of sympathy
with Walthall's efforts to free his slaves. That much seems clear.
The difficulty arises in trying to square Carr's position in these
three cases with his holding in Baugh. A similar difficulty arises
with respect to attempting to derive John Green's views on the
peculiar institution from his positions in these cases. Yet it would
be helpful if we could define somehow the attitudinal space that
these two judges and their colleagues, Brooke and Cabell,
"occupied," so to speak, when Henry Tucker assumed leadership of
the court.
There appear to me four ways to try to do so, and they are not
all equally satisfactory. The least satisfactory way is to content
ourselves with some broad covering label, with thinking of them as
all one nasty pro-slavery lot of white supremacist magistrates, differentiated only amongst themselves and from the Georgia judges
by the extent to which they minced their words about the peculiar
institution. Besides amounting to a premature moral evaluation,
however, such an approach forfeits any fineness of perception in
order to generalize."'
440. Id. (Carr, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 192-93.
442. We would not be very impressed with this kind of analysis in an area where our
contemporary ethical feelings were less interwoven with our subject matter. For, as a technique of legal history, it is rather analagous to an art historian's coming along and telling us
that to understand Rembrandt's paintings all we need to realize is that they are almost all
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A second way of attempting to define the Virginia judges' attitudinal space seemed to me, some years ago, more satisfactory than
it does now, although I would still prefer it to the first."' Its drawbacks are three: (1) its use of terms -such as "liberal" or
"conservative," or "pro-slavery" and "anti-slavery," makes it susceptible to misreading;"' (2) it plays down unduly the autonomy of
4
judge-made law;@
and (3) it may be too rationalist in its assumptions about the nature of the judges' personal attitudes about the
peculiar institution."'
The third way would be the closest to traditional legal history,
as Robert Gordon defined it."' This approach would bring into the
foreground for scrutiny the "inner logic of the law," the distinctly
legal and judicial values and doctrines, with personal attitudes towards the peculiar institution taking a secondary place in the analysis. The advantages that it would have are two. First, it would
provide us a better picture of the evolution of the formal uniquenesses of slavery law against the background of, and in relationship
with, doctrinal developments in nineteenth-century law in genbrown. We would probably not be too satisfied with that. And we would not be much more
satisfied if he further observed that the differences among the browns did not matter much
because the "real truth" about Rembrandt's work, the underlying cause of the brownness,
was that the similarity of hue and tone reflected the infra-structure of early Dutch capitalism.
That of course sounds fatuous-but it sometimes seems that we are asked to put up with
something a bit like that in analyzing American legal history.
443. It has had two manifestations. One is Cover's attempt at differentiation of attitudes over time-and I have already indicated why I think this insufficient. The other is my
own earlier effort. In that effort I thought it plausible, largely (and carelessly) ignoring Baugh
and the 1820's cases other than Maria and Isaac, to place the four continuing judges on a
left-right continuum with Carr farthest to the left, most libertarian, and most pro-freedom,
Green near to him, Cabell to the right of him, and finally Brooke farthest to the right.
444. Even if the terms are carefully stipulated in a relativist fashion suitable to the
nineteenth-century South, there is a tendency to read back definitions of the twentieth
century or of the North.
445. That is particularly true with respect to the dimensions of judicial respect for
precedent as a value in itself and as a value different from judicial restraint in the face of
legislative intent, and of judicial desires for symmetry between slavery law and other overlapping areas of the structure of law (such as rules of evidence).
446. That is chiefly so in regard to its assumptions: (a) that each judge had, as an
individual, a well worked-out position on each slavery issue; (b) that these positions all hung
fairly closely together; and (c) that the "oomph" that this "slavery value" would have relative
to the oomphs of other values entering into the decisionmaking process would be relatively
constant from case to case. In dealing with a judge whose pro-slavery values are very clear
and who is given to enunciating them in his opinionwriting, these disadvantages do not
matter greatly. But when it comes to judges such as Green and Carr, it is at least arguable
that the approach tends to push round the data a bit, drawing more certainty than should
be drawn at particular points and then being confounded by an irregularity that emerges at
another point.
447. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 10.
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eral.4 #Second, it would help us in explaining some of the apparent
anomalies in the case law of slavery with which the second approach
leaves us-for example, Carr's position in Baugh vis-a-vis other
cases. If, thus, we could ascribe it to a primary feeling on Carr's part
for the desirability of symmetry between the rules of evidence in
slave law and the rules in other, nonslavery, matters (for example,
title to real property), to a formalist feeling that overcame whatever
sentiments he might have about the "boon of freedom,""' then we
would be farther on in explaining the judge's attitudinal space. The
disadvantages to this "black box" approach are, for our present
purposes at least, two. First, if done in the traditional black box
way, in focusing on doctrinal development it shunts our attention
away from the judicial mind in relationship to slavery.5 0 Second, its
analytic consequence is putting second things first on the agenda of
research priorities."'
Hence we come to the fourth approach, which we have in fact
been taking without saying so but about which we now should be
explicit-because some of what we are going to infer is tenuous and
it is well to be clear both that that is so and why it is so. This
approach tries, more or less artfully, to build some of the concerns
448. For example, it might explain why the writ de homine replegiando maintained a
fitful vitality in the law of slavery while becoming obsolescent elsewhere-or if not why (for
"why" is always the weak point of this traditional legal history), at least in what manner.
Or, and contrariwise, it might lead us to understand why some of the changes in nineteenthcentury American law that we look on now as desirable reforms began in what Friedman calls
the legal periphery of the South-for example, the reform of married women's property rights,
of which the first instance of change occurs in 1839 in Mississippi. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
24, at 185-86.
449. 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 189, 192 (1830).
450. If there is anything that all who examine the law of slavery might agree upon it is
that substantive concern for the terms, conditions, and future of the peculiar institution-in
a large number ofjudges, at any rate-simply must have been the central component pushing
the outcomes reached in a large number of the cases that arose. To put it another way,
whatever the third approach might gain on the swings, as it crosses the middleground of
doctrines, cases, and judges aiming at symmetry as a formal virtue in the law, it loses on the
turns out over the territories of doctrines, cases, and judges aiming either at the perpetuation
of slavery or alternately at opportunities for helping a natural law of rights and liberties, or
the common law, affect, infuse, and subsume the institution. More than loses, we must say,
since the middleground is relatively so small. One cannot easily explain, for example, Benning's attack on the "monstrous doctrine" of cy pres with a formalist, nonsubstantive, approach. Nor can we explain why, in different territory, O'Neall did what he did in Carmille
or why Wythe said what he said in Pleasants.
451. At some point in the future it may amount to a useful gain in our knowledge of
things past if we have a clear formalist portrait of the doctrinal developments of the law of
slavery. But, that, it seems to me, has to come after we have learned as much as we can about
individual judges' responses to the interface between slavery and the rule of law. And that
requires trying to get at, to catch the conscience of the king, not only in the obvious cases
(the Lumpkins, and the Bennings) but also in the less obvious ones (the Carrs and the
Greens).
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of the third approach for purely formal legal values into what is
basically a derivative of the second approach. It keeps as central the
task of trying to understand the individual judges' attitudinal
space. It continues the assumption that, absent rebutting proof, the
primary determinants of that attitudinal space are personal attitude toward the peculiar institution, perceptions of state policy as
expressed in statute and precedent, and perceptions of what the
judicial role properly did, and did not, encompass.
What I am going to say next, and in specific, about these Virginia judges may seem a bit deflated, but I do want to be frightfully
careful and not hoodwink the reader with this fourth approach for
two reasons. One, intrinsic to the approach, and a carryover from
the second approach, is a flaw, a Whiggish driving habit, that does
not beset the first or the third approaches. It is that a succession of
tiny errors in locating a particular judge, occurring from case to
case, by extracting from the data just a bit too much by way of
personal attitude to slavery, can build up to a substantial error-if
45 2 The
the tiny errors are all or almost all in the same direction.
second reason for being careful springs from trying to incorporate
part of t.e third approach. That is because it provides the opportunity for ascribing an attitudinal anomaly about slavery appearing in
a particular case to another set of formalist, legal values. If we are
careful about this then we will probably enjoy a distinct explanatory
advantage. But if we are not, we may inadvertently stumble into
using a closed explanatory system which, notwithstanding its
greater degree of evaluative fineness, is no less closed and selffulfilling than abolitionist analysis or than extremes of dismal
Whiggery.
Those cautions stated, what can we say about the judges whom
Henry Tucker met as he took up the reins of court leadership? Five
propositions seem safe:
1. The judges were not of one mind, and certainly not jointly
rushing headlong to embrace a positive-good theory of slavery.
2. Of the seven major issues that we have earlier described as
making up the primary docket of southern slavery jurisprudence, between 1824 and early 1831 the judges had been called to
rule upon aspects of all but the second, damages for wrongful
detention.
452. That is a difficulty that the "all Rembrandts are brown" approach does not have
to worry about, because it does not try any fine-gauged attitudinal analysis of the judicial
mind. Nor does the third approach, by itself, have to worry since it does not try any attitudinal analysis at all.
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3. On three of the issues-#1 (fair hearings), #6 (fourth parties), and #7 (conflict of laws)-they experienced no disagreement."'
4. The judges agreed on some aspects of the three other issues-#3 (rules of evidence and presumptions), #4 (uncertainty
as to master's intent), and #5 (doubt as to lawfulness of clear
intent)."'

5. The judges disagreed on other aspects of these three issues.,"
What, if anything, can we safely say in generalizing from these
cases to broader attitudes concerning slavery and slavery
jurisprudence? First, I think a conclusion is warranted about the
judge whose tenure on the bench went back closest to the days of
Tucker phre and Roane, closest to Cover's heyday of in favorem
libertatisjurisprudence, Francis Brooke. Though Brooke was well
short of adopting a Benning-like stance, it is not unduly simplistic
to describe Brooke as occupying the attitudinal position farthest to
the right among the Virginia judges of the late 1820's. Second, two
interpretations about Carr and Green seem arguable. One interpretation, which is more cautious, is that we simply cannot tell from
the evidence which of four types of practitioners of the judicial art
they were: (1) neutralists who personally were pro-slavery (though
not enormously so); (2) neutralists who were personally anti-slavery
(though not so strongly as to go very far in jettisoning contra453. Unfair surprise of one party (Hunter,in that case the would-be heir) or inaccurate
summary by the judge of witnesses' testimony (Baugh) required a new trial. Where a plaintiff
acquired a right to freedom under a northern state's gradual emancipation law, the northern
state's law controlled (Spotts). Estate debts did not permanently frustrate a bequest of
freedom; instead the court, as before (Pattyv. Colin, 1807), delayed freedom only until such
debts could be paid off (Dunn).
454. A deed of freedom was not frustrated by a prior deed conveying the slaves to a third
party which seemingly had been lost, and was hence not recorded until after the deed of
freedom had gone into effect-and the original master's acknowledgement that the earlier
deed was genuine had no probative effect (Ben). A will that said nothing about the children
born to a slave free in futuro made them slaves (Maria-andnote that this was the one case
Carr did not sit on). But, a master could not free a slave and reserve as slaves children born
after the effective date of freedom (Fulton). A will that sought to give freedom, drawn up at
a date when the manner sought for giving freedom violated state law, and that did not look
forward to taking effect when such law might be changed, was void (Moses). But, where a
master's intent seemed to be to accomplish two inconsistent aims, one lawful and one seemingly setting up a limited or a quasi-emancipation, the lawful aim of full liberty prevailed
(Isaac).
455. Green and Cabell argued that hearsay evidence and the burden of proof should
both favor the plaintiff seeking freedom; Carr and Brooke argued the contrary (Gregory).
Both Green and Carr, but not Brooke, Cabell, or Coalter, would have granted priority to an
unprobated deed of manumission over the legal disabilities of a feme covert (Thrift). Carr,
alone, would have held that where the master's will was ambiguous as to whether he conditioned a grant of freedom on the possibility of his slaves' remaining free in Virginia, the court
should hold that freedom for the slaves was a separable and superior intent (Walthall).
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freedom precedent or statute); (3) pro-freedom types restrained by
precedent and statute on some occasions but not on others; or (4)
magistrates who were just plain muddled in their slavery jurisprudence. The other interpretation, slightly less cautious, would describe
them as "natural but restrained libertarians." It would "explain"
Green's Maria position as following from precedent, and his
Walthall position as springing from legitimate caution about testator's intent rather than from personal pro-slavery. It would describe
Carr's position as generally the most libertarian, leaning, so to explain, heavily on Walthall and Thrift, and discounting his motivation in Gregory as indicating a craftsman-like unease at the lack of
symmetry between rules of evidence in general and those applying
to a particular type of slave-litigant, those claiming freedom from
Indian ancestry. My own preference, if forced to make an election,
would be slightly for the latter view-but that may be simply because I am aware of what the same judges did during the 1830's in
shaping further the law of slavery. And, it may be that I am wrong.
That leaves Coalter and Cabell. As Coalter left the bench when
Tucker fils came on, it is not necessary here to try to pin down his
position closely. I am inclined to designate Cabell as a neutralist,
but one willing to give more weight to the value of freedom when
not constrained by precedent or statute than was Brooke.
(3) Liberal Gropings of the 1830's?-The Maria Tangle
Henry St. George Tucker's appointment did not bode immediate change toward more libertarian judicial behavior. Indeed, during his first year on the bench Tucker's manumission decisions suggested that he might pursue a more conservative direction than
most of his colleagues. At his first court session Tucker heard a case
involving the validity of oral wills made when the master was near
death."68 In company with Brooke, Tucker wished to void all oral
bequests of freedom. Dabney Carr, however, persuaded them to
limit their decision to voiding the instant will on the much narrower
ground that the dying master had not clearly been aware of what
he was doing.57
In the same session the court unanimously refused to recognize
a state of partial emancipation as grounds for a right of freedom.5 8
456. Winn v. Bob, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 140 (1831).
457. "[Tlhey thought, slaves could not be emancipated by a nuncupativewill, and had
intended to give that opinion on that point; but . . .yielded to the suggestion of Carr, J. that
the point should be left open for consideration when it should be necessary to decide it." Id.
at 146.
458. Rucker's Adm'r v. Gilbert, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 8 (1831).
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Gilbert, a mulatto slave, had been willed a piece of land, and the
testator's executor had been instructed to allow him to settle on it
and to "enjoy the benefit of his labour."59 The court rejected Gilbert's contention that because such quasi-emancipation was illegal
under Virginia law, he should be allowed to move to a free state.
Here the Virginia judges invoked jurisprudence of the sort practiced
by the North Carolina court under John Louis Taylor. Even Dabney
Carr was unprepared for the libertarianism that Gilbert sought."10
A "concert of defense" explanatory model would read these
actions of the post-1831 judges as symptomatic of a hardening proslavery viewpoint. Doing so, however, would fail to account for the
quality of their obiter expressions of opinion and their growing, if
modest, tendency during the next two decades to decide for the
slave. Thus antebellum Virginia decisions are conspicuously short
on general justifications of slavery. Until 1858 no majority opinions
indicated bounding enthusiasm for the peculiar institution-or, for
that matter, resentment of northern abolitionism. Instead, declarations of attitude tended to be fairly realistic about slavery. Thus,
rather than paint gloomy pictures of "wage-slaves at the North" and
romantic pastels of happy Negroes strumming in the tobacco fields,
Tucker would frankly concede that the declaration of the Massachusetts Constitution "all men are born free and equal" was "less . . .
an abstraction, than . . . that which is contained in our own bill of

rights.""' And, interestingly, he insisted on this difference in Betty
v. Horton not to turn down a bid for liberty but rather to uphold a
claim to freedom based on a Virginia slave's one year residence in
Boston, Massachusetts. Here Carr and Tucker moved toward agreement. Carr almost casually assumed that comity and the Massachusetts Constitution controlled the outcome, saying that his impression was that from it "the paupers derive a good claim to their
freedom."462 Tucker felt no reticence in stating, "the construction of
the constitution of Massachusetts by its courts .

. we would of

course respect and follow, if we were sufficiently advised of them.""
These two statements warrant pausing over, and not just because they differ from the positive-good preachings and scorn for the
laws of quasi-slave states of Joseph Lumpkin" and the clap-trap
459. Id. at 9.
460. For decisionmaking virtually as libertarian, however, compare the behavior of the
South Carolina court during the same decade. See Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness,
supra note 25, at 154-66.
461. Betty v. Horton, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 615, 622 (1833).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 623.
464. See text accompanying notes 360-64 supra.
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about Ohio and orangutans in which Mississippi Judge Harris indulged."' These statements by Carr and Tucker are interesting as
they relate to four interpretive matters that concern us: (1) Tushnet's contentions about a developing autonomy of southern slavery
law;"' (2) Hindus' assertion that South Carolina black justice was
never intended to be just and that consequently one must doubt the
claims of other scholars that other southern states' appeals courts
defended the rights of blacks;"' (3) Cover's psychological explanatory model of northern judges' decisionmaking;"" and (4) the
"attitudinal space" of the Virginia court of the 1830's.11'
With respect to the issue of an autonomous law of slavery:
either Betty"" suggests that there was not yet in Virginia jurisprudence any push toward separating the relevant aspects of the judgemade law into two systems, one distinctively slave-state and the
other distinctively free-state; or Betty was anomalous. It was not,
as we shall see. With respect to the question of judicial intentions
pertaining to doing justice, it looks to me as though in the instant
case Carr and Tucker, not to mention their brethren (even Brooke)
who concurred with them, did intend to be just-notwithstanding
their being part of the white power structure. With respect to
Cover's dissonance-reducing explanation for northern judges' decisionmaking, what intrigues me is the apparent absence of an equivalent tension in the Virginia judges' "attitudinal space." Although
Cover's anti-slavery northern judges ruled against liberty for reasons of constitutional necessity, and hence resolved in an uncomfortable fashion a tension between personal attitudes and comity,
Tucker and Carr ruled for liberty and comity at one and the same
time. But that fact itself is a bit curious for those assuming that all
southern judges must have been pro-slavery."'
465. See text accompanying notes 296-98 supra. That is plain-and plain enough to
cause me, at least, to turn a doubting eye on anyone who wants to tell me that they just
amount to different ways of oppressing blacks, more and less subtle. That is just about as
helpful as someone's declaring that Justices McReynolds and Brandeis simply had different
constitutional prescriptions for preserving the tyranny of the capitalist ruling classes over the
common man, or that all Rembrandts are brown.
466. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
467. See text accompanying notes 106-24 supra.
468. Cover's model reduces the cognitive dissonance created by a tension among personal anti-slavery sentiments, the values of the Union, and the values of formalist judicial
neutrality by escalating the formal values of judicial self-restraint and positivist construction
of the constitutional compact with the peculiar institution. See R. CovER, supra note 27.
469. See notes 530-51 infra and accompanying text.
470. 33 Va. (5 Leigh) 615 (1833). See text accompanying notes 461-63 supra.
471. No less curious is what Judge Cabell said in another case in 1833. Given a chance
to choose among the various prior dicta about good juridical policies-Green's "neutralist"
Maria observation, Carr's Baugh dictum about too relaxed rules of law, and Green's contrary-
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What was happening? Were, conceivably, the Virginia judges,
rather than moving away from earlier natural law sensibilities toward an anti-freedom stance, doing exactly the opposite-even becoming unhappy with the chilly neutralism of Maria? Let us look
further. Neither John Green's death in 1834 nor Dabney Carr's demise in 1837 cut short the seeming movement to the "left." First,
Green's successor, William Brockenbrough, though perhaps not
greatly different from Green in personal convictions about the peculiar institution, had less respect than Green for the civil law school
of slavery theorists. As a member of the general court before his
promotion, Brockenbrough had been the only judge sitting in
Commonwealth v. Turner7 2 to take the "John Louis Taylor side" in
a replay of the North Carolina argument over the question whether
the common law was sufficiently all-encompassing to support a
common law indictment of a white for assaulting a black. In Turner
the Virginia defendant was not merely "any old white," but the
slave's master; the indictment was not for homicide, but for "cruelly
beating his own slave.""' The general court majority, although it
greatly "deplored that an offence so odious and revolting as this,
should exist to the reproach of humanity,""' thought, in the absence
of a statute covering the offense, that common law could not cover
the master's behavior, and that the court had no jurisdiction.
Brockenbrough disagreed strongly with the majority's contention that the issue posed a "question of great delicacy and doubt,"'
whether correction of the evil should be corrected "by legislative
enactments, or . . . the tribunal of public opinion."' He thought
the general court exactly the right tribunal and he was quite pretending Isaac assertion about favoring liberty in cases of uncertainty-Cabell chose Isaacand
improved upon it. Dropping the maxim about construing deeds against the grantor, and
omitting the qualifier "some weight," he stated: "I approve of the principle declared by this
Court in Isaac v. West, . . . that every instrument conferring freedom, should be construed
liberally, in favor of liberty." Elder v. Elder's Ex'r, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252, 260 (1833). Possibly
Cabell was simply trying to be misleading. But if that is true, it is odd that he joined in
upholding a manumission despite two strong arguments brought against it by would-be
heirs. First, they advocated the continental argument adopted by the Georgia and Alabama
courts that as chattels, the slaves had no legal capacity to make the choice required by the
will-going to Liberia or remaining in slavery. Cabell stated flatly: "It can, therefore, be no
objection . . . ." Id. Second, the would-be heirs argued that children born while the slaves

had been hired out to pay estate debts fell under the Maria rule that interim children of
manumitted slaves remained enslaved. The court held that the rule would not apply when
the testator indicated a desire to free all his Negroes immediately-even if he forgot to
mention their children.
472. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 686.
475. Id.
476. Id.
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pared to expand its jurisdictional scope. Construing doubtfully, but
humanely-I should add-the relevant colonial statutes that had
expressly made nonfelonious a master's killing of his slave while
whipping or otherwise "correcting" him as merely having suspended
the common law, he declared that the repeal of "this ferocious and
sanguinary system of legislation"" in 1788 had "expressly revived"
the common law. 78
Turning to the question whether so permitting liberal sentiments to determine case law would weaken the peculiar institution,
Brockenbrough asserted that the result would not be "injurious to
the peace of society.""' In his view the fact that courts and juries
generally were composed of masters made it impossible to "conceive
that any injury can accrue to the rights . . . of that class of the

community." 80 Sounding uncannily like John Belton O'Neall
twenty years later, he went on, "with respect to the slaves, whilst
kindness and humane treatment are calculated to render them contented and happy, is there no danger that oppression and tyranny,
against which there is no redress, may drive them to despair?""'
Whether Brockenbrough's words amounted to a "cunning" effort to
debrutalize slavery or whether they displayed a deep-seated need
somehow to try to bring a liberal sentiment into the peculiar institution that would have made possible some sort of peacable evolution
away from an absolute and perpetual dominion of white over black,
is an issue I shall not try to resolve here. What is relevant to our

477. Id. at 689.
478. There is no need here to go through a critique of Brockenbrough's logic, for it had
the difficulties generally common to the side he took in the common-law-versus-continentalabsolutism argument. What is worth noting are his sentiments and what he thought should
be the Virginia general court's jurisprudential behavior: "by that repeal, that [common] law
again extended its aegis over the slave to protect him from all inhuman torture though that
torture should be inflicted by the hand of a master. I had not supposed that I was stretching
the principles of the common law to an unreasonable extent." Id. Brockenbrough perhaps
knew he was stretching them a bit. In any event, he next made a statement that, besides
pointing to the moral enormity of the absolutist version of the peculiar institution, did two
things: embedded the South and slavery squarely in the Western liberal tradition, and (inadvertently) illustrated exactly why I have insisted throughout this Article that in order to
assess adequately southern slavery jurisprudence one should neither separate it out ab initio
from that tradition or abjure the possibility that liberal sentiments at times influenced it.
Said Brockenbrough:
I had supposed that if, in England, the mere attempt . .. to commit a felony .. . be a
misdemeanor, if an Indictment will be allowed in Massachusetts for poisoning a cow, or
in Pennsylvania for killing a horse, an Indictment might be sustained in Virginia for
maliciously and inhumanely beating a slave almost to death.
Id.
479. Id. at 690.
480. Id.
481. Id.
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analytic concerns is that a judge with such views came onto the
court of appeals in 1834. Such a judge well might lean toward liberty
in manumission cases-if he were not just trying to pull the wool
over northern eyes.
This brings us to a second circumstance that boded possible
change. By 1836 President Tucker was more inclined to push for
liberty than he had been in his first term. In that year his patience
wore thin when confronted with the circumstance that for forty
years the "benevolent intentions" of a Methodist master to free his
slaves had been frustrated. In Manns v. Givens" the lower court
had first refused the slaves freedom on the ground that the instrument of manumission had never been proved and recorded in
court."' A second court had rejected the instrument on the ground
that evidence of its validity was "inadmissible and insufficient."",
Some time later, a superior court had initially granted a writ of
mandamus. Responding, however, to a return by the executor who
still held the slaves, that court had reversed itself and refused to
issue the mandamus. On appeal, Tucker waxed angry: "[I]t would
be monstrous," 85 he asserted, should the failure to prove the original
instrument before the testator's death permit holding the slaves in
bondage. He could not "unite in" telling the slaves that they could
not later have the instrument proved. Tucker believed the evidence
"admissible and satisfactory,"" and he awarded a peremptory
mandamus. Would Judge Lumpkin or Chancellor de Saussure have
approved?
In Manns Tucker made himself reasonably clear as to where he
stood on manumission. Speaking of the 1782 Act, he declared:
That act was passed at the close of the revolutionary war, when our councils were guided by some of our best and wisest men; men who looked upon
the existence of slavery among us not as a blessing but as a national misfortune, and whose benevolence taught them to consider the slave not as property
only, but as a man.'

I doubt that Tucker made these remarks merely for the benefit of
northern readers of his opinions. In the further course of his reasoning he travelled across ground that looks, to me at least, rather
libertarian in its implications for future decisionmaking:
One would suppose that a slave, who is capable of nothing else, is at least
capable to take his freedom, and that the grant of it is just as susceptible of
482.

35 Va. (7 Leigh) 689 (1836).

483. Id. at 690.
484. Id. at 693.
485. Id. at 718.

486. Id. at 719.
487. Id. at 709.
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gradations in its progress to perfection, as a bargain and sale of land, or a
feoffment by the custom. . . .
.[Not only will an inchoate and imperfect right to freedom in a slave
be recognized, but even a modified quasi state of freedom is sanction [sic]
by this court . . . .8

To what extent were his views shared by other court members?
In Manns, Tucker carried the entire court with him. But in another
1836 case he did not. In DeLacy v. Antoine"'9 some slaves, allegedly
free-born citizens of the island of Bravo, 9 0 brought against their will
into Virginia and enslaved, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
circuit superior court. Conceding "at once that under our law the
habeas corpus is not the proper method of trying the right to freedom,""' Tucker finessed the point, and over Brooke's dissent upheld their liberty. Tucker observed: "A free negro, as well as a free
white man, must be entitled to the benefit of the habeas corpus act
. . . . [O]therwise, that wretched class would be altogether without protection from the grossest outrages, and their personal liberty
would be an insubstantial shadow.""'2 To my way of thinking
Tucker's rhetoric looks more like a product of judicial libertarianism
than of either ardent or cunning pro-slavery. I would further hazard
the guess that Brockenbrough and Tucker were getting on well together in their slavery jurisprudence, drawing Carr and Cabell not
too reluctantly along with them, leaving Francis Brooke off on a
neutralist or pro-slavery limb by himself.
On only one issue of import in 1836 did more conservative inclinations carry the day, and the result was short-lived. Emory v.
Erskine,493 involving a will granting futuro freedom, brought back
the ghost of Maria v. Surbaugh for a second time. As we have noted
earlier," three years before, in Elder v. Elder's Executor the Tucker
court had delimited Maria by holding that where a testator had
provided for the freedom of "all his slaves," their children born after
his death also went free. But Elder had given no intimation as to
how the Tucker court would construe a will granting futuro freedom
488. Id. at 714, 717.
489. 35 Va. (7 Leigh) 438 (1836).
490. One of the Cape de Verde Islands.
491. 35 Va. (7 Leigh) at 443.
492. Id. at 444.
493. 35 Va. (7 Leigh) 267 (1836).
494. In Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824), the pre-Tucker court held that
the children of slaves who received futuro freedom by the terms of their master's will did not
go free if they were not expressly provided for in the will. See note 417 supra and accompanying text. Elder's1833 delineation of the Mariarule gave no intimation as to how the new court
would interpret such a bequest. See note 471 supra. Emory presented the first opportunity
to reach this question.
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to the mother. Emory presented the first such opportunity, for by
the bequest that gave rise to the suit the testator, Abraham McCoy,
had freed "all his slaves" following a life tenure in his wife, Rachel.
At her death her executor had seized the slaves born during the
tenure, claiming them as a part of her estate. The Negroes argued
in the circuit court that they should go free with their parents, but
the circuit court held they were slaves coming under the Mariarule,
and the appellate court denied their application for a supersedeas.
Left there, the story of McCoy's slaves would suggest that we
had been fooled a bit in thinking that the post-1830 court was inclining more toward liberty-at least when confronted with contrary
precedent. But at this juncture Abraham McCoy's heirs entered the
dispute, claiming that indeed the slaves were not free but that a
correct reading of Maria would deliver the slaves to them, rather
than to Rachel McCoy Crouch's heirs. By the time that this suit
reached the court of appeals in 1838, 11 three judges had changed
their minds."' President Tucker, speaking of the earlier denial of
freedom, stated: "Let me here express my deep regret at that refusal
. . .. I am now satisfied of the error . . . ."19 Tucker announced
that it was obvious that McCoy "designed to exonerate from slavery
every one bound to him by that time."4 " Brockenbrough refused to
apply Maria for "it seems to me, that the right of the child to
freedom is identical and contemporaneous with that of the mother;
and that when Mrs. Crouch died, eo instanti the will of M'Coy
operated to confer freedom on both."4 " There, thus, was Brockenbrough sounding almost exactly like Roane, dissenting in Pleasants,
or Tucker pare, being libertarian in vain in Woodley v. Abby, thirty
years later. Dare we say, good old Brockenbrough-and good older
Cabell-for, lo and behold, Cabell agreed, and the astonishing-and
certainly not neutral-result was that neither heir got the slaves.
Despite the fact that the slaves were not party to the suit, the court
held that they should receive their freedom.
The next case suggested that the court might sail off on an
extended libertarian tack. Parks v. Hewlett,1" inverting a rule laid
down in Brooke's Maria concurrence, 0 ' reached a position hardly
495. Erskine v. Henry, 37 Va. (9 Leigh) 188 (1838).
496. They were Tucker, Brockenbrough, and Cabell. Francis Brooke was ill and took
no part in the decision, and Carr's successor, Richard Parker, disqualified himself since he
had rendered the lower court decision just before his promotion.
497. 37 Va. (9 Leigh) at 198.
498. Id. at 197.
499. Id. at 193.
500. 37 Va. (9 Leigh) 511 (1838).
501. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245-46 (Brooke, J., concurring).
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redolent with Maria's solicitousness for property rights. Tucker asserted that the obverse of Brooke's rule holding the interim child
born to bondage "in exclusion of any future right to liberty"5 02 was
that any child born after the grant was due to take effect went free
50
"in exclusion of any future obligation to servitude."e
This sounded
reasonable on its face. The conclusion which Tucker drew from it,
however, was dubious-that such a child could not be hired out to
pay off estate debts. Thus while the mother would have been liable,
the child was not. Since the mother was dead, the debts went unpaid. Again the 1830's court, if anything, expanded upon a profreedom past.
Following on Elder, Erskine, and Parks, Crawford v. Moses"'4
accordingly comes as a surprise. Crawford's will freed certain slaves
at the age of twenty-one and further provided that their interim
children should go free at the same age. Fairly clearly the testator
was trying to avoid the Maria result. Yet the court believed the
testator had made a fatal slip. Because he had not set the children
free at the same time as their mothers, the grandchildren born while
the children were under twenty-one fell under the Maria rule.
What was going on? Had the judges suddenly repented their
leftward tack and jibed sharply towards pro-slavery? The opinion
of Brockenbrough's successor, Robert Stanard, indicates a qualified
negative response. 5 Something less, but still something, had happened. In appointing Stanard the legislature had selected a judge
who believed in the passive virtues. Personally he had doubts about
Maria: "[M]y judgment has never been convinced of the correctness of the decision . . . ."1o1 He felt judicially bound, however, by
its authority. In voting against freedom Stanard apparently ran his
personal principles aground on the shoals of judicial deference to
precedent. I suspect that Brockenbrough would not have been so
deferential. What of the other judges? Were they also personally
unhappy with the Maria decision, but not quite willing to overrule
it directly? The correct answer appears to be yes-with one exception. Between 1839 and 1849 all the judges except Brooke were
unanimous concerning the extent to which they would undercut
Maria. Maria'srule would hold only if the testator had freed fewer
than all of his slaves-if, in other words, his bequest was to favorites.50 When he manifested an intention to grant liberty to all his
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
57 (1842).

37 Va. (9 Leigh) at 525.
Id.
37 Va. (10 Leigh) 277 (1839).
Brockenbrough died December 10, 1838.
37 Va. (10 Leigh) at 283.
E.g., Ellis v. Jenny, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 623 (1844); Henry v. Bradford, 40 Va. (1 Rob.)
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slaves, Maria was not to apply. 5 This narrowing of the Mariarule
was applied even to a set of facts that at first glance closely resembled Crawford v. Moses.50' In Anderson's Executors v. Anderson 10
proof that the testator had intended "not to. dispose of any of the
slaves as slaves, but to emancipate all"51' secured the freedom of the
original slaves' grandchildren.
Only Francis Brooke disagreed. He had two quarrels with the
court majority. First, he did not perceive any merit in the distinction that his brethren made in order to free Anderson's slaves' descendants. The four-man majority insisted that the Anderson will
opened two avenues to freedom-one, via inheritance from the
mother's prospective right to freedom at the slave's birth; and two,
via the phrase "all my slaves." Maria, the majority declared, only
closed the first. In Brooke's view the distinction was bogus, and
Maria should apply. Brooke's second problem was that Erskine-on
which his brethren relied-had been decided by a bare three-man
court.5 21 Had he not been ill at the time, he intimated, matters
might have been different. He himself would never have agreed to
Erskine's undercutting of Maria. As far as he was concerned, the
court was making bad law.
In one respect Brooke perhaps was right. Maria,for all its continental conservatism, at least had the virtue of relative certainty:
only slaves mentioned by a testator went free. 513 Even Tucker admitted that legislative policy did not seem to favor future bequests.
Furthermore, the Tucker court's efforts to limit Maria undeniably
produced inclarity in the law. A master of the early 1840's who
wanted to free his slaves but who wished first to protect his wife's
comfort after he died, had to be very careful in drawing up his will.
If he wished to have his slaves raised under the protection of the
plantation, and free them at maturity, their descendents would
likely end up in bondage. If judicial decisions should inform the
citizen how to accomplish a legal end, the court was making poor
law.
508. E.g., Lucy v. Cheminant's Adm'rs, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 36 (1845); Anderson's Ex'rs
v. Anderson, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 646 (1841). The distinction between a general intent to free
that yields freedom for the increase, and a specific intent with respect to favorites that does
not, can be argued two ways. On the one hand one can say, "Yes, if the master wanted to
free the favored slaves' increase, why did he not say so?" On the other hand one can say,
"Surely he would have wanted the progeny of his favorites, for the sake of their feelings, to
go free." No completely satisfactory solution exists.
509. 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 277 (1839).
510. 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 646 (1841).
511. Id. at 653.
512. See note 496 supra.
513. If a testator sought to create a perpetuity-as by establishing that each generation
was to go free at a certain age-then like any other estate perpetuity it would be void.
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Ultimately the Virginia legislators had to bail out the judges.
The 1849 legislature took what, from a "concert of defense" standpoint, was a curiously humanitarian step. It passed a law providing
that after July 1, 1850, all children would go free simultaneously
with their mothers. 14
(4) North Carolina's and Tennessee's Alternate Solutions to Maria
Could the Tucker court in the Maria chain of cases have taken
a less confusing path? From a doctrinal standpoint, the answer
clearly is yes. Two paths were possible. The first would have been
to stick rigidly by the Maria position. That, indeed, was what the
Ruffin court of North Carolina did. In December 1842, confronted
by statu liberi, Chief Justice Ruffin adopted the position of the 1824
Virginia court.515 Ruffin cited Green's opinion at length and concluded that it would "be generally looked to, as the leading and
most authoritative one upon this point,"" ignoring the fact it already was losing its authority "at home." Ruffin observed that
"[t]here is a natural inclination in the bosom of every Judge to
favor the side of freedom . . . .1" Nonetheless, not only the Virginia court but also the Kentucky, Louisiana, and Maryland
benches had assumed the restrictive Maria position.5 18 Even the
United States Supreme Court adopted Mariain 1834.19 The judges'
personal inclinations might be violated but Ruffin and his brethren
could console themselves: "[T]he sentence is not ours but that of
the law, whose ministers only we are." 20 Ruffin's statement sounds
like something from the book of northern judges who, though personally opposed to slavery, took refuge in ascribing responsibility
elsewhere. But Ruffin's views-and this point is overlooked by most
historians-shifted to out-and-out pro-slavery by the middle 1850's.
This statement may simply reflect the shift in process.
A second possibility for the Virginia court would have been to
reject Maria outright and to accomplish immediately what the 1849
statute eventually did. The Supreme Court of Tennessee took just
this step.5 1 Confronted with a claim by a slave freed at twenty-five
514. See An Act making appropriations for the removal of free persons of color, and for
other purposes, ch. 6, § 2, 1849 Va. Laws 7 (1850).
515. Mayho v. Sears, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 224 (1842).
516. Id. at 228.
517. Id. at 226.
518. See, e.g., Ned v. Beal, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 298 (1811); Frank v. Milam's Ex'r, 4 Ky. (1
Bibb) 615 (1809); Catin v. D'Orgenoy's Heirs, 2 La. 59, 8 Mart. (n. s.) 218 (1820); Chew v.
Gary, 10 Md. 431, 6 H. & J. 526 (1824).
519. McCutchen v. Marshall, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 139 (1834).
520. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) at 232.
521. Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 153 (1834).
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that her three interim-children should also be manumitted, future
United States Supreme Court Justice John Catron discounted the
would-be heirs' arguments. The heirs, represented by the attorney
general of Tennessee, argued that Justinian's Institutes and the
precedents of Kentucky, Louisiana, Virginia, and Maryland all applied to their situation.2 Since the mother had been freed under the
provisions of a Maryland will, the heirs believed Maryland precedent in particular applied. Catron accepted none of the attorney
general's arguments. Speaking also for two other judges, Robert
Whyte and Jacob Peck, Catron dismissed one Kentucky precedent
summarily: "With the reasons for this decision we are not satisfied."52s The tone is like Lumpkin's, but the result exactly the opposite. Furthermore, Catron rejected the contention that civil law
based on the Justinian Code would deny the interim-children their
freedom.** And, of Maria, Catron declared: "It is a most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in prejudice of human liberty,
and is in conflict with the opinions of Chancellor Wythe and Judge
Roane, in the cause of Pleasants v. Pleasants."*2* Finally, said Catron, the Maryland case should not apply because under Maryland
law "issue" was not "an accessory" but rather "a part of the use." 26
In Tennessee, as in North Carolina, the reverse was the rule. This
observation was true enough, but it did not describe the whole truth.
First, the distinction would not convince the North Carolina court.
Second, and more important, Tennessee and North Carolina estate
laws were paralleled in this respect by Virginia's.
On balance, the decision in Harrisv. Clarissaseems at least as
"prejudiced" in favor of "human liberty" as Mariawas against. Yet
the Supreme Court of Tennessee followed Clarissaeven after three
of the four pre-1830 appointees were replaced by successors elected
during the "Decade of Reaction." 5 27 Indeed, by 184 2 121 the lone
doubter in Clarissahad changed his mind.529
522. See note 518 supra and accompanying text.
523. 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) at 163.
524. Id. at 162-63.
525. Id. at 163.
526. That is to say, in a case in which a life tenure was given to one person and the
property in slaves or other chattels to another upon the death of the first, the heirs of the life
tenant received any interim children.
527. See Table XI infra.
528. In 1842 the question was presented again in Hartsell v. George, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.)
243 (1842).
529. Judge Nathan Green joined the majority in Hartsell.
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(5) The Distribution of Virginia Judicial Behavior and Attitudes,
1831-1849
The failure of the Virginia judges to hew out as libertarian a
jurisprudence in settling the Maria difficulty as did the Tennessee
court suggests several generalizations about the relationship between Virginia jurisprudential behavior and the personal attitudes
of its judges. First, it may show that the judges' expressions of
discomfort were matters of appearance rather than reality. If they
were genuinely unhappy with Maria, why did they not overrule it?
Perhaps they merely made enlightened announcements about, for
instance, the Massachusetts Bill of Rights in order to confuse Yankees. The strength of this interpretation-because of its logical selfenclosure-is that it does not admit of refutation. Ultimately, however, one is forced to choose between this interpretation and others
that order the data differently.
Comparison with the North Carolina Taylor court's handling
of post-mortem manumissions suggests a second possibilitydeference to legislative intent. Such a view might urge that the
equivalents of the North Carolina Acts of 1741 and 1778 were found
by the Virginia bench in the Virginia Statutes of 1805 and 1819.
Whatever the initial validity of the 1799 Pleasantsdecision, its restrictiveness fit well with legislative attitudes less than a decade
later. Certainly this view is not without its attractions, yet it has an
air of incompleteness about it. It leaves something unexplained-the qualifications placed on Maria by the decisions of the
1830's and 1840's, as well as Tucker court decisions on other manumission issues.
A third explanation offers a more satisfying solution. Such an
alternative would accept as prima facie genuine both the judges'
expressions of uneasiness and the existence of a gap between their
private views and their decisionmaking. While not altogether discounting the restraining effects of perceived legislative intent, it
would argue that the Virginia judges tended to stress more the similar effect of precedent even when they did not much care for the
precedent's rationale. This theory would accept as true not merely
that the Tucker court's conception of proper deference to past adjudications limited liberal behavior despite the appearance of liberal
attitudes, but also that the specific continental ideological base of
Marialimited liberality and produced discomfort. On this showing,
the Tucker court majority was caught in the Maria tangle between,
and frustrated by, the conflict of two values-procedural selfrestraint and pro-freedom results.
The advantage of this explanation-besides the fact that it does
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not require minimizing either judicial dicta or the shifts from
Maria's strictness that did occur-is that it makes more understandable the Tucker court's discontinuity of behavior among different areas of manumission jurisprudence. Assuming as it does that
tensions and ambivalences engender discontinuity, this theory does
not have to smooth over quite so much the rough edges of apparently
divergent decisions-a problem for other explanations whether they
attempt to minimize pro-freedom or anti-freedom loose ends of the
Virginia court's slavery decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, a potential difficulty with this explanation exists.
It requires some demonstration that the judicial attitudes were not
those which a "concert of defense" theory would anticipate. It also
requires a showing that the judges of the 1830's were at least as
liberal in personal attitudes toward slavery as their predecessors.
Although the evidence is not as abundant as one might wish, it
seems sufficient to conclude that this third alternative is tenable,
because the connection between behavior and attitude is relatively
easy to establish. Since Virginia legislation during the period tightened the restrictions on slavery, it is likely that whatever liberal
decisions were made stemmed in considerable part from personal
views.
What, then, appear to have been the shifts in judicial behavior
between 1831 and the legislative solution to Maria in 1849? An
examination of the post-1831 positions of each judge answers that
question.
Until 1831 Dabney Carr was the judge who-with the notable
exception of his position in Baugh, the "Indian ancestry hearsay"
case-appeared the most inclined to pro-freedom decisionmaking.
After 1831, he refused in Rucker's Administrator v. Gilbert to sustain the slave's request that the court transpose quasi-emancipation
into liberty "at the North."3 ' That refusal and his Baugh position
suggest that one would be more correct in describing him as a partial rather than an out-and-out pro-manumission judicial activist.
Similarly indicative is his. regretful refusal to allow damages for
wrongful detention.53 1 Furthermore, there is other evidence that his
attitude was not pro-slavery and that his judicial behavior was neither that nor neutralist-besides his pre-1831 minority positions,
the very regretfulness of his position on damages, and his delimitation of the Maria rule in Elder.532
530. Rucker's Adm'r v. Gilbert, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 8 (1831).
531. Paup v. Mingo, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 163, 176 (1833).
532. Elder v. Elder's Ex'r, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252, 256 (1833); see note 471 supra.
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John Green's death in 1834 deprives us of substantial post-1831
evidence of his views. Yet the evidence that exists-his tendency to
agree with Carr, balanced against his Mariaopinion and his majority stance in Walthall-arguefor his characterization as personally
lukewarm toward slavery but not always as a successful neutralist
practitioner.
The position of William Cabell is more complex. On the one
side, he concurred in Maria, Thrift, and Walthall, and refused damages in Paup'sAdministrator.Moreover, his refusal contained nothing of Carr's reluctant tone. On the other side one must balance his
approval in Elder of Green's Isaac dictum, his participation in the
narrowing of Maria in Emory v. Henry, and his agreement in Betty
v. Horton that the Massachusetts Constitution freed a Virginia
slave. Additionally, he was willing to accept presumptions in favor
of liberty that: (1) a below-market sale price indicated a conveyance
in order to free after a term of years;s* and (2) a testator was not
legally insane.'u
What of Francis Taliaferro Brooke? If any of the judges appointed before 1830 were keen proponents of the peculiar institution, it was surely he. Yet even the evidence supporting this view is
slight. Because of the value he generally placed on judicial selfrestraint and neutrality, it consists largely and not irrefutably in his
Baugh dissent concerning the lis mota doctrine's applicability, in
his desire to void all oral manumissions, in his DeLacey dissent, and
in his objections to liberalizing Maria.Had his illness not kept him
from the cases limiting Maria and Thrift, analysts would be in a
better position to judge him. As it is, certainty is clouded by the fact
that his neutrality usually, though not always, happened to reach a
pro-slavery result. 3 1
533. 14icholas v. Burruss, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 289 (1833) (concurring with Tucker and Carr,
JJ.) (Brooke and Green, JJ. were absent).
534. Coalter's Ex'r v. Bryan, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 18 (1844). Coalter'sEx'r v. Bryan was a
ticklish case in that it required the court to determine exactly when Tucker's peppery Jeffersonian half-brother, John Randolph of Roanoke, had gone insane-if indeed he had. Strongly
opposed to slavery in early life, Randolph, who owned roughly four hundred slaves, had
become anti-abolition by the time of the Missouri Compromise-at least on the level of
federal action. Nonetheless he had freed his slaves in a will drawn up in 1821 and in codicils
of 1826 and 1831. In 1832, about a year before his death, he wrote a will revoking his slaves'
emancipation and changing the executor. After his death the original executor, Bishop Meade
of Virginia, sought enforcement of the emancipation, arguing that Randolph had gone mad
prior to drafting the final codicil. The court concluded that Randolph had been compos
mentis in 1821, 1826, and 1831 but-very luckily for the slaves-not in 1832. Cabell was not
forced to agree: he could have pointed to the fact that Randolph was capable of running for
reelection to Congress in 1832 and denouncing Jackson with his old buoyant irascibility in
early 1833. Two judges did not sit: Brooke (a relative) and Stanard (a former counsel).
535. But see Henry v. Boller, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 19 (1836) (Cabell, J., absent) (holding a
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The four appointees of the 1830's probably were at least as
liberal as their predecessors. Tucker, who initially showed signs of
following Brooke's lead, shifted by the middle 1830's toward the
libertarianism of Brockenbrough and Carr."' Tucker's liberalism
probably peaked just after the first Erskine case in February 1836.111
At that time the court refused to curtail Maria.By 1838, Tucker had
become "deeply regretful" of that refusal.' Furthermore, in the fall
of 1836, four justices-Tucker, Carr, Brockenbrough and CabelP"-refused to extend Thrift's 1830 rule that an unproved deed
was void. In Thrift, marriage had intervened. In Manns v. Givens,"'
the master died suddenly after drafting the deed. Thrift's rule had
been announced in general terms, but the court in Manns proceeded
to create a distinction between the effects of marriage and of death.
All four judges present agreed on the distinction, but Tucker went
further than he needed to free the slaves, commenting on the liberalizing Act of 1782 and ascribing it to the "best and wisest" of the
Revolutionary generation."' Having delivered himself of these sentiments, Tucker went yet one step further. He announced his disapproval of Thrift and asserted point-blank that he would have voted
with Carr and Green. 42
This pronouncement is particularly helpful to an interpretation
perceiving gaps between decisional behavior and personal attitude,
and between pre-1830 and post-1830 judicial attitudes. First, by
manumitting testator compo8 mentis, though denying profits during detention).
536. Of course Tucker was never as pro-slavery as his brother Beverley, or even as
ambivalent as his half-brother, John Randolph, became. Although Randolph moved from
active support of African colonization schemes in the 1810's to rejection in the middle 1820's,
see R. KimK, RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 131 (1951), quoting the letter from John Randolph to John
Brockenbrough (January 30, 1826), Tucker approved of the African Colonization Society's
aims throughout the 1830's and apparently until his death in 1848. This approval was evident
in his Elder opinion of 1833. Six years later his attitude led him to take an activist stance to
uphold a will sending slaves to Liberia. Maund's Adm'r v. M'Phail, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 199
(1839). The will was very vague, naming as taker the agent of the "new colonization society
in Africa," one "J.M." Tucker, however, allowed the introduction of parol evidence to prove
that a former agent of the African Colonization Society, one John M'Phail, was the "J.M."
designated to take the Negroes personally and send them to West Africa. The proof consisted
largely in the testimony of the Norfolk Herald's editor that M'Phail had advertised himself
as such in the paper between November 1827 and September 1833. It does not require much
speculation to determine what the Georgia court would have thought of Tucker's decisionmaking on this issue.
537. An alternative and perhaps more plausible reading would see less of a shift, or date
it back at least to Elder and Betty in 1833, and ascribe "first Erskine" to a mistake.
538. Erskine v. Henry, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 188, 193 (1838). See text accompanying notes
493-98 supra.
539. Brooke was absent from Manns v. Givens, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 689 (1836), as well.
540. 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 689 (1836).
541. Id. at 709.
542. Id. at 708.
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distinguishing rather than overruling Thrift, Manns intimated a
judicial deference similar to the Tucker court's handling of Maria.
Second, inasmuch as Brockenbrough's opinion" displayed a similar
dislike of Thrift whereas Cabell's5 " rests solely on the distinction,
it strongly implies that all of the first three post-1824 appointees
were more liberal than their predecessors.15 Had Thrift appeared six
years later than it did, in 1836 rather than in 1830, the slaves in the
case would have gone free because Tucker, Brockenbrough, and
Carr would have formed a three-man majority.
What of the two other judges appointed during the
1830's-Richard E. Parker (1837-1840) and Robert Stanard (18391846)? Because Parker died after only three years on the bench,
little information exists that helps to define his position. He never
dissented from a slavery decision. The only indication that suggests
he was less inclined to find for freedom than his colleagues of the
1830's is his lower court decision in the second Erskine suit,", and
it may be that as an inferior court judge he undertook simply to
apply Maria. It is impossible to be sure.
Robert Stanard clearly belongs at least as far on the profreedom side as Tucker, and was perhaps as far over as Brockenbrough. Both his express lack of faith in the correctness of Maria",
and his cohesion with the Tucker-led majority of 1841, which defended Erskine's limitation of Maria against Brooke's counter4 suggest the correctness of this characterization. A third
attack,"
piece of evidence, however, justifies placing him further left than
any of his contemporaries. In. Crawford v. Moses' Stanard made an
obiter suggestion beyond anything to which Tucker would agree:
that the court consider excepting manumission bequests from the
general rule against perpetuities.5 0 Had the court ever taken his
advice, the slaveowner would have been able to do what Maria
prevented. He could have provided that each future generation of
slaves go free when they reached twenty-one (or any age, for that
matter). An individual "plan of gradual abolition" would then have
been possible, with each child brought up "properly" on the plantation. The political likelihood of such a result is irrelevant. It would
543. Id. at 696.
544. Id. at 706.
545. See Table X supra.
546. See notes 493-98 supra and accompanying text.
547. See Crawford v. Moses, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 277, 283 (1839). See also text accompanying notes 505-06 supra.
548. See text accompanying note 512 supra.
549. 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 277 (1839).
550. Id. at 284.
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probably have created innumerable difficulties-and certainly irregularities-in property law. The point is that Stanard's suggestion
was surely not that of a fire-eating slavery enthusiast, or even that
of one as concerned about symmetry between the law of slavery and
other related jurisprudential domains as Carr had been eight years
earlier in Baugh.Pl"

Only three new judges were appointed during the 1840's: John
J. Allen (1840-1865), Briscoe L. Baldwin (1843-1851), and William
Daniel (1846-1865). Allen, who replaced Parker, apparently shifted
from an originally neutralist, perhaps covertly pro-slavery, position
to an activist pro-slavery one during the 1850's.552 During the early
1840's, however, his decisionmaking was indistinguishable from
Tucker's. Similarly, Baldwin, who filled the vacancy created by
Tucker's resignation in 1842 to become law professor at the University of Virginia," followed the court majority. Actually the Virginia
court made no pathbreaking decisions during the 1840's. No good
opportunities for so doing were presented to it. That decade, unlike
both its predecessor and its successor, saw little jurisprudential activity on the Virginia bench in relation to slavery. The cases are so
few that all one can surmise is that two judges elected during the
1840's were not at the time of their election far to the antimanumission right. The most helpful index to their views is, curiously enough, found in a brief discussion of the 1849 law overruling
Maria by the compiler of a digest of Virginia statutes published in
1857: "This section is designed to annul . . . Maria v. Surbaugh.

That decision has since been adhered to, though it is not believed
that any court since would have made the decision. If the policy of
emancipation be sound, consistency with that policy requires"",
that the children of freed slaves be liberated with their mothers. As
we shall see later, there is good reason to think that William Daniel,
the last appointee of the 1840's, was an exception to this generalization.
To conclude, the interpretation that seems most readily capable of explaining Virginia judicial behavior is that which perceives
two salient characteristics: first, a disjunction between personal attitudes toward manumission and behavior in some particular decisions-a disjunction caused primarily by judicial self-restraint; and
551. Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665 (1831). See text accompanying notes 42426 supra.
552. See notes 633-42 infra and accompanying text.
553. Cabell succeeded Tucker as President of the Virginia court.
554. Matthew's Digest 738, quoted in 1 H. CArrBRAu,, supranote 14, at 75 n.160. It is
interesting to find a southern codifier such as Matthews regarding the wisdom of emancipation as an open question in the late 1850's.
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second, a shift in a liberal direction during the 1830's. The occasional incongruities of the Tucker court's shaping of the law of slavery are best accounted for by assuming a slight degree of tension
between the ideal of judicial modesty and ideas about liberty. Finally, during the 1820's the court seemed more dominated by a
purist neutrality than during the 1830's, when it inclined to promanumission jurisprudence. Never, however, did it reach and maintain the position of activist libertarianism evidenced in the decisions of the Tennessee court.
(6) Precedent and the Tennessee Court to 1835
Eleven men sat on the Tennessee Supreme Court between 1831
and 1860. As Table XI shows,"5 ' the court enjoyed a fairly high
555. John Catron: born Pennsylvania but moved to Virginia when young; 1778-1865;
admitted to the Tennessee bar in 1815; on the Tennessee court 1824-1836; Van Buren's first
appointment to the United States Supreme Court (1837-1865). Catron was a very strong
Jackson supporter and active in his behalf while on the Tennessee bench. See, e.g., letter from
John Catron to Andrew Jackson (Jan. 2, 1833) (confidential) (in the John Catron Papers,
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Accession No. 97). The letter reported the results of
a Nashville meeting engineered by Catron and others to ensure that Tennessee public opinion
came down solidly against South Carolina in the Nullification controversy:
[i]t is deemed of the utmost importance that . . . public opinion should be fixed on
the side of the Union party, so that if it comes to open rebellion, a force can be readily
commanded by the Federal government, so very large as to deter resistance at the onset
. . . . If we are to have a civil war in S.C., I wish to see . . . overwhelming military
force at once brought out to suppress the rebellion.
Catron then asks Jackson to inform him through an intermediary "[s]hould I be in any
respect mistaken as to the views of the Executive [Jackson] . . . it is . . . of importance

that the advocates of the measures of the government should not misunderstand it, in reference to this particular transaction." See also letter from John Catron to Martin Van Buren
(December 12, 1835) (in the John Catron Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives,
Accession No. 97) (describing his efforts to present a Tennessee Cherokee case to the United
States Supreme Court so that the Jackson position rather than the Marshall-Story one would
win out, and apparently encouraging the Vice President's ambition to succeed Jackson);
letter from John Catron (from Washington) to Andrew Jackson (then retired in Tennessee)
(February 5, 1838) (in the John Catron Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Accession No. 97). The latter letter is interesting for its laudatory view of Taney, its assertion that
being on the United States Supreme Court presented "few of the difficulties I had apprehended; the legal questions . . . depend more on common sense than any deep legal knowledge;" and finding
political tendencies . . . just as strong . . . as they are in any other department of the
Government. . . . Division is just as natural and almost as common, as in the Senate,
and why it escaped the West, they needed no representationhere, is most strange: I
would as soon think of having no Senators in Congress, and we must have more Judges.
Of this anon.
Nathan Green: Virginia; 1792-1866; moved about 1816 to Tennessee; probably no college;
Jacksonian but became Whig; state senate 1827; defeated for Confederate Congress; pro"internal improvements;" Unionist; Presbyterian.
William Turley: born Virginia; 1800-1851; moved about 1808 to Tennessee; Cumberland
College; Mason.
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degree of continuity. For a quarter of a century after 1835 two of the
three seats were filled by only four judges,56 all of whom except
Robert McKinney were Whigs. With the fitful assistance of the
occupants of the third seat, these judges created what in absolute
terms formed the most generous emancipatory jurisprudence of any
southern court.5 11
William B. Reese: born Tennessee; 1793-1859; went to college but not known where;
Whig, lost in race against Bell for Whig senatorial nomination; "high morals" but no church
mentioned; president East Tennessee University, 1850; "the most scholarly of all the Supreme Judges of Tennessee, except perhaps, John Haywood." J. Cisco, "Public Men of
Tennessee" (1907) (unpublished biographical sketches, manuscript section, Tennessee State
Library and Archives).
Robert J. McKinney: born Ireland; 1803-1875; immigrated to Tennessee at age 6; part
way through college; Democrat; Unionist, one of ten county representatives to vote against
slavery at 1834 constitutional convention; peace commissioner in 1861; Presbyterian.
A.W.O. Totten: born Tennessee, 1809-1867; Secessionist.
Robert Caruthers: born Tennessee; 1800-1882; one year at Cumberland College (according to one source), at Columbia College or Washington College (according to another); newspaper editor, 1827-1832; married Jackson's niece; Jacksonian but became Whig before 1840;
Congressman 1841; declined reelection; Clay elector in 1844; considered for Whig gubernatorial nomination in 1851; Unionist; peace commissioner in 1861; elected governor in 1863 but
never took office because of occupation of state by Union Army; Presbyterian; Temperance.
William Harris: born Tennessee; 1803-1858; killed when steam boat blew up (one of his
predecessors, Turley, killed by impaling himself on his own walking stick-therefore, clearly
a jinxed seat); Democrat (his brother was governor); Presbyterian.
Archibald Wright: born Tennessee; 1809-(?); Democrat; early and zealous Secessionist.
See generally W. BONE, A HISTORY OF THE CUMBERLAND UNIVERSITY (1836); J. CALDWELL,
SKETcHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF TENNESSEE (1898); J. GREEN, LIVES OF THE JUDGES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, 1796-1947 (1947); W. SPEER, SKETCHES OF PROMINENT
TENNESSEANS (2 vols.) (1888).
556. The first seat was occupied by Nathan Green (1831-1852) and Robert Caruthers
(1852-1860), and the second by William Reese (1836-1847) and Robert McKinney (1847-1861).
557. A relativist may argue that they were not quite as libertarian as some of their
Mississippi and South Carolina colleagues, both because their statutory starting points were
more favorable to liberality and because, unlike the Mississippi and South Carolina judges,
they never outraged the legislature by their decisionmaking. Laws enacted in North Carolina
prior to her cessation of Tennessee continued in force in the new state except as modified by
its legislature. Most of the lacunae left in the North Carolina Negro Code were filled during
the early nineteenth century. Tennessee legislative activity was far less constant of purpose.
Reading and writing were never proscribed for slaves, and the legislators never seemed able
to stick to one point of view about manumission. In 1831 they declared that all slaves manu-

mitted in futuro would have to leave the state. Act of Dec. 16, 1831, ch. 102, § 2, 1831 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, reprinted in A COMPILATION OF THE STATUTES OF TENNESSEE OF A GENERAL AND
PERMANENT NATURE 279 (Caruthers & Nicholson eds. 1836) [hereinafter cited as CARUTHERS
& NICHOLSON]. But in 1833 they excepted "any slave, or slaves, who had bona fide contracted
for his, her or their freedom, previous to the passage of said act" and "all cases of emancipation . . . by persons who died previous to . . . 1831." Act of Nov. 23, 1833, ch. 81, 1833 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, reprinted in CARUTHERS & NICHOLSON, supra, at 279. In the same session the

legislature passed a law, Act of Nov. 26, 1833, ch. 64, 1833 Tenn. Pub. Acts, cited in C.
MOONEY, SLAVERY INTENNESSEE 75 (1957), designed "to aid the colonization society" by giving
it $10.00 for each Negro removed from Tennessee to Africa-a sum more substantial than it
seems, amounting, according to the American Colonization Society, to about 50% of the ocean
transportation cost. AMERICAN COLONIZATION SoCIETY, A FEW FACTS RESPECTING THE AMERICAN
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TABLE XI
TENNESSEE JUDGES 1831-1860

Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Nathan Green
Robert Caruthers
Robert Carathers
Robert Caruthers

1858

John Catron
John Catron
John Catron
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
William Turley
A.W.O. Totten
A.W.O. Totten
A.W.O. Totten
A.W.O. Totten
A.W.O. Totten
William Harris
William Harris
William Harris
Archibald Wright

1859
1860

Archibald Wright
Archibald Wright

Robert Caruthers
Robert Caruthers

1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837

1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847

1848
1849
1850
1851

1852
1853

1854
1855
1856
1857

Robert Caruthers
Robert Caruthers
Robert Caruthers
Robert Caruthers

Jacob Peck
Jacob Peck
Jacob Peck
William B. Reese
William B. Reese
William B. Reese

Robert Whyte
Robert Whyte
Robert Whyte
(seat vacated
and court

William B. Reese

three seats)

William
William
William
William
William

B.
B.
B.
B.
B.

reduced to

Reese
Reese
Reese
Reese
Reese

William B. Reese
William B. Reese
William B. Reese
William B. Reese
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. MeKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney
Robert J. McKinney

Pre-1835 judicial precedent favored liberality on three
counts-its procedural bent for judicial activism, its substantive
opting for common law rather than civil theories of slavery, and its
ambiguous estimate of the peculiar institution as a social order.
COLONIZATION SOCIETY AND THE COLONY AT LIBERIA 9 (1830). I assume the accommodations were
not exactly first class. In 1842 the legislature further exempted legally emancipated slaves
who had not left the state and free blacks who had migrated to Tennessee prior to January

1836 on condition that they satisfy the courts of their good character. Act of Feb. 4, 1842, ch.
191, § 1, 1841-1842 Tenn. Pub. Acts, reprinted in STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
OF A GENERAL CHARACTER 16 (Nicholson ed. 1848). In 1849 the legislators reverted to their 1831
position. Act of Dec. 31, 1849, ch. 107, 1849-1850 Tenn. Pub. Acts. But in 1854 they qualified
it once more by allowing elderly or unrobust Negroes to remain in the state after manumis-

sion-a position which was in one respect more lax than the position taken by some other
states much earlier-for example, South Carolina in 1800. Act of Feb. 24, 1854, ch. 50, 18531854 Tenn. Pub. Acts. The South Carolina law prevented masters from freeing such Negroes
at all. However, note a possible quite different, "paternalist" reading, of the two statutes.
That is, one could say that South Carolina law was humane in preventing unprincipled
masters from discharging aged slaves "onto the streets," whereas Tennessee, more "raw
capitalist," permitted this. From what I know of the two states' legislative and popular
climates of opinion, however, I do not credit this view with much substance.
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First, judicial activism on the pre-1835 court was high. Of the four
leading pre-1835 judges-John Haywood, Jacob Peck, Robert
Whyte, and John Catron-only Catron seemed to value judicial
modesty when it collided with substantive justice. A criminal law
example is especially telling on this point. In Bob v. State"' a slave
sentenced to death in 1826 asked the supreme court to grant certiorari although an intermediate appellate judge had refused to do so.
John Catron perceived three serious flaws in Bob's conviction.
First, "I would say that in the course of a life of some considerable
experience in criminal prosecutions, I have never known any person
convicted of a crime, upon evidence so slight. . . ."'" Second, Bob

had been subjected to three trials because of the first jury's inability
to reach a verdict and the second jury's failure to appear. Third, the
second and third trials had been convened by four justices of the
peace rather than the legally proper three. To Catron the procedure
was "as highly criminal as any society can institute."1o0 Yet as much
as he objected to the procedure, the future United States Supreme
Court Justice did not feel he could grant an appeal. The relevant
statute of 1811 declared that "either party in any suit . . . depending in any of the circuit courts . . . may . . . pray an appeal.""' The

circuit court judge's refusal to grant a writ meant that the case was
still in the lower court. In Catron's view the statute did not allow
the supreme court to act so early.
The other two justices, however, refused to be constrained by
such a legislative limitation on appellate judicial power, and
granted his appeal only one day before he was to be executed. The
two justices saw red at the recalcitrance of the circuit judge. Jacob
Peck stated flatly: "Color, rank or situationcan make no difference:
even the slave has such rights as the statutes of the country have
afforded him."" 2 The circuit court judge might have discretion to
grant appeals, yet his "[d]iscretion must not be arbitrary . . . .

Peck's gargantuan 350-pound colleague John Haywood6 " agreed:
558. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 155 (1826) (known as Bob's Case).
559. Id. at 171.
560. Id. at 170.
561. Id. at 168 (quoting ch. 72, § 11, 1811 Tenn. Pub. Acts, reprintedin CARUTHERS &
NIcHoLsoN, supra note 557, at 93).
562. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
563. Id. at 165.
564. North Carolina-born, a Tarheel Conference judge from 1794 to 1801, and in 1826
sitting for his fifteenth and final year on the Tennessee bench, Haywood was a man with at
least four pronounced characteristics-wit, political activism, atrocious penmanship, and
obesity. On one occasion, sitting on the Tennessee bench, he challenged an attorney for his
authority on a point in the law. The attorney replied with a smile, "[A]n eminent judge of
North Carolina, Judge Haywood." Dead-pan, Haywood countered, "Yes, . . . I knew that
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Shall it be said that a human being shall be condemned to death by a wrongful
sentence, and that there is no power residing in the law to rescue him from it?
Does the law delight in cruelty? Will it inflict punishment where it is not
deserved? Will it give no power to avoid the unjust sentence?"'

To Catron's neutralist objection that the discretion to permit
an appeal unfortunately was vested by statute in the circuit judge,
Haywood offered a reply much like Peck's. The discretion, according to Haywood, was "[n]ot an arbitrary one, to do as he pleases;
but to discover by the right rule of law what is right, and so do that.
If he does otherwise, his unrighteous discretion shall be purified
. . ."I'

Embarking on righteous purification not only of the cir-

cuit judge's arbitrariness but also of the statute, Haywood bolstered
his emotions with precedential authority. Asking if the court could
interfere, he observed, "[tihe subject is discussed in Peck's Reports, 337, 338; and the opinion thereupon given is, in my judgment,
a correct one." 67
The pre-1835 court unanimously took a liberal position concerning the applicability of common law versus civil law to slavery.
In the 1829 case of Fields v. State,"' judges Whyte and Peck adopted
young man. He was put on the bench of North Carolina when he was quite young and he
made many mistakes. Judge Haywood of Tennessee overrules Judge Haywood of North Carolina." J. GREEN, supra note 555, at 67. For an example of his political activism and atrocious
penmanship, see undated letter from John Haywood to Judge Robert Whyte (located in the
Robert Whyte Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Accession No. 141, Box No. 2,
Folder No. 11, Item No. 2) (encouraging Whyte's ambition for office).
565. 10 Tenn. at 158-59. He continued in sentences that, notwithstanding any doubts
that dismal Whigs may have, look to me like a bit more than a ritualistic invocation of
considerations of humanity:
Then where is the justice of the law, and where is its boasted humanity? And for what
good and purpose is it, that the arm of the law should be lengthened to strike the fatal
blow, but made too short to save an unfortunate victim who is unjustly doomed to suffer?
It is enough to ask the question, and every heart will respond that it should not be so.
Id. at 159.
566. Id. at 160-61.
567. Id. at 160. That he should judge correct the court's discussion of discretionary
appeals in Sevier v. Justices of Washington County, 7 Tenn. (1 Peck) 268 (1824), was not too
surprising. The decision was penned in 1824 by Judge Haywood of Tennessee-who in Bob's
Case saw no reason to overrule his younger self or even to note explicitly his authorship. See
note 564 supra.
568. 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 14i, 156 (1829). The court held that a white man acquitted of
the statutory crime of slave murder still could be convicted for common law manslaughter.
Interestingly, Catron concurred in this decision. The results in Bob's Case and Fields suggest an intriguing point about the Tennessee court in comparison with other southern
courts-for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court and the General Court of Virginia.
As we have seen in these judiciaries, the main absolutist/nonabsolutist debates occurred
over the effect of the common law in situations in which statutory law did not clearly cover
an injury. The Tennessee judges assumed that the Taylor-Brockenbrough position was
right, and were willing to go one step farther to allow abstract principles of justice to override
clearly applicable, though inhumane, statutory provisions.
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John Louis Taylor's position but with much less ado. Whyte shortcircuited the defendant's elaborate argument that the common law
had no application since "slavery never subsisted in England"",
by remarking that the villeinage and slavery exhibited "a strong
resemblance." 7 0 Peck at least addressed himself directly to a main
point of the defendant's brief-the continental theory that the master had via caption a right to his slave's life. Arguing that the defendant was misconstruing Vattel, Peck asserted that such was "a
doctrine too monstrous for my mind."571 Paraphrasing Taylor, Peck
concluded, "The law . . . protects the slave. Law, reason, christian-

ity and common humanity, all point one way."5 2
Twenty-two years later Eugenius A. Nisbet, the most brilliant
antebellum Georgia judge and, until Lincoln's election, no fire-eater
by that state's standards, characterized Fields as resulting from a
"fervid zeal in behalf of humanity to the slave""' and resting upon
a legal ground that was "wholly untenable." The libertarianism
displayed by the Tennessee majority of the late 1820's is consistent
with the tenor of the manumission decisions of the early 1830's that
we have considered: the 1833 guarantees of fair hearings and damages in Sylvia and Matilda and the 1834 rejection of the Maria
doctrine in Harrisv. Clarissa.Moreover, three other decisions of the
early Thirties reinforce the impression of liberality (or, if you prefer,
"extreme cunning"). First, Loftin v. Espy,' in an interesting display of "paternalism," forbade the sale ofA's slaves to pay B's debts
569. Id. at 143.
570. Id. at 144. The most cogent antebellum "refutation" of this theory of resemblance
is Eugenius A. Nisbet's extraordinary opinion in Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 559 (1851), which
includes a dissection of Lord Mansfield's use of precedent, an attack on England for discouraging Colonial attempts to restrain the growth of slavery, and an amusing side-swipe at the
late medieval clergy for convincing the laity of the wickedness of villeinage while refusing to
free villeins bound to church manors: "This conduct of the Holy Fathers was certainly characteristic." Id. at 564.
571. 9 Tenn. at 148. The citation given in Peck's opinion is "Vattel, 421." I can find
nothing in my edition of M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs (1787) at that page, and there
is no section with so high a number. However, Book m, Chapter 8, § 152, at 531, seems more
susceptible to Peck's view. True, Vattel says that if one takes a prisoner of war and makes
him a slave "I still continue with him the state of war." Id. In isolation this implies the
defendant's claim. But Vattel precedes his comment by stating, "The ancients used to sell
their prisoners of war for slaves. They indeed thought they had a right of putting them to
death. In every circumstance, when I cannot innocently take away my prisoner's life, I have
no right to make him a slave." Id. And he has just previously limited the right to kill to those
who "have rendered themselves personally guilty of some crime deserving death." Id.
572. Id. at 165.
573. Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 583 (1851).
574. Id.
575. 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 68 (1833). See Woodley v. Abby, 9 Va. (5 Call) 336 (1805) (the
early 1800's Virginia case, particularly Spencer Roane's position). See notes 403-04 supra and
accompanying text.
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to C, even though A was in debt to B and had no other assets.
Second, Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs6I declared unconstitutional an
1831 statute limiting the debrutalizing (or libertarian) effect of one
passed two years earlier. The 1829 law had allowed slaves to file bills
in equity by next friend if the executor tarried in obtaining the
state's assent to a bequest of freedom. The 1831 Act barred applying
this rule to all pre-1829 wills, and ordered equity chancellors to
strike such pending cases from the dockets. This limitation, the
court declared, violated due process of law."' Third, Blackmore v.
Negro Phill 75 took the court to a position regarding comity beyond
that of the Tucker court."' In Negro Phill, the Tennessee court held
that Tennessee Negroes emancipated in the symbolically appropriate town of Equality, Illinois, remained free even after their return
to the South. Arguably, the Tennessee court was here more liberal
than the United States Supreme Court was to be in Dred Scott v.
Sandford"s' two decades later. True, Phill, unlike Dred Scott, asserted his freedom with his master's compliance while still in free
territory. The more important indicator of Tennessee judicial attitudes, however, was Judge Peck's view that northern emancipation
would be valid in Tennessee even if the master's acts were mere
forms, undertaken to evade the operation of Tennessee laws and
policy. Such a view was miles removed from Georgia justice. 8 '
These cases bequeathed to the post-1835 court libertarian (or,
if one still prefers, "cunning pro-slavery") precedents in criminal
trials, manumission hearings, detention damages, and evasions of
restrictions on manumissions. In setting these precedents only one
judge-Catron-ever made a neutral decision that did not favor the
black. One could seek to render this record somewhat less striking
by stressing that some of the cases presented "forced choices," with
no apparently neutral options available to the judges. But that interpretation still would leave unexplained why the judges, when
forced, never opted for a conservative over a liberal alternative. Nor
would it explain the rejection of neutrality in the three suits in
which it lay available-Bob's Case, Sylvia, and Negro Phill. I find
it hard to ascribe the majority's result in Bob's Case to anything
576. 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 78 (1834).
577. Id. at 106. Is this perchance "paternalistic" due process?
578. 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 297 (1835). This case was a continuation of an earlier suit, Hadley
v. Latimer, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 426 (1832).
579. Recall that in Betty v. Horton, 33 Va. (5 Leigh) 615 (1833), the effect of the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights had been to free a slave by virtue of her residence in Boston.
See text accompanying notes 461-63 supra.
580. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
581. Catron and Green concurred in Negro Phill. Whyte had left the bench in 1834 and
under the new constitution adopted that year the court thereafter had only three seats.
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except "gut-feelings" -requiring fundamental fairness to an
"unfortunate," but still "human," being. Similar tendencies may
have lain behind the rejection in Sylvia of reliance on other remedies
to assure a hearing, and behind the failure in Negro Phill to take
into serious account the master's seemingly evasive motives. 58 2 The
pre-1835 course of Tennessee decisions is, in sum, so consistent that
the only sensible room for dispute about the court majority's behavior consists in whether to describe it as full-fledged pro-freedom
libertarianism or as only close to it. On balance, the former description appears more tenable-despite the absence of explicit declarations of attitude that one might expect to accompany such behavior.
The differences between the consistency of the Tennessee judges
and the cleavage from issue to issue of the Tucker court appears too
manifest to ignore.
Finally, in line with this judgment we do have relatively clear
expressions of attitude by the one judge who chose neutrality, John
Catron. Shortly before he was elevated to the federal Supreme Court
he made two statements not at all indicative of abolitionism but
also not at all indicative of single-minded positive-good pro-slavery.
The first statement rejected the "raw capitalist" attitude toward blacks that Stanley Elkins has argued characterized
nineteenth-century southern views.113 Catron observed in Loftin v.
Espy:5 94
Nothing can be much more abhorrent to . .. every benevolent individual,
than to see a large family of slaves sold at sheriff's sale; the infant children,
father and mother to different bidders. To treat them as other domestic animals would be to declare, that, as a people, we had, in reference to this class,
sunk all feelings of humanity, and that the slave was not elevated in his
sensibilities over the lower classes of animals .

.

.. As a fact, and as a theory,

this is untrue."

This statement is important in that Catron used it not merely as
obiter theory, but in practice to prohibit the sale of slaves.
The second statement makes it clear that at least at the time
Catron held to a nonromantic, conditional approval of the peculiar
institution. In Fisher'sNegroes" he took a gloomy view of the free
582. The court's rejection elsewhere of continental doctrines suggests the discounting

of another possibility-interest in the master's absolute property rights.
583. I do not wish to suggest a U.B. Phillips' view of the peculiar institution-that is,
that benevolent paternalism characterized the institution. Indeed, one can find similar expressions of regrets about "breaking up" a slave family which, regretfully, "break it up" in
the name of capitalism. See, e.g., Cannon v. Jenkins, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 426 (1830) (Ruffin,
J.). The point is that neither the Phillips nor the Elkins view alone sufficiently describes
slavery.
584. 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 68 (1833).
585. Id. at 78.
586. 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 78, 85 (1834).
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Negro's lot in the South. He argued that it was and probably always
would be less pleasant than that of "the slave who receives the
protection and care of a tolerable master.""' This statement is in a
sense pro-slavery. The exact sense, however, is important-it is conditional on the "tolerable master." It does not suppose that southern slavery was an improvement over northern "wage-slavery." Still
more crucial are his approval of colonization schemes and, explicit
in that approval, his rejection of the view that Negroes were an
inherently "shiftless lot:"
The [colonization] society has formed a colony of free blacks at Liberia, .
The people residing there . .. speak our language, pursue our habits, profess
the christian religion; are sober, industrious,moral, and contented; are enjoying a life of comfort and of equality which it is impossible in this country to
enjoy, where the black man is degraded by his color . .. his fancied freedom
... a delusionYm

Thus attributing the American degradation of the Negro more to the
fact of living in a racially prejudiced white society than to inherent
inferiority, the least libertarian Tennessee judge of the 1830's stood
in his understanding of the societally produced causes of black
"inferiority" closer to many abolitionists of the 1850's than to Josiah
Knott or James Henry Hammond."'
(7) The Tennessee Court and Manumission, 1835-1860
Notwithstanding the liberalism of the Tennessee court to 1835,
its liberal course from then until the Civil War was extraordinary,
particularly since the legislature must have known the attitudes of
two of the five major post-1835 judges prior to electing them: William Reese and Robert McKinney. William Reese's behavior on the
equity bench was hardly a model either of deference to the legislature or of pro-slavery. Sitting as chancellor at the initial hearing of
Fisher'sNegroes v. Dabbs 99 Reese had refused to follow the dictates
of the 1831 law and to drop the Negroes' case from the docket.
Instead, anticipating the ruling of the supreme court, he had declared the law unconstitutional.-"' The will's administrator conse587. Id. at 86.
588. Id. at 85-86 (emphasis supplied).

589. And one might even argue that he stood to the left of Lincoln, at least prior to
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. See Current, The Friend of Freedom, in
RECONSTRUCON 25-47 (K. Stampp &L. Litwack eds. 1969).
590. 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 119 (1834).
591. It should be noted that Reese concludes his opinion by declaring his own personal
hostility to domestic emancipation under then present circumstances. Id. at 139. Quaere,was
he being wholly genuine, or was he seeking to "get right by" the legislature? The declaration
comes at the end of an extended apology for ruling the law unconstitutional. In that apology
he manifests considerable anxiety for the independence of the judiciary. His later judicial
behavior hardly denotes great personal hostility. See note 594 infra.
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quently had been forced to take the slaves before another chancellor
who proved to be more cooperative. In Henderson v. Vaulx5 92 Reese
had prohibited the removal of various slaves to Mississippi by a life
tenant. Ostensibly, his argument turned on the ground that the
future heirs might not be able to recover them from Mississippi:
"[W]e know not their system of laws."1 3 Probably Reese's underlying motive is expressed in a passage contrasting slavery in the two
states:
We have a mild penal code, as regards slaves, as well as others; they might be
taken where this would be otherwise. We have a much greater proportion of
free than of slave population; and the slave, without severity, is kept in a due
and safe subordination; they might be taken where the proportion is the other
way . . . . Here there is a liberal philanthropy and protective public sentiment

to the slave-there it might be otherwise. Here the . . . interest is on the side
of humanity, and he may not be over worked-there the annual profit may be
one third of his entire value, and the temptation would be to overwork him.
Here . . . mothers and children are tenderly treated-there a different state

of things may produce a different feeling and a different course. Here we have
a temperate, healthful climate-there the climate may be less favorable to
life.5"

Protecting the slaves seems to be the real goal of Reese's decision-one that he finally admitted he had reached "by the aid
rather of principle than of authority."15 But with what principle-if
not one at least partially derivative from the better side of Enlightenment Liberalism?
A further reason why the legislature should have been aware of
both Reese's and McKinney's perspectives was that they had played
an active anti-slavery role off the bench during the prior decade.'"
592. 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 30 (1836).
593. Id. at 38. But it would not have been very difficult for Reese to ascertain Missis-

sippi law: he should have been able to deduce a conclusion anyhow. Mississippi would have
had to allow recovery. Otherwise she would run afoul of both the contract and the full faith
and credit clauses of the United States Constitution.
594. Id. at 39-40. I think that a remarkable passage-not because we would today agree
with Reese's definition of "liberal philanthropy" or that slavery could be dominated by
"humanity"- but rather on three counts. One, the difference Reese perceives between Lower
and Upper South slavery is, whether accurate or not, significant enough to him to control
his decision in the case. Two, no plausible way of ascribing the result to cunning pro-slavery
rather than real conviction exists. The de-brutalizing, aristocratic, would-be preservor of the
peculiar institution (whatever else he might say in trying to persuade the North that, while
"peculiar," the institution was not all bad) would not (assuming he had any common sense
at all, which Reese plainly possessed in abundance) likely set up, by way of a political tactic,
so sharp a division between better and worse southern slaveries. Three, and rather like his
Fisher'sNegroes opinion apologizing for holding legislative action on a touchy subject unconstitutional, Reese's statement strikes me as precisely what an intelligent, sensitive, and onbalance judicially daring man who had moral difficulties living in, and deciding the fate of
blacks subjugated beneath, a system of inequitable law, might say.
595. Id. at 40.
596. See 1 P. HAMER, TENNESSEE: A HIsToRY 1673-1932, at 464 (1933). In my view

174

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

Robert McKinney, in fact, was one of the ten county representatives
at the 1834 Constitutional Convention who voted to abolish slavery.
As far as I know, the other three major post-1835 judgesNathan Green, William Turley, and Robert Caruthers-did not
display public hostility to slavery before their appointments and
thus their personal attitudes are not susceptible to easy categorization. Some clues, however, do exist. In 1858, after retiring from
the court and becoming president of Cumberland University,
Nathan Green wrote and circulated throughout the state an open
letter defending Congress' right to abolish slavery in the District of
Columbia. While Green's action may have stemmed from a desire
to exercise his "first amendment" right"' to free speech in the face
of pro-slavery extremists, or solely from his Whig constitutional
views rather than from any underlying doubts about the peculiar
institution, it is not probable. Neither is the theory that Turley and
Caruthers may have been ardent proponents of slavery. As we have
noted earlier, Caruthers went with McKinney to Washington in
early 1861 to try unsuccessfully to work out a modus vivendi between the Gulf States and the Lincoln Administration. More notably, the consistent voting of the major judges for pro-freedom solutions in slave cases suggests that the gulf in attitudes between those
for whom we have off-the-bench evidence of strong doubts about the
justice of slavery and those for whom we do not, was not very
great. 59
This majority tendency can be seen most economically by restricting our attention here to three sorts of freedom cases-ones
directly comparable to other states' adjudications, ones in which
attitudes are most in evidence, and ones in which slavery attitudes
seem significantly linked to liberal views on other matters. From
historiography has insufficiently stressed the fact that agitation against slavery in the late
Twenties and early Thirties accomplished as little in Tennessee as it did in Virginia. In 1827
abolitionists showered the state legislature with 2818 anti-slavery petitions; in 1829 they
presented 1327 documents. In 1829 a bill to provide for gradual abolition was defeated in the
state senate by a vote of 18 to 11. If only four state senators had changed their minds the
vote would have been 15 to 14 for abolition. At the Constitutional Convention of 1834 the
delegates appointed a committee to look into the possibilities of general emancipation. Its
report was defeated 44 to 10. The vote on a constitutional clause precluding future legislative
abolition of slavery without the master's consent and without providing compensation passed
by a much closer vote, however-30 to 27. Moreover, a motion to forbid compensated emancipation-put forward by a group wishing to "lock" the state permanently into the institution-was defeated.
597. I place the term "first amendment" in quotations in light of Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
598. I certainly would not include the short-term occupants of the third seat during the
1850's-A.W.O. Totten (1850-1855), William R. Harris (1855-1858), and Archibald Wright
(1858-1860)-in these generalizations. Totten and Wright seem to have been secessionists.
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this examination an additional motif will emerge: Tennessee judges
became, if anything, increasingly libertarian as the Civil War approached. Three cases requiring the judges to construe the master's
intent illustrate comparative liberality and the linkage between attitudes and behavior. In 1849 Lewis v. Daniel' presented almost
the same question that the Virginia judges had decided in Walthall:
did the master intend his slaves to go free if they could not remain
in the State? Their master had declared:
[M]y said executor shall, in due form, emancipate and set at liberty, each
and every one of my said slaves before mentioned; provided, however, and
upon condition, that said slaves mentioned shall be permitted by law to remain in the State of Tennessee. In case my said slaves cannot, by the laws of
Tennessee, be emancipated, . . . then I do will and bequeath each and every
one of the negroes above mentioned, to W. F. Daniel, who is the executor to
the will.'"

What could be a more explicit conditioning of freedom on a geographic permission? The Virginia justices, faced with that devise,
surely would have awarded the slaves to W. F. Daniel."' Directing
the slaves to be freed and removed from Tennessee, however, William Turley asserted that manumission should be considered the
primary object and should prevail over a secondary object impossible of fulfillment. The difficulty with the argument is that it rests
on an unproved point-that the primary intent was to free the slaves
at all costs. It appears to me that the primary intent was to liberate
in and have the slaves remain in Tennessee, while the secondary
intent was not what Turley asserted-to have them remain in the
state-but rather to give them to the executor. Such would seem to
be a neutral reading. If the testator really had in mind Turley's
primary-secondary distinction, he chose an extraordinarily clumsy
way of expressing it. I am not sure that even William Brockenbrough would have reached Turley's result.
The second case of intent implies a linkage between liberal
judicial attitudes concerning religious beliefs and pro-freedom views
of slavery.60 2 In July 1842 William Turley upheld a devise of freedom
599. 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 305 (1849).
600. Id. at 308-09.
601. The Virginia judges, with only Dabney Carr dissenting, had construed an undeniably ambiguous will to mean that the slaves were to remain in bondage. Walthall's Ex'r v.
Robertson, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 189 (1830). See notes 445-51 supra and accompanying text. Yet
in Lewis, in which the would-be heirs had a far stronger case, the Tennessee court reached
the opposite result.
602. In the context of an 1807 holding that "no man who did not believe in a future
state of existence, rewards, and punishments," State v. Cooper, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 95 (1807),
could be a witness, and an 1852 decision reversing that holding, Bennett v. State, 31 Tenn.
(1 Swan) 411, 413 (1852) (semble sub silentio), the result in Gass' Heirs v. Gass' Ex'rs, 22
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against the contention that its maker had been insane. The wouldbe heirs in Gass' Heirs v. Gass' Executors"' proved that John Gass
was an elderly eccentric who:
entertained the opinion that there were degrees of happiness in a future state
of existence; that in whatever circle a man moved in on earth, he would move
. . . in the second state of existence; and that . . . pre-eminence . . . in his

,future existence depended in some measure upon the amount of estate he
should acquire, and the charitable purposes to which he should contribute it.",

Turley saw no proof of insanity in this strange combination of Dante
and Calvin. Turley admitted that he would think insane a "man
who fancied he was Jesus Christ,""o' or one "who imagined he corresponded with a princess in cherry juice.""o' But he could not
"comprehend a delusion upon a point of belief as to the nature of
future rewards and punishments." 0o While he considered it "a
dreadful error" not to believe in a God, he was sure that the nature
of the after-life was "a subject beyond the ken of mortal men, and
. . . perhaps, every individual is laboring under a delusion who

attempts to solve it."es' Warming to the subject, Turley observed
that there was no way of adjudging the relative truth of the Muhammedan's "heaven of sensual enjoyment" and the Christian's
"intellectual points of faith." 0 This was hardly repressive fundamentalist Protestant Christianity of the sort that supposedly blanketed Dixie at the time that the pro-slavery concert of defense began
to play the symphony of positive goodness.
The final case of intent arose only eighteen months before the
Civil War and suggests that even at so late a date the Tennessee
judges had not abandoned liberal inclinations. In December 1859,
in White v. White,61 they were asked to rule void a bequest of
freedom drawn up by a Tennessean who had moved to Mississippi
about six months before his death. The would-be heirs argued that
since Mississippi law forbade post-mortem manumission, comity
required that the Tennessee court forbid the liberation of a MissisTenn. (3 Hum.) 278 (1842), suggests further that the Tennessee court became more, rather
than less, liberal in its perspectives as the Abolitionist decades wore on.
603. 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 278 (1842).
604. Id. at 279.
605. Id. at 284.
606. Id. Whether Turley would have thought insane a man who, like Lumpkin, believed
that slavery had been ordained by Jahweh, is another matter about which I shall not
infer-merely insinuate-here.
607. Id. Regrettably, he had nothing to say about the more difficult question of the
sanity of Methodists' thinking that transubstantiation can be accomplished with grape juice.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 404 (1859).
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sippi citizen's slaves. As evidence of the decedent's domicile the
heirs pointed out that he had gone to Bolivar City, Mississippi, in
October 1857, had bought land there, and had built a house. Moreover, he had died in Bolivar City. Judge Caruthers, however, refused to admit this change in domicile. Most of his furniture remained in his old home and office in Giles City, Tennessee; therefore, his legal residence was still in Tennessee. The slaves went
free. White v. White, then, turned on the percentage of furniture in
White's two abodes at the instant of his sudden death, not on what
was apparently his intention as to residence. Had the movers been
more efficient, the blacks might have remained slaves. I have no
doubt whatsoever that pro-slavery enthusiasts such as Judge Benning of Georgia or the men who had just taken control of the Mississippi and Virginia benches would have delivered the slaves to the
heirs.
White's intimation of continued liberality is strengthened further by cases whose central question was adequacy of proof rather
than intent. The clearest example of this was the court's policy of
permitting suits to substantiate claims to freedom by introducing
hearsay testimony-a practice that the common law did not generally allow in property suits, that the United States Supreme Court
specifically rejected in slave cases, and that divided the Virginia
judges in 1831. In 1835 the Tennessee court admitted that it had
extended "the right to introduce hearsay evidence to the utmost
limit, and further than other courts of high authority have gone."",
Yet it did not seem to care. In fact, on the related issue of direct
oral testimony the court became progressively more liberal. In 1839
Reese disallowed parol proof that a bill of sale absolute on its face
actually had conveyed merely a life-tenure, after which the slaves
were to be freed."' Yet twenty years later, in 1859, the court allowed
just such an exception to free a Negro who had been sold absolutely
in a written conveyance with a verbal understanding that he would
be liberated after eight years. 13 Caruthers appeared much less
enamoured than Reese of regularity in the law. Admitting that
611. Miller v. Denman, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 233, 236 (1835); see Vaughan v. Phebe, 8
Tenn. (1 Mart. & Yer.) 5 (1827).
612. Richardson v. Thompson, 20 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 151 (1839). Rejecting the slaves' bid
for freedom, Reese observed that all the exceptions allowing such verbal evidence which had
crept gradually into the law to overcome fraud, accident, or mistake probably had been a bad
idea: "[I]t may well be doubted whether the interest of society, and the honor of the law as
a science claiming a reasonable degree of certainty, would not have been . . . promoted by a
rigid adherence to the severe simplicity of the general rule." Id. at 155. These parol exceptions
threatened legal chaos in which cases would have different and unpredictable results
"according to the peculiar cast of thought or state of legal metaphysics of each individual
judge." Id.
613. Isaac v. Farnsworth, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 275 (1859).
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"[p]erhaps in no case was the proof ever more irreconcilably conflicting,"' he freed the slave anyhow, observing: "It is revolting to
see to what an extent some men will go against the rights of the
weak, in the eager pursuit of gain.""'
The Tennessee court's concern for claimant blacks was particularly evident in its treatment of dilatory executors. A Kentucky
executor who attempted to avoid his duty to manumit by carrying
slaves from Kentucky to Tennessee forfeited the slaves and was
required to pay them both the money contained in the Kentucky
bequest and adequate compensation for their labor.' Similarly, the
court found a Tennessee executor who removed Tennessee slaves to
Mississippi instead of freeing them guilty of contempt.' Executors
who tried this tactic were subjected to tirades from irritated Tennessee judges. Typical was Green's statement in 1846 accusing an executor of "gross violation of duty and a corrupt disregard of . . . high
trust . . . guilty of the grossest fraud, and in this case the more

culpable, because of the helpless condition of the complainants.""
And if these remedies of removal of power, forced damages, contempt, and denunciation did not 'suffice, the court had a final
weapon: letting slaves propound a will for probate themselves. On
being told by the executor's counsel in Ford v. Ford' that this
action amounted to jettisoning the whole notion of the slave as
chattel-property, Green countered with a view of the black that
would be "liberal" for too many Americans today. Of course a slave
could sue, he said; the fact that a slave's liberty was restrained and
under the control of his master did not mean that he was "in the
condition of a horse or an ox" because the slave "is made after the
image of the Creator," and has a "high-born nature" that cannot
be extinguished by "the accidental position in which fortune has
placed him."6 2 0 Nathan Green likely was influenced in his conclusion by a law unique to Tennessee that allowed slaves to contract
for their freedom. Yet he did not have to make a further flourish of
egalitarianism that outdid Jefferson and Lincoln: "He has mental
capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature, that constitute
him equal to his owner . . . ."621
Though it is impossible to offer irrefutable proof, one may sus614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.

Id. at 277.
Id.
Reuben v. Parish, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 122 (1845).
In re Underwood, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 46 (1840).
John v. Tate, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 388, 391 (1846).
26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 91 (1846).
Id. at 95-96.
Id.
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pect that sympathy for freedom and approval of masters who freed
their slaves motivated Green as much as did the positive law itself.
No less did anger at the executors, who were the slave's halfbrothers, underlie Green's rhetoric than it had Reese's declarations
the previous year in Elias v. Smith.62 2 Elias was a free Negro who
some years earlier had been allowed to purchase his slave wife and
child for ten dollars, on an understanding with the owner's administrator and heirs that he would emancipate them. Though he had
treated them as free, however, he had never posted the required
bond or secured the county court's consent. Elias fell into debt and
his creditors attempted to take his wife and child in payment. Technically the creditors were right; they were still slaves. But Judge
Reese would have none of their technicalities, arguing that the administrator and heirs would certainly not have sold the wife and
child, worth at least $600, to Elias "with the view of conferring . . .
a pecuniary advantage."1* Had they been selling to a stranger, they
would have demanded written commitment to "an express trust in
favor of the emancipation." Ignoring the fact that he was subscribing to something that looked suspiciously like quasi-emancipation,
Reese waxed rhetorical. The administrator and heirs trusted
to the heart of the husband and the father, as being at least equivalent to the
deed of another. If he, stifling the voice of nature, and severing the paternal
tie, had been such a barbarian and monster as to have meditated a sale of them
for his pecuniary advantage, upon the strength of his mere legal title, is there
a chancery court in Christendom . . . which would not have promptly interposed . . . and enjoined him from .

.

. so flagrant a wrong? 24

Sure of the behavior of all Christendom's chancery courts-perhaps
unduly so-Reese enjoined the defendants from further action, stating that their doings were "little short in . . . enormity of that
supposed."'

Such was Tennessee appellate justice. To say that this type of
justice sprang, not at all from a genuine, if faulted, linkage with all
the Euro-American liberal tradition, but merely from paternalism
or from intent to perpetrate slavery by debrutalizing it, would be
to manifest an utter failure to apprehend what in fact was going on
in the judicial minds that wrought that justice.
(8) Populism and the Virginia Switch of 1858
Virginia and Tennessee cases of the 1850's offer an interesting
test of the theory that the ascent of the "lower orders" to southern
622.
623.
624.
625.

25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 33 (1845).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
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political power contributed markedly to the rise of pro-slavery extremism. The Virginia Constitution of 1852 abolished the general
court and vested civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction in the
judges of the court of appeals, who were thenceforth popularly
elected to twelve-year terms. At almost the same time a Tennessee
statute terminated the legislature's appointive power and vested it
in the people, who elected judges for eight-year terms. Conceivably
these "Jacksonian" changes might have induced judicial shifts toward reaction. Judges popularly elected to limited terms might reflect public attitudes more proximately than men enjoying lifetenure unless they ran strongly athwart legislators' wishes. Yet, in
neither state did electoral change produce an immediate shift toward conservatism.
In Virginia, the initial result was a battle over manumission
doctrine in which two liberals popularly elected in the 1850's outgunned the conservative William Daniel, originally chosen by the
legislature in 1846. Richard C.L. Moncure, elected after Francis
Brooke's death in 1851, and Green B. Samuels, who replaced Briscoe Baldwin, formed a two-man bloc. Their initial success in holding the court to liberalism"2 was demonstrated in two decisions from
which Daniel strongly dissented.
In 1853 in Forward's Administrator v. Thamer,2 1 the court
freed a black woman despite her failure to carry out an apparently
integral condition of her emancipatory bequest. Her former master
had stipulated that she leave Virginia within six months or be given
to his residuary legatee; yet, ten years after his death, she still
resided in Virginia. Samuels justified his refusal to return her to
bondage on grounds that could equally have been offered by the
Tennessee judges: "The conditions . . . are in their nature, conditions subsequent . . . . [H]e [the testator] could annex no condi-

tion subsequent repugnant to the freedom conferred."18
This tendency toward generosity continued in Foster'sAdministrator v. Foster.2 1 In Foster the Virginia court actually faced an
626. This moderate liberalism fell short of that practiced by the Tennessee court inasmuch as the Virginia judges did not try to change Virginia precedent voiding quasiemancipation and barring damages for illegal detention. See Smith's Adm'r v. Betty, 52 Va.
(11 Gratt.) 752 (1854).
627. 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 537 (1853).
628. Id. at 539. The liberal thrust here is highlighted by comparison with a similar
South Carolina case of 1803, Maverick v. Stokes, 2 S.C.L. 203, 2 Bay 511 (1803). In Maverick,
the Negro's return to Maryland contrary to his master's direction sufficed to place him back
in slavery.
629. 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 485 (1853). Compare Jincey v. Winfield's Adm'r, 50 Va. (9
Gratt.) 708 (1853) (in which Moncure declared illegal the absolute sale of statu liberi slaves
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instance of deliberate fraud on the state's emancipation law that
Jacob Peck of Tennessee had hypothesized nineteen years earlier in
Negro Phill. Francis Foster was pinched with particular severity by
the law since he had had several children by one of his slaves. In
November 1831 he took them to New York City, executed a deed of
manumission before the mayor, and a few days later brought them
back to Virginia. At the trial following his death it was proved:
That Foster's reason for carrying his slaves to New York to be there emancipated, rather than to emancipate them in Virginia, was . . . that they might
remain in the state of Virginia; he supposing that the law requiring emancipated slaves to leave the state in twelve months would not extend to the case
which he had devised.'"

Samuels, rejecting the would-be heirs' claim to the slaves, argued
that "[tihere was nothing in the law to prevent Foster from taking
his slaves whithersoever he chose.""' That fact was clear enough,
but what Samuels said next was less so: "[lit is impossible to
perceive a reason why an emancipation [made] without the state
. . . should not be fully recognized here . . . . [T]he evidence did
not . . . prove such fraud upon the law as would justify . . . avoid-

ing the transaction."8 3 2 Certainly the Georgia court would have
found a justification. Indeed, given the circumstances of Foster it
is very difficult to perceive here what reason would have constituted
a sufficient fraud to Judge Samuels. Certainly Samuels can hardly
be accused of deciding Foster in neutral accordance with the spirit
of the laws of 1793, 1834, 1838, and 1847-all of which prohibited
free blacks from entering the state to settle.
Justice William Daniel believed the court majority was in fact
violating precisely that spirit. Four times in the past sixty years the
legislature had indicated its unwillingness to swell the burden of
free Negroes with newcomers. Foster's action was an express attempt to evade this state policy by artificially turning Virginia
slaves into "newcomers." Yet Daniel's objection was no more successful in Foster than it had been in Forward'sAdministrator v.
Thamer.3 3 At the time his position seemed a lonely one. Five years
later, however, his pro-slavery logic convinced two of his brethren,
George N. Lee and the new Court President, J.J. Allen.
Bailey v. Poindexter'sExecutor34 and Williamson v. Coalter's
to pay estate debts, and directed that they be hired out only for the minimum time necessary
to meet outstanding claims) with Pinckard v. McCoy, 22 Ga. 28 (1857) (contrary result).
630. 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) at 486.

631. Id. at 490.
632. Id. at 491-92.
633. 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 537 (1853).
634. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858).
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Executors"5 mark the turning-point in Virginia slavery jurisprudence. Discussion in the conference chambers must have been
heated, for the judges' lengthy"' opinions were bitter in tone. In
both cases would-be heirs successfully attempted to seize slaves
freed by will.83 7 In Bailey William Daniel argued that the slaves had
no legal capacity to make the choice offered on the ground that
"nothing short of the exhibition of a positive enactment, or of legal
decisions having equal force, can demonstrate the capacity of a
slave to exercise an election in respect to his manumission." 8 President Allen agreed that "[manumission] is the exercise of a power
conferred on the owner by the law, with which the slave has nothing
to do.""3 ' Lee concurred with Allen and Daniel. In the eyes of Moncure and Samuels, the result of this decision was to throw over the
whole tradition of moderate Virginia liberalism dating back to
Spencer Roane, Chancellor Wythe, Dabney Carr, John Green, William Brockenbrough, and the two Tuckers. Prior adjudications only
made sense on the supposition that slaves had the capacity to
choose. Furthermore, to suggest the contrary was to violate common
sense. If they could not choose, how could they be held responsible
for criminal acts? Finally, Moncure and Samuels stressed that even
the strictest Continental Absolutism did not require such a result.
If the master possessed all rights over the slave except those taken
away by statute, surely he could give back what he chose unless
Virginia statutory law explicitly forbade it.
Judge Daniel ignored the latter two points and focused on the
question of precedent. In his view, prior cases had merely assumed
a capacity to elect. Thus the issue had never been bindingly decided. Against the liberal bloc's protests, the three judges stood firm
for slavery. Moncure objected vainly:
A master may emancipate his slaves against their consent. Why may he not
make such consent the condition of emancipation?
It is as competent for a slave emancipated on condition that he elects to
be free .

.

. as it is for a slave absolutely emancipated to propound the deed

or will for probate, appeal from the sentence, or sue for his freedom. Such right
635. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 394 (1858).
636. Together these opinions were nearly as long as those of the United States Supreme
Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
637. In Bailey the testator allowed the slaves to choose freedom or public sale. In
Williamson the mistress stated: "I direct . .. that they shall be manumitted on the 1st day
of January 1858." 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) at 394-95. She directed her executors to raise funds to
transport the slaves to Liberia, and finally prescribed that if any slaves should wish to remain
they were to choose masters from among her relatives.
638. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) at 197.
639. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) at 398-99.
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of election is incident, as such remedies are incident, to the legal capacity of
the slave to receive his freedom.'"

Bailey's slaves, however, remained in bondage until the Civil War
loosed their fetters.
Samuels and Moncure fared no better in Williamson v. Coalter's Executors. The other three judges simply refused to accept the
distinction which they urged between the two cases. Bailey, Samuels argued, had made a flat option open to his slaves; Williamson
had directed their freedom. That was an absolute act. The further
direction to choose among her relatives was subsequent and subordinate to it. No, Daniel, Allen, and Lee replied implacably; Bailey
controlled. Williamson's slaves were to remain in bondage, too. .
It is hard to be sufficiently critical of the majority's behavior.
Not merely did they adopt an extremely restrictive view of the
slave's capacity and turn to Continental Absolutism of a peculiarly
twisted sort. Had they approached the issue in a vacuum-as for
instance the Alabama court of the 1830's did-one could argue for
the neutrality of their result with some show of plausibility. But
they did not. At the very least, their decision made prior Virginia
judges seem forgetful, careless men who should have reached the
point rather than merely assuming it. Beyond that, one of William
Cabell's opinions clearly intimates that the point had indeed been
raised before. In 1836 in Elder v. Elder's Executor"' Cabell, speaking of election, had stated: "It can . . . be no objection." 42 Why did
he make that comment if the issue had not been raised? It must
have been. Allen's, Daniel's, and Lee's decisions in Bailey and
Williamson warrant placing these three judges in company with
Benning of Georgia and Harris of Mississippi.
From 1858, then, the Virginia court was narrowly but surely in
the hands of unabashed pro-slavery extremists. That is a circumstance redolent with two ironies. First, the shift in position was not
the direct result of popular election of judges. The result was
reached by two appointees from the 1840's in combination with one
elected first in 1852. The two liberals were both popularly elected
in the 1850's. Second, as late as 1855 five judges sitting on a special
appellate court'43 for the capital city of Richmond had unanimously
640. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) at 201, 205. Samuels argued unsuccessfully along similar lines.
641. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252 (1833). See note 471 supra.
642. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) at 260.
643. The legislature created this court in 1848 to speed hearings of the particularly
heavy Richmond docket which the regular appellate judges were unable to handle. It bad final
jurisdiction if both litigants agreed before trial. Its constitutionality was upheld by the court
of appeals in 1849 with-perhaps typically-only Daniel dissenting. Sharpe v. Robertson, 46
Va. (5 Gratt.) 518 (1849).
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allowed slaves to elect."' Had the distribution of judges among the
special court and the court of appeals been slightly different, the
latter might never have embraced pro-slavery reaction. The men
who comprised both courts favored by seven votes to three permitting slaves to elect. Had their distribution been different, the Virginia bench's slavery jurisprudence would have been as unaffected
by the adoption of popular election of judges as was the Tennessee
court's.
The Tennessee court's continuing liberality is adequately indicated by one of Robert Caruthers' last opinions, in which he and
his colleagues, like their North Carolina counterparts, rejected the
newly expressed Virginia view that slaves could make no legally
cognizable decisions until the moment of their freedom. In December 1859 he allowed statu liberi to sue the testator's wife, who had
a life-tenure in them. The slaves' purpose was to prevent her frittering away money allocated in the bequest to send them to Liberia
on her death. Caruthers upheld their suit for estoppel, observing
that if recent scholarly works on slavery and recent decisions of
other courts asserted that "slaves . . . cannot come into a court . . .

in a case like that now before us, we cannot adopt them."' After
all, slaves could only assert their rights through next of friend or
through themselves. Otherwise they would have no recourse.
"Surely there can be no principle that would prevent""' their coming to court. "It would be entirely inconsistent with our liberal slave
and emancipation Code, let others be as they may.""' The Virginia
court majority might have swung to reaction, but the Tennessee
court was not prepared to follow.
PART THREE: SHAPE, CHANGE, AND INTENT IN THE LAW OF SLAVERY

At the conclusion of Part One of this Article, I stated that Part
One's analysis of writings in the legal history of slavery left unresolved six troublesome interpretive issues. One of these issues, that
pertaining to the need for fixing at the outset the investigative
644. Young v. Vass' Ex'r,2 Va. Rep. Ann. 511, 1 Patt & H. 167 (Spec. App. 1855). More
precisely, the election was whether to go to Liberia or to a Free State, since the will set up
an impossible bequest-giving the slaves 250 acres and their freedom in North Carolina. It
seems extremely unlikely that the five general court judges-Richard H. Field, Lucas B.
Thompson, John B. Clopton, George H. Gilmer, and John W. Tyler-would have thought
slaves could select their destination but could not choose between bondage and freedom.
Thompson saw no objection to applying humane principles analogous to cy pres even though
that doctrine was not part of Virginia law. Compare Thompson's statement with Benning's
comment on cy pres. See text accompanying note 342 supra.
645. Stephenson v. Harrison, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 728, 732 (1859).
646. Id. at 733.
647. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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boundaries, I "solved" by fiat-by asserting that if the historian did
not declare and stick to a certain set of rules for admitting and
excluding historial evidence then there was no way of evaluating,
indeed no reason for trusting in, the verdicts rendered about the
legal history of slavery. I also argued that proceeding further towards resolving the other five issues required examining the judgemade law of manumission. Having undertaken that examination in
Part Two, our task in Part Three is set: it is to decide what further
conclusions, if any, about these five remaining issues the evidence
we have been considering permits us to reach.
The correct dispositions of two issues are, in my judgment (and
despite my expectation that not everyone will concur), so clear that,
save insofar as they arise in connection with the disposition of other
issues, virtually all that is required now is their statement. First,
there were significant variations among southern judges and courts
concerning the appropriate relationships between law and slavery
and with respect to the desirability of the peculiar institution. Second, although distinctions between various degrees of judicial liberalism and conservatism and between various degrees of pro-slavery
and anti-slavery may be confusing (if we lapse into the dismal Whig
error of confounding early nineteenth- and late twentieth-century
meanings of these terms), adequate explanation of the significant
variations in the judge-made law of slavery is virtually impossible
without adverting to them.
So saying, I am left with three issues whose further discussion
constitutes our remaining agenda. These are (to restate them in a
fashion suitable to the point to which our inquiries have now advanced): (1) the extent to which the southern law of slavery was, or
became, unified or autonomous; (2) the extent to which the judgemade law reflected and was an instrument of the master class's
oppression of the black, as well as the extent to which that law was
intended to be just; and (3) the extent to which role theory or other
explanatory models of human behavior current in modern social
science and psychology account for the ways in which southern
judges shaped and changed the law of slavery.
Thorough examination of all three issues would complete the
transformation of this modest Article into a book-length essay. Consequently I shall here have to accord them different levels of treatment, concentrating on those aspects whose resolution is most feasible at this juncture, and limiting myself to a few reflections about
other more problematic aspects. Accordingly,. Section A of this Part
probes the issue of slavery law's unity and autonomy in substantially greater detail than Section B addresses the last two issues.
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A. Unity and Diversity in the Law of Slavery
Was there a unified law of southern slavery? For me, this common enough way of putting the issue poses a problem of meaning.
So, too, do some alternate wordings-particularly, "was the southern law of slavery developing towards (greater) autonomy?" If the
question is intended only to ask, "were there more statutes in 1860
than in 1800 designed to protect the peculiar institution from outside influence" or "were there more judges in 1860 than in 1800 who
thought that slaves had no legal capacity to elect between freedom
and slavery?," then I can give an affirmative answer. So relaxed a
standard for unity and autonomy, however, makes the finding virtually empty. Because more is usually intended by the question, I
have a more serious problem with it: it forces together many components of the law that ought to be looked at separately and does not
stipulate with respect to what we are to determine whether it was
or was not unified, or autonomous.
A sensible way of approaching the issue needs to begin by distinguishing (a) between statutory law and judge-made law; (b) with
respect to statutory law, between the activities the statutory law
attempted to regulate, encourage, discourage, or prohibit, and the
penalties or disincentives it set up for its violation (its scope versus
its severity); and (c) with respect to judge-made law, among the
following aspects-its scope, its penetration, and the extent to
which judges did or did not attempt to do more than merely apply
legislative will and precedent. What, in other words, drove their
jurisprudence? In addition, we need to ask, with respect to both
statutory and case law, whether there was unity or disunity, within
and between particular substantive areas of the law. Making these
distinctions, what do we find?
(1) Scope, Penetration, and Severity in Statutory Law
With respect to the statutory law of slavery, it seems safe to say
that there were three broad trends, marked, however, by considerable "untidy" variation. The first trend was towards greater legal
penetration of society and economy. Statutes covered and proscribed more activities of more people, black and white, in 1860 than
they did in 1800. The second trend was dominantly toward relaxation of penalties, except for "direct subversion" of the peculiar institution (by activities such as slave stealing, or by advocating the
overthrow-violent or not so violent-of the institution). Fewer
crimes were capital in 1860 than in 1800, and southern law did not
become enamored with the Beccarian logic of inventing punishments worse than "mere speedy death." Corporal punishment by
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mutilation and branding went out, and although corporal punishment by flogging continued (especially for slaves), there were some
dimunitions in severity. With respect to whites, and to free blacks
in some states, fines and prison terms were prescribed more often
(lacking, however, the "objectless non-productive work punishments" and "reform of the soul by hooding the head" techniques of
nineteenth-century British and northern United States penal
"reforms"). The third trend was towards differentiation in punishments for slaves, whites, and to a lesser but quite noticeable extent,
free blacks, coupled with in the latter case growing divergence between the substantive rights of whites and free blacks.
The question whether southern statutory law became unified,
or more unified, and autonomous, or more autonomous, is thus not
an easy one. The question is better rephrased by substituting another (much more elaborate) wording. That is: "Did the slavery
laws of the southern states have some or all of the following characteristics: (a) protecting and bolstering the peculiar institution; (b)
debrutalizing it, or conversely, increasing its harshness; (c) foreclosing the possibility of status change in the system-and especially
closing opportunities for blacks to move from slavery to freedom; (d)
doing either (a), (b), or (c) in response to abolitionist attacks on the
slavery system; and (e) thereby separating themselves from the content, procedures, or values of either the law of origin, the English
law, or the evolving laws of the northern and western states?" That
wording is more onerous, but it allows more accurate answers.
First, all southern states sought to protect and bolster the peculiar institution by statutory enactments-and it would have been
odd if they had not. Second, in four areas there was considerable
variation among the states and over time as to debrutalizing and
making more harsh the law of slavery. These were: (1) the extent
to which the law sought to control injuries to blacks; (2) the extent
to which the "doors to freedom" were closed; (3) the extent to which
the preconditions for "escaping to freedom" were closed and the
major "civilizing" rationalization for theories of pro-slavery thus
made nonsense of; and (4) the types of protections that the law
afforded to blacks on trial. Some states, Georgia, for example, provided very little statutory protection; Louisiana provided a bit
more-such as prohibiting sale of young children away from their
mothers. No state produced what one could call a really humane set
of working conditions and protections for blacks. But then many
northern states, once they had made the quantum leap to emancipation, rested on their "laurels" and did not produce a humane set
of laws for free blacks either. There was also considerable variation
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as to the preconditions and conditions of freedom. As we have seen,
Tennessee had great difficulty deciding whether to allow domestic
manumission, and, like Maryland and Kentucky, never proscribed
teaching slaves to read and write. South Carolina and Georgia, in
contrast and well before the rise of strong abolition, sought to prevent freedom and its preconditions, thus making a farce out of any
pretensions about "civilizing" and "Christianizing" imported Africans, by denying them the opportunity to read the Bible." The
most respectable, or least indecent, records of the southern legislatures pertained to rights of blacks on trial. But even here there was
considerable variation, as between Virginia's and South Carolina's
relatively regressive stance on the matter, and North Carolina's and
Tennessee's relatively progressive legislation.
Third, with respect to change over time, and the causes of
change, two main points need to be made. One point is that while
it is certainly true that much legislation was enacted during the
1820's and 1830's in response to abolitionist agitation, it is not very
satisfactory to blame the abolitionists for this. Not too long ago that
view was fashionable,"' but the timing of repressive legislation in
the South comports more with the newer scholarly view that the
Revolutionary Era's permissiveness on manumission was shorter
lived than we used to think."' We have already discussed some of
the Virginia and Georgia legislation. That of North Carolina in the
1790's presents a good, though less frequently noticed, example. 5 '
The other point is that just before the Civil War there clearly was a
spate of repressive legislation-such as North Carolina's forbidding
all post-mortem manumission in 1860, and Arkansas' 1858 law permitting free blacks to select masters and return to slavery.
Fourth, as the nineteenth century progressed, the content of
these laws, except for those pertaining to protection and criminal
procedures, diverged, relatively speaking, from those of the rest of
the Atlantic community."'
648. See J. O'NEALL, supra note 305, at ch. 2, § 42.
649. See, e.g., R. OsTERwEls, RoMANcICsM AND NATIONALISM IN THE OLD SoUr 21 (1949).
650. For a good example of the newer view, see W. JoRDAN, supra note 143.
651. Just after the Revolution the Tarheel slave-code began to tighten up. Concomitantly, free Negroes . . . found their rights being slowly infringed. An act of 1787which also prohibited masters of boats from allowing slaves on board after darkpenalized free Negroes who entertained slaves during the night time . . . and fined
those who married slaves. In the next few years legislation came thick and fast: antigambling statutes (1788, 1791, 1794, 1798, 1799, 1800, 1801); increases in the penalty for
trading with slaves, and a 150 fine for encouraging slaves to abscond (1791); a death
penalty for ship-masters who carried runaway slaves out of state (1792); an anti-hiringout law (1794) . . . .

Nash, supra note 19, at 118.
652. I stress "relatively speaking" for a purpose. Not infrequently, one gets the impres-
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To make these comments is to indicate three things about the
law of the peculiar institution and our perceptions of it. First, these
comments indicate why, earlier in Part One, I was wary about using
developmental terminology at all, although I concede that it is difficult never to do so. My reluctance springs in part 5 3 from a general
unease at imposing any linear order upon the blooming and buzzing
disparities of data. The consequence of using developmental terminology is that one is likely to prize a departicularized ordering of
historical data"' over understanding the particularities of what the
historical characters, be they politicians or judges, thought they
were up to. In our search for order and pattern, we may end up
disregarding how they thought about the life of the law and politics,
misconstruing what actually happened to the shape of southern law,
and misunderstanding where it did and did not change.
Second, it seems to me that there were at least three especially
important characteristics of the antebellum southern law of slavery.
One was, not "retrogression," but rather, uneven change; the law
was static here and dynamic there-with considerable disjunctiveness, even doctrinal disunity. A second characteristic was the consequent growth of what a Marxist historian might call "false resolutions" of internal tensions in the "ideology of the ruling classes."
These were resolutions that, far from entirely throwing out the values and rhetoric of Enlightenment and English liberalism, kept
them here and dismantled them there, with a most unsatisfactory
sion that historians think of nineteenth-century southern legal development as going backwards. There is a limited sense in which this is true. But I think it mistakes the principal
vectors, much in the way that, sitting in a train stopped at a station and looking at the
windows of another one similarly stopped, we may be misled if our own train starts very gently
and imperceptibly to glide forward. We may think that we are still stationary and that the
other train has begun to move backward. Exactly why this happens when we look at southern
law is a matter too complex to explore here. It may, however, spring from the circumstance
that most of us feel substantial distaste for the ethical "motion" of nineteenth-century northern law, which we tend to think of as primarily devoted to permitting the economically strong
to exploit the economically weak. Being reluctant to think of northern law as developing in a
morally progressive direction, and disapproving of slave-traders even more than of Jay Gould
and Commodore Vanderbilt, we find it easy to misperceive the direction of the southern legal
locomotive. Or, to be more accurate, we tend to misperceive the directions of all the various
southern engines in the southern legal railway system and to be annoyed that the system did
not contain at least as much "progressiveness" as the northern one.
653. I also have a more specific dissatisfaction about what seem to me two not altogether consistent positions that Whig analysis tends to adopt. One is thinking kindly things
about the northern developmental path when speaking of the creativity of early and earlymiddle nineteenth-century instrumentalist judges. The other is thinking less kindly things
about "exploitation" and "railroad lawyers on the bench" when speaking of later nineteenthcentury northern law.
654. It is, moreover, a method of ordering the data whose plausibility (unless we are
determinists) rests upon a fairly close contingency that might have worked out the other
way-to wit, the outcome of the Civil War.
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legal untidiness. Still another characteristic was the lack of strong
consensus with which these disparate legal results were "achieved"
in at least some legislative battles."' Third, to whatever extent it
may nonetheless be meaningful to talk about a unified or autonomous statutory law of southern slavery, it is less meaningful with
respect to our primary concern in this Article, the shaping of the law
by judicial decisions.
(2) Unity and Diversity in Judge-Made Law
The conclusions we reach about the extent to which southern
law was unified and autonomous-or, as I have preferred to put it,
the extent to which the various laws of the southern states protected, debrutalized, made harsher, or foreclosed status-change in,
the peculiar institution-and so became separated from English law
and contemporary northern law are conclusions that should depend
considerably upon our verdicts concerning the shape and direction
of judge-made law. I want to address our attention to three matters
that help illuminate how unified, or disunified, the law of slavery
was, and how much the unity or disunity may have changed over
time. The first matter is variance in the extent of penetration of the
peculiar institution by judicial rule-application in different southern states. The second matter concerns continuities and discontinuities between the area that occupied us in Part Two of this Article,
manumission, and other major areas of decisionmaking, chiefly
criminal trials of blacks and of whites who unlawfully harmed
blacks. The third matter pertains to continuities and discontinuities
between the doctrines and techniques, as well as the values underlying them, of southern judges shaping the law of slavery and of northern judges shaping both the law of slavery and the law of northern
economic development.
If the southern law of slavery was entirely unified, if indeed it
is convincing to speak of a southern law of slavery rather than of the
laws of fifteen different slave states, then we should expect to see
roughly similar legal penetration of the customs and brutalities of
slavery, as well as reasonably similar judicial dispositions of the
case-law questions posed. The kinds of questions raised, the protection (or lack of it) afforded to slaves, and the styles of jurisprudence
displayed by the judges, ought to be fairly similar. So, too, should
655. See, e.g., 1806 VmGMM SENATE JOuRNA 67 (the critical vote on the 1806 Virginia
statute requiring emancipated slaves to leave the state, on pain of being sold back into
slavery, was passed eight votes affirmative, six votes negative); 1849 TENNESSEE SENATE
JouRNE 25 (on November 2, 1849, the Tennessee Senate vote to require emancipated slaves
under 50 years of age to leave the state was close-13 to 11).

19791

REASON OF SLAVERY

191

be the likelihood that a controversy arising out of slavery should
reach the supreme court.
To be sure, we should not be surprised to see differences at the
outset caused by variations in the inheritance from pre-nineteenthcentury judicial systems and decisions, as well as differences caused
by variations in rate of settlement (by population, and into slavery)
among the older and newer slave states. Nonetheless, similarities in
penetration ought to increase over time. As the Civil War drew nigh,
divergences ought to have diminished, if not to nothing, at least to
substantially less than they were at the time of the Missouri Compromise or the Mexican War. Penetration should have tended to
equalize over time. Two types of evidence suggest, however, that
this was by no means entirely true."' Let us now turn to this evidence.
The first type of evidence pertains to the kinds of disputes that
appellate judiciaries did or did not address, as well as to the curious
ways that they sometimes resolved the disputes, including the political values that seemingly engendered the results reached. That
type of evidence goes to the quality of penetration. The second type
of evidence pertains to the quantity of penetration. How likely was
it that a slavery dispute would reach the appellate courts? Most
significantly, did the various slavery jurisdictions converge or diverge on this matter as the nineteenth century wore on?
As to the qualitative issue, I shall state flatly what I have been
strongly intimating all along-that somehow Tennessee slavery jurisprudence was substantially different from Virginia or Georgia
slavery jurisprudence. Quite apart from the manumission cases we
have discussed and the inclination of Tennessee judges to support
the Union while the Georgians and the post-1858 Virginia majority
were tearing it apart, the jurisdictions differed primarily in three
jurisprudential areas, two of which I have discussed on another
occasion. One area is criminal trials of slaves. The Virginia court of
appeals lacked criminal jurisdiction until the 1850's, and the Georgia court was, with the exception of the one anti-secession judge,
less inclined than most Deep South jurisdictions to extend fair
trials.' The second area is the protection of blacks against both
656. I say this without, let me emphasize, intending to argue that there was no similarity at all, or that the dissimilarities increased over time.
657. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 28 Ga. 604 (1859). Linton Stephens dissented from Lumpkin's and Benning's refusal to award a new trial to a slave convicted as principal for a murder
when the evidence tended to prove that someone else had inflicted the mortal blow, and that
defendant was an inadvertent accomplice. Lumpkin and Benning took the "pragmatic" position that whether a slave be "convicted as principal in the first or second degree, the offense
is murder and the punishment the same . . . ." Id. at 607. Linton Stephens thought this a
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lynch law and particularly oppressive anti-free-black local ordinances."' The third area pertains to civil liability for abuse of
gross miscarriage of justice. I agree. In his view, no evidence whatsoever was admissible under
Hill's indictment
to show that the accused was guilty as principal in the second degree . . . . [Because]
[t]he indictment does not give notice of the nature of the proof, and so, does not afford
the accused opportunity to prepare his defense. He comes to trial prepared to meet the
case stated in the indictment, but he is met by a different case of which he has had no
notice.
Id. at 607-08.
Debate must have been intense in the court chambers, for after discussing the differences
between murder and manslaughter, and principals in the first and second degrees, Stephens
remarked bitterly that "I am told that this is all theory-that practicallythere is no difference
between a principal in the first and second degrees-that 'murder is murder' after all." Id.
at 610-11. Stephens agreed that there was no practical difference, but then, he observed
[s]o, too, there is no practical difference, after conviction, between a conviction for
murder and a conviction for arson in a town, but I apprehend that on the trial of an
indictment for arson, the accused would have a very practicalsurprise, if he should be
met with proof, not that he had burnt a house, but that he had killed a man.
Id. at 611. Stephens had a second objection, namely that the proof to him
clearly and confessedly shows the accused not to have been theperpetratorof the crime.
He struck no blow upon the deceased, and had nothing to do with her, but was engaged
in a scuffle with other persons, while the murderer performed his deed upon a helpless
woman. I do not think the proof shows even that the two negroes had any common intent
of murder. Their mission was probably one of lust, to be gratified peaceably if possible,
forcibly if necessary.
Id. at 612. Hill did not help the other Negro kill the woman, but "was himself engaged with
another woman, whom he neither killed nor tried to kill, and who was a witness against him
on the stand. The evidence is far from satisfying me that Hill was guilty of murder in either
degree . . . ." Id. In Stephens' view the verdict was against the evidence. "The verdict is

not the 'truth.' I do not know what more can be said against any verdict, or any better reason
for setting any verdict aside; and I think this one ought to have been set aside." Id. at 61213. I do not know what more can be said either-except that Hill convinces me that Stephens
was far more genuinely interested in fair trials than either Lumpkin or Benning, and that
southern judges were not all cut from the same cloth.
658. I have found nothing exactly equivalent in Georgia or Virginia jurisprudence to
Tennessee cases such as Kirkwood v. Miller, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 455 (1858), or Polk, Wilson
& Co. v. Fancher, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 336 (1858), or Mayor v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (1 Hum.)
707 (1848). In Kirkwood, the court objected strongly to a lynching and insisted on strict
enforcement: slaves "are property-but have souls and feelings. Those who take it upon
themselves, in periods of groundless panic, to slay and destroy, must do so at their peril." 37
Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 459. In Polk, it awarded a new trial to a lynched slave's owners, calling
the lower court's acquittal of the defendants "a mockery of justice." 38 Tenn. (1 Head) at
341. "But no man whether bond or free, is to be condemned . . . without a hearing-a fair
and impartial trial. There is neither valor nor patriotism in deeds like these." Id. at 338. In
Mayor, it struck down a Memphis 10 p.m. curfew law applying only to free blacks. The
Tennessee court said that if there had been any attempt to "enforce such an ordinance against
a free white person, public indignation would have been aroused, and the corporation would
not only have been sued to recover back the fine, but also for false imprisonment." 27 Tenn.
(1 Hum.) at 709. The free black "is not, it is true, a citizen of full privileges in our own state,
but still he is a free person . . . . The lot of the free negro is hard enough at best . . . and it

is both cruel and useless to add to his trouble by unnecessary and painful restraints in the
use of . . . liberty." Id. For a fuller discussion, see A More EquitablePast?, supra note 25,
at 229-33. But see Cooper v. Mayor, 4 Ga. 68 (1848) ("pre-Benning" Georgia case).
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slaves."'
While this is not the place for a large-scale examination of these
cases, I shall point to one that is particularly instructive because it
shows southern judges in a degree of penetration of the peculiar
institution, and in a manner of resolving the particular issue, that
goes utterly counter to conventional wisdom. The case is James v.
Drake,6 0 which arose, relative to the assumptions made by the
"dismal Whig" school, at the extraordinarily late date of September
1858. In James the one secessionist judge on the Tennessee court at
the time, Archibald Wright, spoke for a unanimous, and dominantly
Unionist, court, in holding that the hirer of a slave was liable for
failing to give the slave a small-pox vaccination. Although the hirer
vainly protested that the master should have had the slave vaccinated, and thereby prevented his falling victim to the disease, Judge
Wright stated, with Robert Caruthers and Robert MacKinney concurring, that the master's omission to do so "furnishes no excuse
whatever to the defendant.""' Notwithstanding proof that the defendant had given the slave due care as soon as he had contracted
the disease ("there is not . . the least evidence of a want of care
in the treatment . . . after he was attacked. On the contrary, . . .

Mr. James remained on his farm during the whole time of the slave's
illness, and visited him several time [sic] a day""'), Wright stated:
"[lit was gross neglect . . . not to have had him vaccinated. He

was as much bound to protect the slave from danger, and the taking
of the disease, before he was attacked, as in the treatment of him
afterwards . . . .""
Not only do I think there is nothing similar to that in the
jurisprudence of the positive-good slavery southern courts, I do not
imagine that there is anything quite like that describing the duties
of employer to employee in the cases arising from "wage-unslavery"
in the North. Moreover, James supports the argument I have been
espousing about the development of the Tennessee court in particular, and more generally about the pitfalls of trying to subsume too
much of the southern case law under the moral rubric of twentieth659. This is an area that, until recently, prodded by the comments of Tushnet and
Levinson, I had put largely aside, not as wholly unimportant, but as less important than those
that previously concerned me. This may, I shall have to concede, have been a mistake.
Notwithstanding the analytic difficulty that these cases pose (sorting out the "interest of
master" from the "interest of slave") and that led me to drop them from top priority, they
do comprise a large fraction of slavery litigation.
660. 24 Thomp. Cas. 170 (1858), excerpted in 2 H. CArrERALL, supra note 14, at 567-68.
661. Id. at 172, excerpted in 2 H. CATTERA. at 567-68.
662. Id. at 173, excerpted in 2 H. CATTERAu. at 567-68.
663. Id. at 172, excerpted in 2 H. CATrERAu. at 567-68.
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century values that we usually use to castigate those of the nineteenth century. James should make us more cautious than we sometimes are about estimating the extent of unity among the jurisdictions in terms of quality of penetration.
With respect to the quantity or degree of penetration, the more
unified the law of southern slavery was, the more similar", ought to
have been the probabilities that the various state supreme courts
would ultimately be appealed to in order to resolve slavery issues.
Further, we might reasonably anticipate that whatever the quantitative differences among the states in propensity to appeal in the
formative years of slavery jurisprudence, as the nineteenth century
went on unification of slavery law would be reflected in at least two
patterns: (1) convergence among the slave states as to the legislatively and precedentially determined conditions of appeal; and (2)
in consequence, increasing similarity with respect to changes in the
rates of appeal (and intervention) over time. But did either convergence come to pass-if, that is, similarity did not obtain from the
start? Table XII, which is nothing more than a listing of the twenty
heaviest annual slavery jurisprudence dockets, suggests not. The
ten heaviest antebellum dockets all appeared in just two states'
supreme courts-seven in North Carolina's and three in Louisiana's.
What is the result if we expand our examination to the top
twenty? North Carolina and Louisiana continue to "dominate,"
with four and three of the second ten, respectively. The North Carolina court had a fifty-five percent majority of the top twenty. Add
Louisiana's six, or thirty percent, and we have accounted for eightyfive percent of the total with two judiciaries. Only four states of the
fifteen slaveholding jurisdictions even "achieved" one entry among
the top twenty dockets. Only three achieved more than one entry.
It is unlikely that one would obtain these results by random
chance."'
664. It goes without saying that one needs to make due allowances for variations in the
amount of judicial intervention encouraged by legislation and by variations in precedents.
But I suspect that such allowances would not account for most of the variation that is to be
found.
665. Nor do the odds improve if we correct for relative black populations and for courts
whose jurisdiction was limited so as to exclude some of the types of cases that might arise.
The former correction does not help much inasmuch as, in the pertinent decades of the 1840's
and 1850's, North Carolina stood fourth and sixth respectively among the slaveholding states,
and Louisiana stood similarly seventh and seventh. The latter correction is no more helpful
since the consequence is to give only a partial explanation for Virginia jurisprudence up to
1850 and for Georgia jurisprudence up to 1845, which made it into the "top twenty" shortly
thereafter anyway.
Let me be cautious. I do not want to argue that minor differences in raw (or corrected)
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We ought to explore this quantitative disparity further, particularly as to changing patterns over time. Tables XIII and XIV omit
three of the seceding states (Florida, Arkansas, and Texas) because
their late settlement and decade-discontinuous slave populations,
coupled with the novelties of a supreme court in frontier territory,
could produce peculiar statistics. The data depicted in Tables XIII
and XIV suggest a tentative answer to the question whether in the
sufficiently long-settled slave states, tendencies to litigate to the
highest appellate level converged or diverged over time. Table XIII
presents the raw numbers of appeals per year to each high court.
Table XIV displays the results of a crude measure"' I have worked
out to correct for population. The measure shows the chances, per
100,000, that a case involving a black would be appealed to the
highest state appellate court. As a glance at Table XIV will verify,
the variation in the measure as applied to the various state supreme
courts is intriguing.
numbers of this sort prove, without more, that there were significant differences in degree of
the law's penetration of the peculiar institution. Less able judges, after all, might fail to
resolve simple issues, thereby creating more litigation-although both Tushnet's verdict on
the quality of the North Carolina judges and our own explanations seem to rule out this
explanation. (While Tushnet and I might disagree as to the precise ranking of the North
Carolina judges in terms of ability, we would certainly agree that they were among the most
able.) So too, Tushnet's view of the advantages to efficient judicial decisionmaking afforded
by the existence in Louisiana of a prior code does not help explain Louisiana's heavy dockets.
Finally, while the oft-noted positive correlation between urbanization and tendency to litigate
may help explain the heavy dockets in Louisiana (with New Orleans), it is of little use for
the Tarheel State, which lacked any large city before the Civil War.
666. Though crude, it is here adequate given the limited point I wish to make and the
extreme interstate disparities that would emerge equally plainly were we to use a more
sophisticated demographic measure. This measure of "propensity to litigate to the top,"
which I am going to argue is a measure of the law's tendency, state-by-state, to penetrate
the peculiar institution, is nothing more than the number of appeals per decade divided by
the midpoint-straight-line black population and multiplied (so that we do not become confused by decimal points) by 100,000.
This crude measure is similar to that used in discussing Hindus' calculations in Part One
supra. A more sophisticated measure would, besides separating out free Negro and slave
cases: (a) lag the population estimates relative to the caseload (since, for example, if on the
average it took three years for a North Carolina case to get from the commission of the alleged
wrong through the lower courts and up to the supreme court, then the caseload of 1841-1850
should be related to the population of 1838-1847); (b) separate out the nonadult population
"not at risk;" and (c) employ a continuous rate of increase function. For a useful related
discussion, see Eblen, On the NaturalIncreaseof Slave Populations,in RACE AND SLAvERY iN
THE WEsTmRN HEMISPHERE: QUANTiTATIVE SrumEs 211-18 (S. Engerman & E. Genovese eds.
1974).
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TABLE XII
THE TWENTY HEAVIEST ANNUAL
DOCKETS OF SLAVERY APPELLATE CASES

Number of
Slavery Cases
Occuring in
a Given Year

State Supreme
Court(s) in
Which Occuring

Year(s)

52
50
48
42
41
39
39
38
38
37

North Carolina
Louisiana
North Carolina
North Carolina
Louisiana
North Carolina
North Carolina
Louisiana
North Carolina
North Carolina

1859
1860
1850
1849
1841
1855
1858
1856
1857
1851

36
36
36
36
35
35
35
35
34
34

Louisiana
North Carolina
North Carolina
Georgia
Louisiana
Tennessee
Georgia
North Carolina
North Carolina
Louisiana

1851
1853
1856
1858
1844
1858
1860
1860
1854
1857
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BUCKS, P
NUmsix Or APPEALSCASESCONCERNING

YEAR, 1801-1860
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1801
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I

1840

r

1850

1860

1850

1860

MISSISSIPPI

10

C

1840
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C
20
e

SOUTH CAROLINA
10

.~
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0

N
0
1801

1810

1820

1830

1840

1850
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N

NORTH CAROLINA

40
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1801

N

1810
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I

A

V
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1850

'

VIRGINIA

1860

198

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:7

TABLE XIV
APPEALSOFCASESCONCERNING
BLACKS
STANDARDIZEDFOR POPULATION, BY DECADES
1801-1860

120

North
Carolina

100
Louisiana

80

Alabama

60

40

Carolina

20
Virginia

18011810

18211830
Decades

18311840

18411850

18511860
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Let us consider this briefly by comparing Tennessee and the
three South Atlantic jurisdictions functioning during the first decade of the nineteenth century, and then by comparing all eight
states over the ensuing decades up to the Civil War. I suggest that
the various states' statistics point to different patterns of penetration. At the outset of the nineteenth century, standardized litigation
rates in the three Atlantic states are fairly similar, with Tennessee's
rate somewhat higher. But then what happens? The Virginia rate
remains essentially static for the next half-century. South Carolina's rate doubles by the 1831-1840 decade and then tails off
slightly. Tennessee's and North Carolina's rates describe an entirely
different course, both climbing-the one, of course, more rapidly
than the other-throughout the antebellum decades. By the end of
the antebellum period North Carolina litigation is occurring at
roughly the same rate as Louisiana's, much higher than other
states', while Tennessee and Alabama wind up close together, occupying a middle-high ground. Georgia, Mississippi, and South
Carolina cluster below that, and Virginia remains distinctively at
the bottom.
It does not do to push the data too hard in making fine distinctions. For example, for two reasons I am not at all sure whether the
declines in five states during the 1850's, or the gains in three are
significant. The first and lesser reason is that the data base may give
a larger underestimate in some states than in others."' The second
and major reason is that, with the exceptions of South Carolina and
Virginia, the raw number of cases continued to climb in each state
supreme court. And, as a cursory examination of the various courts'
reports attests, it is possible that many of these courts were reaching
a point of case overload, primarily in nonslavery cases." Nonetheless, some gross distinctions, including those we have made, probably are valid. Consider thus that during the 1850's the likelihood
that a case involving a North Carolina black would reach the state
supreme court was, corrected for population, eight and one-half
times as great as the likelihood that a case involving a Virginia black
would do the same."' I suspect that we would be on fairly safe
667. The data base is simply a count of all state cases concerning blacks in H.
CATrERALL, supranote 14. It is possible, though not probable, that the percentage of Catterall's omissions of cases varies significantly from state to state.
668. By "overload" I mean relative to what the judges were used to-not relative to
caseloads typical of the late-twentieth century.
669. During the 1851-1860 decade the North Carolina court heard 374 cases concerning
blacks; the Virginia court heard 69. Dividing the black-population-standardized figure (110)
for the more litigious state by that for the less litigious state (13) = 8.46. The reader may
calculate comparisons among other states similarly. It should be understood, however, that
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ground if we tentatively concluded that the two states experienced
quite different trends in the appellate law's penetration of the peculiar institution.
Let us now turn again to the qualitative side of the issue of
southern law's unification-specifically to the question of interjurisdictional doctrinal similarity and dissimilarity. Although we
have already examined in detail a major area of doctrinemanumission-we have yet to summarize the area so that we can
decide how much unity there was. Table XV provides this summary for the three states that we have focused upon as well as for
the other two states to whose judicial decisions we have frequently
alluded, the two Carolinas. The summary sets forth the courts' dispositions of thirteen manumission issues. On only one of the thirteen did all five courts agree with each other-assuring fair hearings
of manumission claims. On ten of the other twelve issues, not only
was there dissensus among the jurisdictions, but there also was
dissensus within individual states' appellate systems. Considered
thus statically, there does not appear to be a very high degree of
unity. What happens if we consider changes over time? Did greater
unity of manumission doctrine emerge as the Civil War approached,
and was it a unity of greater hostility to manumission?
It is certainly true that some southern courts, or at least their
majorities, became more defensive of slavery. We saw that defensiveness in the Virginia court of 1858, just as we saw it when the
Georgia chief justice worked up to the point of persuading the state
legislature to change the law in an anti-freedom direction. So too,
the Mississippi and Alabama courts turned, both in 1859, toward
greater defensiveness. We need to be careful, however, not to attribute too much to these changes in direction. With respect to the
Mississippi court, the change came in a two-to-one split decision,
while the change of the Alabama court was its second change of
direction in five years. Until 1854 the Alabama court had required
that to be valid, a manumittory bequest had to direct out-of-state
freedom, although, unlike the Georgia court, it did not make dubious formalistic distinctions in examining the word order of
"liberate and remove" wills. In 1854, a late date for a move towards
favoring freedom, the Alabama Supreme Court explicitly overruled
an earlier case 70 and directed executors to free slaves out-of-state
although this Table is drawn as a line graph (in order to give a sense of inter-decade trends),
the data displayed are derived from decade totals. Thus, to read a particular state's decadecase-figure the reader should examine the mid-decade dots.
670. Prater's Adm'r v. Darby, 24 Ala. 496 (1854), overrulingTrotter v. Blocker, 6 Port.
269 (1838).
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TABLE XV
UNITY AND DISUNITY IN MANUMISSION JURISPRUDENCE

Dispositions by Various Courts
Issue
Should the Judiciary:

Georgia

Tennessee

Virginia

N.C.

S.C.

Assure fair hearings?

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Allow damages for wrongful
detention in slavery?

-

yes

no

-

yes

Restrict the presumption
against freedom of
skin-color?

-

yes

split

yes

split

Permit "relaxed" rules of
evidence in relation to
hearsay?

-

yes

split

yes

yes

etc.?

no

yes

split

yes

split

Rule for freedom where
the location stipulated
is impossible (send to
another destination) ?

no

yes

split

yes

split

Award liberty to increase
of statu liberi?

-

yes

split

no

Rule for freedom against
allegations of testator's
insanity? Allow nuncupative
wills?

-

yes

split

Permit master to skirt
state laws by freeing out
of state?

no

yes

split

"Wink at" quasiemaneipations?

no

yes

Permit slave to elect
freedom, or destination?

no

Observe comity in giving
effect to other states' laws
on freedom and inheritance
of property by freedman?

Presume freedom from
lapse of time, ignore
defects in the manumission
documents, court-records,

-

split

usually
no

no

split

yes

yes to 1858
no after

yes

split

no

yes

yes

yes

split

no

yes

yes

yes

Permit manumission society
to receive bequest of
slaves and take to free
state or nation?

-
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although the relevant documents made no mention of any such
intention. It was on that issue that the court reverted five years later
to its earlier doctrinal position."' Yet at the same time that these
shifts were occurring, the courts of four other states-North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas"n-were explicitly rejecting these doctrinal shifts. In sum, it requires more capacity than
I have for forciiig untidy facts into neat rows to conclude that by the
eve of the Civil War there was a well-unified law of manumission.
What about the question of unity-or better, relationshipbetween the manumission area and other areas of slave law? I
will just make two propositions based upon my own earlier work.
First, in terms of results in criminal trials of blacks, there was considerably greater similarity among the various jurisdictions than we
have seen in manumission jurisprudence. But, and second, it does
not follow that consequently there was an autonomous criminal law
of slavery. The criminal law of slavery of one southern state not only
increasingly resembled, as the nineteenth century went on, in its
procedural essentials, the criminal law procedures of another southern state. Both also increasingly resembled criminal procedures in
nonslaveholding jurisdictions and modern criminal procedures. If,
in terms of what it punished, southern law differed considerably, in
methods of reaching a verdict, it differed much less. Indeed, it appears that in contrast to the manumission cases (in which the northern courts were leaving the eighteenth-century legal station at a
rapid rate, while some southern courts were inching forward, others
were staying put, and still others were being rammed into reverse
by fire-eating judges), in the criminal procedures area the southern
courts were all leaving the eighteenth-century procedural station,
albeit at different rates. Moreover, some courts passed through the
expansive territory of common law protection in the absence of statutory law, while others skirted that landscape assiduously.
I expect that at this juncture some doubting Thomas of a reader
is going to raise four objections about the logical garden-path I am
attempting to lead us along. Objection #1: Surely the motives of
southern ("slavery-loving") judges were very different from those of
northern ("freedom-loving") judges. Objection #2: What about the
differences in severity of punishments prescribed for whites, slaves,
and free blacks? Objection #3: The most important procedural rule
671. See Evans v. Kittrell, 33 Ala. 449 (1859), overruling Prater's Adm'r v. Darby, 24
Ala. 496 (1854).
672. For a discussion of the Texas court's manumission rulings, see Texas Supreme
Court, supra note 25, at 630-37. Note also that the generalization in text applies to the
majority of the South Carolina appellate law judges, and not to the majority of appellate
chancellors in equity.
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difference has been omitted, one that fundamentally set "Reason of
Slavery" apart from free-state jurisprudence-the rule that barred
blacks from testifying against whites. Objection #4: Surely there
were some significant differences among southern judges with respect to criminal procedures for whites and blacks.
I have responses to all four objections, but I am going to defer
my response to Objection #1 until the next section, because the
matter of motivation is best handled in conjunction with the questions posed earlier pertaining to the law as a reflection of master
class oppression and to the problem of just or unjust judicial intentions. I have four responses to Objection #2: (1) The different penalties were primarily legislatively imposed differences that we should
not attribute to judge or jury, save to the extent that differences
accrued from discretionary sentencing. (2) We are principally concerned here with judicial, not legislative, behavior. (3) Following
from our discussion in Part One of the European penal tradition, it
simply is not clear that if defendant A was fined, defendant B was
jailed, and defendant C was whipped, all three for the same offense,
then A always came off best, B next best, and C worst. (For example, if A, who happened to earn $300 a year in 1850 dollars, was fined
$100, while B received six months in prison, and C received thirtynine lashes, then it seems plain, from what I know about incomes,"'
prices, prison conditions, and whipping practices in the 1850's, that
C well may have come out ahead.) (4) Addressing the question of
judge and jury inclinations, where (as in Nashville, Tennessee)
there was something close to "inter-race and inter-crime parity,"
the punishments doled out simply do not appear enormously different between the races.
My response to Objection #3 is that there was nothing uniquely
southern about a procedural rule barring testimony by nonwhite
against white." Doubts about the wisdom of extending to "lesser
100 (1970) ("free white
673. R. STAROBIN, INDUSTRIAL SLAVERY IN THE OLD SoUT
workers in the South between 1800 and 1861 earned on the average about . . . $310 per
year."). See also D. Scuos, HIRED HANDS AND PLowsors 254-66 (1975) (discussion of northern
agricultural workers' hours and incomes). "The length of the working day approximated
twelve hours . . . although the working day's length in New York and Illinois was thirteen
to fourteen hours . . . . Several states followed the lead of New Hampshire in 1847, legalizing
the ten-hour day . . . ." Id. at 254-55. Compare O'Neall's 1848 Digest recommendations for
reducing by statute the fifteen hours summer and fourteen hours winter working days for
slaves to twelve and ten hours respectively. J. O'NEAu, supra note 305, at ch. II. Daily wages
(without board) for farm laborers in the North in 1850 varied from 78 cents in Ohio and
Indiana to $1.37 in Minnesota, with, according to my calculations, a median of 89 cents (New
York, Michigan, and New Jersey). D. Scuos, supra, at 259.
674. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854). For later nineteenth-century white sensibilities on the issue, see North Pac. Presbyterian Bd. of Missions v. Ah Won, 18 Or. 339, 15 P.
280 (1890).
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breeds without the Law" 7 the right to testify that could bring them
fully "in the law" were not limited to the South. It was, furthermore, not a slave-state but a free-state judiciary that so imaginatively expanded a prohibition against one minority group to encompass another. Judge Murray of California used the "new science" of
ethology to prevent Orientals from testifying;"' Judge Moncure of
Virginia protested against using the same science to prohibit blacks
from making a choice. 7
To Objection #4, I have, not a series of counter-arguments, but
an oblique agreement and a generalization. In the judicial shaping
of southern criminal law there was one critical attitudinal cleavage
and a host of lesser related ones. With few exceptions the judges who
came down on one side of that cleavage also were the judges who
extended the benefit of the procedural doubts in other matters, who
supported Union over secession and nullification, and who gave the
benefit of the doubt to the slave seeking freedom. Conversely, and
notwithstanding any pretensions to the effect that slavery's crowning glory was its equitable treatment of slaves on trial, with few
exceptions, the judges who settled the manumission issues against
the blacks seeking freedom were also the judges who, at the margins
in criminal procedures, ruled against the rights of the defendant and
who ruled that only statutory law protected the slave. To say that
is to state the primary cleavage-which had little to do with reasoning by analogy or reasoning by category, but rather was delineated
by judicial responses to the substantive issue whether common law
protected the slave in the absence of explicit statutory protection.
That was in effect the southern transposition of the issue whether
natural law and rights had any force in a slave society, and that in
the unique Tennessee transposition became the question whether,
given an apparently contravening statutory provision, natural justice and common law were controlling.
To give a few illustrations, thus it was that: (1) The single
Georgia dissent on the issue of fair trials of slaves was that of the
lone post-Lincoln's-election Unionist, that of Linton Stephens in
Hill v. State.7 8 (2) The weakest Florida position on coerced confessions came, not from the dominantly Unionist and northern-born
judges of the 1845-1850 period, but from the southern-born judges
of the years 1851-1853.17" (3) The Georgia judges refused to award a
675.
1885-1932,
676.
677.
678.
679.

R. Kipling, Recessional, stanza 4, line 4, reprinted in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE:
at 380 (1934).
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854).
See Moncure's dissent in Williamson v. Coalter, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 394 (1858).
See note 657 supra.
It was a minority position taken by Chief Justice Wright, who, in Simon v. State,
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new trial for murder of an overseer when one of the jurors prior to
empanelling had said that he thought the defendant ought to be
hanged, whereas the Tennessee judges reversed when nothing more
corrupting to the jury's purity had occurred than separation during
empanelling and being permitted to go home for a weekend when
the trial was in progress."s' (4) The North Carolina judge who dissented from the court majority's decision that a slave whose (black)
friend was set upon by a white had a right to aid his friend, rather
than standing by, was the judge who earlier had laid out the most
absolutist doctrines of slavery of any mid-century judge on that
bench.'
So much for the question of the unity and autonomy of the
southern law of slavery-a law that I see as much less unified and
autonomous, at least in its case law, than as disparate, and as
displaying as much continuing dependence on the larger English
and western legal and political traditions as it did autonomy. So
much for the "what" of the "law of slavery," or as I would prefer it,
of the "laws of slavery"-laws in which two unresolved dichotomies
struggled on-the rule of law versus the supremacy of whites over
blacks, and the black man as human versus the black man as property. Let us now turn to the issue posed by Objection #1. That issue
fundamentally amounts to the "why" of that law-to its purposes.
B.

The Law's Intent and Functions: Using and Abusing the
English Langauge in Order To Generalize
My purpose in this final section of the Article is to explore
exactly what we mean when we ask about the intent of the law of
slavery or, as in Objection #1 above, about the motivations of the
judges who administered it. I do so because the language we use in
answering our queries sometimes strikes me as unintentionally a bit
careless, making assumptions that ought to be thought about and
functioning as both prelude and vehicle to generalizations about
law, society, and economy in pre-Civil War America that resonate
nicely but tell us little about the past. To say that is appropriately
to restate a persistent concern of this Article, for the problem of
meaning reaches its most acute stage when we try to generalize
about slavery law's purposes, functions, and external relationships.
5 Fla. 285 (1853), saw no undue coercion in a confession induced by the suggestion of the city
mayor to a slave in jail with a lynch mob outside that they might not hang him if he would
confess and turn state's evidence. The court majority rejected both this confession and a
confession made the next day to the slave's master.
680. Compare Jim v. State, 15 Ga. 535 (1854) with Wesley v. State, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.)
502 (1851).
681. State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391, 421 (1849) (Ruffin, C.J., dissenting).
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Let me paraphrase as questions four generalizations that one
runs across in the literature on law and slavery. Putting them in the
interrogative will help us to focus on problematic aspects of their
meaning. With the same purpose in mind, I shall italicize words
that I find particularly troublesome and shall discuss.
A. Did the law of slavery reflect the ideology of the master
class?
B. Was it an instrument of racial oppression?
C. Was it ever intended to be just?
D. Were its judges (northern and/or southern) collaboratorsin
perpetuatingthe most brutal socioeconomic system of modern
times?
I expect that many late-twentieth-century students of the history of race relations in the United States, if they were willing to
give quick answers, if they were not on their guard, and if they had
not been alerted by seeing particular words italicized, would answer
"yes" to the first two questions, "no" to the third, and declare their
willingness to agree to the fourth oi the condition that "most brutal" be changed to "one of the most brutal." My inclination is to
give two sets of answers to the above questions. The first set consists
in saying that, in a very vague sense, the short answer to each of
the first three questions is: "Yes. The law did reflect the master
class' ideology, was an instrument of oppression, and was sometimes-perhaps frequently-intended to be just." To the fourth
question my answer would be: "No, because most of the judges did
a very poor job of perpetuating the peculiar institution, if that was
their aim, and because slavery, though very brutal, was far from the
most brutal sociopolitical system of modern times."
My second, and more serious, set of answers begins by objecting
to the wording of the questions. They may be characteristic of the
historiography of slavery in general and of its legal institutions in
particular, reflecting both moral outrage at the American polity's
continuing inability to solve its interracial problems and the recent
determination of American legal history to break away from its
traditional lack of concern for the inequitable distributive consequences of statutory and case law. Yet, moral outrage and distributive concern are no sufficient substitute for analytic precision. For
the historian of the law of slavery it may be tempting to imagine
that he does his duty to the present by avenging the wrongs of
yesteryear in his reconstruction of the past. The first duty as historian, however, remains to understand the past on its own terms.
Understanding the southern legal past requires attempting to
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lessen six muddles in the language that we use in speaking of the
law of slavery. These are what we mean by speaking of: (1) the "law
of slavery;" (2) the law as "reflecting" something else; (3) the law
as "an instrument" of something else; (4) the law as "intending"
some effect, result or (reflexively) state of being, for example, being
just; (5) the law as representing (dominant) public opinion; and (6)
the law's administrators as collaborators in a social system that we
do not approve of. I have difficulties with the ways in which we
frequently speak of all six.
The first muddle I perceive arises when we speak of the "law
of slavery." Do we mean that some single entity called the "law of
slavery" had a real and discrete existence in a past and real antebellum world? Or do we mean only that we are, for convenience, summing up in a single phrase many different statutes and cases in
different jurisdictions and existing at different times, because we
would find it terribly cumbersome to convey what we meant if we
always had to enumerate exhaustively everything that we were referring to? If that is all we mean, if we stay clearly aware that the
existence of the "law of slavery" is real, if anywhere, only in our
minds and on the printed paper, and if we think of it only as a
convenient mental construct, then my difficulty fades away. Frequently, however, no such restricted meaning is intended. Even if
the term is initially used that way, it quickly loses its restrictions,
with unfortunate consequences. Moreover, the extraordinary number of elisions or summations the term entails warrants singular
caution.8 2 The "law of slavery" contains no less than four major
elisions and summations-of statute and case law, of place (jurisdiction), of time, and of subject matter (containing, at least, real
and personal property issues, contracts, negligence, and criminal
law). That is a sufficient number to make us cautious before attributing to it, as a unit, any characteristics, intentions, causes, or
effects.
A second muddle tends to develop when we speak of the law as
reflecting something-for example, "economic interests"-or, as in
Sentence A above, "the ideology of the master class." Let us examine Sentence A because, despite its brevity and despite the blithe682. This term is not like the phrase "the 1820 South Carolina manumission law,"
which is specific and begins to create difficulties only when we talk about its intent or its
effect. Nor is it like the phrase "Pennsylvania tort law in the 1850's," which, though summing
both laws and cases, is still reasonably clear with respect to jurisdiction, subject, and time.
Nor is it like phrases such as "property law" or "admiralty law" where at least the subject
matter or jurisdictions are explicitly or implicitly fairly well defined. It is more like "the law
of capitalism" or "the law of Europe" or "the law of nations"-all of which terms most of us
would be fairly cautious in flinging about.
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spirited fashion in which it purports significantly to link the law's
structures with sociopolitical ideals and purposes, it contains for me
two difficulties besides the one already alluded to, the elision of laws
into Law. One of these difficulties I shall -merely allude to, then
relegate to the footnotes-not because it is unimportant, not because I imagine that it arises only when we venture into the Marxism that the phrase, "ideology of the master class," vaguely smacks
of, but rather because unraveling that difficultness would lead us
far afield, profitably perhaps but at undue length."' Let me here
focus just on the verb "reflect." Perhaps my problem is just that I
am a bit slow, but even if I put aside all the dazzling ways that
"reflect" is used by historians other than in connection with the
legal history of slavery, I cannot account for the awe that the word
seemingly inspires-or what it is supposed to explain, and how. My
difficulty is this. I can think of three types of use in connection with
the antebellum South that I can understand, wherein what is being
linked to what, and how, are all fairly clear. Let me give two instances of each: (1) "Judge Haywood's almost illegible handwriting reflected the onset of Parkinson's disease" or, and similarly, "[als he
urged his men into battle at Chickamauga, Henry Benning's polished spurs reflected the brilliant southern sun;" (2) "Judge Taylor's opinion in Trustees of the Quaker Society of Contentnea v.
683. Even if I could make the somewhat optimistic assumption that all could agree as
to the constituent members of "the master class," the concept of ideology needs greater
specification as to its shape and functions than historians of slavery and of American law
frequently give to it. Saying that master class ideology infused the law of slavery is not by
itself very helpful. The problem is somewhat analogous to trying to explain southern judicial
behavior by characterizing the judicial role as both giving rise to, and providing the opportunity for, reducing "cognitive dissonance" in the psyches of the judges. That is to say, speaking
vaguely of a cognitive-dissonance-reducing mechanism as explaining southern judicial decisionmaking is not very helpful unless we are clear that such dissonance exists, about the
sources of the dissonance, and about the manner in which the reduction is achieved.
Making the concept of ideology analytically useful requires specifying how one is thinking
about it on at least five counts: (1) what one is implicitly or explicitly opposing it to (is there
such a thing as nonideological thinking or, do different types of ideological thinking clash with
each other?); (2) whether one is thinking of it as deliberately misleading, as inadvertently
misleading, or more innocently as merely simplifying (is it accompanied by mens rea?); (3)
what its principal function is (is it to mislead, to persuade someone else, to further one's own
interests, or to reduce one's own psychological strain?); (4) from whom and to whom it is
primarily directed (is it a matter more of institution-to-person communication, or of person
A communicating with person B, or of person A talking to himself?); and (5) how it affects
the case law result (does it dictate or control its substance, or does it merely affect the
substance and/or the style?).
That is not a small set of needed specifications, and working them out adequately would
require a lengthy essay in itself. Consequently, I propose here only to note the analytic
problem. See also Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System in IDEOLOGY AND ITS
DiscoNrERTS 47 (D. Apter ed. 1964).
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Dickenson" reflected primarily concern for legislative intent and
secondarily anxiety about slave uprisings," or, and similarly,
"Judge Nash's opinion in Mayo v. Whitson' reflected his annoyance with the 'birds of prey;'" and (3) "The contrasting manumission decisionmaking of the Georgia and the Tennessee courts reflected the different attitudes of those courts toward the values of
'humanity' and 'preservation of slavery,'" or, and not quite
similarly, "Joseph Lumpkin's becoming Georgia's Chief Justice
reflected his will to dominate the Georgia court." I have put these
three pairs in order of increasing abstraction. While I find it easier
to comprehend and-hypothetically at least-to determine the
truth or falsehood of the first pair than of the second, and of the
second than of the third, they all appear to me more or less manageable as propositions about the past. That is to say, I can set out to
determine whether I am right or wrong as to my explanation for
Haywood's handwriting (which was atrocious), and to verify
whether Benning had spurs and whether Chickamauga was fought
on a sunny day-all quite easily. Whether or not I succeed, there is
not much doubt as to what constitutes appropriate evidence. I can
also think fairly easily about the probabilities of the assertions
about Judges Taylor and Nash. Even if my conclusions are wrong,
they are susceptible to discussion with other legal historians. I can
attach some meaning to the propositions contained in the third pair,
though of course they are more difficult than those contained in the
second pair. All three pairs seem to me somehow different, as propositions, from Sentence A. Why? Because, and despite the circumstance that all except the first pair are metaphors rather than plain,
common, garden-variety statements, nonetheless each fulfills at
least one of the following conditions: (1) The meaning of "reflects"
is clear, its functions are literally plain (what spurs do when they
reflect does not puzzle us). (2) The meaning of "reflect" is, though
metaphorical, still fairly clear (we can read the words of Taylor's or
Nash's decisions and determine whether they seem to manifest the
quality, tone, or content that the predicate assumes the subject
would have if the statements are true). (3) The subjects and objects
are discrete, clearly bounded, if no longer extant, "singular" entities
(despite the circumstance that we have before us only their
"historical tracks," there is not much difficulty determining at what
point Taylor stopped and "non-Taylor" began, or which was a
Lumpkin opinion and which was not). (4) Though not singular enti684. 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 189 (1827).
685. 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 231, 239 (1855).
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ties, they are still relatively well-bounded entities (it is not too
taxing to determine which persons sat on the Tennessee court, and
which did not, or which were, and which were not, manumission
decisions). (5) Though abstract and collective terms, they are still
marginally well-bounded sets of phenomena (for example, phenomena that together we recognize as going to preserve slavery, or as
indicating a will to dominate).
The difficulty with Sentence A is that it fulfills none of these
conditions: what ''reflected" means is not clear, nor are the boundaries of "the law of slavery" and of "ideology." Yet, and this-is what
always astounds me when I find sentences of a similar sort in the
literature on slavery or on its legal history, not infrequently the
authors of such sentences appear to believe that the "truth value"
of such sentences is, if not identical to those of my first pair, at any
rate not much more uncertain than those of my second and third
pairs. By contrast, what I think I am reading or hearing is not that
a well-bounded (X) of whose beginning and end I am fairly clear,
was in some well-bounded fashion linked dependently (for that is
what "reflect" abstracts into) to some well-bounded (Y). What
I think I am reading or hearing is that some (X), about whose beginnings and ends the statement's maker is much less clear than
he thinks he is, is being placed in some very vague dependent relationship with (Y), whose beginning and ends are equally unclear.
Now I do not mean to suggest that it is quite out of the question
that such (X)'s and (Y)'s and their predicate relationships could not
ever be reasonably well bounded. I suggest only that in practice they
do not seem to be. Consequently, I am left in a verbal muddle.
Speaking about the law as "an instrument" of something else
appears to be an almost equally popular habit when it comes to
"understanding the greater significance of legal decisions," when it
comes to forging links from law to society, economy, and polity.
There appear to me to be two current habitual ways of speaking
about the law as an instrument. One is very similar to "reflects"
with respect to the muddles that I perceive in its usage. Does Sentence B mean, for example, that the law was "an instrument" of
racial oppression (begging, for the purpose of this discussion, the
meaning of "racial oppression") in the same way that any of the
following were "instruments?": (1) in the way that the piano of the
antebellum Louisiana composer, Louis Moreau Gottschalk, was
"the instrument" on which he composed his Opus 67, Grand Tarantelle for Piano and Orchestra;"' (2) in the way that the New Orleans
686. Louis Moreau Gottschalk, born in New Orleans in 1829 and died (while on tour)
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slaves of the first modern chess master, Paul Morphy, were "the
instruments" by which he developed his skill at the Ruy Lopez
opening;" or (3) in the way that the whip of a recently much written
about Louisiana slaveowner, Bennet H. Barrow, and his slaves were
the "instruments" of his having on September 4, 1837, "a general
Whiping frollick [sic]?""' Often it seems to me that such is what
the historian assumes when he speaks of the law as an instrument
of racial oppression. But for almost exactly the same reasons that I
have spelled out concerning Sentence A, Sentence B leaves me in a
muddle.
The other recently popular way of speaking about nineteenthcentury American law and "instruments" (that described by the
contrast between legal formalism and legal instrumentalism) deserves more attention for two reasons. One is the circumstance that
so speaking has produced some interesting ways of organizing the
data of those laws. The other reason springs from the intimate relationship between such organization of the data and the concept of
development (about which as I have earlier indicated I am, perhaps
inordinately, suspicious). Unfortunately, deservingness cannot here
be justly rewarded without, again, unduly prolonging this Article.
Hence I shall have to limit myself to two types of comments about
this contrast between two nineteenth-century jurisprudential styles,
one formalist and the other instrumentalist.
First, while I am undeniably fascinated by the research fruits
of this dichotomy, I am not altogether convinced that the dichotomy
is logically sound. What it seems to say, initially, is this: there were
two types of nineteenth-century judges (or, if you prefer, it does not
much matter for the purposes of this discussion, there were two
poles of nineteenth-century judicial behavior between which
nineteenth-century judges situated themselves). One type predominant before and after the period of "grand style jurisprudence"
(roughly 1810-1865), was essentially formalist-believing, or at least
writing decisions as if believing, that the law's truths were absolute,
in Brazil in 1869, was, it will be recalled, the South's and the United States' first serious
composer.
687. For Morphy's skill, see I. KONIG, CHEss FROM MoRPHY TO BOTWINNIK (1950). For
Morphy's "slave chessboard," go to the Andrew Jackson Restaurant in New Orleans. The
restaurant is located in Morphy's New Orleans home. Morphy, who "flourished" in the midnineteenth century is generally regarded as the first modem chessmaster-a point that seems
to have been neglected by southern culture "apologists." As far as I know, unlike the Red
Chinese protagonist in Kurt Vonnegut's, All the King's Horses, in K. VoNNEGuTr, WELcoME
TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 84 (1970), Morphy did not execute captured "slave-men."
688. Barrow's diary entry of September 4, 1837, is reproduced at H. GUTMAN, supranote
174, at 22. Barrow's diary has been a major item of evidence in the recent debate over the
humaneness, or inhumaneness, of penal practices in southern slavery.
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whether contained in natural law, common law, statutory law, or
constitution, and that the judicial task lay in discovering such
truths and applying them to specific cases. Such was formalist jurisprudence, and the formalist judicial role. The other type, predominant during most of the Marshall and Taney judicial eras, assumed
rather that judges should, at least on occasion, use their decisionmaking powers to further certain economic ends-especially industrialization and economic "development." Such was instrumentalist jurisprudence, and the instrumentalist judicial role. My problem
with this dichotomy pertains to the way in which it defines formalism and instrumentalism. Formalism is said to be "mere discovery"
of pre-obtaining truth by the judge. Instrumentalism is said to be
jurisprudence with purpose aforethought. I am not sure that such a
dichotomy amounts to a really parallel or exhaustive definition, or
that it altogether escapes the faults of those apocryphal medical
Chinese dictionaries with entries such as:
Earth: 1, a flat surface; 2, fading into the distance; 3, what aristocrats do not
get under their fingernails; 4, having nothing to do with the word "cousin;" 5,
not polysyllabic.

How so? Let us try some equivalent definitions that, as fairly as
possible, contain the main features of what exponents of the
formalist-instrumentalist dichotomy seem to be attributing to the
two types of jurisprudence:
Formalist jurisprudence: 1, current before 1800 and in the late nineteenth
century; 2, believing that the judge discovers pre-existing legal truths; 3, having no meta-legal, political, social, or economic purposes; 4, relying heavily on
natural law in cases of statutory doubt; 5, not a grand style of jurisprudence.

And, similarly:
Instrumentalist jurisprudence: 1, current when formalist jurisprudence is not
current; 2, not believing that judges discover pre-existing truths; 3, relying not
on natural law; 4, aiming to further economic development; 5, resulting in
transferring the costs of industrialization from the entrepreneur to the public,
especially the employee; 6, a stylistically grand, but perhaps ethically defective, jurisprudence.

There are several nonparallelisms here that it might well be
useful to explore, but I shall only focus on one. It is contained in the
contrast between formalist jurisprudence definition #3 and instrumentalist jurisprudence definition #4. Why is it, in other words,
assumed that if the instrumental aim is not economic development,
or somehow closely related to it, that there is no instrumentalist
aim? So thinking of instrumentalism seems to me to lock up
"instrumentalist law," without good reason, within the confines of
a particular (economic) purpose. I am not sure why that is done. A
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more closely parallel understanding would stipulate differently in
two ways. First, it *ould strip the concept of instrumentalism of any
particular purposive referents, such as economic development, and
of any particular decisionmaking styles, such as grand or not very
grand, and of any particular dispositions about the appropriate reference points, about the types of law to which instrumentalist or
noninstrumentalist judges might advert. Second, it would "allow"
the category of instrumentalist jurisprudence to any type of decisionmaking in which merely "declaring law" did not seem the
judge's only motivation. Hence, a parallel definition of instrumentalism would allow at least the following as "instrumentalist:" (1)
the recently customary definition, based on economic purpose; (2)
any other form of decisionmaking in which the judge appeared to
have some ulterior and general motive (that is, not merely a motive
of personal gain-fame, for example, or being bribed)-be it bolstering the divine right of his monarch, perpetuating slavery, or ushering in the day of the glorious people's socialist republic. All that
looks to me at least as instrumentalist as furthering American economic development, and I am not clear why anyone should think
the contrary. Formalism, by contrast, seems to me to have a different "natural verbal opposite," one that appears to have been lost
in the verbal shuffle of recent American legal history. The obvious
opposite is legal informalism-which might run the gamut from
lynch law to laziness about citations. More seriously, the "natural
and serious verbal dichotomy" would seem to me to be largely embraced in the contrast of styles, between, for example, a Marshall
and a Taney, and more importantly, in their attitudes to a constitution. I would, in other words, be much happier if we could redefine
formalism back to its natural contrast as, in this example, between
those who think that a constitution means what social, political,
and economic circumstances "need" it to mean (that is informalism) and those who think that, no matter how inconveniently, it
means what it says (formalism). So redefined, albeit redefined back
to the normal meaning of language, it would be quite possible for a
judge to be instrumental and formalist, or noninstrumental and
nonformalist, as well as the two opposite permutations of these pairs
of designations recently prominently in use.
Because I do not expect to restore the normal use of language
to legal history merely by making an essentially deductive appeal
to the virtues of plain meaning, let me give an empirical reason or
two on behalf of the same aim. Consider, thus, Joseph Lumpkin's
and John Louis Taylor's jurisprudence. If anyone's jurisprudence
was instrumentalist, it was surely Lumpkin's: he used the law as an
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instrument to his aim, defending the peculiar institution. Moreover,
he used-in the short run quite well-natural law and Christianity
(two noninstrumentalist reference-sources, if I understand correctly
recent literature based on northern legal evolution) in order to further his instrumentalist aims. Conversely, though not quite oppositely, Taylor was, in my judgment, eminently instrumentalist when
he sought to pull slavery under the common law. Taylor, like Lumpkin, used both natural law and Christianity to accomplish his
aim-but he had a very different understanding of the jurisprudential relevance of both law and religion, as well as a very different
aim.
To say this is to indicate my second empirical objection to the
current instrumentalist-formalist dichotomy. In fact, the types of
law to which appeal was or was not made by southern judges did
not dovetail neatly with whether they were instrumentalists or not.
Instrumentalism, rather than going hand-in-hand with particular
points of appeal, pulls upon whatever plausibly lies to hand.
I turn now to my fourth semantic problem, to that exemplified
in Sentence C, to the question whether the law of slavery was ever
intended to be just. The sentence contains, relative to Sentences A
and B, two new difficulties: (1) the meaning of the "law's intention;" and (2) the meaning of "being just." I am here going to finesse
the meaning of "being just" in the same fashion that I did in discussing the semantic problems of prior sentences (where I put aside
the meanings of "master class," "ideology," and "racial oppression"), and instead concentrate on the question of what is meant
when it is asserted that "the law intends" something, or when it is
asked whether "it was intended" that the law be just, or anything
else. The latter passive construction strikes me as either a hopeless
vacuity (since there is no feasible way of pinning down who, or what,
intended the law to do anything at all) or a convoluted way of
attributing intention to the law without quite saying so. I shall focus
on the latter, reading Sentence C as if it said, "Did the law intend
to be just?," for that is what frequently seems to be meant. So
reading, my muddles compound. Not only am I confronted with the
excessive summation of the first difficulty (how the laws came to be
the Law) and the vagueness attendant upon the takeover by metaphor constituting the second muddle. In addition, we are now confronted with the problem of attributing volition and purpose to an
inanimate entity. Now obviously there is a sense in which it is useful
to speak of a law as intending something. Thus, suppose a law that
states, "no slaves shall be manumitted by will," or another that
declares, "it shall henceforth be unlawful for slaves to carry fire-
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arms." I have no great difficulty understanding what is meant when
the statement is made that Statute A intends to forbid post-mortem
manumission and that Statute B intends to prevent slaves from
packing guns. I can even stay with the concept of intention when it
is said that Statute A "intends" to effectuate an anti-freedom policy
or that Statute B "intends" to diminish the likelihood of a successful slave uprising, though we should note that, as we have seen,"'
some judges might not similarly read at least Statute A. But there
is an imminent difficulty. It comes when we attribute any intention
to such an inanimate entity beyond what it literally says-its stated
intention. What we are really saying when we speak of the intent of
Statute A is that at a certain time at least a majority of two legislative houses and (absent an unsuccessful veto) the governor of a
particular state had intentions that produced a statute making certain declarations about permissible human conduct, and that after
enactment no majority of legislators felt strongly enough to vote to
repeal the statute.
I have here belabored the obvious because of what tends to
happen next in our analysis if we are not careful. It consists in
taking a number of such statutes and any cases that may have
arisen under them and "summing" them so as to emerge with a
personified Law, a collective noun that begins to display astonishingly human-like characteristics-growing, developing, and even
"intending" to effectuate this and that. All sorts of difficulties can
emerge from so personifying the Law. I shall comment on just one
type of personification here, which I choose because this personification is so tempting when we try to determine the larger significance
of our area of legal history for the study of slavery. We try to use
the entity we have come to call and personify as the "law of slavery"
to delineate the antebellum climate of opinion, or at least to aid in
that task. We look at all the bits and pieces of statute and decision
out of which we "compose" the law of slavery as a whole, and then
seek to translate the findings back to the attitudinal domain. If we
do that, however, something very curious and unfortunate is bound
to happen unless the divisions of opinion that make up the statutes
and case law were extremely close or extremely varied over time and
jurisdiction. As we go through a process of increasing abstraction in
order to get to something called the "law of slavery," we have been
dropping out the evidence of the attitudes of all dissenting minorities. Thus we fit into the law of slavery the 1835 North Carolina
constitutional convention's withdrawal of voting rights from free
689. See text accompanying notes 224-25 supra (O'Neall's reading of the South Carolina manumission statute).
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blacks as a single racially oppressive act when what in fact was there
by way of relevant opinion was a 52% to 48% split. Thus we fit into
the law of slavery the 1857 Georgia decision against allowing the
freedom of slaves bequeathed to the American Colonization SocietyO and the 1858 Virginia decisions against permitting slaves to
elect.' We put them into the imposing edifice, the "law of slavery,"
as if they are similarly repressive case law decisions. And so they
are, as legal rules. But, when we take them out to use them as
evidence about public opinion, we forget that, as opinion, they are
not at all the same. One was a unanimous registry of "anti-freedom"
views. The other, as we recall, was a three-to-two decision in the
Virginia court against election, a 60% to 40%. split-or, if you indulged me in my contrafactual hypothesis that let me include the
five special court judges who had just taken a position similar to
that of the two dissenting supreme court justices-a 70% to 30%
opinion split, in favor of election. In other words, using the law of
slavery as any index of the climate of opinion, even if we are only
talking about opinion among an elite, is a tricky business indeed,
unless we have been frightfully careful all along not to wipe out the
minor cross-currents of intent and motivation that went to make up
statute or case outcome. When we are not thus careful we readily
say things such as, "the law mirrored the ideology of the master
class," or "the law embodied the exploitative aims of the master
class," and believe that we have fully caught the judicial or legislative conscience of the matter. The results of using such summations,
however, can be very odd and very partial estimates of both public
and elite opinion in the antebellum South, not to mention judicial
aims and intentions with respect to justice and the rule of law.
The results most relevant to the concerns of this Article are of
course the effects upon how we judge the judges-for almost always
we are sufficiently Whiggish to attempt such a judgment, either
explicitly or implicitly. At times the consequence of so summing can
be to imagine that one catches the judicial conscience by asking
questions phrased as Sentence D's query, whether the judges
"collaborated" in a system of racial oppression. When we put the
question this way, two unfortunate things happen. First, we create
a verbal and historical muddle, for if anything ought to be clear by
now it is that "collaborating" is a word whose adverse effects upon
dispassionate understanding of the past on its own terms are enormous. Where we should, as historians, be going back and asking
whether the judges thought they were doing justice or not, and if so,
690. American Colonization Soc'y v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448 (1857).
691. See notes 634-42 supra and accompanying text.
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why, and if not, why not, instead we are imposing a retrospective
Whiggish verdict of guilty as presumed-a verdict whose Whiggery
is not less for its being done up in radical verbiage. As I have remarked earlier, when we engage in this sort of practice (or equally,
and to expand the point now, when we assume that those who,
analyzing the judicial past, do not fling around such verbal epithets
are engaged in mere apologetics on behalf of an unjust past), when
we project our contemporary moral righteousness back upon a complex past incapable of response, then we forget our prime duty of
understanding the past on its own terms.
Second, and to conclude this Article, we are setting up a moral
double-standard whereby we hold the past, for which we have no
culpability, to a stiffer standard than we hold the present in which
we live, and for which in varying measure we have some culpability.
Thus, when we make these sorts of muddling sentences about
judges' complicity in slavery and assume that they pose sensible
questions, we use an analytic terminology that we would rarely
think to apply seriously to more recent judges or to ourselves. Consider for a moment the following propositions, propositions whose
wordings are parallel in their moral loadings to Sentences C or D:
1. "Justice Hugo Black never intended to be just."
2. "Did Thurgood Marshall compromise himself morally by
failing to resign from the United States Supreme Court when
Nixon appointed Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger?"
3. "Do law school professors who accept grants of tenure and
high salaries as well as generous xeroxing privileges act as instruments of Wall Street for oppressing the underprivileged of academe and of the Third World?"
4. "Are the editors of this Law Review committing acts of injustice: (a) in contributing to the impending natural resources
crisis by publishing so lengthy a tome as this particular
Vanderbilt Law Review issue and thus using up paper at an
inordinate rate; (b) by working hard to insure that all the footnotes in this issue are correct, and thereby enhancing their
chances for good post-graduation jobs in a declining young lawyer's economy, rather than manning the battlements on behalf
of prisoners currently being tortured in Argentina; or (c) by telling the author of this Article that he may not violate the canons
of proper law review style and content by introducing issues of
this sort?"
We would all, I imagine, be quite hasty to say that these sentences,
despite any partial truths they might contain, are on balance a bit
preposterous.
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But why is it that they strike us as preposterous? Because they
violate our sensibilities as to what is proper in connection with this
Article? Or because they raise some issues that we would really
prefer not be raised? I am sure that the latter is predominantly the
case. That is to point to the limitations of our own existential conditions that cause us not to be saints or to take vows of poverty or even
to seriously challenge the fundamental power relationships and evils
of our own era. Yet, is it not a little odd that we should be so ready
to castigate the past, that we should be, on the one hand, so certain
that it is quite sensible and proper to judge the past, but on the
other hand, so unwilling to believe that our own actions should
receive equivalent moral attention?
Our Whiggery consists thus in our certainty that it is fine to
hand down moral judgments about an antebellum nineteenthcentury southern low from a late-twentieth-century American high.
But that suggests the ethical rub. When we pass adverse judgments
upon nineteenth-century Americans who actively or passively accepted slavery, we are able to do so in large measure because by the
mid-nineteenth-century the great preponderance of opinion in the
Atlantic community of nations condemned the institution and because, sharing those sentiments, we join in condemning places and
persons that lagged in their moral awakenment. Are we equally
prepared to join the great preponderance of late-twentieth-century
opinion in the Third World that our current national way of life,
consuming thirty to forty percent of the world's resources, constitutes iniquitous collaboration in a brutal exploitation of a small and
finite planet, in taking for ourselves far too much of what should be
shared among all nations and all humans fairly? The plain fact, I
submit, is that most of us do not have trouble sleeping at night
because two billion human beings live out lives of desperate poverty,
or because American national power is so supine with respect to a
world-wide human condition that in some ways is at least as iniquitous as was the peculiar institution. Our moral indifference is, I
suggest, not very different from the moral attitudes of most preCivil War white southerners. Quite possibly, a century from now
historians will write of us as "collaborators" in an international
system shot through with wrong and brutality. Are we prepared to
concede in advance that such Whiggish historiography of the
twenty-first century will thereby have understood our present, and
that century's past-and will thereby have understood us?

